Subj : Re: NetBSD 10
To   : Arelor
From : Gamgee
Date : Wed Apr 03 2024 07:49 am

-=> Arelor wrote to Gamgee <=-

 Ar>   Re: Re: NetBSD 10
 Ar>   By: Gamgee to Arelor on Tue Apr 02 2024 08:20 pm

 >  Ar> 5) Their sandboxing frameworks are much simpler to understand and
 >  Ar> blow Linux equivalents our of the water for applications in small
 >  Ar> deployments.

 > Okay, but not something I use/need.

 Ar> I personally think a modern, usable framework for privilege
 Ar> separation and access permissions for programs is overdue in
 Ar> vanilla Linux. It is a basic feature nowadays that works
 Ar> automagically on stuff like Android.

As I said in a previous reply, we may be talking about different 
use-cases of whatever *nix ...  My case is a simple home LAN scenario, 
not commercial or large-scale.  I solve privelege/access issues like 
*nix always has - with user/group settings.  And even that is pretty 
limited, as I'm basically the only user on my systems.  Wife is a 
confirmed Win-droid.  :-)

 Ar> On OpenBSD, firefox installs get sandboxed by default. You are
 Ar> guaranteed firefox won't make any system call a web browser is
 Ar> not supposed to make and you are guaranteed it won't try and
 Ar> access files out of its sandbox. This is the _default_
 Ar> configuration in OpenBSD and requires no effort. You just pkg_add
 Ar> your firefox and you get a jailed web browser. This is how it
 Ar> should work in Linux and this is what they are trying to
 Ar> accomplish in Linux with mixed results.

Not something I would need.

 Ar> The Linux approach is to either use packaging that includes
 Ar> sandboxing (such as flatpack) or to use some mandatory access
 Ar> framework (such as AppArmor). Stuff like flatpack suffers because
 Ar> they usually give too much access to the programs they are
 Ar> running - like they go and create a sandbox which includes all of
 Ar> your $home in [!!!]). SELinux will make your head hurt very
 Ar> badly. AppArmor is fine but requires you to load an apparmor
 Ar> profile for your applications, and the profiles included with
 Ar> distributions are either too limited or outright broken. Linux
 Ar> distributors have this idea that they ought to have proper
 Ar> privilege separation for programs but they still don't get it
 Ar> quite right. You can eventually sandbox your stuff properly but
 Ar> it hits the "too effort intensive" mark very fast.

Have never used (or needed) anything like that.  <SHRUG>


.... So easy, a child could do it. Child sold separately.
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