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#Post#: 25723--------------------------------------------------
Western Feudalism and Non-Western Patrimonialism
By: antihellenistic Date: April 1, 2024, 2:28 am
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Inferiority of Western Governmental System which led into
Fragmentation and Perpetuate Decentralization
[quote]Some have argued that feudalism emerged out of the chaos
that ensued with the collapse of the Carolingian unity and with
the onset of the Viking invasions. This argument has been
expressed in a vigorous way by N. Bisson in a much debated
paper, “The Feudal Revolution” (1994). He saw feudalism as a
product of a particular historical conjunction characterized by
the loss of Carolingian public power and an unprecedented
“privatization” of political power by a “new” class of
aggressive local aristocrats. He argued that this new class was
responsible for a “feudal revolution” in the 9th to 10th
centuries, leading to the establishment of local hegemonies that
were largely independent of any central authority, and which
enjoyed extensive juridical controls over a class of
longstanding free peasantries. It is my view that “feudalism”
was essentially derived from the early medieval society of
tribal bands. What allows a war-band to take on the character of
a “feudal institution” is the granting of a unit of land known
as a fief by the band leader (the lord) to his followers (the
vassals) in return for their loyalty and service. I accept F.L.
Ganshof ’s argument in Feudalism (1961) that the union and
spread of vassalage dates from the period of the early
Carolingians in the 700s AD. It was the Carolingians who
“deliberately pursued” a policy of granting fiefs to their
vassals in the hope of ensuring their loyalty and thereby
increasing their authority (51).
However, in my view, the background sources of feudalism go
further back to the aristocratic character of Indo-Europeans.
What was different about feudalism was that it formalized the
bond of loyalty between military chiefs and followers. It did so
through the performance of an act of homage which took the form
of an oath in which a kneeling vassal placed his clasped hands
between the hands of the lord and gave his word to be loyal to
him. This personal relationship between vassal and lord was as
egalitarian as that between tribal chiefs and their followers.
The lord reciprocated the vassal’s fealty by swearing to protect
him and, as Ganshof points out, the Carolingian lords
increasingly granted fiefs to their vassals as a way to solidify
their loyalty and provide them with the economic means to
acquire armor, weapons and horses.
Now, to some degree, Ganshof ’s view is not inconsistent with
Bisson’s insofar as he refers to the period between the 10th and
13th centuries as “the classical age of feudalism” – it was then
that feudalism took on the long lasting decentralized form of
rule with which it has come to be identified (65–105). There was
an inbuilt tendency within feudalism towards decentralization.
The provision of a grant of land entailed the enjoyment on the
part of the vassals of certain immunities or political
prerogatives in the governance of their fiefs including, for
example, the right to collect rents from the peasants who worked
the land, the right to adjudicate disputes over property
inheritance, punished crimes, and the right to have a private
army (Bloch 1961a: 163–175, 211–224). Moreover, since this was a
relation between free nobles, there was a tendency, particularly
in times of precarious central authority, for the lord-vassal
relation to be reproduced and extended both upwards and
downwards within the hierarchy of the aristocratic class. The
wealthy vassals, who had feudal bonds with more powerful lords,
were themselves capable of fashioning from their own extensive
lands smaller fiefs for their own retinue of followers who, in
turn, were capable of becoming lords over lesser vassals down to
the level of fighting men who were of noble birth but had no
land and were eager for military adventures and fortune. In
practice, therefore, feudalism encouraged a decentralized form
of political authority that descended from the king down to the
lowest members of the aristocracy. But this system of
stratification was not a hierarchy of submission. While lords
were naturally disposed toward the augmentation of their
territorial sovereignty, and always on the look-out to retake
fiefs from vassals who had failed to perform their duties, it
was equally natural for vassals to seek control over their lands
on a permanent and categorical basis. The stronger tendency
within feudalism was thus for power and ownership of territories
to pass downwards toward the lower stratum. In the long run,
fiefs, which were supposed to revert back to the original lord
at the death of the vassal, came to be seen as inalienable and
inheritable property by future generations of vassals who were
indeed wont to increase their own powers by seeking additional
fiefs from different lords (Poggi 1978: 16–35).
The claim that feudalism, with its autonomous and precocious
aristocracy, was a “product” of the breakdown of the Carolingian
Empire sometimes hinges on the presumption that this Empire was
a “patrimonial” regime similar to those Eastern empires in which
the ruling class consisted of officials who were appointed by a
supreme autocratic ruler. It has been argued (Mann 1986), in
this context, that patrimonial domination per se has a tendency
to slide into a type of feudal rule due to the obvious
difficulties in communications which traditional societies
faced. Not only did they have difficulties controlling local
officials in remote areas, but the officials themselves were
inclined to treat their office-domains as hereditary property.
In traditional societies kinship relations were also very
difficult to dilute and replace with “bureaucratic” norms.
Historians have thus discovered Sumerian feudalism, Chinese
feudalism, Japanese feudalism, Islamic feudalism, and many other
decentralized forms of authority wherever they have found weak
central authorities, dynastic breakdowns, or strong warlords
lording within their own localities.40
As I see it, the feudal bond between lord and vassal was a
contractually based relation entered into between two men who
had an intrinsic sense of their noble status. Whereas vassalage
was a relationship that originated in an army of free warriors
with a heroic sense of honor, patrimonialism was a relationship
that originated in the ruler’s need to acquire personal servants
and personal representatives of the state. Whereas the lord
could not impose duties on the vassal arbitrarily, the
patrimonial ruler was, in principle, in a position to withdraw
the “rights” he had granted to office-holders. Whereas the
relation between lord and vassal was binding to both parties in
that it followed a code of honor involving personal loyalty and
pride of noble status, the patrimonial relation followed a
pattern whereby officials were dependent on the ruler for their
well being. This is why it resulted in a widespread practice
amongst patrimonial rulers in the eastern world to recruit and
train people of low social origin (slaves, serfs, coloni, and
eunuchs who did not possess any family and local connections of
their own but were, instead, entirely dependent on the ruler) to
become officials of the state (Bendix: 334–81).
Therefore, the propensity of patrimonial rule to decentralize
should not be characterized as a tendency toward feudalism.41
Officials who held prestigious positions in the administration
of an empire, including members who acted arbitrarily against
subordinates within their localities in a similar fashion to how
their ruler acted towards them, should not be viewed as “noble”
even when they managed to achieve almost complete independence
from the ruler or when they came to enjoy “privileges” not
available to the rest of the population. What gives European
feudalism its unique identity is that it is a type of political
order based on a contractual agreement between free men who are
ennobled in the calling of arms.
Medieval Japan is the one non-Western society that appears to
have been closest to European feudalism in that it was
characterized by a formalized fragmentation of power in which a
class of war-lords granted vassals tenements similar to the
fiefs of the West. But, as Bloch noted, “Japanese vassalage was
much more an act of submission than was European vassalage and
much less a contract” (1961b: 447). It was also stricter in that
vassals were not free to pay homage to a plurality of lords.
Perry Anderson made a similar argument. Having first indicated
that Japan experienced a type of feudal rule between the 14th
and 15th centuries, which combined the traits of vassalage,
benefice and immunity, he noted that the Japanese relation
between lord and vassal was “less contractual,” as the emphasis
was more on the inequality of the relation than the reciprocity.
The authority of the lord was “more patriarchal. There were no
vassal courts, and legalism was generally very limited” (1987:
414). European vassals enjoyed “rights of immunity” in their own
lands (407–10). The lords, as Bloch emphasized, were equally
required to fulfill their contractually agreed obligations under
penalty of losing their rights over vassals. It was a
“universally recognized right of the vassal to abandon the bad
lord” (Bloch: 451). There was a “right of resistance” by
vassals, even against the king, under the expectation that a
“good” king should be held responsible for the performance of
his duties to his free aristocratic subjects. This expectation
refers back to the Germanic tradition of kingship where kings
were expected to succeed in warfare and to show generosity to
their followers, lest they lose the loyalty of his
tribe.[/quote]
Source :
The Uniqueness of Western Civilization by Ricardo Duchesne page
466-470
Therefore, Hitler who implemented autocracy and vassalage based
on loyalty to the Guided-Socialism ideals, not egalitarian
contractual, was not part of Western Civilization, the
Civilization of Terror and Fragmentation
#Post#: 25724--------------------------------------------------
Re: Western Feudalism and Non-Western Patrimonialism
By: 90sRetroFan Date: April 1, 2024, 4:09 am
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"Hitler who implemented autocracy and vassalage"
Hitler did not implement vassalage at all. To the extent that
National Socialist Germany was insufficiently centralized,
Hitler was dissatisfied with this.
[quote]This is why it resulted in a widespread practice amongst
patrimonial rulers in the eastern world to recruit and train
people of low social origin (slaves, serfs, coloni, and eunuchs
who did not possess any family and local connections of their
own but were, instead, entirely dependent on the ruler) to
become officials of the state [/quote]
The above is precisely what Hitler wanted to develop the Hitler
Youth into.
"Ancient China used to be a model for that, as long as the
teachings of Confucius still throve there. The poorest young
village lad would aspire to become a mandarin." - Adolf Hitler
(Note that Hitler was factually in error. The Imperial Exam was
not a Confucianist idea:
(HTM) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_examination
[quote]Under Emperor Wen (r. 581–604), all officials down to the
district level had to be appointed by the Department of State
Affairs in the capital and were subjected to annual merit rating
evaluations. Regional Inspectors and District Magistrates had to
be transferred every three years and their subordinates every
four years. They were not allowed to bring their parents or
adult children with them upon reassignment of territorial
administration. The Sui did not establish any hereditary
kingdoms or marquisates (hóu) of the Han sort.
...
The original purpose of the imperial examinations as they were
implemented during the Sui dynasty was to strike a blow against
the hereditary aristocracy and to centralize power around the
emperor.[/quote]
(HTM) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor_Wen_of_Sui
[quote]As a Buddhist, he encouraged the spread of Buddhism
through the state.
...
The Book of Sui records Emperor Wen as having withdrawn his
favour from the Confucians, giving it to "the group advocating
Legalism and authoritarian government."[10][/quote]
Wen wanted to combine Buddhism with Legalism and sideline
Confucianism entirely.)
See also:
(HTM) http://aryanism.net/blog/aryan-sanctuary/a-review-of-refugee-resettlement-by-numbers/comment-page-1/#comment-173542
[quote]the syllabus of the essay exam was the Confucian Canon:
(HTM) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Books_and_Five_Classics
which anyone regardless of background could study and then apply
to sit the exam. Hitler was not praising the ideas in the
Confucian Canon itself. As a matter of fact, while some exam
candidates submitted defenses of the Confucian Canon, others
preferred to submit crtiques, so it was certainly not the case
that all exam candidates had to agree with what they had
studied; they just had to prove they were extremely familiar
with the content and able to cogently develop on it in some
direction.[/quote]
#Post#: 25727--------------------------------------------------
Re: Western Feudalism and Non-Western Patrimonialism
By: antihellenistic Date: April 1, 2024, 4:24 pm
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Charlemagne, Man who Revive Western Civilization and its
Feudalism
[quote]...Charlemagne’s army was made up of royal vassals who,
like the warriors of the old Germanic war-bands, were members of
the free-born aristocratic class, some of whom were already
holders of large estates or had been rewarded with benefices for
their services, from which they could feed vassals of their own
(Ganshof 1961: 20–61). When the Carolingian unity ceased in the
10th century, it was almost a natural step for these aristocrats
to reassert, in full, their authority and their privileges in
their local world. Charlemagne is not outside the Western
tradition; he was a commanding aristocratic warrior who managed
to exercise some degree of patrimonial authority over the
Frankish aristocracy without, however, undermining their pride
of noble status. He was a typical but extremely talented
chieftain who attained the Indo-European ideal of immortal fame.
But there was something new to this Germanic ruler missing in
the earlier chiefs.
First, he accorded great importance to the Christian dimension
of his power, as is evident in his orders and laws disallowing
the harming of churches, widows, and the “economically weak,”
and also in his orders to the clergy to celebrate masses, to
address supplications to God, to rigorously observe fasts, and
to join in charitable activities (Fichtenau 1963: 34–36). While
his resurrection of the Roman Empire was more a hopeful look
into the future than an actual reality, his efforts to achieve
administrative, legal, and monastic unification played a crucial
role in countering the centrifugal chaos of the times. Moreover,
by resurrecting the organization of the Church, which had nearly
disappeared by the 7th century, into a strict hierarchy of
offices, as well as revitalizing and endowing new monasteries,
Charlemagne revived and expanded the literate tradition of the
West.
This revival (away from the state of nature) had some
precedents. The barbarian invasions of the 5th century had
brought about a considerable decline in learning, but by no
means entirely and only for some time. The assimilation of
classical culture by the founders of Christianity was continued
right through the perilous centuries of the Germanic invasions,
starting with Martianus Capella (5th century) who worked to
preserve and defend all seven of the liberal arts, drawing on
Cicero, Aristotle, Euclid, and Ptolemy; followed by Boethius
(480–526), Cassiodorus (480–573), Isodore of Seville (560–636),
the venerable Bede (672–735), John Scotus Erigena (810–877), and
others (Colish 1998). Even poor isolated Ireland, a tribal
desolated place devoid of schools and of any Latin or Greek
speaking inhabitant was able, by 600 AD, to send numerous
monastery-educated missionaries across Western Europe to read
Latin and teach the basics of Christian education. These
monasteries, which were spreading throughout Europe, were
inhabited by monks who not only taught and copied Christian
texts but meticulously preserved non-Christian texts as well,
and thus kept classical learning alive, including the poetry of
Virgil and Juvenal, the scientific writings of Pliny the Elder,
the philosophical ideas of Boethius and Cicero, and also
numerous works by lesser known grammarians, mathematicians, and
physicians. During the same period, through the initiative of St
Gregory the Great, Anglo-Saxon England saw the establishment of
a centre of higher learning in Northumbria. The greatest
representative of this Northumbrian ‘Renaissance’ was Bede,
author of thirty-five works of grammar, theology, history,
biblical commentary and science(Dawson 1950).43
With the establishment of some degree of political cohesion by
Charlemagne, and the revival of trade, he set out to organize
and centralize the cultural activities which otherwise would
have remained stranded in different local schools. He was the
first “barbarian” aristocratic ruler to revive and promote
ancient culture; the first to inaugurate one of a series of
Western “rebirths” in the study of the classics. He was, in
other words, no longer your typical berserker, wayward and
lacking in deferential projects for his people.44 He established
the famous Palace School at Aachen, where he brought some of the
most learned men from Ireland, Northumbria, Spain, Italy, and
from his own lands. This Palace became a major teaching source
for the sons of the aristocracy, civilizing them to become train
scribes, administrators, and monks (Fichtenau: 79–102).
Charlemagne’s coronation in 800 at the hands of Pope Leo III (r.
795–816) bespoke of a “Germanic” ruler who consciously sought to
link himself to the Western Roman tradition because he
understood that a geographical region of the world called
“Europa” had become the center of a new epoch in the making of
the West.[/quote]
Source :
The Uniqueness of Western Civilization by Ricardo Duchesne page
471 - 473
#Post#: 25728--------------------------------------------------
Re: Leftist vs rightist moral circles
By: antihellenistic Date: April 1, 2024, 7:38 pm
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Actually, Liberalist Thinking was the Basis of Moral Rightism,
not Moral Leftism
[quote]The West of AD 1000 was still an extremely disorderly
world. The rise of feudalism brought on numerous conflicts over
boundaries and jurisdictional rights, disputes which could not
easily be resolved by appeal to the authority of public
institutions. The contractual character of the lord-vassal
relationship encouraged persistent “private wars” at every level
and in every locality. Nevertheless, by about this time, all
pagans had been Christianized, and thus the violent
Christianization of pagans had ceased. It was in this context
that the Church sought to promote the ideal of peace in a
sincere effort to quell the violence between Christians. The
Peace of God and the Truce of God, enacted between 990 and 1048,
were ecclesiastical laws designed to counter the atrocities and
depredations of quarrelling lords and vassals. From then on, in
principle, and with some degree of success, anyone who robbed
churches, attacked unarmed members of the clergy, stole from
peasants and from merchants, and destroyed vineyards or mills,
was to be excommunicated (Le Goff 2005: 46; Bloch 1961b:
412–420). Warmaking and plundering were likewise forbidden on
religious holidays and from Thursday to Sunday.
Together with this “civilizing process” there occurred the
Christianization of the traditional feudal ceremony wherein a
young warrior was publicly and ceremoniously presented with arms
on the occasion of his initiation into the war-band of his lord.
I agree with Bloch that a “modification of vital importance was
introduced into the old ideal of war for war’s sake,” as this
once strictly military ceremony was now anointed, as it were, by
the Church at the end of the 12th century (316–19). By presiding
over the rituals of knighthood, the Church supplemented the
earlier Germanic and feudal heroic ethos with a more altruistic
ethos serving the common weal of Christian society as a whole.
It was common, following the 12th century, for oaths of a young
warrior to include a commitment to defend the Church, to support
and defend women, widows, and orphans, and others who were
unable to defend themselves. “In this way,” writes Dawson, “the
knight was detached from his barbarian and pagan background and
integrated into the social structure of Christian culture”
(1950: 147).
Dawson is keenly aware that the knightly class remained a
militaristic order and that the Church was not under any
illusions that love and sensitivity would be the new aims of
“those who fought.” The Christian Church, having long
assimilated the realities of empire, state, and war, had no
intentions to rid society of the physical energy and courageous
dispositions of knights.46 The Church was hoping to redirect the
energetic but destructive impulses of the aristocracy toward
ecclesiastical ends. The proclamation of the Crusade for the
recapturing of Jerusalem at the Council of Claremont in 1093 can
be seen in this light, as a way of rechanneling “the warlike
energies of feudal society by turning them against the external
enemies of Christendom” (Dawson: 149). Retaking Jerusalem from
Muslim occupation “satisfied the aggressive instincts of Western
man, while at the same time sublimating them in terms of
religious idealism” – that is, it offered a way to reconcile the
“the aggressive ethos of the warrior with the moral ideals of
universal religion” (151).
...
As stated by Keens, chivalry was not a religious but a secular
ideal grounded in a “martially oriented aristocracy.” It was a
new code of honor of the warrior groups which “owed its strong
Christian tone to the fact that those groups which operated
within the setting of a Christian society” (252). Knights were
possessed by a “strong streak of individualism”; what they
sought was “worldly honour” rather than salvation.48 Virtues
such as generosity, piety, and devotion to Christian ideals and
courtesy to women were, nonetheless, repeatedly stressed in
medieval fictional accounts of knights. Of course, in reality,
knights oppressed helpless peasants, dishonored ladies, and
conquered lands. I would be careful, however, not to disparage
these ideals as mere imaginary tales with no bearing on the
actual conduct of knights. These ideals were “real” values
against which the conduct of knights was measured.
...
The expansionist aggression of the West is an inescapable
expression of its roots in aristocratic men who are free and
therefore headstrong and ambitious, sure of themselves, easily
offended, and unwilling to accept quiet subservience. The
“civilizing process” of this era brought under restraint the
original ferocity of the barbarians. But the goal of the Church
was to spiritualize the baser instincts of this class, not to
extirpate and emasculate them.51 The highly-strung and obstinate
aristocrat has been a fundamental source of destruction in
Western history as well as the source of all that is good and
inspiring. The same expansionist period 950–1350 that Bartlett
condemned saw the Truce of God, courtly love, the invention of
the university, a scholastic commitment to dialogue based on
logic and evidence, the rise of autonomous cities, Romanesque
and Gothic architecture, a new polyphonic music, and more.
...
Even during the 12th and 13th centuries, when there was a
reassertion of monarchical power in France and England, combined
with the revival of Roman law, which provided kings with more
exalted and definite concepts of royal authority in
administration and law-making, the king was still envisioned as
a feudal monarch bound to each of his vassals by a contract
specifying reciprocal rights and obligations. The “patrimonial”
authority of kings did increase with the rise of a bureaucracy
of royal agents, sheriffs, and financiers. Yet, despite these
developments, medieval kings remained aristocratic rulers with a
contractual obligation to seek the vassal’s advice and approval
on questions of war, justice, administration, and taxation. It
was with a strong traditional sense of their primordial liberty
that nobilities throughout Europe imposed upon kings such famous
documents of “right of resistance” or “constitutional” charters
as the Magna Carta of 1215, the Hungarian Golden Bull of 1222,
the Assizes of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Privilege of the
Brandenburg nobles, the Aragonese Act of Union of 1287, and the
Pact of Koszyce of Poland in 1374 (Myers 1975: 19; Bloch: 452).
Notwithstanding the differences between these charters and acts,
reflecting varying times and places, their underlying theme was
the principle of mixed sovereignty. This principle recognized
the “rights” of both the king and his vassals: as the first lord
of the realm, the king, had the right to take initiatives, to
choose men for appointive offices, to enforce the law, and to
protect the territory, but at the same time it was the king’s
duty to seek the counsel and consent of his barons.[/b][/color]
The best known expression of this principle is the Magna Carta
imposed upon King John (1167–1216) by his vassals.[/b][/color]
This charter stated, in exact terms, the obligations of the
vassals to the king and the occasions when feudal aids were to
be paid, while also directing other clauses against abuses in
the royal courts, and asserting that the king could receive
additional financial assistance only by the assent of his feudal
tenants in-chief (Swindler 1965; Holt 1992). I need hardly say
that this “great charter” did not settle the desire on the part
of both parties to tilt the balance of power in their favor.
Just as subsequent kings were inclined to evade the charter and
repeat abuses, so too were future vassals inclined to govern
their own territories without royal authority. Yet, for all the
troubles, including the breaching of contracts and the
rebellions and the civil wars, the aristocratic principle of
sovereignty by consent was the hallmark of feudal governments.
The king was not above the aristocracy; he was first among
equals.
It was this very principle which laid the groundwork for the
development of feudal monarchies into representative or
parliamentary governments. “It was assuredly no accident,” says
Bloch, “that the representative system in the very aristocratic
form of the English Parliament, the French ‘Estates’, the Stande
of Germany, and the Spanish Cortes, originated in states which
were only just emerging from the feudal stage and still bore its
imprint. Nor was it an accident that in Japan, where the
vassal’s submission was much more unilateral, nothing of the
kind emerged…” (1961b: 452). Indeed, parliaments appeared in
most of Latin Christendom in the 13th and 14th centuries, with
nearly all of them surviving until the 17th century. The name
“parliament” (from the French word parler) was originally used
to refer to instances in which the king met with his feudal
advisors to discuss matters of state, but the importance of the
evolution of parliament was in how it came to address not just
the privileges of barons and knights but of townsmen and
prosperous farmers who lacked titles of nobility but who managed
to impose their own will and interests upon feudal society
(Bisson 1973; Myers 1975). It is not my intention to write about
the rise of merchants and the way this class came to acquire
corporate privileges for their towns, and how the three
“estates” of nobles, clergy, and townsmen came to participate in
parliaments where questions of war, justice, and taxation might
be raised. Rather, my point is that the privileges of the
aristocracy were not antithetical to the idea of bourgeois
“rights” and “liberties” but were instead their original
inspiration and precedent.
It would be a great simplification, however, to conceive
aristocratic liberalism as an “essential” force, which on its
own, brought about the uniquely European society of parliaments
and estates. To continue with the Gregorian reform, which
illustrates the living legacy of the classical world and the
worldly ambitions of Christianity, one cannot ignore the
“tremendous” legal transformation of the period 1050–1200
associated with the Investiture Controversy. The aftermath of
this controversy was the recognition by the crown of the
church’s corporate autonomy, and the fact that the church, in
acquiring independent law-making powers, went on to cultivate a
whole new legal system deeply indebted to Roman concepts but
which constituted, in the words of Berman, “the first modern
Western legal system”: the first comprehensive and rational
systematization of law (Berman: 85–119). This was a “modern”
system built on the legacy of the Justinian reformation of Roman
law (6th century) but which went beyond it by analyzing and
synthesizing all authoritative statements concerning the nature
of law, the various sources of law, and the definitions and
relationships between the different and separate kinds of law
(divine law, natural law, human law, the law of the church, the
law of princes, enacted law, customary law) – which came to
constitute the intellectual and legal basis for the
reconstitution of medieval Europe into a plurality of estates in
which the form of central government was a monarchy ruling over
a society composed of kingdoms, baronies, bishoprics, urban
communes, guilds, universities, each with important duties and
privileges. This society of estates, backed by new systems of
law, was unique to Europe. It was ultimately the presence of an
aristocratic spirit within the West that precluded the formation
of despotic governments demanding obedience and nameless
servility from the population.
Enough perhaps has been said to show how much the creativity of
the West was rooted in a culture of free aristocrats. The
contrast between a despotic East and a European world committed
to liberty finds it origins in the ancient Greeks. Hippocrates
(460 BC –370 BC), the celebrated founder of the science of
medicine, saw the war between Greeks and Persians in light of a
fundamental clash between West and East. Europeans, he observed,
were independent, willing to take risks, aggressive and warlike,
while Asians were peaceful to the point of lacking initiative,
“not their own masters…but ruled by despots” (in Goldhill 2002:
7). Europeans loved liberty for which they were willing to fight
and die, whereas Asians were content to live in servitude in
exchange for comfort and security. This libertarian attitude
continues in the Christianized hero-warrior.
...
It is in the early modern era that Europe experiences what some
have called “the taming or domestication of the feudal nobility”
(Taylor (2004: 33), the transformation of the aristocratic class
from independent warrior chieftains to a courtly nobility
dedicated to advising and serving royal power. This new noble
class was no longer associated with a heroic code of honor but a
humanist education. The ideal was no longer training in
chivalrous war but in the cultivation of the capacities of
rhetoric and persuasion, courtesy and “civility”. These newer
ideals were seen to be the talents required by the newly
emerging nation-states. The “war-making” states of Europe
desired some measure of domestic peace within their territorial
borders. The rowdiness and disorderly temperament of the old
nobility came to be gradually identified with the state of
nature or the “natural” condition of humanity in its early
juvenile state. Fighting “was no longer seen as the normal way
of life of the nobility,” except when it was in the service of
the Crown (37). This transformation in matters of civility went
along with the increasing commercialization of society, the
consolidation of power in the hands of merchants, bankers, and
improving landlords, together with a new kind of
self-consciousness which gave central place to the economic,
useful role of human beings. New, softer virtues were
emphasized; sociability, fellowship, courtesy, as well as
industriousness, domesticity, and polite entertainment in
coffeehouses, theaters, schools and gardens. The more a society
turned to commerce, the more it was seen to promote peaceful and
orderly existence – against the destructiveness of the search
for glory. This was a long drawn out process, writes Taylor;
until by 1800 commerce largely came to replace war as the
paramount activity with which the state should be concerned
(37–48, 69–82).52
This newly emerging view of what the purpose of a political
union ought to be was reflected, as Fukuyama points out, in the
contract theories of Hobbes and Locke. These modern thinkers
sought to reduce in importance from political life the excessive
pride of the aristocratic class, which was blamed for the
violence and misery in the world, as witnessed with such
intensity during the English Civil War and the horrifying Thirty
Years War which killed nearly a quarter of all Germans and laid
waste to towns and countryside alike. Hobbes, seen by Leo Straus
as the founder of political science and “creator of political
hedonism” (1969), hoped to convince the more urbane, but still
violent society of his time, that the best state would be one in
which its function was not that of producing or promoting a
virtuous life (in the Platonic Aristotelian sense) but of
safeguarding the natural right to life and security of its
inhabitants. This state, in contrast to the aristocratic state
interested in honor, would ensure the prosperity and happiness
of its citizens. It would do so, according to Fukuyama, by
rechanneling the thymotic and passionate drives of humans into
productive outlets, wherein men would satisfy their vanity by
seeking approbation for their riches or by seeking recognition
for their services to the state and the public order.[/quote]
Source :
The Uniqueness of Western Civilization by Ricardo Duchesne page
475, 476, 477, 479, 481, 484, 485, 486
#Post#: 25777--------------------------------------------------
Differences between Western Government and Non-Western Governmen
t
By: antihellenistic Date: April 6, 2024, 7:12 am
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[quote]However, while humans in general are capable of courage
and great deed, the opportunity to achieve individual renown and
prestige are increasingly difficult and rare as the Near Eastern
cultures move towards centralized state government.45 It is only
among the individualizing cultures of the West that one finds
complex and paramount chiefdoms, as well as in civilized states,
true tales of personal heroism. The foundational values and
ideals of the West were first recounted in Greek, Danish, Irish,
Icelandic, and Germanic heroic poems, sagas, and myths such as
the Iliad, Beowulf, Lebornah Uidre, Njals Saga, Gisla Saga
Sursonnar, and The Nibelungenlied (Nilsson 1968; Littleton 1973;
Nagy 1999; Gurevich 1995). These were the earliest literary
voices from the dawn of Western civilization. Before the Greeks,
none of the cultures of the East knew the written form of heroic
tragedy. Heroism and tragedy require a culture in which some
individuals are free to set themselves apart from others.
Tragedy is a form of literature that expresses acutely the
inescapable sacrifices and limitations entailed in the human
effort to achieve greatness. This sense of limitation grows not
out of a feeling of enslavement to mysterious forces but out of
a realization that individuals who covet immortal fame are fated
to engage in hubristic acts which inevitably bring about
suffering, disappointment, and early death.
To start, let us make some broad observations about Near Eastern
polities. The monumental architecture of the Sumerians, the
Ziggurat, was not seen as an example of the power of man to
master nature, and neither was it seen as a symbol of human
arrogance in the way that Jehovah interpreted the myth of the
Tower of Babel; it was seen, rather, as a symbol of the
subservience of man to the gods. The gods, not humans, were
credited for the achievements of Sumerian civilization (Muller
1961: 34–77). Nature in Mesopotamia was rather unpredictable in
its responses to human effort; natural disasters could strike at
any moment, and in this environment the gods turned out to be
violent in their punishment, heedless and arbitrary in their
will.46 The object of religion was not spiritual holiness;
rather, divination and rituals were performed for the sake of
good crops, health, and success in war. The Egyptians seemed to
have a more optimistic view of man’s capacities, living as they
were in a more stable, united, and relatively secured land,
further away from intruders and enemies, around a Nile river
that never brought drastic floods. But the Kings of Mesopotamia
and the Pharaohs of Egypt were the only “free” individuals in
these cultures, treating their societies as their royal
extensions, empowering their favorite court officials and
governors, selecting them and assigning them specific tasks. Not
daring, willfulness, and courage, but obedience and loyal
subordination were the principal virtues of these states.
There was a large class of “free” men in both ancient
Mesopotamia and Egypt, that is, of individuals who were not
other men’s property or prisoners-of-war. Scholars tend to agree
that, despite the increasing number of slaves, most public works
in both Mesopotamia and Egypt in the 3rd millennium, including
the labor employed in the building of the pyramids, was
undertaken by “free” men (Saggs 1989: 43). Yet these “free” men
had an obligation for labor services for the state in exchange
for rations of food. They were not independent farmers and less
so citizens who participated in public assemblies to discuss the
affairs of the state. Most of the land was institutionally owned
or set aside to provide revenue for the state, religious cults,
office-holders, and socially privileged individuals, though
wealthy office holders did invest income in the acquisition of
large private estates.47
In Mesopotamia, during the Agade period (2340–2159 BC), after
the various Sumerian cities fell under the control of one
central dynasty, we encounter a situation in which the kings
were “exalted beyond the human sphere” and, like the gods
themselves, were seen as the providers of wealth, status and
safety to everyone. They were the redistributors of magnificent
presents to temples, their favorites, and members of the royal
family – all intended to symbolize their unsurpassed position.
The soldiers were not independent men, less so aristocrats, but
servants of the king supplied with rations of food, wool, and
weapons and, in some instances, plots of land for subsistence
(Kurt 2002a: 54–55).
While the Mesopotamian kings were not necessarily tyrants who
ruled for their own material benefit, but were responsible for
the performance of public works, they alone tended to be seen as
individuals with agency, responsible for all the accomplishments
of their society, even if it came indirectly through their
appointed officials, scribes, and provincial governors. They
were providers and protectors, divinely born and appointed only
by god. The ceremonial poems portrayed them as the only
characters capable of greatness and thus of individuality.
According to Kuhrt, the poems and hymns performed in the courts
all contain the same essential elements:
The king is the perfect soldier and military commander,
exceptionally strong and brave and an expert in handling all
kinds of weapons. He always leads his troops into battle; the
fame of his military triumphs is known throughout the world and
inspires terror in his enemies (2002a: 68).
His wisdom and learning are unsurpassed; everyone seeks his
advice in the assembly; he speaks all the languages spoken by
the subjects of his kingdom without recourse to interpreters. He
is the most expert diviner; he also excels in music and knows
all the hymns and melodies; “his music making is so delightful
that he makes his subjects and the gods exceedingly happy (69).
This political culture prevailed through the entire history of
the Near East – or so is the view that comes across in Kuhrt’s
two volume work, The Ancient Near East 3000–323 BC. This work, I
should add, is not putting forth a peculiar argument; it is
actually a straightforward, nonpolemical but “magisterial”
expression of a generally accepted view. Except for
multicultural historians and academic socialists who sympathize
with collectivist states, the consensus is that Near Eastern
polities were autocratic in character. I have focused on this
work as one of the best consensual expressions of the current
state of scholarship. The editorial comments cited in its back
cover (penned by highly regarded scholars) speak of the
“remarkable” quality of this work; “without equivalent in any
language;” “scholarship of the highest order…with massive
accompanying bibliography and footnotes…unmatched by anything
available.” While there were varying details in the political
structures of Near Eastern states through the long period
examined by Kuhrt, particularly in regards to relations between
“secular” and religious orders, the basic principle of
governance was autocracy or, as I like to call it, despotism.
It would also be misleading to view Near Eastern rulers as
tyrannical characters lacking in collective regard for their
kingdoms. The records show clearly that an important role played
by the king was as a source of equity. The celebrated code of
Hammurabi (1790 BC) envisions the king not only as the upholder
of order, but as the source of justice itself (Saggs: 156–60).
The commoners saw their kings as those appointed by their gods
to protect them against the abuses of the rich and powerful.
Protests against corrupt officials and even strikes against
state-work were not uncommon (Saggs: 42–3). Still, it was the
king who was the font of justice and rightfulness, and he
expected servile-like obedience from his subjects. In the
epilogue to the Hammurabi code, the king is spoken of as if he
were the only “I”:
I, the king who stands head and shoulders above kings – my words
are choice, my diligence is unequalled. At the command of the
sun god, the great judge of heaven and earth, may justice become
visible in the land (Kuhrt 2002a: 112).
guaranteed the cosmic order, embodied law and order on earth;
“truth,” “right behavior,” or “correct balance.” As maintainer
of this balance, he was simultaneously expected to rule in
accordance with it. “In relation to his subjects,” writes Kuhrt,
“the king was omnipotent” (2002a: 147). The whole vast
bureaucratic and economic organization of the empire was
directed to the glorification of the Pharaoh (Montet 1964:
32–62). All public offices were, in origin, an expansion of the
functions of the royal house. While family connections were
widely drawn upon to gain access to, and promotion up, the
hierarchy of officialdom, there was no entitlement to position
based on noble privilege. The members of the nobility were
judged according to their performance of public duties to the
king and his kingdom. Revealingly enough, Kuhrt writes that
“long lineages indicating pride in one’s family and noble
origins are absent in the tomb inscriptions – instead individual
service and the way it has been rewarded by the king are the
themes” (153).[/quote]
Source :
The Uniqueness of Western Civilization by Ricardo Duchesne page
403-408
#Post#: 25780--------------------------------------------------
Re: Western Feudalism and Non-Western Patrimonialism
By: 90sRetroFan Date: April 6, 2024, 2:19 pm
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I think this part is also worth highlighting:
[quote]The commoners saw their kings as those appointed by their
gods to protect them against the abuses of the rich and
powerful.[/quote]
The leftist case for autocracy is nothing more than a return to
this elementary awareness.
#Post#: 26164--------------------------------------------------
Re: Western Feudalism and Non-Western Patrimonialism
By: antihellenistic Date: April 28, 2024, 2:36 am
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Difference between Western Civilization and its Opponents
[quote]Before the Industrial Revolution, during the
Enlightenment, European thinkers – Leibniz, Montesquieu,
Voltaire, Hume, and Smith – observed, and variously tried to
explain, the differences between East and West. In their view,
one of the most salient contrasts was Europe’s “genius for
liberty” and Asia’s “despotic” character. Furthermore, in the
Near East and also in China, imperial unification was attained
early on in their histories, with brief interludes of breakdown
and decentralization. While India alternated with longer periods
of fragmentation, most of the subcontinent saw imperial
dynasties. Only Europe, as Montesquieu argued, was ruled by
“many medium-size states” and a type of political structure
called “state of estates,” which amounted to a partition of
powers between kings, lords, towns, and the church, each with a
specific set of rights, duties, and legal roles in the affairs
of the state (Anderson 1987: 462–72). Enlightenment thinkers
discerned certain geographical and ecological factors underlying
Asia’s unity and Europe’s fragmentation. While wide open plains
and intensive-irrigation farming predominated in Asia, the
European landscape was fractured by the Pyrenees, Alps, and
Carpathians Mountains and depended on rainfall for its
agricultural output. Moreover, while irrigation in Asia
necessitated communal organization and public construction
works, which encouraged cultivators to be more servile, in
Europe rainfall farming encouraged smaller, independent farming
units and less intrusive forms of centralized organization
(Wittfogel 1957).1 In recent times, these observations have been
overshadowed by studies based on the supposition that the most
crucial dividing line between Europe and Asia came after the
Enlightenment. The central question is no longer why Europe
enjoyed greater liberties but why Europe/England was the first
region in the world to experience self-sustaining industrial
growth. Ken Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: China, Europe and
the Making of the Modern World Economy (2000), winner of the
2000 John K. Fairbank Prize of the American Historical
Association, co-winner of the 2001 World History Book Prize, and
one of Choice’s Outstanding Academic Books of 2000, now stands
as one of the most influential contributions to this narrower
question.[/quote]
Source :
The Uniqueness of Western Civilization by Ricardo Duchesne page
117 - 118
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