Leak about Russia's digital espionage system published

One of the main mechanisms of the Putin regime of power is STMF
(rus: SORM - abbreviation for System of technical means for ensuring
the functions of operational-search activities). This is a set of
technical means designed to conduct operational-search activities in
telephone, mobile, wireless, radio and Internet networks. The system
was officially put into effect by the Law "On Communications" and
Order of the Ministry of Communications No. 2339 dated August 9,
2000. The main function of SORM is global control of all information
traffic in Russia and international communication lines used by the
country's residents. (https://bit.ly/3RzlMc9)
SORM is installed in all data centers of the country, at all providers
of different levels, at traffic communication points, on all major
search engines, on all major social projects (including popular
Russian social networks Ok.ru, Vk.com, Mail.ru and other).
All Russian telecom operators (without exception!) are required to
install software and hardware systems for intercepting and
controlling traffic certified by the FSB and allowing FSB operatives
to connect online to communication lines and track transmitted
information. Networks of street surveillance cameras are also
connected to the SORM system, some of which are equipped with
built-in microphones (thus, not only visual information, but also
an intercepted conversation on the street may be at the disposal
of the FSB control services). All mail servers located in Russia are
also under the control of SORM. All cryptographic complexes and
programs used in Russia must be certified by the FSB without fail,
which already implies their compatibility with SORM. In addition,
the FSB officers in charge of SORM actively interact with programmers
who, even at the stage of creating programs, make bookmarks that
facilitate the subsequent work of operatives to intercept
information.
The main messengers (Telegramm and WhatsApp) was hacked by the
FSB officers and controlled by them, if necessary, on-line, including
online reading of the user's messages from the screen. As for the
myth about the security of Durov's Telegram, it is being spread by
the Russian special services to blunt users' vigilance.
In the middle of the 2010s, data was leaked from the Nokia archive
regarding the supply of line control equipment to Russian telecom
operators. Based on these data, we can conclude that in 2014-2016
SORM software and hardware systems were installed by operators
in the cities of Vladimir, Lipetsk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma,
Bryansk, Smolensk, Ryazan, Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk, Orel,
Tula, Tver, Tambov and Yaroslavl. Thus, not only Moscow and
St. Petersburg, but at least the whole of central Russia is tightly
taken under the control of the FSB. Of course, the national republics
were not left without guardianship either. Particular attention is
paid to the North Caucasus.
Even a careless phrase intercepted by SORM can become a reason
for excitation of the so-called. criminal case, or at least lead to the
establishment of operational control over an unreliable citizen.
Do not trust instant messengers, especially Telegramm - everything
is easily tracked by SORM. If you are forced to use Telegramm, do
not forget that your activity can be intercepted. Exercise at least the
slightest amount of caution. Try not to use Russian mail services for
correspondence. Do not use mobile lines for confidential calls.
In Russia, ALL conversations on mobile communication lines are
intercepted and written. Most of it (of no interest to FSB
operatives) is stored on average for several days, then overwritten
with a new data stream, because. there is no point in constantly
storing gigantic volumes of conversations. But as soon as you draw
the attention of the "organs" with a careless phrase, all your
subsequent conversations will be transferred to a special
(i.e. permanent) interception and storage mode. In addition, try
not to use Russian anti-virus programs, since they all contain
backdoors that leak your data to SORM servers (this is especially
the case for the Chekist Kaspersky anti-virus, which is actually
an FSB virus).
Try to use only western software, western servers and western
cryptografic. Of course, they are also under the control of Western
intelligence agencies. But in any case, your opposition to the
Kremlin will not be a concern for the CIA or other intelligence
agencies. This does not give a 100% security guarantee, but
it reduces the risk of trouble.