

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

VOLUME 50, PART 185, MAY 1956

SIX THEORIES ABOUT APPARITIONS

A Co-operative Report by Professor Hornell Hart
and associated collaborators in the International
Project for Research on ESP Projection¹

PART I

SOME STATISTICAL FACTS ABOUT APPARITIONS

The Initial Working Hypothesis. The International Project for Research on ESP Projection, which emerged out of the Utrecht Conference of Parapsychological Studies, has found itself confronted with the necessity for exploring the interrelations between the phenomena of ESP projection and the leading theories about apparitions. Two reasons for exploring ESP projection are outstanding. First, this type of phenomenon (if its characteristics can be verifiably established) has crucial significance in its bearing upon the nature of psi, the essentials of human personality, and some of the most fundamental problems of philosophy. Second, ESP projection may have decisive bearing upon the problem of the survival of personality beyond bodily death.

On the survival problem, the possible significance of ESP projection may be stated quite simply in terms which can be reduced to the following hypothetical propositions :

1. That full-fledged ESP projection consists in a conscious apparition of a living person, within which the projected personality carries full memories and purposes, and from which, on returning to his physical body, this personality carries back the full memory of the observations and operations performed while projected.

2. That these conscious projections of living persons are in most respects essentially indistinguishable from apparitions of the dying, of those who have been dead for periods up to a few

¹ This Project was made possible by financial grants from the Parapsychology Foundation and from Mr Charles E. Ozanne.

hours, and those who have been dead for days, months, or years.

3. That since this is the case, some of the most frequent types of apparitions of the dead presumably carry with them the memories and purposes of the personalities which they represent, and thus constitute evidence of survival of personality beyond bodily death.

Testing the Hypothesis. At first, the Project started out to explore the above hypothesis by means of qualitative studies of ESP-projection cases. But since the hypothesis involves the relation between apparitions of the living and apparitions of the dead, it soon became obvious that previous theories about apparitions needed to be considered. A preliminary analysis of such theories was made, and mimeographed copies of a tentative draft of an article were mailed out on 23 February, 1954, under the title 'Four Theories about Apparitions'. A number of the collaborators in the Project responded with constructive criticisms.¹ On 23 April an intermediate revision was mailed to the collaborators. In those preliminary versions of this study, the major previous collections and qualitative analyses of instances of apparitions were reviewed and developed, in the light of correspondence between collaborators in the International Project.

Collaborators Challenged Earlier Studies. Those qualitative analyses, however, have been challenged by various collaborators in the Project—particularly by C. W. K. Mundle, W. H. Salter, C. D. Broad, and J. H. M. Whiteman. The questions which they have raised call, obviously, for the development of these qualitative case studies into quantitative, statistical analyses. The basic question, whether conscious apparitions of the living are indeed of the same fundamental character as apparitions of the dying and the dead, is one which can be decided statistically only by defining clearly the traits of apparitions, collecting reliably described cases, with specific enumeration of these traits, and then applying the laws of probability to determine whether the collections of apparitions of the dead are or are not such as might have been drawn from the same universe as conscious apparitions of the living.

Since the comparative analysis and discussion of alternative theories about apparitions can be conducted intelligently only in the light of systematic factual evidence, it has been decided to divide the revised study into two parts, the first presenting the results of a new statistical analysis of 165 cases of reported apparitions.

¹ Among those who sent in suggestions were C. D. Broad, Wm. Edward Cox, Jr., C. J. Ducasse, Raynor C. Johnson, G. W. Lambert, C. W. K. Mundle, Gardner Murphy, Karlis Osis, H. H. Price, William G. Roll, W. H. Salter, Robert Thouless, and J. H. M. Whiteman.

tions, while the second reviews the alternative theories in the light of this statistical evidence.

STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF FIVE TYPES OF APPARITIONS

Classification into Five Types. For purposes of this investigation, five types have been designated: (1) apparitions of persons who have been dead for twelve hours or longer; (2) apparitions of persons who have been dead for periods up to but not including twelve hours; (3) apparitions perceived at the moment of death, or so close to it that no departure from that moment has been established; (4) apparitions of the living in cases where evidence has been presented that the appearer brought back fairly clear memory of his observations and operations during his projection; and (5) apparitions of the living, where no satisfactory evidence is available that the appearer carried back clear memory—or in which evidence seems clear that he did *not* carry back such memory.

A detailed classification, analysis and comparison of 165 evidential cases of apparitions belonging to these five types is presented in Tables I to V. Two preliminary points need to be explained before dealing with the tables themselves—first, as to the methods by which the cases were selected, and, second, the methods by which the traits to be tabulated were selected.

As to Selection of Cases. The endeavour has been to approach as nearly as practicable an exhaustive collection of cases fulfilling the following criteria:

1. They must be cases of purported visual¹ apparitions of the living, the dying, or the dead. A supplementary collection of evidential ESP projections of the living, where the projected person was not perceived as an apparition, provides part of the data of Table V.

2. They must be evidential—at least to the extent that a written or oral report of the experience is reported to have been made, or evidential action taken as a result of the experience, before the verifying information was received.²

¹ The Newnham apparition was perceived tactually and auditorially, not visually, but the appearer's projection experience was visual, as well as tactual, auditory, and motor.

² That the traits of evidential cases should be compared with those of non-veridical hallucinations—of the delirious, the intoxicated, and the psychotic—has been pointed out by Karlis Osis, in a letter to Hornell Hart, dated 17 May 1954. This is a pertinent and important suggestion, which should be carried out as soon as the necessary data—and time—become available.

3. The apparition must have been seen while the percipient was awake, or in a trance; ordinary dreams, even though evidential, are not included.

In order to make as full a collection of this sort as practicable, the chief earlier collections of such cases have been studied, and attempts have been made to locate cases in all promising books to which access could be secured. The works from which cases were obtained are listed in a bibliography at the close of Part I of this paper. While it is obvious that not all published cases fulfilling the above specifications have been located, the omissions have been due to ignorance and lack of time, rather than to any conscious bias.

In this connection, Gardner Murphy points out (in a letter dated 3 August, 1954) that 'the conditions which led to the original funneling of these reports into the literature are largely unknown.' We do know, of course, the purposes announced in the S.P.R. 'censuses of hallucinations', and in other collections of cases by psychical research societies. Readers of Flammarion's books (from which many of the less evidential cases in this collection were drawn) become familiar with his orientation, and with the sentiments which he quotes from the letters of those who sent the cases to him. It seems safe to assume that the motivation of the recorders of cases in this collection varied from quite rigorous and sceptical scientific curiosity to enthusiastic interest in and conviction about survival as believed by spiritualists. The endeavour in the present study has been to employ methods of analysis which exclude literary and credulous ghost stories, and which would test the evidential reliability of the reports.

As to Selection of Traits to be Tabulated. The basic list of traits was derived from G. N. M. Tyrrell's lecture *Apparitions*, delivered in 1942. He itemized 13 characteristics in which 'the perfect apparition' resembles a normal human being, and six points of difference, based on appropriate cases from among the 61 listed in the revised edition of his lecture.¹ This list was supplemented (in early drafts of the present study) by traits derived from the Harts' study of collective and reciprocal apparitions, which was based on a total of 79 cases.² The list of traits derived from these

¹ G. N. M. Tyrrell, *Apparitions*: The Seventh Frederic W. H. Myers Memorial Lecture, with a preface by H. H. Price, revised edition, Duckworth, 1953. Tyrrell's enumeration of observed characteristics of apparitions occurs primarily on pp. 60-6 and 77-80. The list of supporting cases is on pp. 169-70.

² Hornell and Ella B. Hart, 'Visions and Apparitions Collectively and Reciprocally Perceived,' *Proc. S.P.R.*, 41, 1933, 205-49.

sources has been supplemented and revised as seemed indicated from analysis of the 165 cases dealt with in the present study. The endeavour has been to list every frequently recurring trait, as well as all traits to which special attention has been called in previous studies.

The Evidentiality Ratings. The purpose of these ratings was not to exclude non-evidential cases—that has been taken care of as specified above. The ratings are merely for the purpose of giving as accurate a measure as feasible of the relative success which various case reporters and investigators demonstrated in presenting proofs that the alleged evidentiality is dependable. A brief history of the development of these ratings may help to clarify this point.

The International Project for Research on ESP Projection attempted to collect as nearly as feasible an exhaustive list of pertinent cases. A search of the literature produced 288 published cases of purported ESP projection. However, a majority of these were entirely anecdotal, presenting no significant evidence of any objective confirmation or veridicality in the reported experiences. In order to sift down these cases, to arrange them in order of evidential value, and to ascertain objectively what evidential status ESP projection had attained, it seemed desirable to develop a rating device to measure the degree of evidentiality in such case reports.

The scale developed rules out at the start all cases which do not at least assert that the individual who had the psychic experience reported its details before receiving evidence of their veridicality. Only 99 of the 288 published cases survived that test. The next step was to devise ratings to measure, at least approximately, the degree to which the case record presented evidence substantiating the claim to evidentiality. The rating device attempted to secure a record of answers to five questions: (1) What written or oral testimony was given as to evidential details before confirmation had been secured? (2) What confirmation was secured later as to the correctness of these evidential details? (3) What investigation of the case was made by a competent and independent researcher? (4) How full a documented record was made of the case? and (5) What time interval elapsed between the evidential events and the making of a written report? Mimeographed copies of the detailed instructions for such ratings are available.

Of course, any such ratings depend to a considerable extent upon subjective judgments. The reliability of the evidentiality scores in test groups of cases has been measured by correlating ratings made by the present author with ratings by Mrs A. S.

Kaplan and by Mrs Laura Dale. From these data it is estimated that the ratings given in the five tables of this report would correlate .95 with the pooled ratings of an indefinitely large group of judges similar to the three of us, and that the average rating by such a group would be lower by about .05 than those made by Hart.

The evidentiality scores range (theoretically) from 1.00 to .00. Various policies might be adopted as to the inclusion or exclusion of cases. For example, some researchers may prefer to throw out any case which rates below .50. But in the present study, the *exclusion* of cases was based on the considerations stated before the rating technique was described. For our purposes, if a case rated .01, it would be used. That .01 rating would mean simply that the people who reported and published the case asserted that it had evidential factors which were reported in writing or orally before confirmation—but that they have done little or nothing to *prove* that such was the case. One of the objectives of the present study is to compare the cases with high and low evidentiality scores, and to get statistical evidence as to the significance of this factor, under the definitions used in this study.

The Primary Data. As a result of this analysis, the findings having the most direct bearing on the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this article are summarized in Table I.

FOUR REPRESENTATIVE APPARITIONS OF PERSONS DEAD 12 HOURS OR MORE¹

Before discussing the details of Table I, the meaning of the statistics may be made clearer by summarizing briefly four representative cases of apparitions of persons dead twelve hours or more, and four representative cases of conscious apparitions of the living. In these summaries, the evidential details will not be developed; the evidentiality score merely will be given.

1. *Wheatcroft* (evidentiality .34): In September 1857, Captain Wheatcroft left for India to rejoin his regiment, leaving his wife behind in Cambridge, England. Towards the morning of 15 November she dreamed that she saw her husband ill and anxious. She immediately awoke (23)² with her mind much excited. It was bright moonlight, and as she opened her eyes she saw her husband (4, 18) standing beside her bed (7, 21). He was dressed in uniform (5), his hands were pressed

¹ Sources of these and other cases cited in this article will be found in the alphabetical index at the end.

² These numbers in parentheses refer to the characteristics listed in Table I.

TABLE I

CONSCIOUS APPARITIONS OF THE LIVING VERSUS APPARITIONS OF THE DYING AND THE DEAD : PERCENTAGE FREQUENCIES OF BASIC TRAITS AS REPORTED BY PERCIPIENTS

Traits	Apparitions of the Dead or Dying (D)	Apparitions of Living Persons who Remember being Projected (L)	Difference (L-D)
Number of Cases - - - - -	104	25	-
<i>Traits Like Those of Ordinary People :</i>			
1. Full figure (rather than mere face, head, or bust) - -	93	100	7
2. Described as 'solid,' 'real,' or the like - - - -	23	12	-11
3. Details indicated as being vivid - - - - -	39	24	-15
4. Recognized—either when seen or later from a photograph or description - - - - -	85	88	3
5. Case record mentions that the apparition was dressed in ordinary or usual clothing - - - - -	35	24	-11
6. Make normal movements with feet, hands, arms, head, eyes, lips, etc. - - - - -	35	28	-7
7. Make adjustments to the physical surroundings in which they appear, as by passing through doorways and passages, sitting in chairs, walking up or down stairways, approaching a bed, etc. - - - - -	64	80	16
8. Make adjustments to physically embodied persons, as by looking at, avoiding, approaching, smiling at, responding to actions of, etc. - - - - -	61	72	11
9. Speak one or two sentences - - - - -	13	8	-5
10. Speak three or more sentences - - - - -	14	16	2
11. Seen collectively by two or more persons at the same time - - - - -	10	16	6
12. Seen repeatedly - - - - -	12	0	-12
<i>Traits Different From Those of Normal People :</i>			
13. Appear at a distance from the physical body represented - -	100	100	0
14. Appear or disappear suddenly and inexplicably - - - -	38	24	-14
15. Invisible to one or more persons present, who would have seen them if a normal person instead of an apparition had been there - - - - -	14	12	-2
16. Disappear completely within approximately 30 minutes or less - - - - -	100	100	0
17. Convey veridical information about other facts than own death - - - - -	8	21	13
<i>Conditions Seemingly Favourable to Occurrence of Apparitions :</i>			
18. Have some definite emotional bond with the particular house or location in which the appearance occurs - -	18	24	6
19. Appear to some person with whom the appearer has some strong emotional bond—such as husband, wife, betrothed, parent, child, close friend, or beloved relative - - - - -	78	92	14
20. Appear at a time of crisis (other than the appearer's own actual death) - - - - -	11	20	9
21. Show special concern, in other ways, for loved ones - -	21	32	11
22. Percipient in bed (but awake) - - - - -	48	52	4
23. Percipient just woke up - - - - -	26	16	-10

SOURCE : The cases on which this table is based are listed at the end of the article. The apparitions of the dead and the dying include groups A, B and C in Table II, whose sources are there itemized; the apparitions of the living include all the cases in group E in the same table.

against his breast, his hair was in disorder, and his face pale. His great black eyes looked at her fixedly (8) and his mouth was contracted. She saw him, in all particulars of his clothing, as distinctly (3) as she had ever seen him during her whole life. He seemed to lean forward with an air of suffering, and he made an effort to speak, but did not utter a sound. This apparition lasted about a minute, then it vanished (14, 16).

Next morning she told this to her mother and expressed the belief that her husband was either killed or dangerously wounded. Weeks later she received evidence that her husband had been killed at Lucknow on the afternoon of 14 November, about 18 hours before she saw this apparition.

2. *John E. Husbands* (evidentiality .48): Husbands wrote a letter dated 15 September, 1886, stating that while sleeping in a hotel in Madeira early in 1885 [later ascertained to be after 2 February, 1885] on a bright moonlight night, with the windows open and the blinds up, he felt someone was in his room. On opening his eyes (23) he saw a young fellow about 25, dressed in flannels (5) standing at the side of his bed (7) and pointing the first finger of his right hand to the place in which Husbands was lying (8). Husbands lay still for some seconds, then sat up and looked at the man. He saw his features so plainly that he recognized them in a photograph which was shown him some days later (4). Husbands asked the apparition what he wanted; the apparition did not speak, but his eyes and hands seemed to tell Husbands that he was occupying the apparition's place (17). As the apparition did not answer, Husbands struck out at him with his fist, but did not reach him. As Husbands was going to spring out of bed, the apparition slowly vanished through the door, which was shut (14), keeping his eyes upon Husbands all the time (8).

On 8 October, 1886, K. Falkner wrote that the figure Mr Husbands saw was that of a young fellow who had died unexpectedly some months previously [29 January, 1884] in the room which Mr Husbands was occupying (17). Husbands had never heard of the man or of his death.

3. *Miss L. Dodson* (evidentiality .25): On 14 September, 1891, Lucy Dodson wrote a letter stating that on 5 June, 1887, between 11 and 12 at night, being awake (22), she heard her name called. She answered twice, thinking it was her uncle (with whom she lived), but the third time she recognized the voice as that of her mother who had been dead sixteen years. Lucy said, 'Mama!' (4). The apparition then came round a screen near Lucy's bedside (7) with two children in her arms, later described by Lucy as a little girl and a baby newly born. The apparition placed the children in Lucy's arms (8) and put the bedclothes over them (6), saying, 'Lucy, promise to take care of them for their mother is just dead' (17, 21). Lucy said, 'Yes, Mama.' The apparition repeated, 'Promise me to take care of them.' Lucy replied, 'Yes, I promise you,' and added, 'Oh, Mama, stay, stay and speak to me, I am

so wretched.' She replied, 'Not yet, my child' (10). Then she seemed to go round the screen again (7) and Lucy remained, feeling the children still in her arms, and fell asleep. When she woke, there was nothing there (16).

Lucy stated that she mentioned the circumstance to her uncle the next morning, but that he thought she was 'sickenning for brain fever.' (The uncle died before the case was investigated.)

The morning of 7 June, Lucy received word that her sister-in-law had died on 5 June. She later learned that the death took place about nine o'clock in the evening—that is, about two or three hours before the apparition (20).

Lucy's mother, on her death bed in 1871, had specially charged her (19)—and she had promised—to take care of the other children, especially her brother who was then five years old. The brother married in April 1885, and she had not seen him since, though she had heard of the birth of his first child, a little girl, in January 1886. She had never seen her brother's wife or heard of the birth of the second child.

In response to subsequent inquiries, Lucy said that when her mother spoke about the two children and their mother having just died, she had no idea that this referred to her sister-in-law; she was at a total loss to imagine who the children were (17).

4. *C.S.B.* (case 9; evidentiality ·19): The narrator stated that one July morning, in the year 1873, as she opened her eyes from sleep, about 3 a.m. (22, 23), she saw the figure of a woman, stooping down and apparently looking at her (8). The woman's head and shoulders were wrapped in a common gray woollen shawl (5). Her arms were folded, and they were also wrapped, as if for warmth, in the shawl. The percipient looked at the woman in horror and was afraid to cry out. After a time whose duration the percipient could not judge, the apparition raised herself (6) and went backward towards the window (7), stood at the table, and gradually vanished—i.e., grew by degrees transparent (14, 16). The reporter stated that she was ready to take an oath that she did not mention the circumstance to either her brother or the servant.

Exactly a fortnight later, the percipient noticed that her brother was out of sorts at breakfast time. The brother stated that early in the morning he had seen, as distinctly as he saw his sister, a villainous-looking old hag, with her head and arms wrapped up in a cloak (5), stooping over him (8). The first percipient then said that she had seen the same thing (4) a fortnight previously.

About four years later, a boy of four or five years of age, left alone in the drawing room of the house (18), came out pale and trembling, and said to the narrator's sister, 'Who is that old woman that went upstairs?' The sister tried to convince him that there was no old woman, and though they searched every room in the house the child still maintained that the old woman did go upstairs (7, 16).

FOUR CONSCIOUS APPARITIONS OF THE LIVING

The first case cited in this group is one of the most quoted in the literature, but the reference numbers in the following summary may help to bring out illustrations of the data in Table I.

5. *Wilmot* (evidentiality .22) : On 3 October, 1863, Mr S. R. Wilmot sailed from Liverpool for New York, on the steamer *City of Limerick*. His wife and children were in Watertown, Conn. Towards morning on the night of Tuesday, 13 October, he dreamed (23)¹ that he saw his wife (4, 19) come to the door of the stateroom (7) clad in her nightdress (5). At the door she seemed to discover that her husband was not the only occupant of the room (8), hesitated a little, then advanced to his side (8), stooped down (6), kissed him, and after caressing him for a few moments, quietly withdrew (16). In the morning it developed that Wilmot's fellow passenger (whose berth was above his but set farther back) had, while awake (22) seen a lady enter and act (6) in a manner corresponding exactly with Wilmot's dream of his wife's visit.

The wife did not meet the steamer at New York. Almost her first question, when they were alone together in Watertown, was, 'Did you receive a visit from me a week ago Tuesday?' 'A visit from you?' Wilmot asked; 'we were more than a thousand miles at sea.' His wife then told him that she had been worried (21) about him on account of the going ashore of another ship, the *Africa*. On Tuesday night she had lain awake thinking of him (21), and about four o'clock in the morning it seemed to her that she went out to seek him. Crossing the stormy sea, she came to a steamship. Descending into the cabin, she passed through it to the stern until she came to his stateroom (7). (Although she had never seen the ship, she described it correctly in every particular.) She noted the upper berth, set back farther than the lower. In it she saw a man looking at her, and for a moment was afraid, but soon went up to the side of his berth, bent down and kissed her husband, embraced him (6, 8, 21), and then went away.

6. *Goffe* (A case over 250 years old, but with an evidentiality rating of .24) : On 4 June, 1691, Mrs John Goffe died in her father's house in West Malling, England. On the day *before* her death (20), Mrs Goffe grew very impatiently desirous to see her two children who had been left in charge of a nurse at home in Rochester, nine miles away. She insisted that even though she was too ill to sit up on horseback, she would 'lie all along the horse,' so intense was her longing to see the children before her death (21).

Between one and two o'clock the next morning she fell into a trance. The next morning this dying woman told her mother that she had been at home with her children during her sleep.

¹ In this case, the husband reported that he was dreaming. But note that (a) the dream was located in the stateroom where he was sleeping; (b) he observed the same things as the other percipient, who was awake; and (c) the appearer reported herself as having been awake.

The nurse at Rochester, a Mrs Alexander, said that she would 'take her oath on't before a magistrate, and receive the sacrament upon it' that a little before two o'clock that morning she saw the likeness of Mrs Goffe (4) come out of the adjoining room (7) (where the older of the two children (8) was sleeping) and stand by the side of the bed (7) where the younger child (8) was sleeping with the nurse (8). The eyes and mouth of the apparition moved (6), but she said nothing. The nurse said that she was wide awake (22); that she sat up in bed and spoke to the apparition, whereupon it went away. She slipped on her clothes and followed, but could not tell what became of it (14, 16). She then became so frightened that she walked up and down until she was able to rouse some neighbours at six o'clock. She told them that if ever she had seen Mrs Goffe, she saw her (2) on this night.

7. *Oliver Fox* (evidentiality ·11): In the summer of 1905 Fox had a sweetheart with whom he discussed problems of ESP projection. In response to his scepticism about her ability to project, she agreed to appear in his home on the night after they had been discussing the matter.

Fox went to bed late and very tired. Sometime in the night, while it was still dark, he woke (23)—but he states that it was 'the False Awakening'. He could hear the clock ticking and dimly see the objects in the room. He lay on the left side of his double bed, waiting.

Suddenly there appeared a large egg-shaped cloud of intensely brilliant bluish-white light. In the middle was Elsie (4), hair loose, and in her nightdress (5). She seemed perfectly solid (2) as she stood by a chest of drawers (7) near the right side of his bed. Thus she remained, regarded him with calm but sorrowful eyes (8), and rubbed her fingers along the top and front side of a desk which stood on the drawers (6, 7). She did not speak.

For what seemed to be some seconds, he could not move or utter a word. At last he rose on one elbow and called her name. Thereupon she vanished as suddenly as she had come (14).

The following morning, when they met, Fox found Elsie very excited and triumphant. 'I did come to you!' she greeted him. 'I really did. I went to sleep, willing that I would, and all at once I was *there!* This morning I knew just how everything was in your room, but I've been forgetting all day—it's been slipping away.' She thereupon described in detail six particulars about the room which proved to be exactly correct (17).

8. *Jensen* (evidentiality ·03): Mr J. S. Jensen, a publisher of Copenhagen, and his wife, reported the following case in 1931. Some years previously they lived on the isle of Hornholm. One night when he was away on one of his commercial journeys, his wife was awakened and much terrified by a thunderstorm, and had an intense desire to get into communication with her husband (19, 21). Suddenly she had a vision of him going along an alley and entering a house she did not know; thence going into one of the rooms there. She watched him

undress and go to bed and was a little angry because he forgot to use a certain ointment she had given him to put on his face. She then went to sleep. Next day she wrote a letter to her husband, addressed to Copenhagen, telling all about this experience.

On the evening of the vision, Mr Jensen had been in the little Danish town of Randers, where his wife had never been. After a little walk down an alley in the evening he returned to his hotel and went to bed (22). Suddenly (14) he saw the figure of his wife (19) standing before his bed (7). She was clad as usual (5) but seemed to look much younger, as if she was glorified. Next day he sent a telegram home with his exact address, but without mentioning his vision. His wife's letter was then sent on to him. Her description of the alley and the house was entirely adequate to the hotel in which he was staying in Randers and its surroundings.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FIVE TYPES PROVE TO BE HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT

Point 2 of the Hypothesis—that Apparitions of the Dead are Basically Similar to those of the Living—is Substantiated by these Data. The cases just cited may serve to give a clearer picture of ways in which the traits listed in Table I are actually combined in specific cases. They may also help to make clear the fact which stands out from the data of this table—namely, that conscious apparitions of the living are basically similar (with respect to the great majority of these 23 traits) to apparitions of individuals who have been dead 12 hours or longer. The differences between the percentages in the samples (as shown in the last column of the table) are relatively small. The criterion for the chance occurrence of such differences consists in the critical ratio. The largest critical ratio for any one of the 23 differences is that for trait No. 12—namely, 1.79. In a normal distribution, such as would result from purely random sampling, more than 7 per cent of the critical ratios of the differences between percentages would exceed 1.79. The percentage differences in these two types of apparitions, therefore, do not tend to exceed what would be expected to occur if the two samples were drawn from the same universe. The conclusion would seem to be clear (on a *prima facie* basis) that apparitions of the dead are basically similar in character to apparitions of the living—at least in most of these 23 particulars.¹ But since this is so, the conclusion would seem to be a natural one that

¹ Additional cases of conscious apparitions of the living are needed to narrow the confidence intervals, and such additional cases are likely to call for minor (but not major) modifications in interpreting the data.

apparitions of the dead, like these conscious apparitions of the living, may be vehicles within which the conscious personalities of the individuals represented go on with their past loves, hopes, and interests, carrying with them memories of the past, and purposes for the future, and using these apparitions as vehicles for observation and operation. In a word, this comparison would seem to strengthen the hypothesis of the survival of personality beyond bodily death.

DIFFERENTIAE OF FIVE APPARITIONAL TYPES

The comparison set forth in Table I is between one of the five categories of apparitions listed on page 155, in contrast with a combination of three others. In general, all the five classes show remarkable similarities in the percentage frequencies of the various traits. But each of the five types does differ from the combination of the other four with respect to the frequencies of a few of the characteristics listed in Table I. Each of the contrasts shown in Table II is greater than would be expected to occur by chance once in 100 investigations of this sort.

Apparitions of persons dead more than 12 hours include more haunts than do the other four categories. That means that the proportion of cases in which an emotional linkage with a house or location is evident is significantly larger—four times as large, in fact—as in the combination of the other four types. It also means that the proportion involving emotional linkages with percipients is significantly smaller. Fewer apparitions of those long dead are recognized, and more of them are seen repeatedly.

Of apparitions of persons dead less than 12 hours, about three times as large a proportion give evidence about their own death as in the combination of the other four types.

Of persons at or very near the point of death, the proportion giving evidence of the appearer's death is also significantly high. In contrast with apparitions of the long-dead, these at-the-moment cases have only one-twentieth as large a proportion of linkages with locations.

Among apparitions of living persons giving no clear evidence that they remember their projections, the proportion appearing in conjunction with crises other than the appearer's actual death is significantly large. The majority of these crises consist in the fatal illness of the appearer. Also, this type of apparition shows an apparently significant tendency to be perceived collectively more than are the other types.

TABLE II

DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF FIVE DIFFERENT TYPES OF APPARITIONS :
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS

Types of Apparitions and Their Distinctive Traits	Among Apparitions		
	Of the Designated Type	Of Other Types	Difference (2)-(3)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Of Persons Dead 12 Hours or Longer (38 cases) :			
1. Having an emotional bond with the location - - - - -	42	10	32 ²
2. Having an emotional bond with the percipient - - - - -	50	93	-43 ²
3. Being recognized - - - - -	60	95	-35 ²
4. Being seen repeatedly - - - - -	26	8	18 ²
B. Of Persons Dead Less than 12 Hours (22 cases) :			
5. Giving evidence of the death of the appearer - - - - -	59	19	40 ²
C. Of Persons at or Very Near the Point of Death (44 cases) :			
6. Giving evidence of the death of the appearer - - - - -	45	18	27 ²
7. Having an emotional bond with the location - - - - -	1	23	-22 ¹
D. Of Living Persons, Without Clear Evidence of Full Memory Afterward (36 cases) :			
8. Occurring at a crisis other than the appearer's actual death - - -	33	13	20
9. Collectively perceived - - - - -	31	12	19 ¹
10. Appearer reported to have been directing special attention toward percipient - - - - -	69	8 ²	61 ²
E. Of Living Persons, With Evidence of Fairly Full Memory Afterward (25 cases) :			
11. Appearer dreaming, or in a trance, at time of projection - - - - -	40	0	40 ²
12. Appearer reported to have been directing special attention toward percipient - - - - -	40	8 ²	32 ²

¹ Would occur by chance, in random sampling, between once in 100 and once in 1,000 times.

² Would occur by chance, in random sampling, less than once in 1,000 times.

³ Comparison here is with apparitions of the dead and the dying.

SOURCE : A list of cases, with source references, is given at the end of this article. In the present table, the groups consist, respectively, of the cases numbered as follows :

Group A : 4, 9, 17, 27, 30, 33, 35, 36, 42, 43, 48, 49, 55, 57, 61, 68, 69, 74, 79, 81, 82, 87, 106, 110, 114, 117, 121, 128, 131, 135, 153, 159, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173 and 180.

Apparitions of living persons who bring back fairly full memories of their projections have a characteristic not appropriate to the other four types—namely, that of occurring in conjunction with a dream or trance by the appearer. Another outstandingly significant characteristic of these conscious apparitions of the living is that 40 per cent of them are reported to have coincided with special direction of attention by the appearer towards the percipient. Indeed, of the 25 cases of conscious apparitions of the living, 22 involved either special concern for loved ones, or dreaming about the percipient, or some other direction of attention towards the percipient by the appearer. This may be highly important. If apparitions of the dead and the dying are essentially the same sort of phenomenon as are conscious apparitions of the living, and if conscious apparitions of the living involve almost always a definite direction of attention by the appearer towards the percipient, does this not strengthen the hypothesis that apparitions of the dead do frequently involve actual directions of attention by surviving personalities towards the loved ones who perceive their apparitions?

SOME LESS FREQUENT CHARACTERISTICS OF APPARITIONS

The apparitional characteristics listed in Tables I and II include all of those for which there are enough examples to justify comparing the percentage frequencies in the two samples. But a good many other purported traits of apparitions are listed in Tyrrell's study. That list was further developed in preliminary drafts of the present study. When actual cases were analysed and tabulated, however, these other traits were found to be reported relatively rarely. Table III lists these less frequent traits, showing also their percentage frequencies for the entire collection of 165 apparitional cases.

Group B: 1, 7, 22, 24, 34, 46, 60, 62, 64, 84, 88, 102, 127, 134, 138, 158, 160, 164, 169, 172, 176 and 178.

Group C: 8, 10, 14, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26, 28, 31, 32, 40, 47, 59, 66, 67, 75, 77, 85, 92, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 105, 107, 112, 116, 118, 119, 124, 130, 142, 145, 151, 154, 155, 170, 175, 177, 179 and 181.

Group D: 3, 5, 11, 12, 13, 16, 29, 44, 50, 53, 54, 70, 71, 76, 78, 83, 86, 90, 91, 98, 108, 109, 113, 122, 123, 129, 136, 137, 141, 144, 146, 147, 157, 161, 162 and 171.

Group E: 2, 6, 20, 37, 41, 52, 58, 63, 65, 72, 73, 80, 89, 94, 95, 111, 120, 125, 126, 139, 143, 152, 156, 163 and 174.

Each of the characteristics listed in Table 2 is included in Table 1. For example, Trait 1 here is the same as trait 18 in Table 1.

TABLE III

TRAITS OF APPARITIONS IN GENERAL, APPEARING IN 12 PER CENT OR LESS OF THE 165 CASES: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCIES

Trait	Per cent for Which Trait Is Reported		
	Dead or Dying (D)	Conscious Living (L)	All the Apparitions
Number of cases - - - - -	104	25	165
<i>Traits Like Those of Ordinary People :</i>			
1. Colour other than black or white mentioned - -	7	8	10
2. Clothing worn gave evidential details - - -	6	8	7
3. Perceived tactually as well as visually—as by the percipient being touched, kissed, grasped, etc. - -	8	20	11
4. Perceived audibly (other than through speech) as well as visually—for example, in the sound of footsteps, of doorknobs being turned, of garments rustling, of breathing, etc. - - - - -	14	16	12
5. Appear to move physical objects (as by opening or closing doors, moving draperies, etc.) - - -	8	8	7
<i>Traits Different From Those of Normal People :</i>			
6. Appear to pass through physical matter, as by entering or leaving through a closed or locked door, sinking through the floor, or passing through a solid wall - - - - -	6	4	5
7. Not solid—if one attempts to take hold of or to embrace the apparition, the percipient's hands or arms pass through them with little or no resistance - -	2	0	2
8. Transparent, wholly or in part - - - - -	2	0	2
9. Fade out (or, sometimes, become visible slowly) - -	8	8	8
10. Glide instead of walk - - - - -	4	0	2
11. Rise into the air without physical support - - -	1	0	1
12. Accompanied by a sensation of abnormal cold - -	3	0	2
13. Seen in supernatural ways, as when one sees someone behind one's back, or with details not normally visible - -	0	4	1
14. Self-luminous, surrounded with supernatural light, or completely white - - - - -	12	4	10
15. Apparently attempt to speak, but fail to do so - -	8	4	6
16. Surrounded by a cloud, fog, or veil - - - - -	1	0	1
17. Have precognitive or retrocognitive features - -	0	0	1
18. Communicate ideas without words, gestures or symbols - - - - -	4	0	2
19. Accompanied by other apparitions - - - - -	7	0	5
20. Have other accessories besides clothing and fellow apparitions - - - - -	5	4	6
<i>Traits Relating to Conditions Under Which Apparitions Occur :</i>			
21. Perceived by strangers - - - - -	14	8	10
22. Had made compact to make contact after death - -	7	0	4

Further Statistical Proof of the Likeness Between Apparitions of the Living and the Dead. In connection with Table I, it was pointed out that the differences between the percentage frequencies of the 22 traits among the conscious apparitions of the living and the apparitions of the dying and the dead have critical ratios which range well within the limits which would be expected in random samples drawn from the same statistical universe. This makes it statistically reasonable to assume that the two samples were such as might have been drawn from a common universe of apparitions in general, and that therefore apparitions of the dead are of the same basic character as conscious apparitions of the living—that is, of full-fledged ESP projections of the living.

For the comparisons in Table III, the statistical method used in relation to Table I is not applicable because the formulas do not apply to such small percentages. However, an even more fundamental statistical procedure is available. We can calculate the coefficient of correlation between the percentage frequencies of the 44 traits of apparitions which appear in Tables I and III (excluding the trait of having made a compact before death to appear after death, which obviously does not apply to apparitions of persons still alive). If the coefficient of correlation between the two sets of percentage frequencies is significantly high, that means that the percentage frequencies of one type could be predicted from the percentage frequencies of the other type, within a stated margin of error. The result of this procedure as applied to the data of Tables I and III combined is highly significant. The coefficient of determination between the two series of percentage frequencies is $\bar{r}^2 = .94$, with a Student's t of 26—a result which would not occur by chance even once in millions of times. Of the variance which occurs in the frequencies of traits of apparitions of the dead and the dying, 94 per cent is accounted for by the same factors which account for the variance of the frequencies of those same traits among conscious ESP projections of the living.

HOW DO THE MORE EVIDENTIAL CASES DIFFER FROM THE LESS EVIDENTIAL?

It is often assumed that accounts of psychic phenomena grow more marvellous as they are repeated from one reporter to another. In the course of the present investigation it has been possible to check this assumption by comparing the ratings on some re-written cases with the ratings on the original accounts. For example, the 'Physician' case, as summarized in Flammarion's

After Death, pages 143-5, rates .11 in evidentiality; but in the original from which he drew the case—Podmore's *Apparitions and Thought Transference*, pages 401-5, it rates .56. Similarly, the Mrs J. P. Smith case, as given by Flammarion, *After Death*, page 99, rates .36, whereas it rates .60 as given in the S.P.R. *Proceedings*, Vol. 10, pages 214-6. The Fytche case, as given by Flammarion in *Unknown*, pages 162-3, rates .01, whereas the account in *Phantasms*, Vol. II, pages 45-6, rates .08.

The above findings are in line with those reported by Walter Franklin Prince. He said :¹

The too general assumption is that a second-hand story, if it distorts any details, is bound to do so by their improvement, their exaggeration, in the direction of supernormality. But long experience in testing such matters shows that an authentic incident of this character is much more often than not improved after one has found the original percipient or a witness who was actually present. The second-hand narrator is very apt to have forgotten, or at least to have omitted, some of the chief evidential details.

Gardner Murphy, in his letter dated 3 August, 1954, commented as follows :

I think there may be some confusion about what happens to apparitions stories as they are retold. Surely they may lose authenticating detail, and yet at the same time grow more marvellous and impressive. I think that you and to some extent Prince imply that convincingness and impressiveness are the same thing. What is terribly impressive may owe its quality to the very elaborations which make it unconvincing to the careful critic.'

The point raised by Dr Murphy may be explored by a statistical procedure. For each of the cases cited above, an evidentiality rating has been given. These are based on the rating methods described earlier in this article (pages 5-7). Such ratings, when based on the judgment of only one rater (as in the present cases), have a considerable margin of error. When fairly large *groups* of cases are considered, however, it is safe to assume that the group with a high mean rating is more reliable, evidentially, than a group with a low mean.

Each of the 165 cases discussed in the present article has been rated. In Table IV, the cases with the highest ratings are compared with those with the lowest ratings. Each of the five groups of apparitional cases was divided into the higher and lower half, and then all the high halves were combined, and compared with the combination of all the low halves. For the traits reported in

¹ Walter Franklin Prince, *Human Experiences*, Boston Society for Psychical Research, 1931, pp. 109-10.

TABLE IV

COMPARISON OF HIGH-EVIDENTIALITY WITH LOW-EVIDENTIALITY APPARITIONAL CASES, WITH RESPECT TO PERCENTAGE FREQUENCIES OF TRAITS REPORTED IN MORE THAN 10 PER CENT OF ALL CASES

Number, as in Table I	Trait	High evidentiality	Low evidentiality	Difference
	Number of cases - - - - -	83	82	—
1	Full figure - - - - -	96	94	2
2	'Solid', 'real' - - - - -	22	26	-4
3	Details vivid - - - - -	40	29	11
4	Being recognized - - - - -	89	85	4
5	Ordinary clothing - - - - -	39	32	7
6	Normal movements - - - - -	26	39	-13
7	Adjust to objects - - - - -	72	58	14
8	Adjust to people - - - - -	64	60	4
9	Speak 1 or 2 sentences - - - - -	11	17	-6
10	Speak 3 or more sentences - - - - -	11	15	-4
11	Seen collectively - - - - -	11	21	-10
12	Seen repeatedly - - - - -	13	11	2
13	Distant from body - - - - -	100	100	0
14	Suddenly come or go - - - - -	32	41	-9
15	Invisible to some - - - - -	16	7	9
16	Disappearing soon - - - - -	100	100	0
17	Veridical information - - - - -	15	20	-5
18	Emotional bond to place - - - - -	20	15	5
19	Bond to percipient - - - - -	87	80	7
20	Crisis not own death - - - - -	21	13	8
21	Concern for loved ones - - - - -	21	16	5
22	In bed, but awake - - - - -	46	46	0
23	Just awoke - - - - -	24	21	3

SOURCE : The 'high evidentiality' cases are those numbered 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 26-31, 33-5, 40-2, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 53, 57-61, 64, 67-71, 73-6, 82-8, 91, 92, 94, 97, 100, 107, 108, 111, 112, 122-6, 128, 134, 136, 142, 145, 152, 156-8, 165-7, 169, 172-4, 177, 179 and 180. The other half of the cases are classed as 'low evidentiality'.

over 10 per cent of the cases, the percentage frequencies are as shown in Table IV.

If the non-evidential cases tended to embody impressive elaborations, these should show up in identifiable traits of the case accounts, and should be significantly more frequent in the less evidential cases. No such tendency has been observable. The largest difference found, as shown in Table IV, is 14 percentage points in item 7. According to the mathematics of probabilities, such a difference might be expected to occur oftener than once in 20 times, merely by random sampling. But since more than 20 differences are explored in this table, the distribution

here is just about what one might expect if the high-evidentiality and low-evidentiality groups had been mere random samples, drawn from the same universe. Stated in another way, the largest critical ratio for any difference in Table IV is 1.88 for trait 7. In a normal distribution of critical ratios, such as would be expected in comparing two samples drawn at random from the same universe, 6 per cent would be greater than 1.88. In other words, no evidence appears here that cases low in detailed authentication (at least, above the minimum threshold set in this investigation) differ significantly in reported characteristics from the cases in the upper half of the authentication range.

Another method of investigating this question is to work out the correlation between the percentage frequencies for the high-evidentiality group and the low-evidentiality group on the entire 45 traits listed in both Table IV and Table III. The coefficient of determination is found to be $\bar{r}^2 = .97$ ($t = 36$). In other words, 97 per cent of the variance in the low-evidentiality cases is accounted for by the factors which produce variance in the high-evidentiality cases. The differences in characteristics between the two groups are practically negligible.

IS IT LEGITIMATE TO APPLY STATISTICAL PROBABILITIES TO THESE APPARITIONAL CASES?

When a statistical comparison of types of apparitional cases was suggested to one of our collaborators, he pointed out certain logical difficulties. Have the apparitions of the living been collected and selected under conditions statistically comparable with those under which the apparitions of the dead have been collected and selected? Unless there is some assurance on that point, critics point out that any differences between the frequency of traits in the contrasted samples might arise from methods of selection rather than from inherent characteristics of the phenomena themselves, while, if the samples prove to be statistically indistinguishable, their apparent likeness might be spurious, because of actual differences which might have been masked by methods of collecting the data. These difficulties are frankly acknowledged by the collector of the data analysed in this article. But the essential fact must be recognized that these difficulties are not introduced by using statistical methods. The difficulties are all there, in even more serious forms, when merely qualitative comparisons are made, such as those presented by Tyrrell, by Salter, by the Harts, and by other previous investigators—and

even in the earlier statistical analyses made by the authors of *Phantasms of the Living*.

What we have done in the above analysis has been to present accurately described collections of cases of five basic types, to explore statistically the question whether or not these five samples are such as might have been drawn at random from the same universe, and then (when their basic similarity has thus been established) to invite critics to point out any ways in which the tentative conclusions reached might be invalidated by possible biases in the selection of the cases. If no plausible alternative hypotheses can be offered, then the present investigators may feel justified in maintaining that a *prima facie* case has been established, and that the findings of this study may be used as a basis for further research—unless and until someone comes forward with valid proof of alternative interpretations.

HOW IT FEELS TO BE AN APPARITION

If it be granted, even tentatively, that a *prima facie* case has been established for the generic similarity of apparitions of the dead to conscious apparitions of the living, then it becomes of special interest to explore the characteristics of the experiences reported by persons who have undergone conscious projection. The 25 cases of conscious apparitions of the living belong to this group. In addition, there are presently available 16 evidential cases of conscious ESP projection, in which there are no definite reports of the projected body being perceived as an apparition.

Tabulating the reported traits of the projection experiences in these 41 cases, and arranging them in the same three categories used in previous tables of the present article, we obtain the results shown in Table V. A highly pertinent query about that tabulation has been raised as follows, by Mr Mundle, in his letter of 4 August, 1954 :

In [an earlier version of the Apparitions study] your generalizations were given on the basis of an analysis of 99 evidential cases of ESP projection ; whereas in the latest paper you take into account only 25 cases of 'conscious apparitions' plus 16 similar cases, where, however, there are 'no definite reports of the projected body being perceived as an apparition' . . .

The 99 cases include the total analysed in the study of ESP projection published in the Fall number of the A.S.P.R. *Proceedings*. The present study is focused on a different approach—namely, apparitions. The following breakdown of the two collections of projection cases may help to clear up the matter somewhat :

TABLE V

TRAITS OF PROJECTION EXPERIENCES REPORTED IN 41 CASES : PERCENTAGE FREQUENCIES

Trait	Per cent Reporting
<i>Corresponding to the Apparitional Traits Which Are Like Those of Ordinary People :</i>	
1. Indications of awareness of having a projected body -	43
2. Moving the parts of that body - - - - -	24
3. Being perceived as an apparition - - - - -	62
4. Seeing oneself being seen as an apparition - - - - -	19
5. Observing physical objects in the location to which projected - - - - -	71
6. Observing physically embodied persons at that location -	74
7. Making adjustments to physical objects - - - - -	57
8. Making adjustments to physically embodied people -	62
9. Speaking - - - - -	12
10. Hearing words - - - - -	24
11. Hearing other sounds - - - - -	10
12. Reporting tactual contact - - - - -	12
<i>Corresponding to Apparitional Traits Which Are Different From Those of Ordinary People :</i>	
13. Being aware of leaving or re-entering one's own physical body - - - - -	19
14. Seeing one's physical body from a point completely outside it - - - - -	31
15. Travelling by directing one's attention - - - - -	17
16. Travelling without one's own volition - - - - -	7
17. Passing through space (or the upper air) - - - - -	12
18. Finding oneself suddenly at a distance - - - - -	19
19. Passing through solid matter - - - - -	10
20. Being unable to move matter - - - - -	5
21. Being independent of gravitation, as by rising or floating	14
22. Gliding instead of walking - - - - -	5
23. Communicating without words - - - - -	5
24. Supernormal vision - - - - -	2
25. Supernormal light or luminosity - - - - -	7
26. Precognitive or retrocognitive aspects - - - - -	2
27. Contact with non-physical persons - - - - -	21
28. Contact with non-physical regions - - - - -	5
<i>Conditions Seemingly Favourable to Conscious Projection :</i>	
29. Dreaming - - - - -	24
30. Self-inductive methods - - - - -	21
31. Spontaneous occurrence other than in dreams - - - - -	55
32. Cataleptic paralysis or related sensations - - - - -	14
33. Lying in bed - - - - -	67
34. Being linked emotionally with the percipient - - - - -	83
35. Being linked with the location at which appearance occurred - - - - -	7
36. Directing attention towards the percipient - - - - -	45
37. A death crisis (including fatal illness by the appearer) -	19
38. Other types of crisis - - - - -	26
39. Being concerned about loved ones - - - - -	36

SOURCE : The 41 cases analysed in this table consist of the 25 cases in Group E of Table II, plus cases numbered 19, 25, 38, 39, 45, 51, 56, 103, 104, 115, 132, 133, 140, 148, 149 and 150 in the list at the end of this article.

Types of Cases	Used Before			Used Now	
	Total	Included Now	Excluded Now	Added	Total
Hypnotic projections without apparitions - - - -	21	0	21	0	0
Conscious projections seen as apparitions - - - -	30	22	8	3	25
Apparitions of the living, without evidence of memory carried back - - - -	25	19	6	17	36
Projections not seen as apparitions	23	15	8	1	16
Totals - - - -	99	56	43	21	77

The hypnotic cases were excluded because this method very rarely (if at all) produces an apparition, and because the hypnotic subjects rarely report any details of the projection experiences other than the observations which they purportedly make at the scene to which the hypnotist has directed them to project. The other 22 exclusions are due to three factors. First, it is difficult at times to draw the line between visions and projections, and that line was drawn more severely in the present study, excluding half a dozen cases which might be regarded as visions. Second, some of these 22 cases involve purported projections by preliterate medicine men, and the experiences of the projectionists are not given with any detail useful for this study. Third, the evidentiality criterion was applied rather more rigorously, so as to exclude a few cases about which doubts might have been raised.

Four illustrations of conscious apparitions of the living have already been given on pages 162-7, but there they were annotated with reference to the traits reported by the percipients rather than by the persons projected. To illustrate the more frequent of the traits reported by the projected individuals themselves, the following cases are given, with numbers in parentheses to indicate points from Table V:

McBride (evidentiality 34). Walter E. McBride was a bachelor farmer whose address was Indian Springs, Indiana, Route 1. He stated that on 23 December, 1935 he had been wondering about his father during the entire day (36), and was under the impression that he might be ill (39). Shortly after retiring at about eight o'clock that evening, he reportedly found himself floating in the room (21), in a whitish light which cast no shadows (25). He says that he was wide awake at the time (31). He reportedly found that he was floating upwards through the building; the ceiling and floor failed to stop him (19). After reaching a certain height his body (1) turned vertical, and looking downwards he saw his physical body lying upon the bed (14).

Almost at once he realized that he was moving through the air (17) towards the north, and he seemed to know that he was going to his old home (35) several miles way. Passing through the walls (19) of his father's house he stood at the foot of the bed (7) in which he saw his father (34) reclining. His father's eyes were fixed upon him (4), and he seemed to be surprised, but he did not seem to hear when McBride spoke (9) to him. The knowledge came to him that his father was well (23) whereupon he found himself travelling (16) back to his bedroom, where he again saw his own body (14), still lying on the bed where he had left it. Upon re-entering (13) his physical self he was instantly alert, with no feeling of drowsiness. Throughout this projected excursion, McBride was aware of a presence, which he was unable to identify, but which he subsequently came to regard as a guide (27).

Immediately upon recovering possession of his physical body, McBride got up, made a light, and wrote down an account of what he had just experienced. Two days later, on Christmas Day, he visited his father, who verified his experience by saying he had seen McBride, just as he had stood at the foot of the bed. The father, moreover, had written down the time of his vision, and it tallied with the time written down previously by the excursionist.

Funk (evidentiality .03). Sometime before 1907, a well-known physician of New York City (who was known personally to I. K. Funk, the editor and publisher) was on a river steamer travelling from Jacksonville to Palatka, Florida. He had been having some curious sensations of numbness (32) and of psychological detachment for some days. During the night on the steamer he found that his feet and legs were becoming cold and sensationless (32). He then 'seemed to be walking in the air' (21) with intense sensations of exhilaration, freedom and clarity of mental vision. In this state he thought of a friend who was more than 1,000 miles distant (15). Within a minute he was conscious of standing in a room (7) where the gas jets were turned up, and the friend was standing with his back towards him. The friend turned suddenly, saw him (4) and said: 'What in the world are you doing here? I thought you were in Florida,' and he started to come towards the appearer. The appearer heard the words distinctly (10) but was unable to answer.

He then had an ecstatic experience of a life beyond the consciousness of time or space (28). But he decided to return to earth. He saw his body (14), propped up in bed as he had left it, but retained the consciousness of another body (1) to which matter of any kind offered no resistance (19). Then he re-entered his physical body (13).

On the next day he wrote a letter to the distant friend whom he had perceived in this excursion. A letter from the friend crossed his in the mail, stating that he had been distinctly conscious of the appearer's presence, and had made the exclamation which the appearer heard.

Newnham (evidentiality .48). In 1854, the Rev. P. H. Newnham, then a student at Oxford, had a 'singularly clear and vivid' dream (29) that he was stopping in the home of his fiancée's family. All the younger ones had gone to bed (6), and he stopped chatting to the father and

mother, standing by the fireplace (8, 9, 10). As he started for bed, in his dream, he perceived (6) his fiancée (34) near the top of the staircase. He rushed (2) after her, overtook her (8) on the top step (7), and passed his arms around her waist, (2, 8) under her arms, from behind. Although he was carrying his candle in his left hand when he ran upstairs, this did not, in his dream, interfere with this gesture. On this he woke, and a clock in the house struck ten almost immediately afterwards. He wrote a detailed account of this the next morning to his fiancée. Crossing his letter came one from the lady, telling that about ten o'clock on the night when the dream occurred, on reaching the landing of the stairs, on her way to bed, she heard his footsteps on the stairs and felt him put his arms around her waist.¹

These three cases (and the four presented earlier) fit in with the hypothesis that conscious ESP projections provide internal views of the phenomena observed externally in connection with apparitions of the living. Since such apparitions have been shown (at least tentatively) to be of the same basic nature as apparitions of the dying and the dead, these experiences may be regarded, provisionally, as conveying something of the nature of the experiences undergone at and (to a limited extent) after death.

Non-Physical Persons and Non-Physical Regions. In his exceedingly helpful letter of 4 August, 1954 Mr Mundle said: 'I suggest that, in Table V, items 24 to 28 require elucidation. . . . I don't understand at all what is meant by 27 and 28.' The reason for these entries is that many of the cases have the non-evidential characteristic of purported contact with individuals and regions which do not belong to the material world. In the Funk case the doctor, after appearing to his distant friend, and before he decided to return to earth, had an ecstatic experience of a life beyond the consciousness of time or space. In the Esther case the excursionist dreamed of seeing the spirit of her sister, who took her to California to view the sister's body, which had just died of cholera. In the Saile case the excursionist, during his first projection, heard a voice speaking to him: 'Do not be afraid. You do not need to worry—you will get back there again.' Subsequently, in another projection, he asked to be conducted to 'the place called heaven,' and at once purportedly found himself in a wonderful country where he reports that he talked to many of his friends who had died a long time previously. In the Larsen case the excursionist reported having observed the spirit of a drug addict leave his body for the last time. In the Brittain case the excursionist reported having become aware of the presence of her sister Sally, who had died six years before, and who guided her to the

¹ *Phantasms of the Living*, 1886, Vol. I, 225-6.

window where she made the evidential observations. Lady Doyle (Case 51) reported that during her projection she moved away to a region of light and calm, where she saw her deceased husband and another spirit. Such aspects of case reports are obviously non-evidential, but the phenomena would not be adequately or impartially described if these features were not mentioned frankly.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing constitutes Part I of an article on 'Six Theories about Apparitions.' The present instalment has sought to present the basic descriptive and statistical facts which this study has collected about apparitions. The discussion of the theories themselves will be taken up in Part II.

AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX TO APPARITIONAL AND ESP-PROJECTION CASES CITED IN THIS ARTICLE

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| 1. A, Mr E. ¹ '27; 29: 10, 223-4. ² | 24. Bowyer-Bower '39; 21: 9, 39-46. |
| 2. A, Mrs '09; 28, 345-7. | 25. Brittain '06; 4, 63-5. |
| 3. Addison '12; 25, 96. | 26. Brougham '48; 15, 395. |
| 4. Aindow '13; 1'5, 88-90. | 27. Bull '81; 21: 27, 297-303. |
| 5. Alexander '50; 15: 1, 214-16. | 28. Byers '42; 28'4, 79-81. |
| 6. Apsey '64; 16'5. | |
| 7. Arondel '20; 9'5, 154-5. | 29. Caldecott '48; 29: 10, 293-5. |
| 8. B, Miss L. '54; 29: 10, 213-14. | 30. Carriere '28; 9'5, 183-5. |
| 9. B, C. S. '19; 29: 2, 141-4. | 31. Carslake '81; 15, 216. |
| 10. Barford '24; 16, 520. | 32. Cass '30; 29: 10, 231-2. |
| 11. Beard 11/81 '14; 15, 104-6. | 33. Cavagnaro '24; 9'5, 265-6. |
| 12. Beard 12/82 '72; 15, 106-8. | 34. Cavalcante '50; 29: 33, 160-5. |
| 13. Beard 3/84 '72; 15, 108-9. | Cecilia (see Esther). |
| 14. Bee '54; 15, 218. | Charles (see Bourgeois). |
| 15. Belasco '11; 28'5, 150-1. | 35. Charlton '34; 20 (May 1908). |
| 16. Belcher '30; 29: 10, 237-8. | 36. Clarke '06; 28'3, 297-01. |
| 17. Beresford '38; 9'5, 202-3. | 37. Clergyman '08; 31, 59-60. |
| 18. Benecke '48; 29: 33, 183-9. | 38. Cockersell '01; 20: 31, 369. |
| 19. Bertrand '09; 28: 8, 194-200. | 39. Collins '01; 25, 100-1. |
| 20. Bevan '20; 15, 318-20. | 40. Collyer '60; 15, 204. |
| 21. Biliowsky '08; 9'8, 156-7. | 41. Correspondent '14; 31, 29-30. |
| 22. Bonnet '17; 9'8, 72-3. | 42. Coulay '39; 29: 8, 200. |
| Bouellier (see Arondel). | |
| 23. Bourgeois '08; 9'5, 122-3. | 43. Danovitch '13; 9'5, 252. |
| | 44. Danvers '81; 27: 1, 696. |

¹ The name used is that of the appearer, when this is available in full. When it is not available, the name of the percipient is used if available. If an initial or first name of the appearer is available, that may be cited as a cross-reference.

² In each reference, the first number (preceded by a decimal point) is the evidentiality rating. The black number refers to the source, as listed at the end of this index. If there is a colon, followed by a number (e.g., 29: 10) that refers to the volume number. The numbers following the comma refer to pages.

Many of the black numbers have decimals. That is due to the retention of the reference numbers used in the article on 'ESP Projection: Spontaneous Cases and the Experimental Method', published in *Proceedings of the A.S.P.R.* 48, 1954, 121-46. Additions to that list were inserted by the decimal method.

45. De Forest '13; 16⁵.
 46. de Freville '64; 15, 212-14.
 47. Deslandes '03; 9⁸, 60.
 48. Dodson '25; 29: 10, 380-2.
 49. Dog '16; 20: 35, 92-5.
 50. Douglas '70; 29: 10, 279-81.
 51. Doyle '02; 26, 124-5.
 52. Driesch '16; 20: 33, 51-3
 Du F. (see Husbands).
 Durocq (see Etchevary).
53. E '48; 29: 10, 306-8.
 54. Elgee '01; 16, 239-41.
 55. Elisa '16; 29: 19, 378.
 56. Esther '03; 31, 76-9.
 57. Etchevary '49; 17, 22-4.
 58. Evans '60; 29: 10, 301.
59. Falkenburg '54; 28³⁵, 398-401.
 60. Farler '48; 15, 414.
 61. Faulkner '56; 29: 33, 205-8.
 62. Fondiella '06; 9⁸, 59-60.
 63. Fox '11; 10, 56-9.
 64. Frost '48; 29: 10, 225-6.
 65. Funk '03; 11, 179-85.
 66. Fytche '08; 16, 45-6.
- G (see Brougham).
 67. G '32; 16, 521.
 68. Gates '29; 25⁵, 76-9.
 69. Gayraud '64; 9⁵, 161-5.
 70. Godfrey 11/86 '43; 27, 688.
 71. Godfrey 12/86 '43; 27, 690.
 71. Goethe '05; 31, 60.
 73. Goffe '24; 28, 187-9.
 Goldsmith (see Henry).
 74. Goodhall '49; 29: 10, 310-11.
 75. Greany '43; 29: 10, 228-9.
76. H '48; 29: 10, 308-9.
 77. H, Mr J. '30; 29: 10, 227-8.
 78. Habershon '14; 16, 625-6.
 79. Hamilton '04; 28⁴, 114-17.
 80. Hare '05; 26, 168-9.
 81. Harford '08; 29: 6, 29.
 82. Harris '80; 20: 37, 144-7.
 83. Hawkins-Dempster '48; 29:
 10, 261-3.
 84. Hayworth '48; 20: 39, 113-25.
 85. Henry '38; 28⁴, 76-7.
 Henry (see Kemble).
 86. Hervey '60; 29: 10, 282-4.
 87. Husbands '48; 29: 5, 416.
88. Jack '56; 29: 33, 166-7.
 89. Jensen '03; 20: 26, 174-5.
 Jim (see Nugent).
 90. Joy '27; 16, 523-4.
91. Kapnist '49; 29: 10, 284-6.
 92. Kelsey '60; 15, 207.
93. Kemble '13; 28⁴, 77-8.
 94. Kirkbeck '33; 14, 23-4.
 95. Kittelle '09; 25, 60.
 96. Kraemer '10; 9⁸, 51-2.
97. L, F '72; 15, 210-12.
 98. L, Mrs '01; 25, 83.
 99. L, Miss J. E. '27; 29: 10, 224-5.
 100. Lady '48; 29: 33, 177-9.
 101. Lagrarrue '08; 9⁸, 152-3.
 102. Langenest '11; 9⁵, 147-8.
 103. Larsen '06; 23, 42-4.
 104. Leonard '05; 24, 95-101.
 105. Leontine '04; 9⁸, 61-2.
 106. Librarian '12; 28³⁵, 427.
 107. Lloyd '38; 29: 10, 216.
 108. Loose '90; 30⁷, 55-73.
 109. Lutz '02; 9⁸, 110.
- M, Miss L. (see A, Mrs).
 110. M, Marthe '15; 9⁵, 177-80.
 111. McBride '34; 26, 186-7.
 112. McConnell '51; 30⁵, 58.
 113. Malleson '23; 29: 10, 295-7.
 114. Maloy '10; 27: 2, 348.
 115. Mansfield '24; 26, 171-2.
 116. Marryat '12; 23⁵, 127-8.
 117. Merchant '16; '5, 92-3.
 118. Mine '06; 9⁸, 81.
 119. Money '27; 29: 10, 263-4.
 120. Morison '10; 18⁵, 126-7.
 121. Morton '80; 29: 8, 311-32.
 122. Moses (1) '45; 15, 103-4.
 123. Moses (2) '43; 15, 104.
 124. Murray '43; 29: 10, 229-30.
125. Napier '12; 26, 201-2.
 126. Newnham '48; 15, 225-6.
 127. Nugent '36; 15, 531-2.
 128. Nun '49; 32, 45-7.
129. O '27; 29: 10, 286-7.
 130. Obalecheff '26; 29: 10, 218-19.
 131. Olivier '19; 28⁴, 106-10.
 132. Osgood '38; 20: 16, 197-9.
- P (see Walker-Anderson)
 133. Parker '03; 26, 147.
 134. Physician '56; 28³⁵, 401-5.
135. Quilty '14; 2⁵, 139-41.
 136. Quinn '42; 30⁷, 40-7.
137. Rasch '36; 28⁵, 166-9.
 Reddell (see Alexander).
 138. Reeves '17; 9⁵, 64-6.
 139. Riggs '03; 26, 79.
 140. Roberts, A. '03; 25, 56-9.
 141. Roberts, R. '01; 29: 1, 135-6.
 142. Rosa '32; 15, 448-9.

143. Rule '03; 26, 116-17.
 144. Russell '01; 5, 128-9.
 145. S, Emily '43; 28'4, 84-6.
 S, Mrs (see Morton).
 146. S, Mrs C. W. '26; 20: 1, 596-602.
 147. Sagee '08; 31, 64-9.
 148. Saile '07; 26, 123-4.
 149. Say '12; 14, 21-3.
 150. Schmid '07; 26, 58.
 151. Scott '17; 30'5, 40-3.
 152. Scott, Mrs '27; 29: 33, 205-6.
 153. Seigneur '05; 9'5, 277-8.
 154. Sherar '18; 29: 10, 238-9.
 155. Sims '30; 29: 10, 230-1.
 156. Sinclair '48; 27: 1, 697-8.
 157. Singh '38; 29: 33, 190-204.
 158. Smith '60; 29: 10, 214-16.
 159. Smith, Miss M. '20; 1'5, 129-31.
 160. Stella '03; 9'5, 127-9.
 161. T, Alec '12; 2'5, 338-41.
 162. Thompson '19; 31, 22-6.
 163. Turban '02; 26, 103-4.
 164. Tweedale '31; 9'5, 133-6.
 165. Vanka '29; 20: 32, 253-6.
 Verity (see Beard).
 166. Vida '63; 1'7, 10-15.
 167. Vidigal '22; 21 (1898) 281-95.
 168. Walker '06; 29: 6, 293.
 169. Walker-Anderson '70; 29: 10, 212-13.
 170. Wambey '27; 16, 510-11.
 171. Warner '29; 29: 33, 82-4.
 172. Watson '64; 20: 45, 92.
 173. Wheatcroft '34; 9'8, 163-5.
 174. Wilmot '22; 29: 7, 41-4.
 Wilson (see Belcher).
 175. Wilson, Mrs '04; 1'5, 210-11.
 176. Wünscher '26; 29: 6, 341.
 177. X, Baroness '80; 30'5, 7-9.
 178. X, Mme '08; 9'5, 156-7.
 179. X, Mr '38; 15, 209.
 180. Z, David '29; 29: 5, 459.
 181. Z, Julia '02; 1'5, 81-2.

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PART II

THE THEORIES, AS RELATED TO EACH OTHER AND TO THE CASES¹

SOURCES OF THE THEORIES

AN attempt to reach an understanding among those thinkers in the Western World who have devoted the most attention to facts and theories about apparitions has been a major objective of the International Project for Research on ESP Projection. In Part I of the present study, a brief history has been given of the way in which research on ESP projection led to recognition of the necessity for a co-ordinated study of apparitions in general, and how the international discussion of theories about apparitions led to recognition of the need for a rigorous statistical study of apparition cases. That statistical study was presented in Part I. It now remains to explore the relationships between those cases and the major theories.

As indicated at the start of Part I, the most nearly definitive analysis of apparitions seems to be G. N. M. Tyrrell's lecture on that subject, delivered in 1942.² In that lecture, three theories were discussed: (1) that of Edmund Gurney;³ (2) the theory which H. H. Price⁴ developed on the basis of theories of Frederic W. H. Myers and of C. A. Mace; and (3) Tyrrell's own theory. As Tyrrell pointed out, these three theories conflict in several basic ways. Each of them, moreover, appears initially to be inconsistent with the concept of ESP projection.

(4) A fourth theory was suggested by Gardner Murphy, in his response to the Preliminary Draft of this paper. Since he cited

¹ Constructive suggestions have been received from C. D. Broad, Wm. Edward Cox, Jr., R. Crookall, C. J. Ducasse, Raynor C. Johnson, G. W. Lambert, C. W. K. Mundle, Gardner Murphy, H. H. Price, William G. Roll, W. H. Salter, Aage Slomann, Robert Thouless, and J. H. M. Whiteman.

² G. N. M. Tyrrell, *Apparitions: The Seventh Frederic W. H. Myers Memorial Lecture*, revised edition, with a preface by H. H. Price (London, Duckworth, 1953).

³ W. H. Salter's *Ghosts and Apparitions* (London, Bell, 1938) put forward 'the Gurney view of phantasms, with such modifications as seemed called for by the cases collected since the publication of *Phantasms of the Living*, cases which were on the whole superior in quality to those available to the authors of that book' (W. H. Salter, letter to Hornell Hart, 8 April, 1954).

⁴ H. H. Price, 'Haunting and the "Psychic Ether" Hypothesis . . .', *Proc. S.P.R.*, 45, 1939, 327-8.

as major sources William Stern and Whately Carington, this will be called the Murphy-Stern-Carington Theory. While this theory deals with psychical phenomena in general rather than merely with apparitions, it does offer an approach different from the preceding three.

(5) In February 1953, Raynor C. Johnson, one-time Lecturer in Physics in King's College, University of London, and now Master of Queen's College in the University of Melbourne, published a book titled *The Imprisoned Splendour*. Part II of that book contains eight chapters on 'The Data of Psychical Research', several of which deal with apparitions. This book was reviewed by H. H. Price, who said of Part II :

It is an excellent survey of the whole field, well arranged, clearly written, and illustrated by a very impressive series of cases, some of them new ones. . . . This section of the book could be warmly commended as a general introduction to the subject. But it is much more than that. It is an original contribution to the theoretical interpretation of the facts. . . .¹

As to his relation to the other theories, Johnson has made extensive use of Price and of Tyrrell. He says : 'To [the psychic-ether hypothesis] Professor H. H. Price has given the most satisfactory form. The most important contribution to the theory of apparitions has been made by G. N. M. Tyrrell.'² But his basic approach is closely related to mysticism. Part III of his book is entitled 'The Data of Mystical Experience.'

(6) THE OPERATIONAL APPROACH

When theories conflict, one way to remove misunderstandings and to advance towards larger and larger areas of agreement is to reduce the entire discussion to terms of what people report that they have observed, what operations have been performed, and the ways in which these observations and operations are related in time sequences and in spatial configurations. This method has been called *operationism*.³ By making use of the operational

¹ *Journal of Parapsychology*, 18 (March 1954), 53-4.

² Raynor C. Johnson, *The Imprisoned Splendour: an Approach to Reality, based upon the Significance of Data drawn from the Fields of Natural Science, Psychical Research and Mystical Experience* (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1953), p. 209.

³ *Operationism*, as the term is used in the present article, has been developed from sources cited (directly and indirectly) by the author in two previous articles : 'Operationism Analysed Operationally', *Phil. of Sci.*, 7, 1940, 288-313 ; and 'Toward an Operational Definition of the Term "Operation"', *Amer. Soc. Rev.*, 18, 1953, 612-17.

approach, it is hoped that the areas of agreement between the other five theories may be brought out, and also the nature of the real issues, and the possibilities for effective reconciliation. The essence of this method (as applied to the problem of apparitions) may be explained as follows :

Instead of asking whether an apparition is composed of 'physical matter', or of 'psychic ether', or is merely a 'mental hallucination', the operationist asks what kinds of incoming experiences (observations) people report when they tell about apparitions, and how such observations are related to each other and to the outgoing actions (operations) which are performed. Operationism thus means *factuality*, with the recognition that facts can be known to any one of us only in terms of actual or potential observations and operations, and of the ways in which observations are related to each other and follow each other. Space and time, themselves, are experienced in terms of such relations and sequences of observations and operations.

When a group of observations and operations keeps recurring recognizably, we call such a group a *configuration* (or *gestalt*, or *pattern*). Every definable word represents a configuration. To define it operationally requires that the implied relations and sequences of observations and operations be stated verifiably—i.e., so that other competent observers and operators may obtain recognizably similar experiences under specified conditions. Apparitions are configurations. The various types of apparitions may be defined operationally. Meaningful differences in interpretation of such configurations can be reduced to specified differences in actual or potential relations and sequences between observations and operations.¹

After the above statement had been drafted, the following pertinent quotation from Carington turned up :²

The words 'real,' 'reality,' etc. are always redundant ; . . . the word 'exist' must be defined in empirical terms. . . . [Materialists and Idealists] differ only in talking about different configurations of the same

¹ F. H. Cleobury commented in a letter dated 26 May, 1954 : 'I think your own advocacy of the operational method and my advocacy of the translation of "ordinary" language into what I call "person-language" are prompted by the same insight. . . . For philosophy we should, I maintain, use . . . language consisting of sentences the grammatical subjects of which are nouns or pronouns designating conscious beings.' His letter developed some of the implications of that position.

² Whately Carington, *Matter, Mind and Meaning* (London, Methuen, 1949), pp. 140, 102-3 and 141. Carington footnoted : 'By "nature" here, I . . . mean . . . whether they are what we refer to by such words as "yellow", "red", "salt", "sweet", "loud", "high-pitched", etc.'

entities. . . . Even a Dialectician, given time, may be brought to realize that he cannot ultimately refer meaningfully to anything but cognitum groups and sequences. . . .

The term *cognitum* . . . refers to a class of existents . . . including the referents of all such words as 'sensa,' 'sense-data,' 'sense-contents,' 'percepts,' 'images,' 'ideas,' 'impressions,' 'sensations,' 'appearances,' etc., etc.

All that matters . . . is to realize clearly that any conceivable experience, whether of material objects, of hallucination, of events in a dream, of imagination, or of ecstasies of mystical experience, *must* in the last analysis, consist in the cognition of cognita of some kind, and that correspondingly, any statement about experience must finally reduce to statements about the nature and relationships of the cognita cognized. . . .

Any verifiable statement about space . . . must be reduced to terms of cognita. . . . Even if it . . . may be meaningful to speak of 'non-physical space,' which I doubt, the inevitability of ultimate reduction to cognita would still hold.

Operationism More Formally Defined. The above informal explanation of operationism (as used in the present article) may be summarized in the following more formal definition :

The operational method consists in reducing all crucial concepts, procedures, and generalizations to terms of repeatable sequences and configurations of observations and operations. This implies excluding from consideration everything which cannot be so reduced and stated.

An operational definition of the term *operation* is as follows :¹

An operation is the process by which a person produces intentionally, in himself or in his environment, any sort of physical or mental change from what would otherwise have existed or occurred.

If the above definitions and explanations appear obscure or confusing at first, it is suggested that the reader proceed on the simple assumption that *this article seeks to find out the facts, in as verifiable and useful terms as possible.* As applied to the problem now in hand, this method calls initially for two steps of procedure. The first is to state clearly, on the basis of evidentially acceptable data, the observational and operational configurations which describe the phenomena. The second step is to state the alternative hypotheses which have been offered to account for various

¹ Cf. Hornell Hart and Associates, "Toward an Operational Definition of the Term "Operation"; *Amer. Soc. Rev.*, 18, 1953, 612-17.

phases of the phenomena, formulating each hypothesis in operational terms.¹ The first of these steps has been carried out in Part I of this study ; Part II will be devoted to the second step.

SOME METAPHYSICAL PRELIMINARIES

The approach described above has sought to be factual, and to subordinate metaphysical theorizing except as such theories prove to be indispensably important in reaching an understanding and in dealing effectively with the data. Over and over again, however, our correspondence has brought us face to face with the fact that many disagreements hinge upon underlying metaphysical assumptions. The following passage from a letter by Professor Ducasse (dated 7 June, 1954) brings out some of the fundamental issues :

You speak of laying aside the metaphysical approach to the conception of material objects. But the 'operational method' as you describe it commits itself to a particular metaphysics, namely, that of Berkeley ; and Hume's criticism of it cannot then be just ignored. Berkeley had said that he never perceived Matter, but only ideas and configurations of ideas ; and that the supposition of Matter was therefore vacuous and gratuitous. Thus, only ideas and the spirits or selves that have them exist. 'Self', 'Spirit', 'I', however, not being ideas, are not perceived, but perceivers. Hume, however, carried to its logical conclusion the empiricism which Berkeley had used to discard Matter ; and said that, when he tried to observe the 'self' or 'spirit' that 'has' the ideas, he never found it, any more than Berkeley found Matter, but only and always some idea or other. And he concluded that 'I', 'self', 'a mind', are terms which denote only the collection or stream of ideas. . . .

Thus, Hume would say—and I think most introspectionist psychologists would tend to agree—that the 'observer-operator', which you assert the word 'I' denotes, and which you declare to be 'the most basic reality of which I am aware,' is not, any more than Matter is, anything of which you are directly aware at all, in the sense of observing it as you observe feelings of hunger, pain, colour, or such a configuration of sensations as constitutes the visual and tactual appearance of a book ; but, like Matter, is only a 'thing'—a psychological instead of a material one—that is, in modern terminology, a logical construct.

The Primary Reality of the Observer-Operator. A crucial phrase in the above quotation is : ' . . . observing it as you observe feelings of hunger, pain, colour, . . . ' The observer-operator persists in

¹ Johnson implies his general acceptance of the above factual approach when he says : ' I cannot find that any of the characteristics of apparitions which Tyrrell carefully listed . . . are inconsistent with the views I have expressed above ' (op. cit., p. 211).

reappearing as the subject of the verb 'you observe. . . .' Who is this 'you'? 'Feelings of hunger' take the form: 'I am hungry'; feelings of pain take the form: 'I feel pain'; and so on. Semantically, the distinction between the subject and the object seems to be inescapable; the referent of the nominative first person singular is present whenever one discusses or thinks about 'my own' experience.

The same basic fact obtrudes itself when one seeks to build one's philosophy upon the crucially important rule stated by Korzybski, namely, to start one's thinking with such propositions as cannot be denied without reasserting them in the very denial. Among such propositions, the most fundamental with which I am acquainted is this: 'I am conscious.' When I am talking or thinking to myself I cannot deny that proposition without reasserting it. If I say to myself: 'I am unconscious,' the question immediately arises in my mind: 'Says who?'

This inescapability of that which is referred to by *the first person singular* is not paralleled with respect to material objects. I know of no comparable statement about matter which, if denied, reasserts itself inherently in the very denial. Hence, I have to build my whole system of thought on this personal subjective awareness of myself.¹

The Operational Conception of Material Objects. In the document which has been emerging out of our international correspondence, the 21 May, 1954 draft contained the following passage on the conception of matter:

Operationally, the material existence of *any physical* object consists in its correlated configuration of actual and potential motor operations and sensory observations.² No statement about objects in the physical world has operational significance except as it can be reduced to descriptive statements and to at least tentative predictions about the space-time configurations of such observations and operations.³

That broad statement about the operational conception of physical objects may perhaps be made clearer by a concrete illustration. If I

¹ Johnson says: 'Consciousness is a fundamental idea which cannot be defined—yet without it nothing else can be defined. . . . It is, and it knows that it is. . . . The sum of memories, thoughts, and experiences will be designated by such terms as the Ego, the empirical self, the personality. . . .' (Op. cit., p. 219.) This is in line with Price's statement that 'Spirit [is to mean] the fundamental "I", the pure ego, the *Atman* of the Hindu philosophers,' as C. W. K. Mundle quotes him in 'Some Philosophical Perspectives for Parapsychology', *Journal of Parapsychology*, 16, 1952, 257.

² This sentence has been revised from its previously circulated form, in the light of a pertinent criticism by Mundle, in a letter dated 17 May 1954.

³ Cf. Tyrrell on 'Normal Sense Perception,' op. cit., pp. 83-8.

perform the motor operation of tossing a 'bunch of keys' into the air I experience a group of correlated sensorimotor observations. Besides the muscular and tactual sensations of tossing the keys, I experience the visual observation of seeing them rise into the air and fall back, and the auditory observation of the tinkling sound which they make when tossed and when caught, and I make also the temperature observation of the coolness or warmth of the keys. I remember that certain locks can be opened, or closed to intruders by inserting certain of these keys. I know also that I can add or subtract keys by certain types of physical operations. Vaguely I realize that specific colour changes can be made in the keys by applying certain acids, or by heating them red-hot or white-hot; and that they can be bent by certain kinds of physical pressure—and the like. Theoretically, I know that the keys might be used to transmit electricity, that they could be melted into a liquid by raising their temperature to a certain level, and that an unlimited number of other observations might be derived from them by other specific operations.

For me, therefore, the 'material existence of this bunch of keys' consists in the bundle of correlated operations and observations which I or others may or might obtain from them. If I see the keys with my eyes, or if I feel them with my fingers in the dark, those initial observations are like the end of a tangle of many-coloured yarn. By following up the end I have hold of, I can obtain both the repetition of the observations with which I am familiar and also an indefinitely long series of other operations and observations, correlated with one another. I need not worry about whether there is 'something out there' which 'gives rise to' my sensorimotor experiences. I can define *the material existence of any sensorimotor object* in terms of observations and operations.

A vital aspect of this 'independent existence of the material world' is the fact that the observations to be obtained by operating on a given material object in specified ways are partially, but never completely, predictable. This may be illustrated by an experiment. I take an apple and a knife into a classroom. I offer a small money prize for the best drawing which any student will put on the blackboard as representing the design which will be revealed by cutting the apple through its equator (regarding the stem as the North Pole). A person who has tried the experiment a few times will know that the core of the truncated apple will be seen as a five-pointed star. But no one, no matter how familiar he is with this experiment, can ever draw perfectly the shape of the star which will appear when the apple is cut.

Commenting on the above statement, Professor Broad, on 11 May, 1954, called attention to Bertrand Russell's treatment of this topic. Russell said:¹

Instead of supposing that there is some unknown cause, the 'real' table, behind the different sensations of those who are said to be looking

¹ Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, 1921, pp. 98-9.

at the table, we may take the whole set of these sensations (together possibly with certain other particulars) as actually *being* the table. . . . I suggest, as a first approximation, that these particulars, together with such correlated others as are unperceived, jointly *are* the table; and that a similar definition applies to all physical objects.

With reference to the above passage, Professor Ducasse commented:¹

One more remark, concerning your preference for speaking in terms of 'bundles of correlated actual and potential observations and operations,' instead of in terms of 'things' and 'substances' (whether psychical or physical). That terminology functions essentially as an admonition to be empirical; but, I take it, is not intended to deny that there really are material things, e.g., books, pens, etc.—that is, it is intended to remind the reader that material things are *inferred* (from sensory clues), but are not *directly presented* as sensations are; i.e., it is not intended to assert that the inference is *invalid*. If so, I fully agree. (That material things are known by construction is the central contention of Chapter 15 of my *Nature, Mind and Death*.) But, once it having been stated and understood that this is what a 'thing' or 'substance' is—a bundle of potentialities, only a few of which are actualized (in the sense of affecting experience) at any given moment—why not, from then on, use plain English and speak of 'things,' 'substances,' 'doors,' 'books,' 'bodies of flesh and blood,' etc., instead of, so clumsily, in terms of 'configurations'; which terminology, I think, tends to obscure instead of clarify what you mean. For, so far as I can see, the long and short of the 'operationism' you demand is that, whenever one asserts anything, one should be prepared to say *just how one knows* it to be as one asserts it to be, or at least, just *how one could find out* whether or not it is as asserted to be. If I am right in thinking that this is what you are essentially demanding, then it seems to me that it would be better to say it directly in some such way, than to burden the statement of it with metaphysical assumptions that are highly questionable.

The above position appears to be sound and helpful. Hereafter in this article material objects will be referred to in the simple way suggested by Professor Ducasse, but with the implications pointed out in his remarks and in the passage to which those remarks refer.

Space. One of the basic questions to be discussed in this article is the spatial relationships of apparitions, when perceived in physical surroundings, and particularly when perceived collectively. Gardner Murphy, H. H. Price, C. D. Broad, Aage Slomann, Guy Lambert, J. H. M. Whiteman, and others among our collaborators have contributed to a discussion which may be summarized very briefly somewhat as follows:

Every observer of material objects finds his observational

¹ Letter dated 7 June 1954.

experience organized in three spatial dimensions around a viewpoint within his own physical body. As an operator, he operates from much this same centre. *Above, below, forward, backward, left, right, near, far, at hand, out of reach*, and similar concepts are experienced functionally in relation to the observer-operator's own purposes, interests, and ability to come into contact with and produce results on his surroundings. Every observer-operator also experiences time, and records or experiences it dimensionally when he looks at a clock, keeps a diary, throws or catches a ball, drives a car, takes a moving picture, reads a history book, studies or constructs a time chart—or the like. These functional relations of the individual observer-operator in relation to material objects and events may be referred to as his 'personal sensorimotor space-time'.¹

Dr Murphy commented: 'It seems to me that in all your work [on apparitions] it is quite clear that what happens is the interpenetration of the spatial worlds of different persons, quite aside from any question of anchorage in physical space.'² This proposition seems to be generally agreed to—in the sense that often (but by no means always) the phenomena which we are studying are dissociated from or dislocated from physical space. On the other hand, it also seems clear that physical space-time consists in a basic and comprehensive reconciliation of the personal sensorimotor space-times of all sensorimotor observer-operators. The shared and reciprocal experience-configurations of physical space provide a framework within which individual experiences of space may be fitted together functionally. Moreover, one of the most fundamental problems to be dealt with in connection with apparitions is how they fit into physical space.

¹ Gardner Murphy wrote, on 15 March 1954: 'I would strongly suggest that you read in William Stern's *General Psychology* [*General Psychology from a Personalistic Standpoint*, New York, Macmillan, 1938, pp. 92-100, and 153-4], the discussion of the attributes of psychological space, its non-symmetry, its fluidity, its individual expression of the person who moves in it, and so on.' Professor Broad commented (in his letter of 11 May 1954): 'I don't want to minimize the *importance* of this document, but I think it is odd to associate it with one particular author. Surely, the distinction between "private spaces," visual, tactual, and so forth, and a common "public space," which is in some sense "constructed" out of them, has been a commonplace with competent psychologists who have treated the psychology of spatial perception. You will find it, e.g. in William James's *Principles of Psychology* and in Stout's *A Manual of Psychology*, two classical textbooks. But, for your purpose, perhaps the most interesting form of it is in some of Bertrand Russell's books and essays. . . .'

² Letter dated 15 March 1954.

In memory, dreams, and imagined scenes, the observer-operator also experiences similar dimensions of 'inner' space and time, which are also basically integrated with his own functioning, and which are often organized around his remembered, dreamed or imagined body. In an ordinary dream, the dreamer seems to himself to be moving about in a four-dimensional world (three of space and one of time) in which he appears to have a body more or less similar to the one which he uses in his physical waking life. When one awakens, the dream structure fades out, and one becomes aware of physical space, physical matter, and one's physical body.

But the fundamental rules are bound to be different in the space-time of the inner world and the space-time of the sensorimotor world of material objects. In the material world :

1. Movement from one point to another must traverse a continuous series of intermediate points.

2. An operator can move or shape matter only by acting through his voluntary muscles upon a continuous chain of material objects intervening between the operator and the matter to be operated on, or by altering a force-field which includes the operator and the object to be operated on.

3. Movement in time can occur only in the forward dimension, in unison with the rest of sentient beings, and in correlation with the movements of the earth and the heavenly bodies.

4. The configurations of sensorimotor experience are ordered in terms of physical dimensions and distances, and of sidereal time.

5. The space and time of the material world can be described and predicted (within limits) by mathematics.

In the inner world of memory, dreams and imagination :

1. Movement to distant points can be achieved instantly, without traversing intermediate points.

2. Objects can be moved and shaped without any chain of intervening objects, and if force-fields are involved, they do not depend upon the vibratory forces to which the law of inverse squares applies. The relative sizes, the relative speeds, and the shapes of objects in the inner world can be altered more or less at will.

3. In inner-world time, movement backward as well as forward is possible, and sudden jumps from point to point in time are normal.

4. Experience patterns in the inner world are ordered, not by

physical distance, nor by sidereal time, but by emotional, ideational and habitual linkage.

5. Mathematical systems can be created, beyond any assigned limit, in the inner world, but the spontaneous phenomena of that world do not conform to inherent mathematical laws—so far as yet discovered.

Apparitions as Related to the Two Kinds of Space-Time. Tyrrell pointed out, as follows, some of the operational facts about space and apparitions:¹

Apparitions, are . . . in no way bound to appear in the space in which material things exist. They *can* appear in common space, but that is only one out of several possible modes of appearance. There is an unbroken transition from appearances in space, through appearances in detached and private spaces, to appearances in crystals, in dreams, or in inward types of vision.

Salter stressed much the same point as follows:²

In veridical cases realistic apparitions shade off almost imperceptibly into semi-realistic ones (such as the case in my book of the Indian Prince who saw a portrait of his father then at the point of death occupying the space of a real picture in his hotel bedroom), and these again into visual images wholly or partly symbolic, into border-line cases between sleep and waking, into dreams, and into telepathic impressions not externalized at all. This implies that it is the telepathic impulse that is significant. . . .³

Private Versus Public Reality. The difference between private and public reality is that experience of a public object or event can be shared without the intermediation of words, numbers, gestures or other symbols, while private objects and events cannot. A material object is public in so far as it is possible (actually or potentially) for more than one person to see it, touch it, manipulate it or otherwise deal with it in sensorimotor ways without having to have his observations and operations transmitted by words or other symbols. But sensorimotor experience in itself is private—except and unless as transmitted or shared by telepathy. A reciprocal dream, in so far as its objects and events are actually shared directly by telepathy, without the necessity of transmission by symbols, is a public experience.³

In the light of the foregoing clarifications, a series of issues may be analysed, which emerge out of the six theories about apparitions.

¹ Op. cit., p. 53.

² Letter dated 8 April 1954.

³ Aage Slomann, in a letter dated 8 June, 1954, called attention to the discussion of public and private space by the Danish philosopher Jørgen Jørgensen in his *Psychologi*, Copenhagen, 1941, pp. 159-60 and 314-15.

IN WHAT SENSE, IF AT ALL, ARE APPARITIONS VEHICLES
IN WHICH OR THROUGH WHICH CONSCIOUS PERSONALITIES
OBSERVE AND OPERATE?

Tyrrell's 'Perverseness'. Tyrrell stated this issue as follows :¹

It might be said that if there is evidence to show that an apparition is aware of viewing a scene from some particular standpoint in space, that is proof that its consciousness occupied that position. There is undoubtedly evidence to show that apparitions behave *as if* they were aware of their surroundings and therefore of being at a particular place among them. . . . Nearly every apparition which appears in physical space gives evidence of being aware of its surroundings. It may come in at the door. It nearly always moves about a room with normal respect for the position of the furniture. If it wanders about the house it makes normal use of doors, passages, and staircases. . . . Crisis-apparitions also frequently approach the percipient, look him in the face, speak to him, and even put a hand on his shoulder, thus giving evidence of what, in the case of a living person, we should take to be conscious appreciation of their surroundings and situation. . . .

But behaving *as if* aware is not the same thing as *being* aware, or we could say that the figures on the cinematograph screen were consciously aware of being there. I am prepared, however, to admit more than this. There is a small amount of evidence that the apparition of a living person can be seen at a place in space and that the person afterwards remembers viewing the scene from that identical position. . . . There are also the cases of 'travelling clairvoyance', . . . in which the sensitive describes a distant scene as from a particular point of view. But, perverse as it may seem, I am not prepared to accept this as evidence that the conscious self of the sensitive actually *occupied* that spatial point of view. . . .

The facts reveal the apparition to be a piece of stage-machinery. . . . All the evidence points to the view that what is 'there' is only a psychological marionette, the expression of a drama which has been thrown into sensory form, just as the human figures in a film-play are not 'there' in the ordinary human sense but are optical constructions contrived to express a drama which has been arranged elsewhere.

This 'perverseness' of Tyrrell's has been criticized as follows by Thouless :²

Of course, about Tyrrell's question of whether consciousness of an apparition is present in space, he does not realize that his further statement that no-one's consciousness is present in space makes the question meaningless. One can still ask, 'Is a ghost's consciousness there in the same sense as I am inclined to say that my consciousness is here?'

¹ Op. cit., pp. 47-8, 60, 101-2, 121.

² Letter dated 13 April 1954.

Price has continued the discussion as follows :¹

As to Tyrrell's doctrine about the non-location of selves. As Thouless in effect says, the power of Tyrrell's contention is much diminished by the fact that it is a perfectly general one, and not a specific one concerned with apparitions only. And so, for all he has said, it might be no *more* erroneous to say that the 'self' of an apparition is in this room, than it is to say that my own self is in this room now. And if there is a sense in which this latter statement is admissible (as there clearly is), then in the same sense the former statement is or might be admissible too. As a matter of fact, it is not too difficult to define a sense in which an ego or self can be said to be in a certain place. There are two criteria which we might use : (1) a self is in a place P if P is the point of view from which that self is perceiving at the moment. (2) It is in a place P if it is *acting upon* objects which are in the immediate neighbourhood of P. I think that is substantially the same as your own position. It has the consequence, of course, that a self need not necessarily be in the place where its physical organism is. 'I'—my self or ego—might conceivably be in London when my physical organism is in Oxford ; e.g., if the point of view from which I am perceiving was in Piccadilly Circus.

Johnson says :

Consciousness by its very nature is not *in* space at all. . . . It does become aware of that which is other than itself at a particular point of space and time. . . . Such awareness can be moved about in space by movement of the physical organism, as we do when we travel : it also appears that it can be transferred from one place to another by a process which seems to be a temporary withdrawal from the physical organism.²

An Operational Analysis. Tyrrell's 'perverseness' about consciousness not being located in space reduces to a matter of the label which he gives to a configuration of observations and operations and operations which can be quite clearly specified. To state that A's body is located at a given point in physical space and time can mean nothing, operationally, except a summation of the ways in which he has been and can be observed and operated upon by other persons who perceive him in that location, plus the ob-

¹ Letter dated 22 May 1954. Professor Price then raised a theoretical point which should receive further discussion if actual cases are found. He wrote : 'But is it conceivable that the two criteria I have mentioned should diverge? Suppose that by PK I am moving some object in London, while the point of view I am perceiving from is in Oxford. Shall we then have to say that my ego or self is in two different places at once?' Another interesting question which he has raised is whether, under the telepathic theory of apparitions, the same appearer could appear simultaneously in a number of different places.

² Op cit., p. 219.

servations and operations which he has experienced and can experience and carry out at that location. As Whiteman puts it :

Tyrrell's 'perverseness' consists only in refusing to attach the label 'conscious self' to a configuration of observations clearly specified. To insist that, although the 'person' may be consciously present at a given point in space and time, his 'conscious self' is not so located, is to introduce the operationally undefined and irrelevant concept of a spaceless consciousness supposed to exist independent of the personal form that seems to contain it.¹

The crucial question for the present discussion is whether projected observers can actually make verifiable observations, and perform certain types of operations, which are oriented to a given point in space and time in a way closely analogous to observations and operations by a person in a physical body at that point. That is the operational meaning assigned to the statement that the projectionist was consciously projected to that point in space and time. From an operational standpoint, the question of whether given *physically embodied* people are conscious—and if so, to what extent—reduces to observed evidence, interpreted in the light of sympathetic introspection. The same principle is applicable to exploring the extent to which *apparitions* are conscious, which also reduces to observed evidence, interpreted by sympathetic introspection and analogy.²

To the 'crucial question' of the previous paragraph, a factual answer is provided by the case records analysed statistically in Part I of the present article. The 25 self-conscious apparitions of the living, analysed in Table I, and the additional 16 projection cases analysed in Table V, differ from the figures on a moving-picture screen in that the configurations involved include not only the objective observations of the percipients but also the subjective observations reported by the appearers, and summarized in Table V. In some cases, in addition to making observations, the projected observers reported that they had performed operations which corresponded with the observations of those actions by the percipients. Operationally, we have the same kinds of evidence that some of these apparitions of the living were conscious as we have evidence that any ordinarily embodied person is conscious. When all the relevant observations are included in the evidence, it becomes clear that apparitions of the living are *not* mere marionettes, but (in at least a large number of cases) are actual vehicles of the observer-operator who is the essential consciousness of the appearer.

¹ J. H. M. Whiteman, letter dated 7 June 1954.

² Cf. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

Tyrrell's Treatment of ESP Projection. Tyrrell, while ignoring the great bulk of case materials on 'out-of-the-body' experiences, selected one such report, and then brushed it aside :¹

The whole scene . . . is described as if seen from a particular point in space, and gives the impression that the clairvoyant is standing in the room and looking round exactly as a person materially present in the room would do. I suggest that this is an elaborate piece of dramatization, and that the clairvoyant is not present as an observer in space at all.

The difference between *dramatization* and *ESP projection* must be reduced to operational terms before Tyrrell's 'suggestion' can have standing in a rigorous scientific inquiry. An operational examination of such cases indicates (to the present writer, at least) that the simplest, clearest and most economical summary of the available observational data is to state that the essential observer-operator *was* present at that point in space. Such a statement needs, of course, to be safeguarded by whatever qualifications the detailed observational and operational evidence may require.

Again, in his discussion of the Wilmot case, Tyrrell seemed almost to have recognized the significance of ESP projection. He said :²

At first this case seems to afford strong evidence in support of Myers's view that a consciously observing mind is present in the space where the apparition is seen ; for Mrs Wilmot remembered the experience of having been in the cabin, and having seen the interior from a point of view in the doorway, where her apparition was seen to stand ; she also remembered the arrangement of the berths, the presence of a man in the upper one, and her hesitation on entering. Mrs Sidgwick, however, commenting on the case, says that she still adheres to Gurney's telepathic view. . . . She regards her seeing the cabin as due to a telepathic link with her husband—a telepathic effect for which he, as agent, was responsible.

But what about the cases in which projectionists have reported verifiable information about locations at which no person was present, or about scenes in which the people who were present showed no awareness of the projectionists? Several such cases are listed in Part I of the present article.³

Price has recently pointed out, in his review of Johnson's book :⁴

¹ Op. cit., pp. 119-20.

² Op. cit., pp. 116-17.

³ See cases numbered 19, 25, 38, 39, 45, 51, 56, 103, 104, 132, 133, 140 and 148-50.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 59.

We have to consider 'out of the body experiences'. Dr Johnson discusses these in Chapter 10. The chapter is illustrated by an excellent series of cases. . . . Moreover, Dr Johnson devotes a good deal more attention than most of us do to the narratives of the 'voluntary projectors,' Muldoon and others. He is obviously right to consider these experimental cases—for that is what they are—alongside the spontaneous cases.

Full-fledged ESP Projection. This term may be taken as referring to a phenomenon, specific cases of which would have most if not all of the following characteristics :

A. From the standpoint of the projectionist : (1) being aware of leaving one's physical body (19%)¹ and seeing that body from a point completely outside it (31%); (2) being aware of having a projected body (43%), whose parts one can move like a physical body (24%); (3) being independent of gravitation (14%); (4) passing through solid matter (10%); (5) directing one's attention (45%) towards a person with whom one is emotionally linked (83%); (6) travelling by directing one's attention (17%); (7) being transported swiftly (12%) or instantly (19%) to a distant point; (8) observing physical objects (sometimes verifiably) in the location to which one is projected (71%); (9) observing at this location the person towards whom one's attention had been directed, with or without other persons (74%); (10) seeing oneself being seen as an apparition (19%); and (11) speaking (12%) and hearing (24%) words.

B. From the standpoint of the observer, full-fledged ESP projection has most if not all the following characteristics : (1) seen as a 'real' or 'solid' (12%)² full figure (100%) with vivid details (24%), dressed in ordinary or usual clothes (24%); (2) recognized (88%); (3) making normal movements with feet, hands, etc. (28%); (3) making adjustments to the physical surroundings (80%); (4) making adjustments to persons present (72%); (5) speaking (24%); (6) being seen by other persons present (16%); (7) appearing at a distance from its physical body (100%); (8) appearing or disappearing suddenly and inexplicably (24%); and (9) showing special concern for loved ones (52%). The above A and B characteristics are among the ones which any adequate theory of apparitions must take into account.

Are Some Apparitions Conscious and Some Unconscious? Professor Price wrote on 22 May 1954 :

¹ Percentages in the A group of characteristics represent frequencies with which the specified characteristics were reported among the 41 cases tabulated in Table V of Part I of this article.

² Percentages in the B group represent frequencies among the 25 conscious apparitions of the living as tabulated in Table I.

I think that you have made a very good case for saying that an apparition is at least sometimes a 'vehicle' of consciousness. But not necessarily always. It is not by any means clear that a haunting ghost is always, or even usually, a vehicle of consciousness; though occasionally it may be, when its behaviour shows intelligence and purpose. It seems to me that a 'psychometrical' theory, such as I have propounded in my Presidential Address, might fit *some* cases of haunting. Here, though the image experienced did originate in the mind of the late Mr Smith, it would I think be quite wrong (or at least unsupported by evidence) to suppose that Mr Smith's consciousness was present in the haunted house. It would be rather as if one said that your consciousness was present in Oxford when I in Oxford read a letter from you or see a photograph or cinematograph film depicting you. You are the remote cause of what I see. It would be very odd to say that you are *here*.

Similarly, there might I think be *some* crisis-apparitions when we should not want to say that the 'consciousness of the 'appearer' is where the apparition is, though there are others where we should want to say this. This amounts to suggesting that Tyrrell's Theory of Apparitions (or something like it) might be right for some of the cases, while yours is right for others. In this connection, it has always seemed to me that a telepathic 'impulse'—if you will forgive the expression—has many alternative ways of manifesting itself in the consciousness of the percipient and chooses (so to speak) the one which is easiest—a dream, or a mental image, or a mental image 'projected' into a crystal, etc., or a full-blown visual or auditory hallucination, or sometimes a piece of automatic bodily behaviour (automatic speech or writing). Which particular mode of manifestation it adopts depends primarily on the permanent psycho-physical constitution of the percipient, and on his temporary psycho-physical state. Now those considerations fit in very well with the Tyrrell theory, which treats apparitions as hallucinations. Suppose that someone (X) has a serious or fatal accident, and that three friends or relatives of his have paranormal experiences correlatable with the accident. A has a telepathic dream about X, B a vivid mental image of X, C sees an apparition of X.¹ Now your theory, *if* stretched to cover all apparitions without restriction, would have to say that C's experience was of an entirely different type from A's and B's; whereas on Tyrrell's theory they are all basically of the same type (telepathic) and only differ in a relatively unimportant manner—viz., in respect of the way in which the telepathic 'impression' manages to manifest itself in the percipient's consciousness. Thus his theory, one might say, *unifies* 'paranormal crisis-phenomena' in a way yours does not. It does seem to me entirely credible that a telepathic 'impression' (forgive the phrase again) should utilize the psycho-physical mechanism of hallucination in order to manifest itself. I think then that the telepathic theory of apparitions—and that is what Tyrrell's theory is—might be true of

¹ 'Add, if you like, that another person, D, produces an *automatic script* giving a veridical account of X's accident,' says Professor Price.

some apparitions, and especially of some crisis-apparitions, while yours is true of others. The ones it fits best would be very fugitive ones—non-collective ones, and ones in which no signs of intelligence and purpose are shown—those apparitions, in fact, which come closest to ‘projected’ mental images. Whereas your theory fits the relatively very ordinary ones, the collective ones (I agree with you that Tyrrell’s theory of these is just a very ingenious *tour de force*), and those in which intelligence and purpose *are* shown.’

To cover the data referred to by Professor Price—and perhaps some other types of cases—the following hypothesis may be offered. Let us suppose that *every* apparition is a more or less self-existent mental structure (whose nature will be discussed in a later section of this article). Suppose that such a structure is primarily of a visual character, but involving (when fully developed) auditory, telepathic-ideational, tactual, and other characteristics. Suppose that any such structure—and, indeed, any fraction of such a structure—may become a vehicle through which consciousness, to a greater or less extent, operates and/or observes. Consciousness itself must be recognized as complex, involving such fractionings as are found in the various levels of the subconscious and in various forms of multiple personality. The apparently purposeful apparition of a living person, operating when the full consciousness of the person represented is located elsewhere—and may even be observing its own apparition—and the curious cases in which the focus of consciousness shifts back and forth from the physical body to a projected body, each in turn observing the other, would seem explicable under such a conception.

Are Apparitions only partly Conscious, or may they vary in their Degrees of Consciousness? Price regarded apparitions as complex sets of etheric images. In his S.P.R. Presidential Address, he said (about haunts):¹

This set of interrelated images is something like a very rudimentary secondary personality. It was split off from the [haunter’s] main personality at the time when he lived in [the haunted] room; it escaped from his control and acquired an independent existence of its own. . . . To call it even a secondary personality, even though the adjective ‘rudimentary’ be added, is very likely an indefensible stretching of language. All the same, it is an interrelated set of mental contents, endowed (if we are right) with a certain telepathic power. Moreover, it is a ‘cinematographic’ phantasm which we are now considering: there is the appearance of *movement*. . . . And there often is the appearance of a rudimentary purpose. The complex of persisting images is dominated as it were by a kind of *idée fixe*. If we did not

¹ H. H. Price, ‘Haunting and the “Psychic Ether” Hypothesis . . .,’ *Proc. S.P.R.*, 45, 1939, 327–8.

know that we were seeing an apparition, we should say 'here is a human being who is behaving in a curiously somnambulistic way'. . . . A 'bit' of the deceased personality has succeeded in surviving.

Johnson, after stating that there is no difference in existential status, on the sense-data level, between a well-developed apparition capable of stimulating all the senses of a human being, and a living person, continues :¹

On the next higher level of mental qualities there is a most marked difference. The apparitional behaviour is usually confined to a semi-automatic type. Anything beyond this is generally of a single idea or purpose—e.g., to stroke hair, to wave the hand, to exhibit a wound, to frequent a neighbourhood or to demonstrate continued existence ; having done which the sustaining subsistent thought (or object) has expended the impulse which gave it birth and it fades away. Such mono-ideaism is far removed from the wealth and complexity of mental structure of the normal living person. . . . Those higher levels of singificance, beyond the mental, which are represented in the human being by structures constituting the essential self and its sustaining selfconsciousness, have, as far as can be seen, no representative in apparitions. In other words, an apparition of a human being is not a centre of consciousness : it is, so to speak, a psychical marionette given temporary life by some quite separate centre of consciousness. This is doubtless true both of apparitions of the living and the 'dead' (with reservations made in regard to another type of apparition to be discussed in the next chapter [on 'Experience Outside the Body']).

When he refers to an apparition of a human being as not being a centre of consciousness but 'so to speak, a psychical marionette given temporary life by some quite separate centre of consciousness,' Johnson does not appear to think of this as being inconsistent with regarding apparitions as temporary 'vehicles of consciousness.'²

The above views of Price and Johnson gain fuller significance when considered in the light of introspective reports by purported ESP projectors. Much of the case material about ESP projections suggests that apparitions of the living often experience subjectively something of the mental limitations which seem evident objectively in the behaviour of haunts and of crisis-apparitions. The following is a non-evidential but striking example : One day in the summer of 1916, after a storm, Sylvan Muldoon took hold of a live wire, and found himself projected, watching his physical body undergoing electrocution. He was rescued in time to save his life, but he noted :³

¹ *The Imprisoned Splendour*, pp. 212-13.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 213 and 240.

³ Sylvan J. Muldoon and Hereward Carrington, *The Projection of the Astral Body*, London, Rider, 1929, 187-9.

Almost every night, after this tragedy, I dreamed that I was being electrocuted. . . . On one occasion I awakened in this awful dream and found myself projected, living through the horrible experience exactly on the spot where it occurred, which was several blocks from my home.

Now, let us suppose that at the moment of this nightmare projection of Muldoon's a suitably attuned ESP observer had passed that spot, and had seen the apparition writhing at the end of his phantasmal wire. That would have corresponded fairly closely with many reported 'haunts'. Yet Muldoon's report indicates that this sleep-walking phantom was actually the vehicle of his consciousness at that moment. In many cases, the person who has been seen as an apparition admits to having felt hampered in such matters as conversation, while on his excursion. But other excursionists report having experienced, at times, what they felt to be high levels of consciousness. Yram was summarizing the reported experiences of many ESP projectionists when he said: "The phenomenon is not therefore a state of sleep, natural or induced. It has a clarity far superior to that of terrestrial life."¹

Muldoon's accounts of many other of his numerous projections indicate that the nightmare limitations of consciousness which he experienced in the repeated projected re-enactments of his electrocution accident are not characteristic of his usual mental states when projected. On other occasions he seems to have been much more fully conscious.

And, since we are exploring hypotheses open-mindedly, we must remember that many of our cases which are evidential in other respects involve reports by projected individuals that they encountered apparitional bodies which behaved as if they were vehicles of the surviving personalities of persons whose physical bodies were dead, and that these 'departed' individuals often behaved as if they were far more fully aware than are ordinary human beings.

In seeking more light relative to the above question, an intensive operational study of the range of intelligence-level experienced by ESP-projectionists would be helpful.

DOES COLLECTIVE PERCEPTION DEMONSTRATE THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF APPARITIONS?

The problem of consciousness in apparitions hinges to a considerable extent upon the facts about ESP projection, as

¹ Yram, *Practical Astral Projection*, London, Rider, 1935, as quoted by Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

developed in the preceding sections of this article. Similarly, some of the problems raised in succeeding sections hinge to a considerable extent upon the phenomena of collective perception of apparitions.

Tyrrell's Generalization about Collective Cases. In his classical study of *Apparitions*, cited earlier in this article, Tyrrell stated and then demolished a theory which had been set forth by Edmund Gurney in *Phantasms of the Living*, in 1886. Gurney had taken the position that collectively perceived apparitions are produced by an agent, *A*, who telepathically influences, in the first place, the primary percipient, *B*, in whom he is interested, and that *B*, while creating a sensory image of his own, acts as an agent, in turn transmitting the apparition to *C*, who repeats the process, re-transmitting the apparition to *D*, and so on. Gurney himself described the process as spreading by 'infection'.¹ Broad, in his lecture, 'Phantasms of the Living and of the Dead,'² appears to have been primarily concerned with inquiring into some of the difficulties involved in this theory.

In addition to other obstacles to the acceptance of Gurney's interpretation, Tyrrell summarized as follows what appears to be a fatal objection :

The real crux of the difficulty is not merely that each of the percipients sees at the same time an apparition *more or less* similar to that which the others see ; it is that all the percipients see the *same* thing, each from his own point of view in space, just as though it were a material figure. Gurney, apparently, half doubted whether this were so ; but I do not think that the evidence, carefully looked into, leaves any reasonable doubt that it is. . . . It seems therefore that there is scarcely room for doubt that the sensory image of one percipient is correlated with the sensory image of another just as it would be if the two percipients were seeing the same material figure in normal perception. . . .

If it be granted, as I think it reasonably must be, that perception of apparitions is full-blown perception, identical in its features with normal perception, and that in collective cases the various percipients see the *same* figure, each appropriately according to his position and distance from the figure ; and that, as the figure moves, the sensory images of all the percipients change exactly as they would if the figure were a material one, then Gurney's theory of collective perception breaks down. For it might be conceived that one percipient should telepathically affect another so as to cause him to see a figure more or less like the one he was seeing himself, but it is inconceivable that the figures should be exactly correlated to one another as in normal perception. Indeed, experimental telepathy suggests the figures seen by

¹ Tyrrell, op. cit., p. 43.

² *Proc. S.P.R.*, 50, 1953 51-66.

the different percipients would be likely to differ a good deal from one another.

The above statement appears on pages 70 to 73 of the printed lecture. On page 102 the crucial point is reiterated as follows :

It is not merely a feat of multiple *perception* which is performed in such cases ; it is a feat of *correlation* in which each percipient sees exactly the aspect of the moving apparition which he would see from his particular standpoint in space if the apparition were material.

Salter and Broad have challenged Tyrrell's Factual Basis. Commenting on a preliminary discussion emerging from Tyrrell's treatment of collective cases, Professor Broad said :¹

If Tyrrell is right in his alleged facts about the correlation of the hallucinatory appearances as *between different percipients* (in the case of collective hallucination) and about the correlation of *successive hallucinatory* appearances (in the case of a *single* percipient who changes his position during the course of his experience), I think that his criticism of Gurney's theory is another nail in its coffin. But I must confess that I am extremely sceptical about the alleged facts. I very much doubt whether enough percipients have made and reported enough sufficiently accurate observations on the correlations in question to justify any confident generalization such as Tyrrell makes here.

Similarly, Mr Salter commented :²

It seems to me very doubtful whether we have at present sufficiently well-established evidence on which to build a satisfactory theory that would cover all sorts of types of apparitions, veridical and non-veridical, those of the living and of the dead, those occurring once to a single percipient, and those occurring simultaneously to several percipients, or on more than one occasion in connection with the same place. . . . In particular, I was not sure, nor am I now, that there were enough well-evidenced instances of apparitions that were both collective and veridical to justify the arguments on this subject either of Gurney or of Myers.

Tyrrell's Statistical Summary. As to the existence of substantial evidence of collectively perceived apparitions, Tyrrell said, in 1943 :³

Out of a total of 1,087 visual hallucinations [reported by the Census of Hallucinations], . . . there were only 283 in which another person (or persons) besides the percipient were present. Of these 283, 95 were collectively perceived and 188 were not. [When the percipient is not alone at the time of the experience, collective percipience] takes place in about one third of the cases.

¹ C. D. Broad, letter, 15 April 1954.

² W. H. Salter, letter, 8 April 1954.

³ Op. cit., p. 23.

Tyrrell said that he had counted 130 collective cases, and that he had no doubt that this list was not exhaustive.¹

Broad Facts obtained in the Present Statistical Study. Tyrrell's data were collected under different statistical criteria from those used in the present study. He does not appear to have listed his 130 collective cases, and doubtless many of them would be included here if our collection were more nearly exhaustive. However, the findings of the present inquiry are of interest in comparison with those of Tyrrell.

Not only in the use of operationally defined evidentiality scores, but also with respect to the definition of the situations, our study differs. Tyrrell included among his 283 cases all in which another person or persons besides the percipient were 'present'. We have stipulated that the additional persons must have been, not merely present, but so situated that they would have perceived the apparition if it had been a physically embodied person. This excludes persons who were present but asleep, or with their backs turned, or cut off by intervening walls, furniture or the like. Under these specifications, the cases thus far may be classified as shown in Table VI.

TABLE VI

VISIBILITY OR INVISIBILITY TO ADDITIONAL PERCIPIENTS, OF APPARITIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO LIFE-OR-DEATH STATUS

Apparition's Status as to Collectivity	Life-or-Death Status of the Appearer					Totals
	Dead 12 Hours or More	Dead 0 to 11 Hours	At Point of Death	Living		
				Not Conscious	Conscious	
Collectively perceived Invisible to persons who would have seen normally embodied person similarly located -	8	0	3	11	4	26
-	3	5	7	2	3	20
Totals - - -	11	5	10	13	7	46

Of the 1,087 visual hallucinations cited by Tyrrell, 26 per cent had other persons 'present'. Of the 167 cases analysed in the present study, 46, or 28 per cent, reported other persons so situated that they would have perceived the apparition if it had been a normal person. Of Tyrrell's visual hallucinations with more than one person 'present', 34 per cent were reported as

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-72.

collective. Of the 46 cases of the present study in which more than one person was in a position to be a percipient, 26, or 56 per cent, were reported as collective. In other words, the present study confirms—and, if anything, strengthens—the conclusion that collectivity is a frequent phenomenon when more than one person is favourably situated to be a percipient, and that a fairly numerous collection of such cases is available.

Does Sensitivity of the Percipient, or Visibility of the Apparition determine Collective Perception? If apparitions were subjective projections, induced by telepathic impressions, then ESP capacity would determine the frequency of collective perceptions, when two or more potential percipients were in position to perceive. In order that 56 per cent of cases should be collective when two potential percipients were present, the probability of a single potential percipient seeing an apparition when one was present would have to be .56. In other words, it would be necessary to assume that more than half of all persons have the capacity to perceive apparitions when apparitions are present. That would mean that apparitions actually are only very rarely in position to be perceived.

But are they really so rare? A representative sample of Duke students was asked this question: 'Have you ever actually seen your physical body from a viewpoint completely outside that body, like standing *beside* the bed and looking at yourself lying *in* the bed, or like floating in the air near your body?' To this question, one in three of the students answered 'Yes'. Most of these students reported having had such experiences more than once. Probably most projections out of the physical body are unconscious, or are forgotten. Assuming that such phenomena are as frequent as such data would seem to indicate, millions of people ought to be seeing them with great frequency—if they were normally perceptible. It seems probable that not one in thousands of the projected individuals is seen as an apparition.

It seems clear, then, that the capacity to perceive apparitions must be very widespread, and that the occurrence of such cases depends, not so much on the ESP capacity of the percipients as on the *variable visibility of apparitions*.

The Lambert Hypothesis of Psi Light. The high frequency with which other persons present share the perception of an apparition might, perhaps, be explained on the basis of the following hypothesis, proposed by Guy Lambert, in a letter dated 16 June 1954:

The evidence taken as a whole seems to me to suggest that an apparition is not an evanescent construction which builds itself up, and then dissipates itself again, but is a continuing object which only rarely

becomes visible, because it is only rarely 'illuminated' by a kind of 'light' which it can reflect, or give off. To find 'room' for psi-objects need we posit a fourth or fifth 'dimension,' or 'psychic space'? Can they not exist in 3-dimensional space, but in a 'substance' which is not normally perceptible by any of the five senses. I am so closely 'geared' to objects illuminated by ordinary physical light (call it normal or N-light) that I have never seen an object (save, perhaps in a dream) visible only by psi-light. But there seem to be some people ('sensitives') who give off a certain amount of psi-light, by which they can see psi-objects in their neighbourhood, even when they are awake. (Compare the expression 'this light' used by 'controls' and 'communicators' to describe Mrs Piper herself, the famous medium.) There seems also to be a process whereby a psi-object can be strongly 'illuminated' by some 'agent' other than the percipient (sensitive), so that it forces itself on his attention, and is seen as an object intruding into the ordinary environment lit by N-light. The psi-object (apparition) is 'out there' where the percipient sees it, and if there is another person present sufficiently 'sensitive,' he or she may see it too (a collective case). If the percipient shuts his eyes, the disappearance of the N-scene *may* by force of suggestion cause him to lose sight of the psi-object. But if he is a person accustomed to seeing psi-objects (like Mrs Verrall, cited by W. H. Salter in *Ghosts and Apparitions* pp. 91-2), he will probably continue to see the psi-object while his eyes are shut, because psi-light is not intercepted by N-objects (at this juncture, eyelids).

If the percipient, on the other hand, tries to touch the psi-object, he finds 'nothing there,' and the negative suggestion is so strong that it renders him unable to see the psi-object any longer. But if his sense of sight remains uncontradicted by his sense of touch, he can see a third person walk through the apparition without losing sight of it himself.

The fact that an invisible 'presence' is sometimes strongly felt before an apparition is seen (cf. Kearne case, Raynor Johnson, p. 196) supports the view that the *seeing* of an apparition is a matter of 'illumination' of something already there. Compare the device known as 'Pepper's Ghost,' which may be a closer analogy than one has been accustomed to suppose.

If an apparition touches a percipient, the percipient usually feels the touch. That may be the result of a positive suggestion, as to a hypnotised subject, i.e., the effect is the reverse of that mentioned above, where the percipient tries to touch the apparition. Why these opposed effects should occur, I do not pretend to understand. Within the field of one sense, e.g. sight, a psi-object under full psi-illumination seems to take precedence over N-objects in the same part of the field (the Morton Ghost, e.g. 'intercepted the light'—(R. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 201)) but when the psi-light is slowly increasing or decreasing both fields of vision can be seen for a short time and 'transparency' effects are noticed.

It seems to me that there must be a generic likeness between psi-vision and N-vision. Otherwise their 'fields' could not overlap, as they do. . .

The Qualitative Study of Collective Cases. Professor Broad, in a letter dated 11 May 1954, supplemented as follows the statement cited on page 203 :

I am not specially sceptical about the occurrence of collective apparitions in a wide sense, i.e. that several persons in close spatial contiguity may simultaneously have hallucinatory perceptions which may roughly be regarded as *quasi*-perceptions of one and the same object. What I am sceptical about is whether we have good ground for holding that these hallucinatory perceptions are precisely so interrelated as they would be if they were normal perceptions of one and the same physical object from various points of view. I doubt whether any careful observations to test *this question* have been made in any appreciable proportion of the reported cases. What ground had Tyrrell for [his] very confident assertion on what (I should have thought) has never been accurately and explicitly tested by the percipients concerned?

A crucial issue in the discussions which have been embodied in this article is whether (1) the available evidence about collectively perceived apparitions points towards the existence in such cases of an objective structure, or whether (2) the reports of such cases might rather be interpreted as merely the simultaneous occurrence of telepathic impressions on the part of various percipients, all of whom projected these images into their environment in such ways as to produce the reports of collective perception of an apparition. The challenges by Broad and Salter point towards the need for a reappraisal of the evidence on this point.


In the following analysis it is taken for granted that veridical apparitions have been perceived in at least scores of cases, and that in a considerable number of such cases the perception has been either collective, reciprocal, or both. The present purpose is to assemble the readily available evidence which may help to determine which of the foregoing hypotheses fits the pertinent cases best. Only cases having some reasonable degree of evidentiality will be cited, but the details bearing upon evidentiality will not be reviewed except as they come incidentally into the discussion of the main issue stated above. The available cases of collectively perceived apparitions may be classified into the following categories :

1. *A Case of Verified Dual Perspective*

In, or about, 1892, Lady B and her daughter were sleeping in the same room in London. In the middle of the night both ladies suddenly started up wide awake, and saw a female figure in a white garment with dark curly hair hanging down the back. The figure was standing in front of the fireplace, over which was a mirror. Lady B saw the face in quarter profile, the head intercepting its own reflection in the mirror.

Miss B saw the back of the figure with its long dark hair ; the face was not directly visible to her, but she saw it clearly reflected in the mirror. Both percipients immediately sprang out of bed to the doors, which were found locked. When they turned round again, the figure had disappeared.¹

The way in which the two percipients viewed this apparition from different angles (and thus verified the fact that their two observations corresponded with what would have been observed if a physically embodied person had been occupying the position in which the apparition stood) can be made clearer by a diagram :



From the account of the above case, and the relationships summarized by the diagram, it seems clear that both percipients saw this apparition in the perspectives which were proper to their respective viewpoints, both directly and as reflected in the mirror.

2. *Cases Involving Three or More Percipients.* Perhaps the most famous case of this type is that involving the collective percipience of a conscious apparition of Mrs S. R. Wilmot.

In this case, the first percipient was the wife herself, who experienced ESP projection to a ship a thousand miles or more at sea, in which she visited her husband's stateroom, perceived her husband in the lower berth while another man watched her from the upper berth, and in which she went to her husband's side, stooped down, kissed him, and after caressing him for a few moments withdrew. The second percipient was the husband, who perceived her at the door of the stateroom, clad in her nightdress, saw her discover the occupant of the upper berth, saw her hesitate, and then perceived her advancing to the side of his berth, stooping down, kissing him, caressing him, and withdrawing. The third percipient was the man in the upper berth, who saw her enter the stateroom and carry out the actions noted by the wife as her opera-

¹ *Jour. S.P.R.*, 6, 1893-4, 145-6.

tions, and by the husband as his observations. In this case, the apparition seems to have been experienced by each of the three percipients in correct perspective, and in correct orientation to the stateroom.¹

The second case in this group is that of the tax commissioner in a New England state who committed suicide on Easter Monday, 1920.

He had been greatly devoted to a church of which he was senior warden. On the next Sunday morning, when the offering was brought to the chancel steps by the new warden and his associate, the rector and two parishioners, in widely separated parts of the church, saw an apparition of the suicide at his usual place near the other two wardens. It is reported that he was as lifelike and realistic to each of the three percipients as on any Sunday of the thirty years during which he had officiated there. This obviously means that each of the three purportedly saw him in correct perspective from their individual viewpoints.²

The third case in this group is that of Samuel Bull, who died in June 1931, and whose apparition was seen repeatedly, sometimes by individual members but several times by groups of his relations.

On one occasion, the figure was visible continuously for a period thought to have been a half hour. It always appeared to be quite lifelike. The features were clearly recognized. He was dressed as he usually had been in the evenings when he had finished work. In one instance nine members of the family all perceived the apparition at the same time. The reported lifelikeness of these appearances makes it seem evident that each of the percipients saw the apparition in at least approximately correct perspective—as if an embodied human being had been at the spot where the apparition was seen. Not only visual but, in at least one instance, auditory and tactual percipience was also involved and was correctly correlated with the visual.³

For comparison with the above three apparitional cases, it may be suggestive to consider a shared dream in which each of three participants appears to have perceived the drama from his own appropriate perspective. This dream was reported by Henry Armitt Brown, later a distinguished lawyer, who at the time of the experience was a law student in New York City.

Brown dreamed, one November night in 1865, that he was lying on his back on the cobblestones of a narrow street, writhing in the grip of

¹ *Proc. S.P.R.*, 7, 1891-2, 41-4; F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality*, Vol. I, pp. 683-5.

² *Jour. A.S.P.R.*, 22, 1928, 429-30.

³ *Jour. S.P.R.*, 24, 1928, 227-31.

a low-browed, thickset man with unkempt hair and grizzled beard, who with one hand at his throat and holding his wrists with the other, threw his weight upon Brown and held him down. As he struggled he saw the horror-stricken faces of friends within a rod of him, rushing to his rescue. Before they could reach him, his assailant chopped Brown's head open with a shiny new hatchet. The next day, the friend who had been the foremost among the rescuers told of having dreamed of hearing noises and cries of murder, of hurrying in the direction of the noise, and of finding Brown lying on his back fighting a rough labouring man who was holding him down, and who struck Brown on the head with a hatchet and killed him before the rescuing friends could reach him. The next week, the second among the rescuers, spontaneously and without having been told of the experience of the other two, told of his having dreamt also his part in the shared dream. Under the definitions of ESP projection being used in this Project, Brown's figure in the dream should be regarded as a projection—presumably into a non-material environment. From the accounts given by Brown and his two friends, it seems clear that each of them perceived the situation in perspectives consistent with one another.¹

3. *Pedestrian Apparitions observed by two or more Percipients.* At least seven fairly good cases have been located in which the apparition walked or glided through a room or scene, while two or more independent percipients observed and subsequently agreed as to the character of the movement.

In one case, three women independently recognized the apparition of Dr R.'s mother, who had died ten years before. The two percipients who were interviewed recollected the precise dress of the apparition, and their account agreed entirely that the apparition had crossed the room, approached a portrait of Dr R., lingered to look at it, recrossed to the door, and inexplicably vanished.²

In a second case, Mr and Mrs Barber, approaching their own home, saw a woman pass through a gate, move up the path to the house, and then up two steps, disappearing through the locked door before their eyes. The figure appeared entirely natural, commonplace, and substantial.³

The other five cases are similar.⁴

4. *Apparitions whose Positions were Independently and Consistently observed by two or more Percipients.* In view of the fairly clear-cut evidence given in the cases cited above, it hardly seems

¹ Walter Franklin Prince, *Noted Witnesses for Psychic Occurrences*, 1928, 61-4.

² *Proc. S.P.R.*, 6, 1888, 1889-90, 32-3.

³ *Jour. S.P.R.*, 6, 1893-4, 22-5.

⁴ *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II, pp. 241; 260; 615-16; *Proc. S.P.R.*, 8, 1892, 311-32; 10, 1894, 305-6.

necessary to cite in detail the 16 cases in which two or more percipients at the same time observed apparitions whose location in the room or the outdoor scene were agreed upon consistently by those who observed them. The citations are noted below.¹

5. *Walking around an Apparition.* Tyrrell, describing 'the perfect apparition,' generalized: 'We should be able to walk around the apparition, viewing it from any distance and from any standpoint, and as regards distance and perspective, we should detect no difference between it and the living person.'² Six cases are cited in support of this point. The following case is not cited by Tyrrell in this connection and is not collective (as such cases need not be), but it seems outstandingly pertinent.

On 8 May, 1885, Alfred Bard, passing through Hinxton Churchyard on his way home from work, saw Mrs de Freville leaning on the railing of a stone vault in which her husband was buried. Bard knew her very well, having at one time worked for her. He noted that she was dressed much as he had usually seen her, in a coal-scuttle bonnet, black jacket with deep crape, and black dress. She was looking at him. Her face was very much whiter than usual. Bard walked round the tomb, looking carefully at it in order to see if the gate was open, keeping his eye on the apparition and never more than five or six yards from her. Her face turned and followed him. He stumbled slightly and looked at his feet for a moment only, but when he looked up she was gone, though no physically embodied person could have reached any of the exits without having passed very near him. It was not until next morning that Bard learned that Mrs de Freville had been found dead about two hours previous to the time when he saw her apparition.³

6. *Apparitions of the Living observed Independently and Consistently from the outside and the inside.* This is a simpler variety of a kind of phenomenon reported with more elaborate connections in some of the preceding groups. Indeed, it may be worth noting that the Wilmot case (in Group 2) combines the features of subsequent Groups 3, 4 and 6. Of 10 cases where the conscious apparition perceived himself or herself as being at the same

¹ Raynor C. Johnson, *The Imprisoned Splendour*, 1953, 202; *Jour. A.S.P.R.*, 1922, 197-9; *Jour. S.P.R.*, 6, 1893-4, 179-81; 9, 1903-4, 185-7; 24, 1928, 227-31; Sylvan Muldoon, *The Case for Astral Projection*, 1936, 96; *Phantasms of the Living*, I, 104-6; II, 211-12, 239-41, 625-6; *Proc. S.P.R.*, 6, 1889-90, 26-9, 370-1; Harold M. Sherman, *You Live After Death*, 1939, 55-73; Ralph Shirley, *The Mystery of the Human Double*, 1937, 59-60, 64-9.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

³ *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I, pp. 212-14.

location at which an independent observer perceived him or her to be, references are given below in the footnote.¹

Cases favourable to the Telepathic Hypothesis. In varying degrees, each of the above six classes of purported apparitional phenomena is consistent with the hypothesis of an apparition being an objective structure which can be perceived in correct perspective and consistent relationship with physical or non-physical surroundings, by various percipients, or by the same percipient at successive points in the movement of the apparition or of the percipient. But are these cases consistent with the alternative hypothesis of telepathic impressions transmitted independently to two or more observers? What sort of apparitional cases might we expect to find if the Gurney theory of independent telepathic transmission were the fundamental explanation?

Strikingly enough, we have to turn to shared or reciprocal dreams to obtain illustrations which seem reasonably to indicate the kind of phenomena in question. For example, the following case presents what seems to be diverse formulations of a common telepathic impression by two dreamers :

On the night of 3 July, 1916, a man had an experience which was paralleled in dreams by his brother-in-law and by the latter's daughter. The comparable items may be shown in parallel columns as follows :²

<i>Events</i>	<i>Brother-in-law's dream</i>	<i>Niece's dream</i>
The man	The brother-in-law	The niece
found himself lying on the floor, feeling very ill, unable to call help ;	dreamed that he saw him lying unconscious and ghastly on the floor ;	dreamed that she had found her uncle lying unconscious ;
called the cook saying, '... I am very ill. ...'	that the dreamer tried unavailingly to get assistance ;	that her uncle had previously said : 'I am very ill' and had left the room ;
cook sent housemaid for whisky ; they poured some in his mouth.	that a woman promised to get some whisky, but did not come back ;	
cook and housemaid, with difficulty, lifted him to the bed.	that the dreamer previously lifted him with difficulty to the bed.	that neither she nor others were able to go to his assistance.

¹ Oliver Fox, *Astral Projection*, 1938, 56-9 ; Isaac Funk, *The Psychic Riddle*, 1907, 179-85 ; *Jour. A.S.P.R.*, 3, 1909, 615-16 ; Muldoon and Carrington, *Phenomena of Astral Projection*, 1951, 186-7 ; Myers, *Human Personality . . .*, 1903, 696 ; *Phantasms of the Living*, I, 1886, 225-6, 318-20 ; W. F. Prince, *Human Experiences*, 1931, 210-11 ; *Proc. S.P.R.*, 1, 1882, 122-3 ; 33, 1923, 415-17.

² *Jour. S.P.R.*, 18, 1917, 25-9.

The sequences in the two dreams differed from each other, and from the sequences of the actual events, to a somewhat greater extent than is evident from the above arrangement. But the central point is that both dreamers appear to have picked up, extrasensorily, the ideas of the man unconscious (and, later, conscious) on the floor, and of the difficulty about getting help. The brother-in-law picked up the idea about the woman going for whisky, and about lifting the man with difficulty to the bed; the niece picked up the idea—and the words—of the 'I am ill' speech. On the other hand, one might explore the alternative hypothesis that the brother-in-law and niece *may* each have been projected to the scene, and may have awakened with incomplete and somewhat transposed memories of the experience.

More clearly pertinent, perhaps, is the following partially shared dream:

A woman called Ann Jones awakened from an unusually deep sleep at 7.45 on the morning of 28 December, 1919. She carried over from her dreaming consciousness a vision of heaven as an immense, dark, blue-purple-violet globe, with a segment open, from which radiance and strongly stressed music issued. Trying to arouse herself, she turned and saw (normally) a white toy elephant which stood in the room. This sight banished her vision and the sound of the music. She told no one about it until she related it to her brother in the afternoon. Just after he left, and without having seen the brother, their sister, E., came in, and spontaneously told of dreaming that morning that she saw Ann walking up an incline into a mound which was heaven. In a few moments she perceived in her dream that Ann reappeared from behind the mound in the form of three small white elephants. E. then awoke, to find that it was 7.45. Both participants signed independent accounts of these experiences, which were filed within three months of the occurrence. The brother also signed a statement that he remembered his sister having told him a dream on this occasion.¹

Both dreamers included the idea of heaven as a globe or mound, and the idea of entrance into it. The white toy elephant in Ann's waking experience seems obviously to correspond with the three small white elephants in her sister E.'s dream. Otherwise the imagery of the two dreams (as reported) appears to have been quite different.

Another pair of shared dreams, with marked discrepancies, is the following:

On a morning in February 1924, a man dreamed that a long-necked bird (something like a cross between a turkey and a pheasant) was

¹ *Jour. S.P.R.*, 21, 1924, 350-2.

rubbing his wife's eyes with its beak, and that he warned her to be careful with her eyes. In his dream he heard her say that it would be all right. She, at the same time, dreamed of a swan coming up out of the sea and attacking a dog. In her dream she crouched down, with the swan's neck over her. She kept quiet and said to her husband in the dream, 'I suppose it could hurt me.' He replied, 'Oh, rather! It could have your eyes out.' A joint statement of these dreams was written out immediately after the participants had related them to each other, and was signed by both of them.¹

In these two dreams, the idea of a bird with a menacing relation to the wife's eyes is shared by both dreamers, but the other details are markedly at variance.

Such discrepancies between telepathically transmitted images would be expected in the light of the unreliable and incomplete character of experimentally demonstrated telepathy. Many reciprocal dreams have much closer correspondences than the three just cited, but this amount of deviation would certainly seem to be within the expected range. If that is the case, why do we not find a great many incipient or fragmentary examples of apparitions in versions as different as those in the above presumably telepathically similar dreams? The nearest approach to such a case which the present writer has been able to locate is the following :

On 20 June, 1905, Captain Frederick Ward had an accident in which he was badly bruised and shaken while returning from driving his friend, Mrs Ella B. Green, to a place where she was to visit. The next afternoon, between three and four o'clock, while he was lying on a couch thinking about Mrs Green, he suddenly heard her voice outside the house. He managed with difficulty to get to the window to call her in, and was greatly amazed not to see her and find no one there. The same afternoon, Mrs Green, in the drawing room of the house where he had driven her the previous day, happening to look up, saw Captain Ward outside the bay window, looking in at her as though he desired to speak to her. She rose hastily and went to the window calling to him and waving her hand to him, as a sign for him to go to the hall door. When she reached the window she was surprised not to see him. She hurried to the door but he was not there, nor was anyone near the house.²

In the above case, it seems reasonable to suppose that the idea of the other person being outside the window might have been transmitted telepathically. The case would be a more obvious deviation from correct perspective adjustment if Captain Ward had seen an *apparition* of Mrs Green outside his window instead

¹ *Jour. S.P.R.*, 21, 1924, 349-50. Cf. the telepathic dream image of H.B.'s sweetheart's swollen face, reported by Salter, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11.

² *Jour. S.P.R.*, 12, 1905-6, 193-6.

of merely hearing her voice. If Mr Salter, Professor Broad, or any other readers of this article know of other cases, pointing more clearly to a telepathic interpretation, the present writer would greatly appreciate having his attention called to them. In the absence of such data, the hypothesis that apparitions usually constitute some sort of objective images seems to be fairly well substantiated by an impartial summary of available evidence.

Physical Psychic Phenomena. The present study is concerned primarily with visually perceived apparitions. But in collecting cases of this type, the number of more or less parallel cases involving physical phenomena has been impressive. The overturning of furniture, the shattering of glass and crockery, the ringing of bells, the stopping of clocks, and the like appear to be so frequent that it is a distortion of the picture to ignore them. Such cases correspond logically to the psychokinetic phenomena of the Parapsychology Laboratory. They appear to be so well authenticated that they need to be recognized as part of the total factual picture. They add further weight to the conception of apparitions as objective phenomena.

TYRRELL'S IDEA-PATTERNS, PRICE'S ETHERIC IMAGES, AND JOHNSON'S PSYCHIC AETHER

The foregoing review of evidence would seem to settle fairly decisively the question whether collectively perceived apparitions are to be interpreted as (1) mere simultaneous but independent subjective constructions on the basis of telepathic impulses from the same source, or as (2) some sort of objective reality, perceived jointly. Clearly, the latter must be assumed. But what is the essential nature of this objective reality? Three leading answers to that question have been advanced—the one by Professor H. H. Price in his Presidential Address of 1939, the one by Tyrrell in his book *Apparitions*, first published in 1943, and revised in 1953, and the one set forth on Raynor Johnson's *The Imprisoned Splendour*.

Tyrrell's Theory. That apparitions are not material objects was stated emphatically by Tyrrell:¹

The apparition has no physical basis. . . . The evidence for the non-physical character of apparitions arises from the following circumstances : (i) they appear and disappear in locked rooms ; (ii) they vanish while being watched ; (iii) they sometimes become transparent and fade away ; (iv) they are often seen and heard by some of those present but not by all ; (v) they disappear into walls and closed doors and pass through physical objects ; (vi) people have put their hands through

¹ Op. cit., pp. 54, 60.

them and walked through them without encountering any resistance ; (vii) they leave no physical traces behind them.

And, further :¹

In whatever sense the central figure is 'there,' the auxiliary objects, the additional figures, and the environment are 'there' too. . . . The situation is rather a strange one because, although nothing is physically present in space, something (a *visual solid*) is *visibly* present in physical space.

To account for these difficult facts, Tyrrell presented a theory which may be epitomized as follows : Sense data can be originated not only by physical stimulation of the physical sense organs, but also by operation of an idea, aided by subconscious activities of the personality. An apparition is an 'idea-pattern'—a moving picture in three dimensions, ideationally created by the dramatic co-operation of the subconscious minds of the appearer and the percipient or percipients.² Such an idea-pattern (*a*) is usually associated with an initiating drive ; (*b*) manifests an urge toward expression and completeness ; and (*c*) is marvellously resourceful in adaptation and in adjusting means to ends.³

Tyrrell's explanation for collective perception of apparitions was as follows :⁴

Perhaps it would be useful here to introduce a metaphor and to compare the consciousness of the agent to the author of a play, and that 'something' within him which works out the idea in dramatic form to the 'producer'. Further, the 'something else' within him which expresses this drama in the form of an apparition may be compared to the 'executor' or 'stage carpenter' of the play. . . .

The apparitional drama is quite clearly in most cases a joint effort in which the subconscious producers of both agent and percipient take part. We know this because not only are there items in the apparition which the agent cannot have known ; there are also often items which the percipient cannot have known, such as a wound in a particular part of the body. . . . Thus the . . . 'producer-levels' of the agent and per-

¹ Ibid., p. 69.

² Gurney had said (*Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I, 1886, pp. 536-7) : 'In the case of the spontaneous phantasms the percept . . . represents something which is certainly not consciously occupying the agent's mind—to wit, his own form or voice. . . . We shall thus shift, so to speak, the responsibility for the hallucination to the percipient's mind ; which we shall conceive as actively generating and projecting it under a peculiar form of impulse, instead of passively receiving a full-fledged percept from the agent's mind, where nothing in the least resembling such a percept had any conscious place.'

³ Op. cit., pp. 93, 96, 100-3, 109, 114, 143, 155.

⁴ Op. cit., pp. 101-2 ; 112-13 ; cf. pp. 71-3.

percipient must get together to work out apparitions ; and in cases of collective percipience the 'producer levels' of the additional percipients must also take part. . . .

An apparition is not a physical phenomenon but a sensory hallucination, and is collectively perceived because of some kind of telepathic process taking place between the percipients. . . . I am suggesting that the 'telepathy' which accounts for collective percipience is the establishment of a relationship between the mid-level centres of the personalities of the percipients of such a kind that it causes each to play his part in expressing a collective idea-pattern. . . .

Given that a dramatic idea-pattern is formed, the features it contains will be provided on account of their relevance to the theme. In collective percipience, people who are near the apparition are caused to see it because their physical situation makes them *relevant* as percipients. Similarly, the idea-pattern constituting a haunting ghost has for its theme a figure moving about in a particular house or locality. Anyone in this house or near this locality becomes a relevant percipient and is psychically operated upon so as to become one.

Professor C. D. Broad commented :¹

I have never clearly understood Tyrrell's own theory. All the talk about co-operating stage-carpenters seems to me to be mythology, and I find it hard to discover what its precise cash value may be.

Professor Price replied :²

I think Broad pours too much cold water on the 'producer' and the 'stage carpenter'. Of course those phrases were not intended to be taken literally—they are just rather whimsical personifications of certain (unconscious) levels or phases of human personality. But something of the kind seems to be needed to explain ordinary dreams, when our astonishing dramatic and inventive power is sometimes displayed of which our ordinary humdrum conscious minds seem quite incapable. It seems to me that we ought to be much more astonished at this feature of dreams than we usually are. I suggest then that we can go at least that far towards accepting Tyrrell's rather peculiar language on this point.

Salter commented :³

It seems to me that Tyrrell made a very great advance in emphasizing the dramatic co-operation of subconscious minds in the production of veridical apparitions. This was not an entirely new idea as it had been suggested by Mrs Sidgwick, but it was Tyrrell who brought it out in some detail. It is the nature of this phantasmal space that seems to require elucidation.

¹ C. D. Broad, letter, 15 April 1954.

² H. H. Price, letter, 22 May 1954.

³ W. H. Salter, letter, 8 April 1954.

The Myers-Price Theory. In contrast with that of Tyrrell, the theory which Professor H. H. Price developed, on the basis of concepts of F. W. H. Myers and C. W. A. Mace, held that apparitions are formed from something intermediate between mind and matter. Price explained this theory (in part) as follows :¹

There is one fairly comprehensive hypothesis which has commended itself in various forms to a number of inquirers. . . . This is the hypothesis of a something intermediate between mind and matter as we ordinarily understand them : something which is in *some* sense material because it is extended in space (though not necessarily in Physical Space) and yet has something of the properties commonly attributed to minds. This something was called by Frederic Myers 'the Metetherial'. . . . Let us follow Mr (C. W. A.) Mace in calling it the 'Psychic Ether'. . . .

We will indeed concede that every image is *originated* by a mental act—not necessarily a conscious one—and that this act has its physiological correlate. But we will suppose that, once it has come into being, the image has a tendency to *persist* in being ; and that it is not dependent upon the mind for its continuance, as it was for its origination. . . . We will also suppose that it is not necessarily *private* to the mind of its original author, but is capable of presenting itself in suitable circumstances to other minds as well. . . .

Let us suppose that images are not only persistent entities but are endowed with causal *properties*. If you prefer to put it so, we will say that they are 'dynamic' rather than 'static' entities, endowed with a kind of 'force' of their own.

Tyrrell and Price were not completely at odds with one another in their theories of apparitional structure. A parallel-column epitome may help to bring this out.

	<i>Tyrrell</i>	<i>Price</i>
Name of structure :	idea-pattern	etheric image
Dynamic :	initiating drive ; urge towards completeness	dynamic causal properties ; tendency to persist
Origin :	by operation of a current or very recent idea	in a mental act—which may have occurred long ago
Extension :	in three dimensions	spatial entities
Motion :	a moving picture	a cinematographic phantasm
Sharedness :	created co-operatively	not necessarily private ; telepathic affinity ; Common Unconscious

The Myers-Price Theory would explain *collectively* perceived apparitions as being due to telepathic perception, by the various

¹ *Proc. S.P.R.*, 45, 1938-39, 317-28 ; 333 ; cf. F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*, Vol. II, p. 266 ; cited by Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-6.

percipients, of dynamic etheric images which had developed in the common unconscious. Price said :¹

... Let us suppose then that every image is endowed with a kind of *telepathic charge*, enabling it to modify or even perhaps to generate other mental contents, which need not necessarily be contents in the mind of its original author. . . .

When I suggested that images might be dynamic entities as well as persistent ones, and that each was endowed with a telepathic charge, this was only a special and limited form of the hypothesis of a Common Unconscious :² limited, because images are only one sort of mental contents. . . . The hypothesis of a Common Unconscious is only another way of saying that at their deeper levels all personalities are in complete and continuous telepathic rapport. . . .

I now want to illustrate the explanatory value of my hypothesis by applying it to the phenomena of . . . haunting without physical effects. . . . Let us now suppose . . . that in certain special circumstances an image or group of images might get itself localized in a particular region of Physical Space. . . . Suppose that a human being now enters the room ; and suppose there is a telepathic affinity between the contents of his mind on the one hand, and these persisting and localized images on the other. A telepathic process then occurs. . . . In the most favourable cases, it might be the generation of a phantasm located in his ordinary waking visual field (or tactual field as the case may be). This apparition might be related to the persisting image in much the same kind of way as the visual sense-datum of a chair is related to the physical chair. . . . And so we should be entitled to say here that he is *perceiving* the persistent and localized image. Moreover, if there were other persons in the room whose mental contents had the required telepathic affinity with the persisting image, we could say that these other persons too were perceiving the persistent image as well as he. Likewise he or others might perceive it again on some later occasion. Thus the persisting image would be a kind of 'public object', as the chair is ; except that it would be 'public' to a restricted class of persons—namely all those, and only those, whose mental contents had the requisite minimum of telepathic affinity—whereas the chair is public to all percipients with normal eyesight.

Tyrrell's Criticism. After summarizing Professor Price's theory in about two-thirds of one page, Tyrrell offered the following criticism :³

I find . . . some difficulty in seeing why a purely psychical process of perception, or sensing, should be dependent upon the percipient's

¹ Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-6.

² See 'The Association Theory of Telepathy,' in Whately Carington's *Thought Transference*, 1946, pp. 98 ff., and especially p. 104.

³ Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-6. Price points out that he partly anticipated this objection, and suggested a reply to it on pages 334-6 of his Address.

physical proximity to the image. The image, itself non-physical or at most quasi-physical, is anchored by some material influence to a position in space. If it operated physically on the percipient's sense-organs, it would, of course, be obvious why he should see the image when he is near the place. But if it operates *psychically* by a process having nothing to do with matter or space, he would surely be expected to see the hallucinatory figure wherever he was. In other words, it seems to me that Professor Price's theory suffers in some degree, like that of Myers, from its hybrid character, being partly physical and partly non-physical.

Professor C. D. Broad commented :¹

I attach more weight than you seem to do to Tyrrell's criticism of Price's theory. I take it that the point of Tyrrell's objection is this. In the case of normal sense-perception observers perceive a body through sensations generated by physical influences travelling from it to their bodies and affecting the appropriate sensory organ. We can understand the relevance of spatial proximity between the observer's body and the perceived body in this case. But Price supposes that the awareness by a percipient of the supposed 'image' in the 'psychic ether' is due to a perception of a completely different sort, which he calls 'telepathic'—whatever that may mean in this context! It is not at all obvious why spatial proximity of the observer's body to the place in which the 'image' is located should be relevant.

Professor C. J. Ducasse wrote :²

With regard to the notion of 'dynamic etheric images', it seems to me that what is wrong with it is the attributing of the dynamism to the images themselves ; for the very *occurrence* of the image in somebody's consciousness is an effect which the dynamism of something *other than the image* produces. The error is the same as would be that of attributing dynamism to our sensations, instead of to the physical objects whose dynamism (i.e., whose exercise of their operatory capacities) causes the sensations. Thus, it is not etheric *images*, but etheric *substances* (etheric objects), which persist.

These etheric objects constitute a 'common unconscious' only in the sense in which physical objects, *at times when nobody is perceiving them*, are a 'common (physical) unconscious' ; that is, at such times, they are 'unconscious' in the sense of *actually unperceived* ; and 'common' in the sense that, at such times, *everybody* is actually unconscious of them, though they are potentially public, i.e., susceptible of being perceived by all persons.

Thus, Tyrrell's criticism of Price's theory . . . that if the image (the etheric object) 'operates *psychically* by a process having nothing to do with matter or space, (the percipient) would surely be expected to see

¹ C. D. Broad, letter, 15 April 1954.

² C. J. Ducasse, letter, 23 March 1954.

the hallucinatory figure wherever he was' is invalid; for it is not physical but psychical proximity to the etheric object, which determines whether *it* is perceived or not; and psychical proximity to it is a matter not of the spatial location, *as such*, of the percipient, but of the psychical affinity, or not, between the etheric object and the psychical state, to wit, the sensations and feelings, caused in the percipient by the physical objects present at that location.

Price replied :¹

I am thoroughly confused—was then, and still am—about Ducasse's point . . .—the distinction between images and image-objects. I think some such distinction is needed. But how an image *object* should be conceived of, I do not clearly see. I wanted to say, of course, that though created by a mental act in consciousness, it could go on thereafter independently. One is tempted to think that it would be the same sort of thing that Phenomenonistic philosophers say that physical objects are. A physical object, he says, is just a permanent possibility of sensations. Would an image object be a permanent possibility of images? There is, however, an important difference that whereas matter's permanent possibility of sensations is certainly not *created* by anyone's act of sensing, an image object (at least according to me) would have to be created by someone's act of imaging. . . . This suggests to me that imaging and sensation are not as completely parallel as Ducasse's theory would make them: i.e., the relation of his 'etheric substances' to consciousness is not wholly parallel with the relation of ordinary physical substances to consciousness. But I am afraid I just don't see my way through this particular tangle at present.

Raynor Johnson's Theory. Price remarked :²

The most original and interesting part of Dr Johnson's discussion . . . is his theory of a 'psychic aether'—something intermediate between mind and matter as we ordinarily conceive of them, and possessing properties akin to both. This conception has been tentatively suggested by others [notably by Price himself]; but no one else, I think, has applied it on anything like the scale Dr Johnson does. . . . Psychometry . . . comes right into the centre of the picture.

And, it might be added, Dr Johnson draws his basic theory from Theosophy. Price points out that while 'the hypothesis of a psycho-aetheric body is just an extension of a hypothesis which is supported by other paranormal phenomena, namely psychometry, haunting, clairvoyance, and . . . psychokinesis, . . . the original conception of a psychic aether has . . . been extended a good deal' in Johnson's theory.

¹ H. H. Price, letter, 22 May 1954.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 55, 61.

In his own words, Johnson's conception of apparitions as related to matter may be abstracted as follows :¹

Reflection shows that sense-data, which we are prone to project on to an external object, are really private and personal. That they have much in common with other people's sense-data is no doubt true. That there is a 'subsistent object' which corresponds to an impenetrable region of space outside ourselves *may* also be true. All we want to be clear about is that the sense-data are what the mind is immediately acquainted with, and that they are not a part or property of the subsistent object, but are the mind's contribution to the art of perceiving. We might put it in the form of an equation : Material Object for a person equals Subsistent Object plus Sense-Data for that person. Of the nature of the subsistent world we can know nothing through our senses. Since this is so, it is open to us to speculate that it may be of the nature of a permanent mental field to which our own minds are related or in which they are immersed. . . .

Apparitions would thus be regarded as perceptions similar to those of everyday life, except that they lack permanence and impenetrability, due to the evanescent character of the subsistent object created. . . .

There is only one mode of excitation of sense-data, which is identical for both normal 'objects' and apparitions. In both cases the fact of collective percipience leads naturally to the view that there is a subsistent object. . . .

I cannot find that any of the characteristics of apparitions which Tyrrell carefully listed and considered in his Myers Lecture are inconsistent with the views I have expressed above. . . .

There is nothing remarkable about different degrees of materialization. . . . I regard the telepathic thought-form as the animating principle or transient 'mind' which clothes itself in an aetheric body. This may condense enough chemical matter around it to reflect light. The extent to which it does this seems to differ greatly : sometimes the figure is transparent and the background can be seen through it ; at other times it has a solidity indistinguishable from an ordinary figure.

Johnson's approach to the collective aspect may be inferred from the following :²

Each member of a crowd around a table might say 'I see a green apple'. . . . We postulate a subsistent object as the common cause of their agreement. (We also find the 'subsistent object' useful to explain why, if the crowd go to sleep, as a result of which all their sense-data vanish, the apple does not cease to exist, and there is no necessity for a miraculous new creation of similar sense-data the next morning.) . . .

Because apparitions can be collectively perceived, it means no more and no less than the fact that apples can be collectively perceived. I

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 206-16 and 246.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 208-9.

infer a 'subsistent apparition,' . . . as well as a 'subsistent apple'. The former has its origin in an individual mind, and is often the cause of incompletely developed sense-data. It is also evanescent. The latter is part of the pattern sustained by the World Mind. . . .

Degree of Materialization. Guy W. Lambert wrote as follows :¹

The fact that *sometimes* an apparition disappears if the eyes are shut seems to me to indicate that *sometimes* the external sense organs are involved in the process of seeing an apparition.

There seem to be degrees of 'externalization,' from subjective visions, seen only in the dark or with the eyes closed, up to full externalization into the ordinary visual field. In the latter case the physical retina would seem to be involved. . . .

A fully externalized apparition seems to disappear by going more or less rapidly through the various 'degrees,' becoming transparent before it completely vanishes. . . .

If there is a process which can be experimentally induced [as by the drug peyotl, *Proc. S.P.R.*, 48, 356] and enough 'marginal' spontaneous cases can be selected for study, it seems to me there is some hope of making progress with the study of the theory of apparitions.

This question of the degrees of materialization is dealt with as follows by Johnson :²

The phenomena of materialization are not, I suggest, different in kind from those of apparitions. In the seance room, in the presence of a medium who has a loosely-knit type of aetheric body, such forms constructed or moulded by mind in the extracted aetheric material assume a 'density', so to speak, which attracts a sufficient amount of ordinary chemical matter to enable them to scatter light and become clearly visible. . . .

Remembering that the psychic aether is a bridge between mind and matter, that it is the medium through which ψ_k is operative, we here have the basis of psycho-kinesis—i.e., the movement of objects. By such means we can conceive of material objects being lifted into the air or thrown about, or floating down gently, of curtains billowing out as though in a wind, and of levitations. We have at least in the psychic aether a medium capable of sustaining mental-cum-physical forces and operating on matter in a 'paranormal' manner. The aetheric forms may not always have enough chemical matter associated with them to be visible (as in Dr Osty's work with Schneider), although the infra-red absorption may still be appreciable.

It has been suggested by Geley, Osborn and others that the process of construction of materialized forms in the seance room, while a little amateurish, is not substantially different from that associated with creation and growth in Nature. How do we suppose a physical body is built? Why does a leaf or flower grow to the size, shape, colour and

¹ Letter, 20 May 1954.

² Op. cit., pp. 246 and 248.

symmetry-pattern which in fact it does—and to no other? When repair of a wound takes place, why are the form and outline of the original pattern so closely followed? Perhaps the so-called 'astral' body is a dynamic, precise and persistent thought-form, which, through the medium of the aetheric body-structure which it directly creates, in turn moulds the body of ordinary matter to its form. The difference between the normal processes of growth in Nature and these paranormal processes may be only a difference of degree. . . .

What we need is a programme of research to secure that a minimum is postulated and a maximum correlated. I think it is also clear that we shall not get very far until a number of well-educated, scientifically trained persons develop their own clairvoyant faculty.

A SUMMARY CHECK OF HYPOTHESES AGAINST DATA¹

Of the six theories listed at the beginning of Part II of this article, the first three may be taken as basic hypotheses, to be tested against the factual evidence. Instead of the Johnson theory (which may be regarded as an extension of the Myers-Price theory in the direction of Theosophical views) let us test the more general occultist conception of the 'astral' body and the 'astral' world. The Murphy-Stern-Carington Theory seems to have been accepted generally, by the participants in the Project, as a conceded background. Instead of it at this point, let us test the Spiritualistic Theory in its generally advocated form. This gives us a revised set of five theories, to be tested in comparison with the conception which has been emerging out of the Operational Approach.

The five alternative hypotheses have been numbered A1 to A5. They may be epitomized briefly as follows :

A1. The Gurney hypothesis interpreted apparitions as mental hallucinations, created by individual percipients in response to telepathic impulses directly or indirectly received from the appearer.

A2. The Tyrrell hypothesis regarded apparitions as idea-patterns produced currently or very recently by the subconscious levels of the percipient, with or without the co-operative assistance of the unconscious of the appearer.

A3. The Myers-Price Theory, which has been further developed by Raynor C. Johnson, suggests that apparitions are etheric images, created currently, or in the past, by some mental act.

A4. The occultist theory holds that apparitions consist of the

¹ This summary section follows closely the address given by Hornell Hart before a meeting of the Society for Psychical Research at its headquarters on 7 July 1955.

astral or etheric bodies of the appearers, with clothing and accessories created *ad hoc*.

A5. The spiritualist theory assumes that apparitions of the dead are the spirits of the departed.

Data Consistent with the Gurney Hypothesis. Four points of established data may be enumerated which appear to be consistent with the Gurney hypothesis and which, to varying degrees, are also consistent with various of the other hypotheses :

D1. Apparitions of the living, the dying, and the dead are perceived with such frequency and with such similarity of basic characteristics that this type of phenomenon must be accepted as part of the reality of our existence.

D2. Typically, apparitions are perceived in ordinary clothing, and with accessories—such as objects which they carry in their hands, vehicles in which they ride, dogs or other animals by whom they are accompanied, and even apparitional companions, all of which disappear when the apparition disappears.

D3. Many characteristics of apparitions are indistinguishable from those of physically embodied persons, but apparitions may also have such characteristics as appearing and disappearing instantly, passing through solid matter, and being independent of gravitation.

D4. Apparitions tend to confine their words, gestures and activities to some relatively simple idea or group of ideas.

D5. While apparitions tend to coincide in time with crises about which they convey information, some apparitions involve precognitive information—or at least facts which are to occur in the future—and some apparitions (perhaps particularly haunts) may be retrocognitive in character.

Data Inconsistent with the Gurney Hypothesis, but Consistent with the Tyrrell and Myers-Price Hypotheses. While the Gurney theory would seem to be in accordance with the above five items, it seems to fail to take account of the observed data summarized in the following paragraphs :

D6. These apparitions are more likely than not to be perceived collectively, when they are perceived by one individual in the presence of another physically embodied person or persons who would have perceived them if they had been physically embodied, and they may be perceived by strangers or by persons other than the one most directly involved emotionally.

D7. The perspective in which apparitions are seen when they are perceived collectively, or when they move through a scene, or when the percipient moves relative to the apparition, is similar to that in which physically embodied persons would be seen under

similar circumstances. The angles of vision, interception of other objects, changes in apparent relative size, and so forth, are what would be experienced if the apparition were physically embodied.

D8. Apparitions of persons long dead may be seen repeatedly, even by strangers, in locations associated with tragic or other emotionally intense experiences. Such apparitions are likely to go through some relatively simple routine related to the long-past crisis.

The above three traits, while inconsistent with the Gurney theory of an hallucination created telepathically, do seem to be reconcilable with the Myers-Price theory, and two of them are consistent with the Tyrrell hypothesis. Those theories, however, appear to be inconsistent with the following apparitional traits :

D9. The characteristics of apparitions, and of their attendant apparitional accessories, do not necessarily correspond with the ideas in the conscious or the unconscious minds of either the percipient, the appearer, or (in some cases) of any living person. Back views of apparitions appear to be normal, and as detailed in appearance as front views. Evidential details are often conveyed which need not have been in the conscious or unconscious minds of either the percipient or the appearer.¹

D10. During ESP projection, a person may perceive his own physical body from a position wholly outside that body, may be aware of being in a projected body, and may, during the same excursion, be perceived as an apparition.

¹ On this subject, Professor Price wrote (in his letter of 22 May 1954) : 'The appearer is not very familiar with the appearance of his own body from without, e.g., the shape of his own nose, etc. Yet the apparition manages to be a very life-like imitation of him, which his friends can recognize quite easily. How is this managed? Tyrrell says, by co-operation between the producer-levels of the agent and the percipient (the percipient does know what Mr X looks like from without, though Mr X doesn't). [But equally life-like detail is reported in cases where the percipient has never seen the appearer in real life, and knows nothing about him. H.H.] What does your theory say about this? Would you say, by any chance, that the unconscious or subconscious forces which ideoplastically mould the apparitional body of Mr X are *also* responsible for moulding his *physical* body—e.g., for giving it this sort of nose and red hair of just this colour? It is not quite enough to refer to mirrors, I think. A man does often see his own face in a mirror, but he sees it the wrong way round. In the apparition, however, it is the right way round (as far as I know), e.g., if his physical hair is parted on the left, then it is parted on the left in the apparition. Moreover, most people, probably, have never seen their own backs in a mirror—since this requires quite an elaborate arrangement of several mirrors—but the backs of apparitions, as far as I know, are as life-like as their fronts.'

D.11 The apparitional body is used, during ESP projection, as a viewpoint for observation and as a base for operation by the projected observer-operator, but on the other hand, apparitions may be seen when the appearer is not aware of the appearance, and even when his attention is actively concentrated on other matters.

D12. A person may perceive his own apparition, from a viewpoint within or outside his own physical body, and the apparition may appear to be operating normally. Similarly, during projection, a person may observe that his physical body is carrying on its normal activities in an apparently intelligent way.

D13. Physical psychic phenomena also indicate that we are dealing with something more than subjective hallucinations.

The Occult and Spiritualistic Theories as Related to the above Data. While neither the Gurney, the Tyrrell nor the Myers-Price-Johnson hypotheses account satisfactorily for the data, as itemized under points D9 to 12, the occult and spiritualistic theories do seem to be consistent with part of these items. The occult conception of an astral body seems to account for almost all the data—but with the major exception of point D2, relating to the clothing and accessories perceived in conjunction with apparitions, which disappear when the apparitions disappear. The spiritualistic theory that apparitions are the veritable surviving spirits of the departed persons whom they represent seems difficult to reconcile with point D2, and also with D4, relating to the limited character of apparitional conversations and actions.

A CONVERGENT AND OBSERVATIONAL THEORY ABOUT APPARITIONS

The fact that each of the above five theories fails in various ways to account for the observed data does not mean that all of them—nor indeed any of them—needs to be discarded *in toto*. Each of these hypotheses or theories was developed and presented by its advocates because it did help to account for observations noted in the more reliable accounts of apparitions. Each of them might be modified in various ways so as to take account of the characteristics which the cruder statements of the hypotheses seem to miss. But such modifications would bring all of the theories into convergence toward a common, operationally accurate and adequate theory, making use of the valid aspects of the previous ones, but supplementing them so as to account adequately for all the clearly established types of observations.

This proposed convergent and operational theory involves two

basic propositions which may be stated briefly, and may then be reduced to observational specifications as follows :

1. Apparitions and their accessories are semi-*substantial* in the sense that they tend to have the following characteristics :

- (a) They are described as 'solid', 'real', or the like, and their visible details are often said to be vivid.
- (b) They are often perceived tactually and audibly as well as visibly, and these three kinds of perception are consistent with one another.
- (c) As thus perceived, they appear to be recognizably similar to—and often identical with—material human bodies and physical objects.
- (d) Their observed details may be otherwise unknown to any living person, and yet may prove to be verifiably correct.
- (e) They make adjustments to their physical surroundings and to physically embodied people, in much the same ways in which physically present people would do.
- (f) They are seen in normal perspective, both when stationary and when moving ; they may be reflected in mirrors, may obscure other objects and be obscured by other objects, and in other ways they fit into the physical environment as physical objects do.
- (g) They are often seen collectively by two or more persons at the same time.

2. Apparitions and their accessories are only *semi*-substantial, in the sense that they tend to have the following characteristics :

- (a) Their visibility is erratic, in that they are likely to appear or disappear suddenly and inexplicably, to be invisible to people who would see them if they were physically embodied, to fade in or out, and to be self-luminous.
- (b) They may pass through solid walls or locked doors.
- (c) They may rise into the air without physical support, and may glide instead of walk.
- (d) They may communicate ideas without words, gestures or other symbols—i.e. telepathically.

This semi-substantiality goes beyond the mere etheric images which the Myers-Price theory regards as being specially created in the case of every apparition. This would seem to call for a new theory, which may be named and described as follows :

A REVISED 'ETHERIC-OBJECT' HYPOTHESIS

The above analysis has shown that none of the five alternative

hypotheses is adequate to account for the data. In order to accommodate all the above facts, it would seem to be necessary to entertain some such hypothesis as the following: Let us suppose that every physical object (including human bodies, and other living animals) has an etheric counterpart, similar to it in every detail. Let us suppose that etheric objects may also be created by imagination, by imitating, modifying, or combining the etheric objects found in nature. Let us suppose that these etheric objects differ from physical objects in the following particulars:

H1. They exist in psychic space rather than in physical outer-world space, but these two kinds of space may have merging intersections, as described elsewhere.¹

H2. Etheric objects must be regarded as having four dimensions, including a time dimension, but these dimensions are not usually co-ordinated with those of the physical world.

H3. The functional relations among these etheric objects, and between them and physical objects and observers, are based on the kinds of association discussed by Whately Carington.² For example, the particular costume worn by an apparition, or the appearance of an apparition in a particular room or to a particular percipient would be determined by the association of ideas, emotional linkages, and the like, rather than merely by physical contiguity.

H4. The prominence and accessibility of an etheric object would vary with the frequency and intensity with which it entered into experience. On these grounds, a person's etheric body would be outstandingly prominent and accessible.

H5. The observer-operator would be thought of (under this hypothesis) as making use of the etheric counterpart of his own body as a vehicle for observation and operation. The etheric counterpart might coincide with the physical body, or it might move out of that position, and the observer-operator might shift back and forth between his physical body and his etheric counterpart, using each in turn as his vehicle of observation and of operation. If the observer-operator moved from the physical body to the etheric counterpart, that apparently would not necessitate the cessation of active and even apparently intelligent activity on the part of the physical body—as evidenced by such experiences as that of the surgical nurse who watched her own physical body

¹ Hornell Hart and Associates, "The Psychic Fifth Dimension, II," *Jour. A.S.P.R.*, 47, April 1953, 49-54, 64-6.

² Whately Carington, *Thought Transference*, New York, Creative Age Press, 1946, pp. 103-6.

assisting a surgeon at the other side of the operating table from where her etheric counterpart appeared to have been located.¹

H6. For the etheric counterpart of a given object to be perceived at one point in space-time does not exclude its being perceived at some other point in space-time, without our having to assume that the etheric counterpart itself has been 'moved' from one such point to the other such point. On the other hand, it would seem that it would be no more feasible for a given observer-operator to be fully conscious and active in more than one vehicle at the same time than it is feasible for a person to give full attention to two subjects or activities at the same time when ordinarily embodied.²

H7. The differences between etheric objects and physical objects are matters of degree and may vary through the whole range between those of sheer subjective imagination and those of completely materialized forms. Collective percipience of apparitions, materializations and dematerializations, and physical phenomena in general (so far as genuine) involve relatively high degrees of approximation to physical traits on the part of etheric objects. On the other hand, 'purely mental' imaginings and dreams on the part of individuals would represent points towards the other end of the same scale.

TO SUMMARIZE

Each of the other hypotheses has been tested as a possible alternative to the Revised Etheric-Object Hypothesis, and the testing has been in terms of the question as to which hypothesis best fits and explains the available data.

The Gurney Theory (A1) is ruled out by the data summarized in paragraphs D6 to D8, and by the comparison earlier in this article between these facts and the confusions characteristic of the presumably telepathic sharing of some dreams. This exclusion of the simple telepathy theory means that some hypothesis involving some degree of objective reality of apparitions must be substituted.

The Tyrrell Theory (A2) stresses the facts summarized in paragraphs D2, D6, D7 and D8, but it leaves no room for the facts summarized in paragraphs D9 through D13. Tyrrell's explana-

¹ Aage Slomann (in a letter dated 8 June 1954) has pointed out that Jean Lhermitte, in his book *Les Hallucinations* (Doin & Cie, Paris, 1951) has a Chapter IV on 'Les Phénomènes Héautoscopiques' in which he cites not only the case of Goethe given by Tyrrell (p. 131) but also those of H. Taine, Guy de Maupassant, Alfred de Musset, and Gabriele d'Annunzio.

² In his letter of 22 May 1954, Professor Price suggests some interesting experimental explorations of this matter, which must await preliminary progress on other aspects of the theory.

tion for collective cases and for the appearance of an apparition at a given location seems highly artificial, and the idea of the co-operating subconscious levels miraculously creating the minute details and the accurate interadjustments of the 'idea-patterns' seems forced.

The Myers-Price Theory (A₃) substitutes the collective unconscious instead of the co-operating mid-levels of the immediate participants. Like the Tyrrell theory, it suggests special creation of the etheric images connected with any given apparitional case, and it fails to come to grips with the facts summarized in D₉ to D₁₃.

The Astral-Body Theory (A₄) puts the psychic counterpart of the human body into a special category, leaving difficulties in explaining the clothing and accessories of apparitions (D₂).

The Spiritualistic Theory (A₅) fails to take adequate account of the mental limitations under which most apparitions appear to suffer, and also seems inadequate to account for apparitions of living persons who were not conscious of the surroundings in which their apparitions were seen.

The Revised Etheric-Object Hypothesis takes into account all of the data summarized in the D paragraphs. It discards the rather clumsy stage machinery of the Tyrrell Theory. It avoids the inconsistency of locating 'etheric objects' in the 'common unconscious' as the Myers-Price Theory requires, and instead adopts the simple operational procedure of recognizing the experience-configurations involved in apparitions and clairvoyance, noting that these configurations have characteristics which can be most simply summarized by calling them objects and events, and thus provides a simple and workable basis for further research.

The Revised Etheric-Object hypothesis would appear to explain understandably the major phenomena listed in the preceding section. It would appear to be parsimonious in the sense that it does not include arbitrary and accessory features not needed to explain the data in hand. However, it does suggest a great many implications and potential developments which might prove to be exceedingly interesting in relation to the problem of survival and to various other specific problems of psychical research.

WHAT BEARINGS HAVE APPARITIONS UPON THE SURVIVAL QUESTION?

1. Gurney seems quite largely to have avoided this question. Neither the term *survival* nor its equivalent appears in the index

of *Phantasms of the Living*—a title which is itself significant. Broad comments: 'I think that Gurney was quite deliberately avoiding the question of posthumous activity in *Phantasms of the Living*.'¹

2. Price's answer to the survival question appears to be summed up in the following conclusions which he reached in his study of Haunting:²

A 'bit' of the deceased personality has succeeded in surviving. . . . If a bit of his personality has managed to survive, if something which is at any rate *quasi-mental* has managed to carry on its existence for years quite apart from a brain and nervous system, the survival of a complete personality is not impossible; the antecedent improbability of a complete or integral survival is at any rate diminished. . . . It is a question of *how much* survival we must postulate in order to explain the phenomena of Haunting. . . . Though the phenomena of Haunting do not in themselves require the hypothesis of complete survival (since something very much less will suffice to explain them), they do indirectly weaken the most important objection against that hypothesis, by showing that something which is at least *quasi-mental* can exist in the absence of a brain and nervous system.

At the Le Piol Conference in April 1954, as reported by Professor Ducasse, Professor Price pointed out that personal identity and hence survival may be a matter of degrees or of parts rather than of Yes or No; and that apparitions, when evidential at all of survival, are not evidence of complete but only of fragmentary survival, no matter whether or not it be a fact that the rest of the personality also survives.

3. Tyrrell's answer was stated specifically in connection with the haunting reported by Miss R. C. Morton—a ghost heard by about 20 people, and seen by at least seven of these, between 1882 and 1889. Tyrrell commented:³

What agency are we to attribute to such a ghost as this? My own suggestion is that the ghost is essentially the same phenomenon as the crisis-apparition, the post-mortem apparition, and the experimentally produced apparition. . . . The differences . . . lie in the differences between the themes of their idea-patterns. . . . We must look for an agent who is capable of producing the theme. I must confess that I cannot see any plausible agent other than the surviving self or personality of the Mrs S. whose appearance and habits the ghost reproduced. . . .

I have now done my best to consider what light the evidence for apparitions throws on their agency. The conclusion I reach is that if

¹ C. D. Broad, letter to Hornell Hart, 11 May 1954.

² Op. cit., pp. 327-8.

³ Op. cit., pp. 140, 142, 148-9.

we consider all *recognized* apparitions, belonging to the four classes, as being the expressions of telepathic idea-patterns originating with the persons represented by the apparitions, we have the explanation which most naturally accords with the evidence, and which is also most economical of hypotheses. But it involves the admission that some ghosts and post-mortem cases, and probably some post-mortem crisis-cases, are due to surviving agents.

4. Johnson's conclusions about survival are summed up as follows:¹

We have enough trustworthy evidence to anticipate our survival of the change called death. . . . I expect, when the immediate shock of change is over, to find myself with a body familiar to me (because it has always been a possession without my realizing it), in a country from which come thronging back to me welcoming echoes of old familiarity. It will still be a world of Appearance; but since one veil at least will then have fallen from the face of Truth, I shall expect to find myself more responsive to her Eternal Beauty as I set out again—a pilgrim on the endless Way.

Johnson's conclusions about survival are, however, a matter of faith rather than of proof. He says:²

The evidence of psychical research has . . . shown it to be most improbable that Mind depends on matter for its ability to exist and function. Never has the survival by Mind of the death of the body seemed so probable, on the basis of the evidence, yet never has conclusive proof of survival been so difficult to secure. If we knew definitely what are the limits beyond which extra-sensory faculty cannot operate, it would be possible to devise a conclusive experiment; but we do not know these limits.

OPERATIONISM AND SURVIVAL

In what Operational Sense might Apparitions of the Dead be REAL? Mr Charles E. Ozanne, after studying the preliminary draft of this article, asked: 'Does not this operational approach reduce apparitions of the dead to mere figments of the imagination?' The answer is: not necessarily—any more than the operational conception of physical objects reduces them to merely subjective delusions. The reality of an apparition of the dead might be regarded, operationally, as a variable quantity, depending upon the answers to such questions as the following: (1) How detailed, vivid, and external-to-the-observer were the ESP observational configurations of the apparition? (2) To what

¹ Op. cit., p. 293.

² Ibid., p. 275.

extent were various types of perception (visual, tactual, auditory, etc.) correlated in the configuration? (3) To what extent did the apparitional configurations include appropriate configurations suggestive of memory, purpose, creativity and the like? How much creative communication was possible, such as would have been possible if the living person had been present, or such as represented reasonable developments from those earth-life possibilities? (4) To what extent is it possible for others besides the individual percipient to join co-operatively in perception of the apparition and in co-operating with its conscious purposes? If such questions as these are answerable verifiably with such terms as 'to a high degree,' or 'to a great extent,' then the apparitions of the dead may be regarded as having a very intense reality.

Research Comparisons of Different Types of Apparitions. Tyrrell held that the haunt, the post-mortem crisis-apparition, the crisis-apparition of a person still physically alive, and the experimentally produced apparition are merely four different forms of the same essential phenomenon. He regarded this phenomenon as the production of a 'marionette' which acts as if it were conscious but actually is no more an autonomous observer-operator than is the figure on a moving-picture screen. He did hold, however, that an apparition, in any of these forms, requires an initiating agent, and this gave him a basis for tentative belief in survival.

The operational approach, taking into account the observations reported by ESP-projected observers as well as those reported by percipients of apparitions, leads to the conception of apparitions as being generally (or often) vehicles for partly or fully conscious observer-operators, just as physical bodies are. If that proposition be taken as a working hypothesis, and combined with Tyrrell's insistence upon the essential similarity of all four fundamental types of apparitions, what bearing will that have upon the problem of survival?

Stimulated by the discussion summarized up to this point in Part II of the present article, the investigation reported in Part I was carried out. That study was designed to seek statistical evidence as to the validity of three hypothetical propositions, namely :

1. That full-fledged ESP projection consists in a conscious apparition of a living person, within which the projected personality carries full memories and purposes, and from which, on returning to his physical body, this personality carries back the full memory of the observations and operations performed while projected.

2. That these conscious projections of living persons are in most respects essentially indistinguishable from apparitions of the dying, of those who have been dead for periods up to a few hours, and those who have been dead for days, months, or years.

3. That since this is the case, some of the most frequent types of apparitions of the dead presumably carry with them the memories and purposes of the personalities which they represent, and thus constitute evidence of survival of personality beyond bodily death.

The bearings of the statistical evidence upon this hypothesis have been analysed in Part I of this article. The relationship may be restated as follows: Suppose that consciousness is crucially dependent upon the existence of the individual's physical brain. The phenomena of ESP projection show that at least a considerable proportion of apparitions of the living are vehicles of consciousness, and that the behaviour of such apparitions is closely related to memory, purpose, emotional attachment, feelings of guilt, and other aspects of conscious personality. Suppose then that we array all evidential cases of apparitions in a distribution according to the length of time they occur before or after death. Assuming that consciousness is dependent on the living physical brain, a sharp alteration should be evident in the character and behaviour of apparitions when the death point in the array is passed. *But no such alteration is evident in the data*—except such as might be expected from the alterations of purpose which death would produce in the appearer.

In view of this fact, and of the detailed data presented in Part I, it is submitted that the burden of proof now rests with those who would argue that apparitions provide no evidence of survival.

Experimental ESP Projection. A second line of research suggested by the foregoing operational analysis would be experimental. It would involve a much more thorough and systematic series of attempts to achieve new and better examples of repeatable experiments in ESP projection. Tyrrell referred to the type of experiment in which apparitions are produced by mental concentration. Perhaps more promising for scientific research are the types produced by hypnosis and by more complex methods of mental self-discipline. One of the objectives of the International Project for Research in ESP Projection is to encourage the carrying on of such experiments, and to provide a means through which experiences in such experiments may be interchanged among researchers in various countries.

Price observes :¹ 'We badly need further evidence about [out-of-the-body experiences]. The spontaneous evidence is not at present very extensive ; and it is highly desirable that competent and critical minded persons should try to repeat the experiments of the voluntary projectors. (They will need some courage too.)'

Is Survival an Untestable Hypothesis? Roll, in his comments on the preliminary draft of 'Four Theories about Apparitions,' wrote as follows :²

I do not think that the survival hypothesis at present is empirically testable. . . . Any conceivable evidence to support the postulation of a psychological survival after the disintegration of the physiological organism can be accommodated by already existing concepts. As we at present do not know the limits of ESP from living persons it can always be said, and should be said, that a certain piece of evidence *prima facie* supporting the survival hypothesis can be accommodated in terms of ESP of records or from the memory of living persons. At present the need is to learn more about ESP and to press experimentation which will enable us to control ESP. It is only an experimental situation in which ESP is prevented from occurring which will allow the verification or falsification of other hypotheses, such as the survival hypothesis.

Suppose one parallels Mr Roll's argument by asking what kind of evidence would prove the independent existence of other conscious personalities besides one's self, or the self-existence of material objects apart from one's own sensorimotor experiences with such objects. One might say quite plausibly : 'Any piece of evidence *prima facie* supporting the existence of other independently conscious persons, or of self-existent material objects, can be accommodated in terms of sensory perception and motor operation on the part of the observer.' Such a statement, however, would seem to be irrelevant, in view of the fact that sensory experience is ordinarily interpreted merely as a mode of contact. Operational scepticism takes the position that our direct experience of 'material objects' and of 'other people' can consist only in sensorimotor configurations, and (hypothetically, at least) of extrasensory perceptions. The *interpretation* of these configurations is the crucial point.

The configurations of one's sensorimotor experience seem to be capable of being dealt with most economically and meaningfully by assuming the independent existence of material objects and of other persons. The survival question hinges upon the issue of whether the configurations of extrasensory experience including apparitional configurations designated as 'telepathic,'

¹ *Journal of Parapsychology*, 18 (March 1954), 60.

² William G. Roll, letter to Hornell Hart, 3 April 1954.

'clairvoyant,' 'precognitive,' and 'psychokinetic') can be interpreted most economically and meaningfully by the assumption of the independent existence of observer-operators who can function apart from a material brain—either during physical life, while separated spatially and chronologically from the brain, or after the brain has ceased to live or has been destroyed. The present writer takes the position that the exploration of these questions can be carried forward by the kinds of research which have been outlined in the preceding section.

Professor Price, in a letter dated 22 May 1954, commented as follows :

It seems to me that there is something in his [Roll's] point, so far as mediumistic communications are concerned. As we do not know the limits, if any, of the ESP powers of embodied human beings (mediums and sitters) it is always possible to propound a non-survivalist explanation of even the best mediumistic material. The explanation may have to be complicated and far-fetched: it may have to postulate ESP powers far more extensive than we have evidence for from other sources; but I do not see how, in the present state of our knowledge, it can be ruled out. Therefore, as things now stand, we can and do get *evidence* of survival from the best mediumistic communications, but we cannot at present get proof of survival, because there is always an alternative way of explaining the facts.

Do these considerations apply to the quite different procedure which you propose? Roll assumes that they do. But if we did get apparitional evidence of the sort you describe . . . what ground should we have for arguing that it could all be explained (or explained away) by means of the ESP powers of embodied human beings, and how would the explanation work? Does Roll want to say that the apparently 'conscious' apparition of a deceased person is a complex hallucination constructed out of the memories which the percipient (or percipients) have about the late Mr Smith? But then ESP would not come into it. I suppose he would want to bring it in one or other of the following ways. (1) The apparition, by what it said or did, might show knowledge of facts not known in any normal manner to the percipient(s). Roll might explain that by saying that the percipient(s) did know those facts in a paranormal manner, and that this—unconscious—knowledge of theirs contributed to the formation of the hallucinatory percepts which they had. (2) Conceivably he might also want to say—in case it was an apparition of someone the percipients had never known when he was alive—that it was *retrocognition* (not just memory) which was responsible for the generation of the hallucinatory figure. Indeed if precognitive telepathy is possible, why not retrocognitive telepathy too? There is indeed some experimental evidence for it. This might lead Roll to propound a theory rather like Tyrrell's. This very life-like apparition of the late Mr Smith (he might say) is a hallucination constructed out of a retrocognitively-telepathic impression originating in the mind of the

late Mr Smith when he was alive, plus the percipient's own memories, plus—perhaps—some precognitive or clairvoyant data he had acquired for himself. By this account of the matter Mr Smith is himself the telepathic agent, and it is he who is ultimately the source of the apparition. But unfortunately it is not Mr Smith as he *is* who is the agent, but Mr Smith as he *was*, ten years ago perhaps, when he was still alive and embodied.

But if this is the kind of explanation Roll wants to offer (when he points out that we do not know the limits of ESP) I think he is begging the question against you. He is assuming that an apparition *must* be some sort of hallucination; and that the only problem is to explain why the hallucination takes the specific form it does. In this, of course, he tacitly agrees with Tyrrell. If the 'Tyrrelian' type of apparition were the only sort of apparition there is or could be, Roll's anti-survivalist arguments would have some force—much the same force as they have when they are applied to mediumistic communications. But of course the whole point of your paper is to show that the Tyrrelian or hallucinatory-construct type of apparition is *not* the only sort.

To put it another way, Roll refuses to consider the possibility that apparitions or some apparitions might be 'real objects'—spatial though not physical—and that one function our ESP powers might have is to make us aware of such 'real objects'. I think he is tacitly assuming (like many other people) that the only entities our ESP powers can make us aware of must *either* be mental [telepathy] *or* physical [clairvoyance]. But your apparitions—or at least the ones we are now considering—are neither mental nor physical, but betwixt and between. If once it is granted that an apparition is at least sometimes a 'real object'—real in the sense of not being just a hallucinatory construct—the further step you want to take, that this object is, or may be, a genuine 'vehicle of consciousness,' follows fairly easily. The evidence we have, or might conceivably have, that it *is* such a vehicle, could quite well be just as strong as the evidence we have that any ordinary physical organism is a vehicle of consciousness—i.e., quite strong enough to satisfy any reasonable person. But of course the survival which such apparitional evidence would point to (if we could get it) would not be the survival of a *disembodied* mind, but of a mind which was still embodied, though in a [indecipherable word] and non-physical sort of body with certain 'ideoplastic' properties. And 'out-of-the body' experiences in this life, such as Dr Whiteman's, should then strictly be called 'out of the *physical* body' experiences. (I entirely agree with you, of course, that we need more facts about such experiences—both spontaneous ones and experimental ones. But it isn't going to be easy to get them.)

CONCLUSION

The theories with regard to apparitions which are reviewed in the present article range in date from 1886 to 1954—a period of more than two-thirds of a century, or two full generations. The

various approaches to the problem are quite obviously not mere isolated adventures ; they represent various approaches towards a common reality. These approaches are related to each other, and often deal, under varied terminologies, with the same aspects of the phenomena.

Back at the beginning of this 68-year exploration, Gurney said :¹

It is not . . . with the ultimate conditions of the phenomena that the study of them can begin : our first business is with the reality, rather than with the rationale, of their appearance. Telepathy as a system of facts is what we have to examine. Discussion of the nature of the novel faculty in itself, and apart from particular results, will be as far as possible avoided.

Operationism, as understood in the present article, is largely a renewed emphasis on the factual approach, seeking to develop procedures by means of which those of us who are keenly concerned with the examination of the observations and operations involved in apparitions can eliminate misunderstandings, enlarge areas of agreement, and move forward towards a clearer and more useful understanding of the nature and significance of these phenomena. The operational theory is not complete unless and until it absorbs from other theories all contributions which can be validated operationally.

¹ *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I, 1886, p. 7.