MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY 1940 WHAT YOU MUST DO OH 17 Jsoto This 3d. official pamphlet, comprising 24 pages with 1 1 illustrations, tells you how, with a few simple materials easily obtained, or readily available in most households, a refuge room can be made in any ordinary dwelling-house that will give almost as good protection as a steel or brick garden shelter. 3 ON SALE AT EVERY POST OFFICE, ORDER IT FROM ANY NEWSAGENT Or send 4d. in stamps to the address below. LONDON. PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. 1940 To be purchased from H.M. Stationery Office at the following addresses: York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120 George Street, Edinburgh 2; 26 York Street, Manchester I ; I St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; 80 Chichester Street, Belfast; or through an/ bookseller MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY AIR RAIDS What You must know What You must do Crown Copyright Reserved LONDON: H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE Price 3d. Net or 10s. for 50. CONTENTS Page FOREWORD 6 CHAPTER 1.— THE CIVIL DEFENCE SERVICES. Introductory . . . . • • • • ^ Organisation of Civil Defence 7 The Warning System 8 Air Raid Wardens 8 Auxiliary Fire Service 8 First Aid Parties 8 First Aid Posts and Hospitals • • • • 9 Rescue Parties . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • 7 Demolition and Repair Parties 9 Gas Identification Service 9 Decontamination Squads • • 9 Treatment of Unexploded Bombs and Wrecked Aircraft . . . . 10 Report and Control Centres 10 A.R.P. Controllers 10 CHAPTER 2.— SELF-PROTECTION AGAINST HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS, AND BEHAVIOUR DURING A RAID. High Explosive Bombs and TTieir Effects 1 1 Splinters . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • ..Is Blast . . . . • • ... • • • • • • • • * ■ Types of H.E. Bombs . . . . . . . • • • • • . . 12 High Bombing Attacks 12 Low Flying Attacks and Machine Gunning 12 Other Falling Projectiles 13 The Importance of Shelter 13 Provision of a Refuge in the House 13 Selection of a Refuge 13 Protection of Windows and Doors 14 Protection against Splinters 14 Protection against Blast 15 Keeping Out Wind and Rain when Windows are Broken . . . . 16 Provision of a Shelter Outside the House 17 Types of Shelter Independent of Buildings 17 Trenches . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . . 17 Government Steel (Anderson) Shelters 17 Surface Shelters . . . . . . . . • . . . • • ..18 General Notes on Shelters 18 2 Page Independent Lighting . . . . . • . . • • • • . . 19 Water Supply • • • • . , 19 Flooding . . . . ■ ■ • • . • • * • • • • . . 19 Sanitary Arrangements . . . . . . . . . • • . . 20 Tools . . . . • • « • « • • • • • • • * • 20 Comforts and Occupation 20 Action to be Taken on the Sounding of a Warning and Behaviour During a Raid . . . . . . . . . • . • . . • • . . 20 After the Raid . . . . . . . . . - • • . . 21 ■ CHAPTER 3. — INCENDIARY BOMBS. Incendiary Bombs and Their Characteristics 23 Incendiary Agents . . . . . . . . • • • • . . 23 Incendiary Bomb Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Penetration and Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Characteristics of Light Magnesium Bomb . . 24 Methods of Controlling the Bomb and Dealing with Incipient Fires . . 25 The Use of Water 25 Stirrup Hand Pump . . . . . . .25 Methods of Use .26 Sequence of Action 26 Alternative Methods . . . . . . . . • • • . . . 28 Use of Chemical Extinguishers 30 Larger Fires . . . . . . . . • . • • • • . . 30 Precautions to be Taken in Advance 34 CHAPTER 4.— WAR GASES. The Nature of War Gases 36 Non-Persistent Gas 36 Persistent Gas 36 Effects of War Gases on the Body 36 Lung Irritants (Choking Gases) . . . . . . . . . . 36 Eye Irritants (Tear Gases) 36 Nose Irritants (Sneezing Gases) . . . , 37 Blister Gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 37 Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Gas Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 37 Behaviour of Gas 38 Respirators for the General Public 39 The Civilian Respirator 39 Description . . . . . . . . 39 Putting on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Adjusting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Testing Fit . . . . 41 Size «• « « « . • * *. »* •* *• • • 41 Checking 41 Securing . . 41 Rcmov&i • • • « « » » » • • • • ** 42 3 Page The Small Child's Respirator Description Putting on and Removal Adjustment and Testing. . The Baby's Protective Helmet Description Fitting and Operation . . Use and Care of Respirators Treatment to Prevent Misting of Eyepieces 47 Carriers for the Civilian and Small Child's Respirators 47 Gasproof Accommodation 48 Protection of the Body Against Blister Gases . . 49 Decontamination of Contaminated Articles of Personal Apparel . . 50 Ordinary Clothing 50 Leather Boots and Shoes 50 Respirators . . 50 CHAPTER 5.— SIMPLE FIRST AID. Introductory . . . . . . 51 Wound Shock .. .. ..51 Bleeding (Haemorrhage) 52 Types of Haemorrhage . . . . 52 Symptoms of Haemorrhage . . . . 52 Treatment of External Haemorrhage . . 53 Treatment of Internal Haemorrhage 53 Wounds in the Abdomen 53 Fractures . . . . . . 53 Simple Fractures 53 Compound Fractures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Complicated Fractures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Simple First Aid Treatment of Fractures 54 Improvised Splints . . • 54 Improvised Bandages for Securing Splints . . . . . . 54 Improvised Slings 54 Unconsciousness (Insensibility) 56 Suffocation (Asphyxia) . . , 56 Removal from Electrical Contact .56 Burns (other than from Gas) and Scalds 57 Gas Casualties . . 57 Blister Gas .. 57 Lung Irritant Gas . . . . .58 Nose Irritant Gas 58 Summary 5S Notes on Improvised Splints 60 APPENDIX. TABLE OF WAR GASES 62 SELECTION OF OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS . . . . 64 4 . 42 . 42 . 43 . 43 . 43 . 44 . 45 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Improvised window protection — using books A completed Anderson shelter Emergency exit from cellar Chart illustrating protection obtained by taking cover . . Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb Stirrup Hand Pump Controlling fire with jet Directing spray on the bomb . . Shovelling sand on the bomb The bomb almost completely controlled by sand The Redhill Container, long-handled scoop, and hoe . Opening the door of a burning room Rescuing an insensible person from a burning room Bringing an insensible person downstairs Smothering the flames when clothing is on fire . . Preparing to escape from an upstairs window Dropping from an upstairs window Putting on the Civilian Respirator Back of head with respirator in position Preparing to remove the Civilian Respirator Small Child's Respirator Baby's Anti-Gas Helmet Testing rubber of mask Examining rubber disc Civilian Respirator correctly packed in carton . . Artificial respiration — backward swing Artificial respiration — forward swing Improvised splint for fractured thigh bone Improvised splint for fractured shin bone Improvised splint for fractured forearm 5 FOREWORD BY SIR JOHN ANDERSON, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., M.P. Minister of Home Security. This book is written to help you and your family and your friends. There has been built up in the last few years a vast organisation for Civil Defence; and, thanks to the devotion of a great army of volunteers, the services which it comprises have been welded into a highly efficient force. This organi- sation is briefly described in the first chapter, which has been included in this book for two reasons; first, because I may, in the near future, have to call on many of you to give some part of your time to one or other of these services, and secondly, because you may need the help of the services and should therefore understand something about them. But the Civil Defence services alone cannot protect you from the conse- quences of air raids. Your own protection and the protection of your family must, in large measure, depend on your taking certain necessary precautions. You can yourself do much to minimise risk to yourself and to those dependent on you. A great deal of information has been collected as a result of experience gained in actual air raids, and from this and from research and experiment the basic principles on which the protection of life and limb and property depends have been worked out and are set down here for your guidance. They are simple to understand and easy to carry out; and if you will act on them you will be able to face the dangers of air raids with the sure conviction that you have done all in your power for the safety of those depending on you, and with the calmness and assurance that come from a knowledge of the way in which these dangers can be met. In this way you will be helping not only yourself, but the Nation, for it is through the strengthening of your powers of resistance that the people of this country will be enabled to defeat every attempt the enemy may make to weaken its morale and paralyse its war effort. In this war every man and woman is in the front line. A soldier at the front who neglects the proper protection of his trench does more than endanger his own life; he weakens a portion of his country's defences and betrays the trust which has been placed in him. You, too, will have betrayed your trust if you neglect to take the steps which it is your responsibility to take for the protection of yourself and your family. This is a contribution to the winning of final victory which you personally can make and which no one else can make for you. I am confident that you will make it. June, 1940. Ministry of Home Security. 6 CHAPTER 1 THE CIVIL DEFENCE SERVICES. Introductory. The object of enemy air raids is to dislocate the war effort of the nation. The attainment of this object may be sought by deliberate attacks on targets of military significance, a term having a wide application in these days, or by unrestricted and indiscriminate bombing of the civil population. The primary responsibility for resisting the enemy's efforts lies with the active defence services. But it is essential to have available a nation-wide organisation, the purpose of which is to minimise the effects of air raids by such aircraft as succeed in penetrating the active defences. Such an organisation, known as Civil Defence, has been built up and forms what might now be referred to as the Fourth Defence Service. The operation of this service is the responsibility of local authorities in the United Kingdom, working under the general direction of the Ministry of Home Security. The tactics of bombing from the air vary from mass raids by large numbers of bombers to attacks by small numbers of aircraft or even by single machines. Attacks may be launched in single raids with long intervals between each raid, or in successive raids following closely upon each other both by day and by night, and maintained over an extended period. Whatever form aerial attack takes, damage of some kind is inevitable, and the lives of many civilians will be endangered, unless certain essential elementary knowledge is previously gained, and a number of simple pre- cautions observed. The most effective weapon for causing major damage from the air is probably the high explosive bomb. Its destructive effects are immediate, and it is a difficult weapon against which to provide complete protection except at a very high cost. To cause numerous major fires simultaneously over a wide area may also be an enemy objective, and this may be done by means of incendiary bombs, particularly those of the lighter type, thousands of which could be dropped at one time upon a densely built-up area. Machine-gun fire also may be directed from low-flying aircraft upon persons exposed to the raiders. The possibility of poison gas being used, though it is forbidden by the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, cannot be overlooked, and such attacks might be made either by bomb or spray or both. All these weapons of air attack may be used by themselves or in effective combinations devised to cause the greatest dislocation of the war effort of the nation, and to threaten the morale of the people. The Organisation of Civil Defence. There is much that citizens can do, and which no one can do for them, to help themselves, their families, and the nation, but it has been necessary to set up in addition the great organisation of Civil Defence, built principally on unpaid voluntary service, for the discharge of the many skilled duties described below. Everyone should understand this organisation, both so that he may 7 be able to help so far as he is able, and so that he may not fail to take advantage, in case of need, of the services which have been set up. The Warning System. A means by which warning of an approaching raid can be given to the general public is of first importance, and this is provided by a national system. Warning messages are sent out to the districts where air attack may materialise, and in those districts only is the "Action Warning" sounded by sirens. The signal is a "warbling" note given on a variable-pitch siren, or a succession of 5-second blasts sounded on a fixed-pitch hooter followed by intervals of 3 seconds. The warning is then taken up locally by sharp blasts on police and wardens' whistles. When the raid has passed or is no longer expected, this is announced by a continuous blast, known as the "Raiders Passed" signal. All siren signals are sounded for a period of two minutes. If the presence of gas is suspected, warning of it is given locally by wardens' hand-rattles; and when the area is known to be safe again, this warning is cancelled by the ringing of wardens' handbells. Handbells may also be sounded to inform the public when it is again safe to emerge from shelter, if sirens are put out of action as the result of a raid. Air-Raid Wardens. There will be a great need in time of air raids*for persons of courage and personality, with a sound knowledge of the locality, to advise and help their neighbours, and generally to serve as a link between the public and the authorities. To provide for this, the Air Raid Wardens' Service has been organised, based on a large number of local Posts. Wardens have important duties to carry out, including assessing air-raid damage, reporting it concisely and correctly, guiding and assisting the A.R.P. services sent to deal with it, and giving general assistance and guidance to members of the public. Their functions are in some respects allied to those of the police, with whom they will need to co-operate closely; and, though they are not part of the police or special constabulary, the wardens* service is generally placed by the local authority under the executive control of the Chief Constable. It is important that everyone should know the names and addresses of the nearest Wardens and the position of the Warden's reporting post, since it may be necessary as a result of air-raid damage to make immediate contact with a Warden, or to arrange for the making of an urgent report. Auxiliary Fire Service. It is important that fires should be tackled as soon as they are started, as they are very much more easily put out at this stage than later. Incendiary bombs may cause fires in such large numbers in a comparatively restricted area that the normal resources of the Fire Brigade will be inadequate. An Auxiliary Fire Service has therefore been formed and trained to reinforce the regular fire brigades. The fire brigade equipment has also been increased by the provision, on loan to the local authorities, of large numbers of pumping units, mainly trailer pumps, drawn by cars, taxis, vans or lorries, but including also self-propelled units where required. Emergency fire floats have also been added to the fire brigade equipment in a number of areas. First-Aid Parties. There may be injured who must be given attention where they lie; some will require removal for further treatment. For this work there are First Aid 8 (or Stretcher) Parties, each consisting of four men with a driver and transport for themselves and vehicles for the injured provided by the Ambulance Service. First-Aid Posts and Hospitals. There must be places where the lightly and seriously injured can be treated, and this is done at First-Aid Posts and Hospitals. First-Aid Posts are normally in buildings adapted and equipped for this work. They are supplemented by Mobile Units, consisting of vehicles in which the appropriate equipment and staff are conveyed to scenes of damage in order that temporary First-Aid Posts may be established nearby. In rural districts First-Aid Points are established, and consist of a first-aid box placed in some central building where attention to the injured can be given. The position of First-Aid Posts and Points should be known to all who live in the vicinity, for it may be necessary for slightly wounded persons to go there on foot, or for uninjured persons to convey a neighbour, for the purpose of obtaining first aid. Rescue Parties. Those who have been trapped in shelters or under buildings must be released. This work requires experience and care, since debris unskilfully moved might release other parts of the structure, and so cause it to crash upon both rescuers and those to be rescued. This work is done by Rescue Parties, who will also undertake the temporary shoring up or the demolition of partly collapsed buildings where these are a source of immediate danger and the work is within their scope. As it is probable that many of the trapped will be injured, at least four members of each Rescue Party are also trained and equipped to render first aid. For certain parts of rescue party work, for example, the removal by manhandling of piled-up debris, Rescue Parties may ask for the assistance of able-bodied members of the public who are available nearby. Demolition and Repair Parties. After an air raid extensive demolition work may have to be done, streets cleared of wreckage, craters filled in, and fractured gas, water, and electricity mains and sewers may need repair. Such work may have to be carried out urgently in order to remove danger, or for the purpose of restoring essential services. Work of this kind will be undertaken by parties obtained from local authorities' staffs or the staffs of public utilities as required, or from contractors, according to the particular work to be undertaken. In clearing wreckage, demolition and repair parties may, like Rescue Parties, utilise the services of members of the public who are willing to help. Gas Identification Service. If poison gas is used, wardens will immediately report the fact. They will also warn the public. There may arise problems in connection with gas warfare, however, which require the services of experts, and to provide for this a local Gas Identification Service, consisting of specially trained chemists antl assistants^ has been formed and equipped with apparatus suitable for their Decontamination Squads. Areas where persistent gas has fallen are said to be contaminated, and are dangerous until the gas has been neutralised or removed. The work of 9 decontamination is related generally to that of the Street Cleansing Services, and special Decontamination Squads, consisting of a foreman and five men with the addition of a driver, have been recruited, principally from these services, for the work. Treatment of Unexploded Bombs and Wrecked Aircraft, Bombs from enemy aircraft or shells from our own anti-aircraft guns may fall without exploding; these are a potential source of danger, and their presence and exact position should be immediately reported to a Warden or the Police. They will then be removed or destroyed by parties specially trained in this work, and in the meantime they should not be touched. Similarly, a crashed enemy aircraft is also dangerous. If it catches fire, the petrol, ammunition, and any bombs still remaining in their racks may explode. If the aircraft is not on fire, there still remains a possible danger of explosion. It will be the duty of Wardens and the Police to keep the public away from unexploded bombs, shells, and crashed enemy aircraft, and to arrange, as necessary, that nearby buildings are vacated until the area has been made safe by the appropriate means. Report and Control Centres. For the operation and control of all A.R.P. services, there must be local headquarters to receive damage reports and to issue instructions for the despatch of the necessary parties to scenes of damage. For this purpose Report and Control Centres have been established. These are manned by telephonists, messengers, clerks, and representatives of the various A.R.P. services, who are co-ordinated by an Officer-in-Charge. A Report and Control Centre may be combined, or there may be one or more Report Centres linked to the Control Centre, which is the nerve-centre of the local organisation and the headquarters from which local operations are directed. A.R.P. Controllers. The local A.R.P. services are under the general charge of an A.R.P. Controller, whose duty it is to maintain the smooth and efficient working of the various A.R.P. services of the local organisation and who is supremely responsible for their operations in times of raiding. 10 CHAPTER 2 SELF-PROTECTION AGAINST HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS, AND BEHAVIOUR DURING A RAID- High Explosive Bombs and Their Effects A high explosive bomb consists of a charge of high explosive mixture contained in a steel case fitted with a fuse and exploder. The destructive effects are twofold : those of blast, i.e. the air pressure and waves created by the explosion, and those of fragmentation, i.e. the breaking up of the steel case of the bomb into jagged pieces or splinters. Splinters. The average size of these splinters is about 1 in. across, and they are projected in large numbers in every direction at about twice the speed of a rifle bullet. On striking a hard surface they may be arrested or, if deflected in their path, may cause damage from an unexpected direction. The effective range of splinters can be considerable, and unless sufficient resistance is encountered in their path, they may inflict fatal injury at points as far distant as half a mile from the fall of the bomb. Blast. Blast is more freakish in the havoc it brings and a detailed treatment of the subject would involve a technical description of scientific phenomena. It is sufficient to say here that on the bursting of a bomb there is a violent outward movement of air in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, followed instantly by a great inrush of air causing a momentary suction. A shock- wave is created and travels at a velocity, in the first instant, greater than that of sound ; but it quickly becomes weaker as it goes. If the explosion takes place after penetra- tion of the ground surface, corresponding waves are also set up in the earth. In the immediate vicinity of the bomb, shock-waves may completely destroy buildings or may partially destroy them by causing the collapse of wall panels, roofs, doors, and windows. These are the 44 near effects,*' caused by pressure or suction. Further away, only structures of light construction, such as prominent balconies, and roof tiles and slates, plaster from ceilings, and window glass are likely to be affected. These are the " distant effects," caused by violent shaking. It can never be predicted, especially in the case of doors and windows subjected to the near effects of blast, whether they will be blown violently inwards or sucked outwards. It can, however, be said that the glass of unprotected windows wiU almost certainly be shattered, and that the flying jagged pieces will be a source of the utmost danger. Window glass subjected to distant effects of blast may also be shattered, but with considerably less violence, the fracture being caused by the resonance set up in the panes by the shock wave. If windows are left wide open they are less likely to be broken. It is advisable, however, to close them if a gas warning is given, and bombing is not in progress at the time. 11 Far greater areas are exposed to the distant effects of bombs than to the near effects, and consequently the chance of a house being subjected to distant effects is far greater than that of its suffering nearer effects. Types of H.E. Bombs. There are certain types of H.E. bombs, such as anti-personnel and armour- piercing bombs, designed for attack on specific objectives, but the most commonly used are the General Purpose types. The latter, as the name implies, are employed for general bombardment purposes and are used, for example, against factories and buildings of ordinary construction. These bombs may be fitted with fuses to detonate them on impact or after a delay varying within a considerable time range; normally they have fuses giving a delay action of a few tenths of a second in order that the target may be penetrated before detonation, but the delay can be increased to many minutes or even longer periods. The weights of bombs vary greatly. In detenruning the size of bomb to be used, account has to be taken of the carrying capacity of the aircraft, the weight of fuel required, and the destructive effect of the different weights of bombs. In the present circumstances, the bombs most generally in service are of about 100 lb., 250 lb M and 500 lb.; such bombs are between 4 and 5 feet long; and from 9 to 15 ins. in diameter. High Bombing Attacks. Hostile aircraft will be subjected to heavy anti-aircraft fire from our home defence units. Over certain vulnerable parts of the country, barrage balloons, too, will add to the hazards with which they must contend, and at all times there will be the Fighter machines of the R.A.F. launching fierce attacks upon the enemy. These defences will tend to cause raiding units to keep as far out of range as they can, consistent with the requirements of their plan of bombing. In many cases, therefore, the majority of bombing attacks over this country may be expected to be launched from a considerable height. There are two points arising from this source which are of special interest to the civilian population. Firstly, even if it could be assumed that the enemy would confine his attention to military targets, the small measure of accuracy obtainable when bombs are released from a great height leaves a wide margin as regards the possible positions where the bombs might actually fall. Some may fall in the areas at which they are aimed, whilst others would almost certainly fall in residential areas, the suburbs of cities, or even in parks, fields, or rivers. Every citizen, then, must realise that he and his family are among the potential victims of air attack, and that he must take all possible steps to secure pro- tection. Secondly, bombs released from modern aircraft flying at great heights and speeds must be released well before the target is reached. Anyone who waits till he sees aeroplanes overhead before taking cover is thus running the gravest risk of being injured by the bursting of a bomb dropped before the bomber comes into sight— for in congested areas in particular it is most unlikely that there will be clear view of the sky for many miles in all directions. Low Flying Attacks and Machine Gunning. Where there is no balloon barrage, attacks may be made from very low altitudes, or bv dive-bombing, and aircraft may skim over the roof-tops spraying unprotected persons in the streets and at windows with machine-gun bullets. 12 Other Falling Projectiles. In addition to the dangers resulting from H.E. and machine gun attacks, and from incendiary bomb and gas attacks described in later chapters, there are other falling missiles inseparable from the presence of hostile aircraft over this country. Anti-aircraft shells are designed to explode in the air, and the fragments of metal, including the heavy nose-cap, will descend upon the country below. Expended machine gun bullets resulting from aerial combat will also fall to the ground. The Importance of Shelter. These, then, are some of the dangers which air raids will bring. Outside the very small area in which the severest consequences of a direct hit are felt, there is a large area in the case of each bomb explosion in which there are the gravest dangers to life for the unprotected, as has been explained in the fore- going pages, but against which it is perfectly practicable to provide protection simply and cheaply. Every time a bomb explodes in a congested area, for a large number of people in the vicinity it may make the difference between life and death whether or not they have provided themselves with shelter and, on hearing the sirens, have taken refuge in it. A vital responsibility therefore lies on each householder to ensure that adequate shelter is available for himself and his dependents. In order to assist persons who wish to avail themselves of expert advice as regards the selection of the form of shelter best suited to their own case, certain of the Professional Institutions have arranged, with the approval of the Government, to set up a panel of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors who are competent to give technical advice to householders. For the sum of 10s. 6d. a member of the panel will inspect the house and give the householder a brief written report as to the best place for a shelter and the best way within his means to provide protection. A list of consultants on the panel has been furnished to certain local authorities and on application to the authority a householder may obtain a list of consultants from which to choose. If the authority has no such list, application should be made to The Secretary, Central Board, 1-7 Great George Street, Westminster, London, S.W.I, who will provide the name or names of consultants available near the householder who applies. Provision of a Refuge in the House. In many cases it will be found that the most convenient means of providing a shelter is to adapt some part of the existing premises for the purpose, and this is something which very often a handy man can do for himself, using largely materials which he can find in his own house or garden. Full-scale experiments conducted with 500-lb. bombs have shown that, outside a radius of 50 ft. from the point of burst, the average well-built house of normally substantial construction should give its occupants substantial protection against the effect of blast and splinters, as well as against machine- gun bullets and light missiles, subject to certain provisions being made. Windows and doorways should be blocked up or protected in some other way; ceilings must be supported in case of the collapse of the roof or upper storey; where walls are thinner than 1 3£ ins. of sound brickwork or stonework or the equivalent of this, they must be reinforced by the addition of further material, such as earth in boxes piled beside the wall to a height of at least 6 ft. Selection of a Refuge. The considerations may broadly be divided into two parts; those of lateral protection, that is, protection from blast and splinters provided bv 13 side walls, and those of overhead protection against light incendiary bombs, fragments of anti-aircraft shells, machine gun bullets, etc., and against the fall of debris, should the upper parts of the building collapse. Basement and semi-basement rooms offer the best natural protection, since lateral protection is generally wholly or partly provided by their sunken position, and they probably have fewer windows to be blocked or protected than other rooms. As regards overhead protection, there are all the floors and the roof of the building above them to give protection from falling objects, though they may not possess adequate strength to take the load of the building should it collapse. It is desirable to obtain professional guidance as to whether the ceiling is capable of taking the weight of falling debris, and, if not, how best it can be strengthened for the purpose. Where there is no basement, it will usually be advisable to select a room on the ground floor or one of the lower floors, in order to ensure good over- head protection against falling missiles; wherever possible there should be two floors and a roof above the shelter. Rooms on higher floors are incon- venient to adapt, since it may be necessary to protect the floor from splinters striking up through a window of the room below, and the strengthening of the ceiling also is most difficult and often impossible to arrange. In the case of rooms at or above ground level, it is necessary to consider the thickness of the walls upon which lateral protection will depend. A shelter should, if possible, be protected by 13| in. of sound brickwork or stonework on all sides. It is not necessary that the walls of the shelter room itself should everywhere be of this thickness, provided there are other walls within a distance of about 30 ft. which give on all sides a total thickness equivalent to 13£ ins. of solid brick or stone; if in any direction this degree of protection is not afforded by the premises as they stand, additional material should if possible be added. If it is not practicable to provide a thickness of 13£ ins. in all directions, a single 9-in. wall of sound brick or stone will give consider- able protection. Other things being equal, rooms facing soft ground, such as gardens and fields, are more suitable for use as shelters than those looking out on a street or hard paving, since the destructive effects of a bomb bursting in soft soil are not so great as those of one in contact with a hard surface. Persons living in the upper storeys of houses converted into flats will need to come to some arrangement with the other occupants so that common pro- tection can be secured for all in the manner most suitable to all the circum- stances. Those living on the ground floor or in the basement might give up space in an entrance hall or passage, whilst others might provide material and labour for blocking up a window or making other structural adaptations, or it might be possible to adapt quite simply a common staircase for use as a refuge by all. Protection of Windows and Doors. After a suitable room has been selected as a refuge, the windows and any outside doors will need to be given special protection. Windows in particular are highly vulnerable to both splinters and blast, and even when situated below ground, and thus protected against splinters, they may still be affected by blast. Moreover, they may be broken by the vibrations set up by distant effects in situations where no splinters can reach them. Protection against Splinters. One method of protecting windows against splinters is to remove the window frame and fill in the opening with brickwork of the same thickness as the wall. Another method is to build, outside the window, a wall of brickwork 14 13$ inches thick, or of earth or sand 30 inches thick, or of ballast or broken bricks 24 inches thick ; where materials other than brick are used, they may be contained in boxes, or held between boards or corrugated sheet iron. Pro- tection can also be improvised by placing boxes tightly packed with books to a thickness of at least 24 inches against the inside of the window. Protective walls for windows should extend completely across the opening, overlapping it by one foot on each side and at the top also. A saving can be made in the materials used to provide protection by erecting them on a strong platform or table placed at least one foot below the window to obviate building up the walling from the ground level. As far as bomb splinters are concerned, protection need not extend above 6 feet from the floor, as persons in the refuge will then be safe from such splinters, though the window will, of course, be vulnerable to blast. Similar protection can be given to doorways in outside walls, provided the entrances do not have to be used, except possibly under force if other ways of exit become blocked. Where the door is a regular means of entrance and must be kept free, a substantial traverse should be built to a height of at least 6 feet and to a width greater than that of the doorway, and 3 or 4 feet away from it. Protection against Blast. Windows and doors which are fully protected against splinters by the fore- going methods will generally be protected against blast. But there will be A stout book-case, stuffed tightly with old books, protects one window. Or a table can be used with books 2 ft. 6 in. thick piled on it. If the books are loose they should be roped down firmly. 15 many windows of a house, notably those of rooms other than the one adapted for use as a shelter, which will cause great inconvenience if shattered. No protection can be obtained simply for these against near effects, but some measure of reinforcement can be given to them against distant effects and the risk of small pieces of glass flying about reduced by one of the following means : — (1) A piece of fabric such as muslin, calico, cotton, or linen sheeting may be pasted all over the glass. A variety of adhesives can be used, such as office paste, gum, size, paperhanger's paste, or ordinary flour paste with an addition of treacle or glycerine in the proportion of one part of treacle or glycerine to twenty parts of the adhesive. Waterglass (sodium silicate) should not be used. The glass should be well coated with the adhesive. Where the loss of light does not matter, a strong cardboard may be pasted over the glass. In order to make the card- board stick, its natural curvature should be noted and it should be placed with its hollow side, which may also be coated with the adhesive, facing the glass and then be pressed firmly in contact. When there is not enough cardboard available a strong wrapping paper can be used, but it will not be equally effective. (2) The inner face of the glass may be sprayed or painted with a liquid composition of which special varieties can be bought. These materials mostly have only a limited life, and may have to be renewed after about two or three months. (3) A transparent film of the kind used for wrapping may be applied to the inner face of the glass. It can be pasted over the whole window, or it can be applied in strips at right-angles. There are several materials of this kind and each requires the proper adhesive. The makers* directions should be followed closely. (4) Where none of the above recommendations can be followed, materials can be applied in strips, though they do not prevent glass from splintering quite so well as all-over coverings. Surgical plaster or insulating tape are useful and are best pressed on with a warm iron. Strips of wrapping paper are not so satisfactory because they tear more easily. The strips should not be more than 6 inches apart. In all cases in which glass is retained in the windows of refuge rooms, unless the opening has been wholly blocked, it is essential to arrange protection against the violent scattering of broken glass by one or other of the foregoing methods. Keeping out wind and rain when windows are broken. If window panes are shattered, it will be necessary to keep out wind and rain and possibly poison-laden air. For this purpose, a shutter made of wall- boarding, plywood, or other stout material fixed to a light wooden frame, accurately fitting the window opening and having felt or thick cloth tacked around the edges, is recommended. This wall-board shutter should not be secured in position except by the friction of its close fit assisted by the felt around its edges; it will thus not offer resistance to blast, and, if blown away from the window, will fall into the room undamaged and can be easily replaced. It will be found useful to attach the top edge of the shutter to the wall by two lengths of stout rubber about 18 inches long, so that, while it is left free to swing from the window, it will be prevented from flying across the room. 16 Alternatively, shutters made of wood 2 inches thick throughout may be fixed on the outside of the window. These wooden shutters must be firmly clamped to the wall, for instance, by iron bars fixed across them with the ends securely fastened to the wall. While such shutters will not prevent the glass from being broken by blast, they will themselves normally withstand the effects of blast, and, if fitted with the necessary gaskets, will also keep out poison-laden air. Provision of a Shelter Outside the House. In some cases it may be decided to provide a shelter of special construction outside the house. Such a shelter may take one of several forms and may be situated in the garden, if there is one, or nearby, wherever accommodation permits. Arrangements may be made with neighbours for two or more householders to share the expenditure of a commercially built structure situated con- veniently to all. The entrance of such shelter must always be protected from splinters either by means of a substantial traverse or by proximity to a substantial building or wall. The shelter should be sited not nearer to any building than half the height of that building. Where this cannot be achieved, the roof of the shelter must be made strong enough to resist the fall of debris. Generally it is found that the proper siting and erection of outside shelters are matters for the building and contracting profession. For that reason, only brief notes are given in the pages which follow on the various types of outside shelters, sufficient to indicate the kind of problems to be tackled. Those wishing to provide for themselves specially made shelters are recommended to make contact direct with the profession or to approach the local Council for guidance, whichever is more appropriate. Types of Shelters independent of Buildings. Shelters independent of buildings may take the form of covered trenches or they may be special constructions, lined for example with steel or concrete. Trenches. Being constructed wholly or partly below ground, trenches afford excellent lateral protection, but they must be given overhead cover against light falling missiles. This requires a head cover of 5 inches of concrete or 18 to 24 inches of earth. More earth should not be used, because, in the event of collapse, the occupants of the shelter might be so deeply buried as to be unable to extricate themselves. Trenches should provide not less than 6 feet of head room and should be fitted with seats. They must be lined with strong materials to prevent the walls from collapsing, and should be provided with a form of floor covering, such as duckboards or shingle. Arrangements must be made to drain away any water which may seep into the trench. Government Steel Shelters (" Anderson Shelters ")• Corrugated steel shelters made in sections to accommodate four or more persons made to Government specification have been distributed in large numbers in the more vulnerable areas. The sections of these shelters fit together in the form of an arch designed to carry the necessary covering of earth for overhead protection against falling 17 A Completed Anderson Shelter. splinters and debris. Where possible, they should be sunk about 3 feet into the ground, and should invariably be covered with earth to a minimum depth of 15 ins. over the arch. These shelters do not provide the required protection unless covered by at least this thickness of earth. The shelter should be sited from 6 to IS feet away from a building in such a position that the building protects the entrance from splinters. Surface Shelters. These are built entirely above the ground; they may be constructed of 15 inches of concrete, 12 inches of reinforced concrete, or 13} inches of brick- work. Overhead cover must be provided against the fall of light missiles, and for this purpose reinforced concrete 5 inches thick may be used. General Notes on Shelters. Before a refuge or shelter can be considered to be completed and equipped, there are certain points to which attention must be directed. It is important 18 that these matters be attended to immediately the accommodation is available and not left until just before or during an air raid, when it may be too late. Entrance and Exit. Where possible two entrances, or a main entrance and an emergency exit, such as a window, should exist; they should be as far apart as possible, so that both are not likely to be blocked at the same time. Independent Lighting. As the normal source of electricity may be damaged, it is important to provide alternative means of lighting. In small shelters torches, or even candles and night-lights, may be used for alternative lighting. Water Supply. An adequate supply of drinking water should be available. Flooding. Steps should be taken where necessary to prevent the entry of rain water or water from mains damaged in a raid. This may be done, for example, by provision of tide boards or by the heightening of parapets round the site of the shelter. Underground shelter accommodation should not be discarded solely on account of the fear of flooding, if means can be provided for the safe escape of its occupants. An enlarged coal shute protected from debris can be arranged as an emergency exit from cellars. 19 Sanitary Arrangements. For this purpose, chemical closets may be used if water closets are not available. Some provision, however, is essential. Tools. A number of tools such as picks, shovels, and crowbars should be kept in a shelter to be used in forcing a way out if the occupants are trapped. When the accommodation is being fitted out, it should be discovered where the weakest part of the structure is, or where it would be most suitable to work, should it become necessary to break a way out. This position should be clearly marked for the benefit of all. Comforts and Occupation. Chairs or other seating arrangements are required, and a table, if it can be accommodated, is desirable. Rugs and a stove will be found most welcome during night raids and in the winter months. A radio or gramophone, some books, table games, and toys where children are concerned, will also be found useful adjuncts to shelter equipment. The provision of a kettle, a safe means of boiling it, some tea or coffee, a few biscuits in tins and perhaps some tinned food in addition, will all help to make less irksome the time passed in the shelter. Tt is important that persons in shelters should be given an occupation preferably of the mind, since this will help to divert attention from the noise accompanying an air raid and to prevent idle speculations on what is going on outside. Vigorous activity in a shelter should be discouraged, since it increases the consumption of oxygen out of the air and unnecessarily raises the humidity. If a dog is taken into the shelter, it is desirable that it should be muzzled. Action to be taken on the Sounding of a Warning and Behaviour during an Air Raid. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is most dangerous to give way to the temptation to watch what is going on in an air raid, and to remain out of doors or at a window instead of taking cover. Even if the raid is a con- siderable distance away, fragments of anti-aircraft shells may fall many miles from the scene of action, and in addition, with aircraft travelling at several miles a minute, a person watching a raid at some distance may find himself without warning in the middle of falling bombs. Owing to the great speed of modern aircraft, the bombs are released many miles before the target aimed at is reached, and the person who waits to see the bombers before taking cover may pay for his curiosity with his life. When an air raid warning is heard, or the sound of gunfire or falling bombs is heard m the absence of any warning being sounded, it is of the utmost importance that everyone should seek cover at once, taking care that he has his respirator with him. After a warning is sounded, the period before the raid begins is likely to be short. Persons in or near their own homes should betake themselves, with their dependents, m an orderly fashion, to the refuge; and employees at their place ot business should take cover in the shelter provided. Those caught in the streets at the time of an air-raid warning should not attempt to go home unless they can get there within five minutes. The local authorities, assisted by the Government, have provided public shelters for use by those persons tor whom it would be unsafe to try to reach home. The presence of these shelters is clearly marked, and in congested areas they are situated at close intervals. 20 It is obvious that no time should be lost in finding the nearest shelter. This may not be difficult in daylight, but in the dark — perhaps on a moonless night — it might prove an almost hopeless task if no thought had been given to it beforehand. Signs are provided indicating the location of public shelters, and it should be made a matter of habit to look out, wherever one may be, for these notices, so that in case of sudden need arising to seek shelter no time may be lost in trying to find it. Where persons are indoors on the announcement of an air raid, even where no refuge is provided, they should remain on the premises and should not make their way to a public shelter. Public shelters are provided for the safety of those who find themselves in the streets and far from home at the time of a raid. It is much safer to remain in an unprotected house than to be caught in the street when bombs are falling. If a person in the street has not been able to find a public shelter before the raid begins, it is necessary to make the best use of any nearby buildings or other local features which can be turned to advantage as a means of providing cover. Partial protection from flying splinters and debris may be obtainable in archways, doorways, basement yards, under balconies, and against walls. Bodily contact with solid matter, such as with the wall of a basement area, a shelter, or a house, should be avoided since there is a danger of being hurt through the violent percussion or earth shock set up in the ground by the force of a bomb exploding nearby. Protection of the lungs against blast can be secured to some extent by keeping the mouth slightly open, and this can best be done by gripping firmly between the teeth a piece of india rubber, a piece of soft wood, or a handkerchief rolled up tightly into a ball. To protect the eardrums from shock it is useful to put a small pad of loosely packed cotton wool in the ears. In the case of a bomb which penetrates the ground before exploding, the sides of the crater tend to confine the path of splinters to an upward direction, and even in the case of bombs which explode without penetration there is a zone of comparative safety near the ground. It is therefore safer to sit down than to stand up, and safer to lie than to sit. Thus, if a person finds himself in the open in an air raid and no shelter is available, he should lie fiat, preferably in a ditch or in a fold of the ground, with face downwards, support- ing his head in his folded arms. Protection should be given in any possible way to vital parts of the body against the fall of light objects. The chart on page 22 gives an idea of the great reduction in the risk of injury which can be secured by acting on the simple precautions described. After the Raid. After the action warning has been sounded it is important not to emerge from the shelter until the M Raiders Passed " signal is given. It is even more important that an exit should not be made where gas has previously been announced by Warden's rattle until, in addition to the " Raiders Passed " message sounded by the siren, the 44 All Clear " is rung on Warden's handbells. On emerging from shelter, it may often be the first impulse to wish to make inquiries by telephone as to how others in the vicinity have fared. This must not be done, since the communication system of the locality will certainly be required by the Civil Defence Authorities for the purpose of transmitting and receiving reports and for ordering out assistance to the scenes of damage, where the factor of time is of paramount importance. Those whose welfare is causing the most concern may unhappily be involved 21 at a scene of damage, and the delay in getting help to them caused by unnecessary blockage of the lines of communication may be a deciding factor in their ultimate safety. During a raid and, indeed, at all times in an emer- gency, it is necessary to keep calm, and to act swiftly, with the knowledge of the right course which must be gained beforehand. Standing in When it is safe to do so after a raid, it is better to go Street. out and help others than to stay at home and fret. Lying in Street. Lying Behind Low Cover or in Doorway. Sheltering in House or Other Place Affording Head and Side Cover away from Windows. In shelter of approved type, e.g., Anderson Shelter, Covered Trench, Strutted Base- ment, or Surface Shelter. This diagram is based on a large number of reports of the results of recent air raids and is an approximate indication of the difference in the degree of risk resulting from taking cover in various ways. 22 CHAPTER 3. INCENDIARY BOMBS. Incendiary Bombs and Their Characteristics. Incendiary Agents, Many incendiary agents, such as petrol, thermite, phosphorus, and magnesium, have been used in war, but the most effective as a projectile is the Magnesium Bomb, which consists of a magnesium alloy exterior and a core of thermite priming composition. The chief advantages of this type of bomb are that the whole of it is combustible with the exception of the striker mechanism and the sheet-iron tail fin, and that it remains active longer than most other forms of incendiary bomb of equal weight. Incendiary Bomb Attack. Generally speaking, the object of incendiary bomb attack from the air is to cause many fires over a large area at once. To do this each aircraft must carry as large a number as possible of the lightest bombs which will effectively start a fire; for this purpose the " kilo " or 2£-lb. magnesium bomb offers great advantages since a large bomber can carry 1,000 or more of these bombs. They may be released in salvos of 10 or 20, and if 15 per cent, of the bombs dropped in a normally built-up area actually hit buildings, a reasonable proportion for such an area, and only half of these started fires, at least 75 fires could be caused by a single aircraft. If there were 10 aircraft 750 fires might thus be started simultaneously. Penetration and Protection. The light incendiary bomb has been designed to penetrate any ordinary roof material, such as slate or tile, and to become lodged in upper storeys, where a fire may result. Unless the bomb enters through a window, it will probably be arrested by the first boarded floor below the roof, where it will start a fire and then, burning its way through the floor, start a further fire on the floor below. To lessen this risk, it is important to remove inflammable materials in attic or roof spaces. In addition, to prolong the resistance of woodwork to burning, it is helpful to apply liberally on upper roof timbers in these spaces one of the many recognised flame-resisting paints or plasters in accordance with the directions of the manufacturer. It is not difficult, however, and it is certainly far cheaper, to buy the ingredients of such a composition and prepare the mixture at home. For those who may wish to do so, the formula is : — 1 J lb. of Kaolin (china clay) to 1 lb. 2 oz. of sodium silicate in syrup form, mixed in 1 pint of water. It should be understood that the application of flame-resisting paints and plasters do not prevent fire, but simply prolong the resistance of dry woodwork to burning, thus giving the fire-fighter more time to get to the bomb before 23 the surroundings are set alight. The resistance to burning in a floored roof space or attic can be greatly increased by covering the floor with 2 ins. of dry sand (if the ceiling structure will support the weight) or with some other suitable material. Characteristics of Light Magnesium Bomb, On impact the thermite core of the bomb is ignited and burns at a temperature sufficient to ignite the magnesium casing. In the initial period, Typical Kilo Magnesium Typical Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Incendiary Bomb. Bomb — Sectional Drawing. 24 normally lasting about one minute, a violent spluttering takes place and molten incendiary matter is thrown a considerable distance, often about 30 ft. This may cause any inflammable material within reach to catch fire. After the initial stage the bomb will have become a small pool of molten magnesium, which will continue to burn with intense heat, but without spluttering, for about 10 minutes or more. If left alone the magnesium will tend to trickle through floor boarding, burning its way as it goes, and so start further fires in the room below. When, therefore, an incendiary bomb has penetrated a building, it becomes immediately necessary : — (i) To subdue and localise the fire resulting from the bomb, since the mam damage is caused by the fire; (ii) To control the bomb and prevent it from burning through the floor. Methods of Controlling the Bomb and Dealing with Incipient Fires. The Use of Water. The effect of applying water to burning magnesium is to increase the rate of burning by supplying oxygen, with the result that the bomb is rapidly burnt out. Water should not, however, be thrown from a bucket or otherwise projected in quantity on a magnesium bomb, since this will cause very violent spluttering and scattering of the molten metal. Even a light jet of water will cause spluttering, and should not, therefore, be used on the bomb. The best method of dealing with a magnesium bomb is by the application of water in a suitable spray, such as that produced by the stirrup hand pump; this enables the bomb to be dealt with at close quarters without any spluttering, and reduces the time of burning from about 10 minutes to a minute or so. Stirrup Hand Pump. The appliance specially re- commended for dealing with incendiary bombs and the result- ant fires is the stirrup hand pump. It is fitted with a dual-purpose nozzle which can produce either a spray or an fr-in. jet of water as desired. The jet will normally carry effectively to a range of about 30 ft., and the spray to about 15 ft. It is supplied with 30 ft. of hose. The advantages of the stirrup hand pump may be summarised as follows : Stirrup Hand Pump. 25 (i) It provides within a single appliance a safe means of attacking both the fire and the bomb; the former with the spray, the latter with the jet. To change from a jet to spray it is necessary only to press a button in the base of the nozzle. (ii) It enables the person operating the pump to keep well away from the intense heat and smoke. (iii) It is economical in water consumption. Not more than 6 to 8 gallons of water are required to extinguish the bomb and any resultant fire in the room, provided the situation is tackled promptly. (iv) It is a valuable means of fighting incipient domestic fires not neces- sarily resulting from incendiary bombs, and it may also be found to have other uses, for instance in the garden or garage. Methods of Use. The appliance may be operated effectively by two people, but three are preferable and they can best work as a team as follows :— No. 1 takes charge of the fire-fighting and operates the nozzle at the end of the line of hose; No. 2 pumps the water from a bucket at the other end of the hose; No. 3 keeps the bucket replenished with water and relieves Nos. 1 and 2 as necessary. No. 3 should also watch for the possible outbreak of fire in the floor below and in other likely places. When the team consists of only two persons, the duties of No. 2 and No. 3 should be combined. An independent source of water supply should be arranged in case water mains are damaged or the pressure of water in them is reduced owing to fire brigade activities elsewhere. For this purpose, water should be stored beforehand in tanks or buckets or used bath water may be retained in the bath during periods of heavy raiding. To approach the fire without being overcome by smoke, fumes, and heat, No. 1 of the team should lie down and keep his face near the floor, where it will be found easier to breathe and to see. He should have a fireman's axe or light domestic hatchet conveniently available for dealing with obstacles in his approach to the bomb, and also an electric torch for use in the final search for smouldering remains. A wet blanket folded and slung across the left arm will help to provide protection against the heat and against spluttering magnesium. Sequence of Action. After the initial period of intense spluttering, the situation should be tackled as follows : — (i) The fire caused by the bomb should normally be controlled first by means of the jet. Until this has been done the operator may not be able to approach the bomb sufficiently closely to direct the spray upon it. (it) The spray should then be directed on the bomb, and during this period the operator should gradually work nearer to the bomb so that he is finally attacking it from 6 ft. He should continue to direct the spray upon the bomb until it is entirely consumed, but it may be necessary to stop spraying the bomb occasionally so as to keep the resultant fire under control with the jet. 26 Shovelling Sand on the Bomb. (iii) As soon as the bomb is extinct, the operator should extinguish any burning parts which remain in the surrounding space. (iv) As there is danger of fire creeping into unseen places where it may remain unnoticed in a smouldering condition, a thorough search must be made; for this purpose it may be necessary to lift floor boards or to remove panelling and skirting from the walls. Alternative Methods. Where an incendiary bomb is found burning upon an incombustible surface, such as the tiled or concrete floor of a kitchen or scullery, an 28 The Bomb Almost Completely Controlled by Sand. alternative technique may be used if the surrounding area has not already been set alight. The principle of this technique is to control the combustion by smothering the bomb with dry sand. A close approach can then be made and the bomb may safely be scooped into a receptacle containing a few inches of sand and so removed outside. The best appliances for use with this method are the Redhill container and long-handled scoop and hoe. The container should be kept full with dry sand and situated together with the scoop and hoe conveniently near the place where it may have to be used. 29 If no other appliances are available, a bucket or coal-scuttle, and a shovel or garden spade, may serve the purpose, provided that a supply of sand, earth, or domestic ash is readily accessible, with which to smother the bomb and to provide a protective layer of a few inches thickness in the base of the improvised container. When the bomb is completely smothered, it may be scooped into the container and removed, care being taken to scoop up every particle of burning molten metal. Use of Chemical Extinguishers. Many chemical extinguishers are excellent for the purpose for which they have been designed, but would have certain disadvantages in meeting the situation caused by an incendiary bomb. The average soda-acid ex- tinguisher is of the 2-gallon type. A single extinguisher of this type would not, as a general rule, be capable of dealing with the bomb and the resultant fire. In addition, it would be difficult to handle when thick smoke made it necessary for the fire- fighter to keep close to the ground. Some extinguishers designed for special purposes would actu- ally be dangerous; for example, carbon tetrachloride, which is used in some, generates phos- gene, a poisonous gas, when in contact with the burning mag- nesium. Larger Fires. If an incendiary bomb is not dealt with quickly, a serious fire may result and the situ- ation will probably call for the resources of the organised fire service. In order to prevent the spread of fires, it is essential that the fire service, if required, should be called without delay. It is of vital importance, therefore, that everyone should know the fire organisation in his locality and the quickest way of obtaining assistance. Telephone lines and fire alarms may well be congested or out of order, and it would be wise to have a notice pinned up near the door stating where the nearest fire station or auxiliary fire station is or the route followed by the fire patrols. In addition, the following notes may be found useful by householders for dealing with a situation where a serious fire has been started. (a) In searching a house for occupants, a start should be made at the top and continued downwards. (b) To avoid smoke and heat, a person should lie down and crawl with head low. This method applies equally to life-saving and fire-fighting. (c) Doors and windows must be kept closed to restrict the supply of fresh The Redhill Container. The Long-handled Scoop and Hoe. These are joined together for shovelling sand on the bomb, as shown in the illustration on page 28. 30 air to the fire. The door of a room in which there is believed to be a fire should not be opened until appliances are ready and in position to attack the fire. (d) Passages or stairways on fire should not be used if rescue from outside can be effected through the window. (e) When using stairways and passages, or crossing rooms, a person should keep near the walls where there is greater support for the floor. if) If the door of a burning room opens outwards, it is important to control its swing by placing the foot a few inches back from the closed door, so that it may be opened steadily and used as a shield for the body against the outrush of flame and smoke which might otherwise overcome the person about to enter. After this a prone position should be adopted. Opening the Door of a Burning Room. (g) To move an insensible person, the body should be laid with the face uppermost and the wrists tied together. The rescuer should then kneel astride the body and insert his head through the loop of the arms thus tied, and crawl. 31 Rescuing an Insensible Person from a Burning Room. Smothering the Flames when Clothing is on Fire. To move the body downstairs, it should be placed face uppermost with the head down the stairs. The rescuer should then lead down- stairs by crawling backwards, helping the body down with his hands placed under the armpits. (h) If a person's clothing is on fire, he should clap his hands over his mouth, lie down and roll. If the clothing of another is on fire, the rescuer should make him lie down with the burning part uppermost. He should then approach the victim, holding in front of himself a blanket, rug, overcoat, or any other article suitable for smothering the flames, and cover the flames with the material. The victim should then be rolled until the flames have been put out. (0 To escape from a window without a rope, the proper procedure is to sit on the sill, turn round, lower the body to the full extent of the arms, and then drop with the knees bent, endeavouring to spring slightly away from the walls. 33 Preparing to Escape from an Upstairs Dropping from an Upstairs Window. Window. Precautions to be Taken in Advance Fire brigades throughout the country have been augmented for the purpose of dealing with incendiary bomb attack. But in spite of this the fire brigade services might be severely strained in the event of a heavy incendiary bomb attack and water for their use may temporarily cease to be available locally owing to heavy demands elsewhere. It is therefore of vital importance that as many of the public as possible should be in a position to deal with fires on their own property before they become unmanageable; there is no household in which this can be neglected with impunity. The following are the more important precautions which should be taken in advance in order to deal with incendiary bombs : — (1) In every household, each adult should be made familiar with the methods of tackling both the bomb and the resultant fire, and duties should be allotted to each person in advance. (2) The appropriate appliances should be obtained before they are required; the cost of doing so may often conveniently be shared between neighbouring households. Supplies of water, independent of the mains, and of sand or dry earth, should always be ready to hand, 34 and everyone should know where these supplies and any stirrup hand pump or other appliance which is available are to be found. (3) Preliminary drill is essential; each person should practise the special duties which he has undertaken to perform, and when he is proficient he should also practise the duties of others, so that each may be inter- changeable with the other. (4) Spaces under the roof, such as attics, in which incendiary bombs are most likely to lodge, should be cleared of combustible material before- hand, and ready access to attics and roof spaces should be provided and made known to the persons concerned. It should be constantly borne in mind that every incendiary bomb which is promptly brought under control, besides saving water supplies which may be of vital importance for dealing with major fires, averts the risk of a conflagration which may end with the extensive destruction of property and life. CHAPTER 4. WAR GASES. The Nature of War Gases. The term " gas," in reference to warfare, covers any chemical substance, whether solid, liquid, or vapour, used to produce poisonous or irritant effects upon the human body. A war gas may be used by itself or in combination with other gases so that the presence of any one of them may be masked and its identification made more difficult. Gases are generally classified in two main categories : non-persistent and persistent. Non-persistent Gas. Non-persistent gases are so called because, in whatever form they are released, they are almost instantly converted into gas or smoke which is gradually dissipated by dilution with the atmosphere when the air is in movement. They are effective, therefore, for only a comparatively short time except when there is no air movement, in which case the process of dilution with the surrounding atmosphere is impeded, and the gas remains effective for a longer period. Some non-persistent gases are visible at the point of release, and wherever the concentration is sufficiently high. Persistent Gas. Persistent gases are usually liberated in the form of liquids, and are called persistent because the process of conversion of the liquid into vapour is prolonged; the liquid itself is dangerous to touch, and any area on which it has fallen will continue to give off vapour in dangerous concentrations until the liquid has completely evaporated or been removed or neutralised. The vapour of persistent gas is normally invisible, and like non-persistent gases, drifts with the wind, gradually becoming dissipated by dilution the further it moves from the source. Effects of War Gases on the Body. War gases may also be classified by their effects on the body to form two general categories, non-blister and blister. Non-blister gases may further be classified as follows. Lung Irritants {Choking Gases). In dangerous concentrations these gases immediately produce smarting and watering of the eyes, irritation of the throat, and violent coughing and retching (this is specially marked with chlorine and chloropicrin). Breathing strong concentrations of them, even for a very short time, may cause death. Phosgene is one of the most deadly of these gases. Lung irritants are usually non-persistent gases. Eye Irritants (Tear Gases). These gases, even in low concentrations, cause extreme smarting and 36 watering of the eyes. Their effects are only temporary and pass off soon after withdrawal from the affected area or after the respirator is put on. They are effective as harassing agents and might be employed to cause panic and threaten morale. Tear gases may be either persistent or non-persistent. Their appearance in liquid form is similar to that of blister gas, and they may be mixed with this type of gas in order to mask its presence. Nose Irritants {Sneezing Gases). These gases are non-persistent, and consist of solid arsenical compounds liberated as very fine particles in the form of a dust or " smoke." They are generally invisible except near the source, and have practically no smell. They produce intense irritation and pain in the nose, mouth, throat, and chest, which is often accompanied by sneezing and headaches. These effects may be slightly delayed, and in severe cases may be accom- panied by feelings of acute mental distress. As immediate relief is not felt after the respirator has been put on, a false belief may arise that the appliance is failing in its purpose. This, and the nauseating effect of the gas, will create a strong impulse to discard the respirator, which in no circumstances should be permitted. The effects will normally pass off quickly if the respirator has been promptly put on and kept on. Permanent injury is most unlikely to be caused by this type of gas. Blister Gases. These gases, whether in the form of liquid or vapour, have the effect of burning and blistering the skin, and may cause injuries to any part of the body which will take long to heal. In both liquid and vapour form they will readily penetrate ordinary clothing. Prolonged exposure to the vapour will cause injury to the eyes and the entry of liquid into the eyes may even cause blindness. If the vapour is inhaled in large quantities or contaminated food eaten, serious internal injuries may be caused. Nevertheless, short exposure to a low concentration of blister gas vapour need have no ill effects. The two most important blister gases are mustard gas and lewisite. Mustard gas is the better known of these and, unlike lewisite, it produces no immediately noticeable effects on contact or inhalation, and so the need for protection against it may not be appreciated until it is too late. If liquid enters the eye, however, this would immediately be felt. Contamination. The word contamination has been adopted to imply the pollution of any substance by war gas in any form, whether solid, liquid, or vapour. This contamination, which is of particular importance in the case of blister gas, is insidious and far-reaching in its effects. Both the liquid and the vapour are absorbed by all porous substances which, when contaminated, continue both to be dangerous to touch and also to give off poisonous vapour after all visible evidence of contamination may have disappeared. Any person touch- ing or walking on a contaminated surface becomes contaminated and would not only suffer injury himself but would carry contamination elsewhere. Likewise contamination may be spread by animals or vehicles. Foodstuffs which have been subjected to blister gas in any form become agents of contamination, and as such are dangerous; in the worse cases they will have to be destroyed. Gas Attacks. One way in which gas can be released from aircraft is by being dropped in 37 bombs. The casing of a gas bomb is usually of thin material, and may contain a small explosive charge sufficient to burst it and release the gas. The sound of the explosion is only slight as compared to that of a high explosive bomb of similar weight, and so normally it would not be mistaken. On the bursting of the bomb, a dangerous concentration of vapour is produced and a considerable area around the point of burst will also be made dangerous by splashes of the liquid. Persistent gas can also be released in the form of spray from a container in the aircraft. From a low altitude the spray of liquid gas would be heavy, but the area covered by the spray from one aeroplane would be limited to a comparatively narrow zone corresponding to the path of flight and the direction of the wind. Spray from high altitudes would fall upon a much larger area, but owing to its fineness when it reaches the ground it would be of little effect except when it fell directly on to human beings. Behaviour of Gas. The effectiveness of gas is markedly influenced by the characteristics of the area in which it is used, and by the weather conditions prevailing at the time. Unlike coal gas. war gases are generally heavier than air, it being an impor- tant requirement that they shall remain near to the ground where they will be effective and that they shall not be too rapidly dissipated by dilution. Consequently they will normally tend to remain longer on low-lying ground in hollows such as the basement areas of houses, where, to a large extent, they will be sheltered from the dissipating effects of the surrounding air movements. The principal weather conditions affecting the behaviour of gases are wind, temperature, and rain. The effect of wind is to carry gas along with it and to accelerate the rate of dispersal. In the case of a persistent gas, the liquid continues to give off dangerous vapour, but the local concentration is lower than it would be in the absence of wind. In built-up areas the free movement of air is to some extent restricted, and consequently gas will tend to remain in these areas longer than elsewhere. Temperature chiefly affects persistent gases. In warm weather the danger from vapour is increased. If it is sufficiently cold, the liquid will freeze and become solid; there will be little danger from vapour while the gas is in a frozen condition, but in the case of blister gases direct contact with the frozen liquid, or with any contaminated object which is frozen, will still produce skin burns. Light rain has little effect upon gases, but heavy rain tends to wash gas out of the air, and to wash away and destroy any liquid gas lying upon the ground or other exposed surface. Non-persistent gas is thus most dangerous when used in calm, dry weather, and persistent gas in dry weather with a high ground temperature and a light breeze; and the danger of both is further increased in a built-up area. Where there is any movement of air, the areas affected by the gas will be downwind from the point of burst. It is most important, therefore, that persons who find themselves in the open in the presence of gas should immediately make their way diagonally upwind, so as to reach an area of safety beyond the point of release. They should, of course, not walk towards 38 the point of release where the concentration will be greatest, but move laterally out of the path of travel of the gas. Respirators for the General Public. Respirators have been issued by the Government to the whole population. They are the property of the Crown, and as such they may not be maltreated or used for any purpose other than that for which they are intended. It is essential that they shall be worn by everyone who comes within range of war gases dropped by the enemy except those within gasproof shelter. These respirators will give protection to the eyes and lungs under any conditions likely to arise from the use of any war gas in air raids. None of them is designed to protect the wearer against domestic and other noxious gases which are not used in warfare. There are three principal types of civilian respirator designed to suit the different ages of wearer. They are the General Civilian Respirator, the Small Child's Respirator for children from about 4 years down to 18 months, and the Anti-gas Helmet for Babies, designed for infants in arms. The Civilian Respirator. Description. This respirator has a window of non-inflammable trans- parent material let into a facepiece of thin sheet rubber which covers the eyes, nose, and mouth, and which is held in position by head-harness. To this facepiece is attached a container which holds activated charcoal to absorb gases from the incoming air, and a filter to prevent the passage of the fine particles of poisonous smokes; the standard of protection against these smokes is now being improved by the fitting of an additional filter known as Contex. Those areas in which Contex filters have not already been supplied will receive them in due course. The local authorities will notify the public when they are available. The fitting of Contex should be carried out only by wardens or other A.R.P. officials. Thrusting the Chin into the Civilian Adjusting the Civilian Respirator. Respirator. 39 Back of the Head with Respirator in Position,shewing central position of buckle . Air is drawn in through the container, and the exhaled air is prevented from passing back through the same channel by a simple non-return valve consisting of a flat rubber disc attached to the inner end of the container. The exhaled air forces its way out by lifting the thin rubber of the facepiece at its edges, so that a separate outlet valve is unnecessary. The facepiece of this respirator is provided in three sizes — " Small/' *' Medium,** and ** Large ** — and the size is marked on the head-straps, or moulded on the brow of the facepiece. The same container is fitted to all sizes. The " Small ** size of the civilian respirator will normally fit a child from 4 years upwards, but in many cases it may be found that a child is sufficiently developed below this age to be likewise accommodated. A stout cardboard carton is provided, and when not in use the respirator should always be kept in this or in one of the types of carrier referred to later. 40 Putting on. Before putting on the respirator it is first necessary to stop breathing and remove any headdress. The respirator should be held in front of the face by each of the side straps with the thumbs under the straps; the chin should be thrust into the facepiece, the straps being drawn over the head as far as they will comfortably reach. The breath should then be released in order to expel any gas inside the facepiece, and normal breathing resumed. The headdress may then be replaced. Spectacles or pince-nez must always be removed before the respirator is put on since they will interfere with the fit and so admit poison gas. Adjusting. If the respirator is properly adjusted it should be quite comfortable in use, and provide a gastight fit in all positions of the head. If the rubber facepiece is stretched too tightly it will be uncomfortable because of the pressure on the face and the undue resistance to the exhaled air, which must pass between the rubber facepiece and the face, usually at the cheeks. This resistance to breathing will be found most exhausting, and the defect may be overcome either by the fitting of a larger size of respirator, if it is not already the large size, or by the proper manipulation of the adjustable head-harness. Testing Fit. If the fit is too loose or incorrect, air may be breathed in without passing through the purifying materials held in the container. This can be tested by holding a flat surface, such as a piece of paper or cardboard or a cork mat, against the outer end of the container, and attempting to inhale. If the intake of air is found to be impossible and the facepiece is sucked in against the cheeks, it can be assumed that a gastight fit is provided. If Contex has been fitted, a piece of stiff paper or card will not seal the holes, because the end of the Contex is corrugated. A thin cellophane jam jar cover may be used instead, or a piece of very thin, good-quality paper. Size. The correct size of respirator can be judged by the position of the transparent window in relation to the eyes, which should be on a line about midway between the upper and lower edges of the panel. If the eyes are considerably above this line, the respirator is too small ; if they are much below, it is too large. Checking. In making tests, and always when wearing the respirator, it must be ensured that the edges of the rubber facepiece are not doubled under and that the straps are not twisted. The buckle should be centred at the back at the crown of the head and the facepiece should be straight on the face with the two side straps horizontal. Women should adjust their hair so that it does not lie under the facepiece, and it may also be necessary to remove hairpins to ensure a safe and comfortable fit. Securing. When the correct adjustment of the head-straps has been found, the safety-pins pro- vided should be used to ensure that it is maintained. In the case of children, to make sure that the respirator remains comfortable, Preparing to Remove the Civilian Respirator. 41 adjustments may be necessary from time to time, in accordance with the growth of the child. Removal. To re- move the respirator, the thumb should be inserted under the buckle at the back of the head and the straps drawn forward over the top of the head and then in a downward direction. Any other method may cause damage to the face- piece, and must not be attempted. The Small Child's Respirator. Small Child's Respirator. Children do not, as a general rule, take well to wearing respirators, and the difficulties their parents and guardians may have in this connection, together with the other dangers of air raids, should be avoided where possible by the evacuation of children from the more vulnerable areas. The possibility of air raids, even in the comparatively safe reception areas, cannot, however, be wholly discounted, and the Government have therefore made a general distribution of the Small Child's Respirator. Description. An attempt has been made in the design of this respirator to make it as acceptable as possible to young children. The colours have been made attractive; it has been made as light in weight as possible; the head- Harness will not weaken in use, is gentle in its pull on the facepiece, and is so designed that it prevents the respirator from being easily pulled off. Since the child breathes much less air than an adult, a less bulky and lighter container than that of the ordinary Civilian Respirator has been included, and this is screwed into the facepiece. The container causes only a negligible resistance to the child's breathing, and the air breathed out passes out of the facepiece through a soft rubber valve which opens freely under the pressure of the breath. Contex may be added to this container also. The facepiece is made of soft rubber so that it readily takes the shape of the child's face and makes close contact with the skin. Eyepieces are fitted in place of the transparent window found in the Civilian Respirator. Putting on and Removal. The respirator is put on in the same way as the adult respirator. Many children quickly learn to put it on themselves if they are shown how to thrust the chin forward into it. If it is put on by a second person it is better to do so from behind, with the back of the child's head resting against the chest of the adult, so that the child's neck is supported against the action of pulling the spring harness over the head. To remove the respirator, it should first be unhooked at the back of the head, and the 42 instructions for putting it on then reversed, the movements following closely those given for the removal of the adult type. Adjustment and Testing. The head-harness is suitable for all sizes of heads without adjustment. If the respirator is properly put on with the harness secured by means of the hook and eye at the back, the fit of the respirator is automatically ensured if the child's face is of the correct size for it, and the close contact between the rubber and the face can clearly be seen. It is unnecessary, therefore, to test for gas-tightness, as suggested in the case of the Civilian Respirator, and this is not recommended. There is only one size of Small Child's Respirator. If there is difficulty in stretching the head harness over the head, or the eyes are unduly high in the eyepieces, this type of respirator is too small for the child, and a small Civilian type should be used. If the facepiece of the Small Child's Respirator puckers at the edges or is loose on the face, or the eyes are unduly low in the eyepieces, the child is too small for this type, and the special appliance, known as the Baby's Anti-Gas Protective Helmet, should be used. The Baby's Protective Helmet. Infants in arms up to the age of about 18 months and young children who show a marked distaste for the Small Child's Respirator, or are other- wise temperamentally or physically unfitted to wear this type, may be accom- modated by the Baby's Helmet. Description. It consists of a hood, made of impervious fabric and fitted with a large window, which encloses the head, shoulders, and arms, and is closed around the waist by means of a draw tape. A baby, when in it, is thus able to get its hand to its mouth. The hood is surrounded by and fastened to a light metal frame, which is lengthened on the underside and fitted with a tail-piece which can be adjusted by means of two screws turned with a coin, so as to form a support and protection for the baby's back. The length should be such that the baby's face is opposite the middle of the' window. It can be made extra long, if required, by overlapping the tailpiece on the last two screw holes only and using an extra screw and nut in the hole which has no fixed nut. A spare screw and nut for this purpose will be found on the domed top of the frame. The tailpiece is turned up at the end to form a seat which prevents the occupant from slipping out of the hood. The baby is made secure in the helmet by means of a T-shaped supporting strap connected to the end of the tailpiece. The metal frame and supporting strap may be varied in length to suit all sizes of babies and children up to about 5 years of age. The hood is padded on the underside where the baby rests. Padding has been omitted from the tailpiece since babies are likely to soil any padding in this position. If required, mothers can supply some washable padding, e.g., a folded towel or napkin, for this part of the frame. Folding legs are provided on the metal frame for use when the helmet is not being carried or nursed. The legs will prevent the helmet from rolling over if it is laid down with a child in it, and they are for use when a baby is being put into the helmet. Air is supplied to the inside of the hood by means of a rubber bellows placed conveniently for the right hand. The air passes through a container which removes all poison gas from it, and enters the hood at the top through a specially shaped orifice which deflects the air upwards so that it sweeps out all vitiated air from the hood and also prevents the stream of air from blowing directly on the baby's head. A slow and steady rate of pumping of about 40 strokes a minute is adequate for keeping out gas and supplying enough purified air even for a child of 4-5 years of age. The space in the hood is large 43 Baby's Anti-Gas Helmet. enough to allow pumping to be stopped for several minutes if required without causing discomfort. When pumping, the operator should be careful not to obstruct the intake holes which lie in the disc at the movable end of the bellows under the palm of the hand. There is no limit to the time during which a child may remain in the helmet if steady pumping is maintained. Contex may be fitted to the container in a baby's helmet, but only by properly qualified persons. The helmet should never be taken to pieces by an unskilled person because there is a risk of its being reassembled wrongly, so that it will not protect the baby against gas. Fitting and Operation. To put the baby into the helmet it is necessary to proceed as follows : — (1) The wire legs of the helmet should be opened and clicked back. (2) The helmet should be laid down with the skirt of the bag open and the top turned back over the window. The wide strap attached to the turned-up end of the metal tailpiece should be out of the way, so that the baby will not lie upon it. (3) The baby should be placed in the helmet so that its seat rests in the curve of the tailpiece with one leg on each side. (4) The skirt should then be pulled down over the baby and it should be ensured that both arms are free and are put up inside the bag before the tape is tied. The ends should then be drawn snugly, but not too tightly, around the infant's waist, and finally finished off by tying in a bow. (5) The supporting piece should now be brought up between the legs and the ends of the canvas strap attached to the buckles on each side of 44 the frame so as to hold the baby firmly in place. If the frame is being used in one of the shorter positions of adjustment, it may be necessary to shorten the supporting piece in order to hold the child securely. This may be done by folding down the top end either once or twice, as required, and passing the ends of the canvas strap out through the metal slots. (6) When the baby has thus been safely secured in the helmet, the bellows should be operated. First, at least twelve sharp strokes are required to clear out the air in the helmet, and then a slow and steady rate should be maintained. The baby in its bag can be nursed on the lap or carried in the arms in the normal way; if it must be taken some distance, the legs of the frame should be folded underneath, and a wide shawl used as a sling to support the baby from the mother's shoulders. It is desirable that the complete drill described should be practised both in daylight and in darkness, and when the parent or guardian is herself wearing a respirator. Since the growth of infants is sometimes rapid, frequent adjustments may be necessary to the length of the helmet in order that the child may at all times be comfortable and fully protected. The carton in which the baby's helmet is supplied is only large enough, with the normal method of packing, to take the helmet with the tailpiece unextended, and the extension of the tailpiece to keep pace with the baby's growth will therefore present a problem from the point of view of packing. It is desirable that the helmet should be kept with the tailpiece extended to the proper length, and at the same time it is important to avoid mutilation of the carton, in view of the need for economy of cardboard. The following method of packing, which will be demonstrated to parents of babies by wardens, should therefore be used when it is necessary to extend the tailpiece of the helmet. The flap of one end of the carton should be turned down inside the carton and the helmet inserted upside down in the carton with the extended tailpiece sticking out over the end of the turned-down flap. The other end-flap should then be closed and the side-flaps closed over the top, a piece of string being tied round the whole carton. The carton will then enclose the whole helmet and keep it reasonably free from light and dust, even though the end of the tailpiece protrudes at one end. Use and Care of Respirators. On all occasions when gas is present and a gas-protected room or refuge is not available or has to be vacated, the respirator must be put on without delay. In order to ensure this it is necessary to take the respirator on all journeys on which the wearer will be more than five minutes away from the place where it is ordinarily kept. It is also necessary to practise putting on and taking off the respirator both by daylight and in darkness, so that this may be done when required with the minimum delay. Furthermore, it is desirable to become accustomed to the wearing of a respirator, and to be sure that the respirator is comfortable in practical use over a period of time, since it must not be removed for adjustment in the actual presence of gas. After use, whether for practice or otherwise, the inside of the facepiece or bag should always be wiped dry before the respirator is returned to its carrier. If wet from exposure to rain the outside should also be wiped. Occasionally it may be necessary to clean the appliance more thoroughly. This may be done by means of a small sponge or soft cloth dipped in a rich solution of toilet soap and lukewarm water and wrung out thoroughly before 45 swabbing. The appliance should then be sponged in the same way with clean water, well wrung out. Great care must be taken, however, to prevent the entry of any moisture into the container, since this will damage its contents and impair its efficiency. Respirators of all types should always be put away quite dry. Those of the general civilian type should be folded in such a way as to prevent kinking or unduly bending the delicate trans- parent window. All res- pirators should be kept in a cool, dry place, away from a strong light or heat; they should never be left in front of a fire, near a radiator, or in the sun. Respirators other than the baby's helmet should not be carried or Testing Rubber of Mask. hung suspended from the straps, nor should they be confined to their carrier for long periods without being taken out periodically, since this may affect the fit through prolonged distortion of the facepiece. Occasional inspections should be carried out by the holders of respirators to make sure that they are in good condition, but it must be stressed that any undue tampering with the delicate sections is likely to do more harm than good. The following are a few general points, applicable in particular to the general civilian respirator, which should be looked at occasionally; if any faults are disclosed the local warden should immediately be consulted :— The transparent window is the most easily damaged part, and cracks or weaknesses should be looked for by holding before a light. The stitching round the edges must be secure. At the same time the thin rubber of the facepiece can be tested for punctures, tears, and signs of perishing, by gently stretching it so that a section of an inch is expanded to about 2 inches. Chafing caused by friction against the sides of the carrier, especially where this is not of the Government pattern, is almost always responsible for any weaknesses detected here. The thin rubber disc fitted centrally to the valve pin on the inside end of the metal container should be soft, pliable, and flat. If it is concave it should be taken off the pin and reversed. If it has hardened, it should be renewed. The rubber band joining the facepiece of the general civilian respirator to the metal container should be perfectly fresh and elastic. If it shows cracks, it is perishing and should be renewed. Stitching generally should be sound. The container of the Small Child's Respirator screws into the facepiece; it should be ensured that this is tightly done up. 46 Examining Rubber Disc. A severely dented container, or one which is perforated, or into which moisture has entered (as may be detected by the discolouration of the white filter material visible through the air holes at the outer end of the container), should be further examined by a competent official of the local A.R.P. organisation. In all cases, whether further advice or a new part of a respirator is required, the local warden should be consulted. Treatment to Prevent Misting of Eyepieces. When respirators are worn, moisture from the breath will condense inside them and vision will tend to be obstructed by misting of the transparent window or eyepieces. This can be avoided by the application of a thin film of toilet soap lightly smeared with the finger upon the inside of the window. It is suggested that this treatment should always be applied on putting the respirator away after use so that it will be immediately ready to put on when required. If the respirator is not worn, the treatment remains effective for a week, after which time the window should be lightly sponged and dried, and a fresh treatment applied. Carriers for the Civilian and Small Child's Respirators. Respirators should be kept and carried in the cardboard carton provided for them. They should be inserted with the container leading; the container of the Civilian Respirator should be inserted into the recess at the bottom of the carton, the facepiece being folded over so that the transparent eyepiece lies evenly on the top of the container at full length, without any deformation. In order to preserve the carton and to protect it from rain, it is recom- mended that it should be enclosed in a waterproof satchel, or other durable form of cover, fitted with a suitable shoulder strap. The satchel should be so designed that rain cannot enter between the flap and the body, and so that access to the respirator is impeded as little as possible. For instance, the flap 47 should be secured by means of press studs and not by tie-tapes, which might be difficult to untie in a hurry, and the flap of the satchel should be positioned so as to coincide with the lid of the carton. No other article of any description, such as first-aid outfit, electric torch, anti-gas ointment, lipstick, face-powder, etc., must be carried in the carton with the respirator. If, for convenience, it is desired to combine carriage of such articles with that of the respirator, provision must be made for them in separate pockets or compartments in the satchel. If no satchel or cover is used, the cardboard carton can be strengthened at the bottom joint, at the corners and the hinge of the lid with adhesive tape. The carrying cord should be threaded outside the bottom of the carton to prevent the bottom slipping loose. The water-resistance of the carton can be improved by painting it, on the outside only, with any good-quality oil paint. In rain the carton, if not provided with a waterproof cover, should be carried under the coat or mackintosh. Alternative forms of carrier to the official carton may be purchased, but great care must be exercised before using such alternatives that no damage or deterioration of the respirator is likely to ensue. The following general principles must be observed when choosing a carrier : — (1) The carrier must be designed and made of material which is sufficiently rigid to protect the respirator from being crushed, e.g., in a dense crowd, or against a seat in a moving omnibus, or if the carrier is dropped to the ground. (2) The carrier must have a smooth interior with no inward projection, such as a rim, lip, or sharp rivet head, which would either scratch or catch against the edge of the eyepiece during insertion, withdrawal, or ordinary carriage of the respirator. (3) The respirator must not be a very loose fit in the carrier, so that it rattles and gradually abrades the rubber around the container. (4) The carrier must be of such a size and shape that it neither causes nor allows gross distortion of the facepiece, e.g., it must not require the facepiece to be turned inside out, or be such that the container either rests or can become inverted on to the facepiece. (5) If the carrier forms part of a hold-all, e.g., if combined with a shopping bag or a handbag, it must allow of direct and rapid access to the respirator without the necessity of first removing other articles. Gasproof Accommodation. In view of the universal pro- vision of respirators, gasproof accommodation in the ordinary house is not essential, but where it is possible to do so it is an advantage to make the refuge or shelter gasproof. The main principle to be observed in this connection is the blockage of all sources of draught into the room. Such places as the fireplace or Civilian Respirator Correctly Packed in ventilator gratings in the walls Carton. 48 encourage draught, and consequently it is difficult to prevent the entry of air (and gas, if present) under doorways, between the floorboards, through cracks in walls, and, where windows have not been bricked in, between frames and window, unless these natural ventilators are first blocked. If this is done, quite simple means, such as pasting layers of brown paper over cracks in walls and flooring and over gratings and plugging other places with tightly rolled newspaper or pieces of. felt, will answer the purpose adequately, and no undue expense or preparation is consequently necessary. Whether or not a gasproof refuge is available, the respirator must always be taken there during air raids, since even the distant effects of blast from H.E. bombs may destroy the gas-tightness of the chamber, and if gas were used the respirator would then immediately be required. Where the provision of gas-tightness in a refuge renders the room other- wise untenable for ordinary use, and so presents a source of difficulty or embarrassment to the householder, it is suggested that the materials required for the purpose be immediately obtained and left in the refuge, but that they need not be applied until it is clear that the enemy propose to use gas against this country in air raids or they have already done so. At such a time there should be no further delay in completing the preparations. Generally, when gas is announced in an area by the warden's rattle, if no gasproof accommodation is available, or the gas-tightness of a refuge has been destroyed by the effects of the raid, respirators should immediately be put on. Normally they need be kept on only until the warden's handbell announces the region " All Clear " and free of gas. But if gas has penetrated the building, it will be necessary to clear this by adequate ventilation, employing means of forcing the air to circulate freely throughout the building, so that the premises can be made safe for normal habitation without the use of respira- tors. In spite of the sounding of handbells, therefore, respirators, when worn, should not be taken off until it is certain the air is free from gas. The purity of the air can be tested by lifting the side of the facepiece of the respirator by inserting two Angers at the cheek and gently sniffing the unfiltered air; a fairly full breath should be taken in before the facepiece is lifted, and vigorously expelled after the test has been made, in order to blow any con- taminated air from the respirator. If there is any doubt as to whether gas is present or not, the respirator should be kept on until this doubt can be removed. A rough guide to the smells of various gases is given in the Appendix " Table of War Gases " ; they cannot be implicitly relied upon, however, since the presence of other constituents in existing known gases may alter their smell and so confuse detection. Any unusual smell should be regarded with suspicion, and where any doubt is felt it is recommended that the warden be consulted and asked for assistance. Protection of the Body Against Blister Gases. Protection of the body against blister gas, when this is present, may best be ensured by remaining under cover after a gas alarm has been sounded, until such time as the ringing of handbells by wardens pronounces the area " All Clear." There may, however, be cases in which contamination by misadventure may take place or be suspected, and it is necessary, therefore, to know the way in which the dangers might arise and the immediate steps necessary to overcome or to minimise the possible consequences. The two principal blister gases are mustard gas and lewisite, and further information concerning them, including indications of the way in which their presence may be recognised, are given in the Appendix. The respirator container will prevent the passage of the vapour of mustard gas and lewisite, and will thus protect the face, eyes, and 49 respiratory system, but the remainder of the body will be liable to injury by exposure to the liquid or vapour. Ordinary clothing is of some value in that it delays penetration by vapour, or (to a less extent) liquid, and therefore the full effects of any contamination are not immediately produced on the skin. If such clothing is removed quickly and the skin thoroughly washed with warm water and soap, injury may be avoided, or very much reduced. This procedure is intended to be followed by persons who are contami- nated, or who suspect they have been contaminated, and are near their own homes or places of work, so that they can treat themselves promptly. Where, however, there might be delay, the outer clothing should be removed at once, and treatment sought at a public First-Aid Post. Here it will be possible for the person to wash, to put on clean garments, and to receive such first-aid treatment as his case may demand. Persons who intend treating themselves in their own homes must remove their boots and outer clothing before entering the house, so as to avoid spreading the contamination and causing further casualties. Such discarded clothing and boots should be placed outside the house in a dustbin or other metal container with close-fitting lid, and steps taken at once for their removal and decontamination in accordance with local arrangements. Decontamination of Contaminated Articles of Personal Apparel. Ordinary Clothing. Articles of ordinary clothing, such as overcoats, hats, coats, trousers, dresses, etc., which have been contaminated with vapour, should be hung in the open air for at least 24 hours. If the clothing still smells of the gas after 24 hours it should be placed outside the house in a container described above. Light dresses and underclothing contaminated with vapour should be washed with soap and warm water, after preliminary airing, for at least 15 minutes. Clothing which is, or is suspected of being, contaminated with liquid mustard gas should not be decontaminated at home, but should be placed outside the house in a container as already described. Leather Boots and Shoes. The decontamination of leather boots or shoes is a difficult problem, and all possible care should be taken to prevent their becoming seriously contami- nated, by avoiding, for example, stepping into splashes or pools of liquid gas. Persons who have walked through contaminated areas should in any case examine the soles and uppers of their boots to make sure that the boots are not contaminated with liquid mustard gas, taking care while doing so that they do not contaminate their hands. If any trace of mustard gas can be seen or smelt, the boots must be removed at once and taken as soon as possible to the appropriate place for treatment; meanwhile they should be left out of doors and not worn again until decontaminated. Respirators. Respirators which have been worn in blister-gas vapour should be thoroughly aired before being put away. If there is any sign of liquid contami- nation, the respirator must at once be returned to the appropriate quarter of the local authority, where another will be issued in its place. CHAPTER 5. SIMPLE FIRST AID Introductory. A complete organisation has been set up to deal with all types of injury caused by air raids, consisting of First Aid or Stretcher Parties, an Ambulance Service, First Aid Posts, and specially earmarked Hospitals. Any injured person requiring treatment should go, if he is able, to the nearest First Aid Post. For those more seriously injured, First Aid Parties will render first aid and arrange where necessary for removal to a first-aid post or hospital. There may, however, be occasions after heavy raiding when the services of first aid parties are not immediately available at all places where they are required. Often simple measures, if quickly taken, will save life; for example, in cases of extreme haemorrhage (bleeding) or of true asphyxia (suffocation). Accordingly some of the elements of First Aid are described in the following pages, in order to enable those available at the scene of damage to assist the wounded while trained parties are on their way. Wound Shock. Every injury is followed by a condition known as Shock or Wound Shock, which is a failure of vitality varying in degree from transient faintness to extreme and dangerous prostration. In air raid cases Shock is likely to be very marked. The condition can be divided into two stages, Primary Shock, which immediately follows the injury, and Secondary Shock, which may develop later as a result of excessive pain or bleeding or cold for a prolonged period or through clumsy or incorrect handling. Primary Shock may lead to Secondary Shock, if proper care is not taken, and this, if allowed to develop, may be dangerous to life. Primary Shock can be treated, and Secondary Shock to a large extent prevented, by simple means :— (i) Pain must be relieved ; for example, by gentle adjustment of the casualty's position, or by suitable support to the injured part before removal. (ii) The patient must be protected from chill, since in cases of Shock body temperature falls rapidly. Unnecessary removal of clothing should be avoided, and the casualty should be wrapped in blankets or coats, with at least one layer between him. and the ground. (iii) Loss of blood must be checked. (iv) Fractures or badly injured limbs or joints should be secured. (v) Gentleness and smoothness are always essential in handling, lifting, and removing the patient. (vi) Warm sweet drinks, such as sweetened tea, are of advantage to patients suffering from Shock, but it is dangerous to give any drink 51 or food to an unconscious person, or to one who has a wound in the belly, or who complains or gives evidence of abdominal pain. Hot water bottles are useful for protecting casualties from chill. They should be placed where they can best warm the circulating blood, for example, between the body and outspread arms, or the upper part of both thighs, since in each of these regions main arteries are relatively close to the surface and the warmth is circulated through the body by means of the blood stream. In doing this, care should be taken, by wrapping the hot water bottles in woollen or other material, to avoid burning the patient. They should never be laid directly on the bare skin. Where a domestic hot water bottle is not available, an ordinary glass bottle, or similar container, wrapped in any piece of material or article of clothing, would make a suitable substitute. If an ordinary glass bottle is used, it should not be filled with boiling water, especially if the bottle is cold, as it may thus become cracked and subsequently break ; care should be taken in moving the casualty to prevent the bottle being broken and the casualty cut. Bleeding (Haemorrhage). Profuse bleeding from a large artery immediately endangers life. Loss of blood is in any case one of the main causes of both Primary and Secondary Shock, and even the continued oozing of blood from an extensive area of the body may lead, if neglected, to collapse and finally to death. Types of Haemorrhage. Haemorrhage may be either external, in which case it is easily discovered, or it may be internal, caused by injury to blood vessels inside the body, from which the blood escapes into internal organs or cavities of the chest or abdomen. In the latter case, no blood is visible externally, unless it is coughed up or vomited. Symptoms of Haemorrhage. The signs and symptoms of severe uncontrolled bleeding, either external or internal, are as follows : — (i) There is rapid loss of strength, accompanied by giddiness and faintness, especially if the patient is raised to a sitting or standing position. (ii) The face and lips become pallid, and the skin cold and clammy. (iii) Breathing becomes hurried and laboured, and may be accompanied by yawning and sighing. (iv) The pulse quickly becomes so weak and rapid as not to be felt at the wrist. (v) The patient becomes thirsty. (vi) He may become restless and throw his arms about or tug at clothing round the neck ("air hunger"), unlike a patient suffering from Shock without serious bleeding, who will lie very still. (vii) Finally, the patient may become wholly unconscious. If these signs are observed, but no external cause is apparent, the case should be regarded as one of severe internal haemorrhage. 52 Treatment of External Haemorrhage Blood escapes with less force if the patient is sitting and still less if he is lying, and the position of a casualty with external haemorrhage should be adjusted accordingly. Except in the case of a fractured limb, the bleeding part should, where possible, be raised, to lessen the flow of blood to it. Firm, even bandaging with a pad of cotton wool or other soft material placed over the wound will normally help to check the bleeding. In the case of a severely lacerated limb, bleeding should be dealt with by bandaging over a splint even though no fracture has been definitely recognised. Treatment of Internal Haemorrhage. Internal haemorrhage can only be treated on the operating table. The first aid urgently needed is warmth, extremely gentle handling and lifting, and rapid but smooth removal for surgical attention. Where there is even a suspicion of internal haemorrhage, the patient should on no account be allowed to eat or drink. Wounds in the Abdomen. Casualties with wounds in the abdomen are more comfortable and less liable to further damage in moving if they are placed on the back, with the abdominal wall relaxed by bending the knees over a box, haversack, or rolled coat, and with the head and shoulders slightly raised. If any organs protrude, no attempt should be made to replace them, but they should be covered with lint, a soft towel, cotton wool, clean soft flannel, or similar material for protection, and the covering secured firmly, but not too tightly, with a broad bandage. It is desirable for the material used in contact with the wound to be wrung out of warm water to which, if it is readily available, table salt may be added in the proportion of one teaspoonful of table salt to a pint of clean hot water. On no account should a patient with an abdominal wound be given anything to drink. Fractures. Simple Fractures. When bone is fractured (broken) and the surrounding flesh is undamaged, the injury is a simple fracture. Compound Fractures. When bone is broken and in addition there is a flesh wound at the site of the fracture, the fracture is said to be compound. Complicated Fractures. When bone is broken, and in addition there is damage to some important organ, the injury is a complicated fracture. The following signs and symptoms may be present in cases of fracture : — (i) Pain at or near the point at which the bone is broken. (ii) Loss of power of movement in the affected limb. (iii) Swelling around the part affected. (iv) Deformity, the limb falling into an unnatural position and having an abnormal shape. It may be shortened by the over-lapping of the broken ends of the bone. (v) Irregularity : if the bone is close to the surface, a bump may be felt at the break and, if the fracture, is compound, the bone may be exposed and visible. 53 Simple First Aid Treatment of Fractures. (i) The first object is to prevent further damage being done by injudicious movement or by careless handling, and especially to avoid converting a simple fracture into a compound one, or causing an uncomplicated fracture to become complicated. (ii) Unless the circumstances are such that danger to life is threatened, or that there is danger of further injury being caused if the patient is not immediately removed, the fracture should be attended to where the patient lies. The injured limb should be secured by splints or in some other way, and then the patient may be carefully moved. (iii) If there is severe bleeding which is immediately endangering life, this must be controlled first. (iv) Warmth and air are required to guard against shock which will certainly accompany the fracture. Blankets or coats should be wrapped round the patient, care being taken not to disturb him unduly. Merely covering the patient is often not enough to prevent him from becoming chilled. (v) The limb should be placed in as natural a position as possible with great care and without using force. In the case of a compound fracture with a protruding fragment of bone, no attempt must be made to replace it. (vi) If there is no material for splinting, a fractured leg may be secured by careful bandaging to the opposite leg, or a fractured arm by bandaging to the trunk. (vii) Splints, real or improvised, must be sufficiently firm, and long enough to keep the joints immediately above and below the fracture at rest. The bandages must be firm, but not so tight as to interfere with the circulation of the blood. (viii) Splints should be put on over the clothing and should, if practicable, be padded in places where there is risk of rubbing, or where there would be gaps between the splint and the body. Any suitable material which is available, such as clothing, handkerchiefs, or newspaper may be used as padding. Improvised Splints. Serviceable splints may be improvised from such things as laths from a Venetian blind, from rifles, walking sticks, pieces of wood or cardboard, rolled up linoleum or newspaper, and a number of other articles, provided that the resulting improvisation gives sufficiently rigid support for the limb, and is long enough to prevent movement of the joints immediately above and below the fracture. Improvised Bandages for Securing Splints. Where the proper bandages, such as a triangular bandage, cannot be obtained, scarves, such as those worn by Boy Scouts, or pieces of cloth can be used. Ties, braces, straps, belts, or lengths of rubber tubing may be employed to secure splints or dressings. Improvised Slings, Slings may be improvised by pinning the sleeves of the coat to the garment, or by turning up the lower edge and pinning it to the main body of the coat. Improvisation may also be successfully effected by passing the hand inside the coat or waistcoat, which should then be buttoned. Scarves, ties, or belts ioosely slung around the neck will also provide support. 54 Unconsciousness (Insensibility). As a general rule, an insensible person should be laid on the back, wrapped in coats or blankets, with the head turned to one side ; if he has false teeth, they should be removed. If the face is flushed, the head and shoulders should be slightly raised ; if it is pale, they should be kept low. Any tight clothing, especially at the neck, chest, or waist should be loosened. Nothing must be given through the mouth to a person who is partly or wholly insensible. If an insensible person must be moved, smoothness and care are essential. Suffocation (Asphyxia). Anything which prevents the body from getting sufficient oxygen will cause a condition known as asphyxia, which, if unrelieved, will lead to insensibility and death. Common causes of asphyxia under air raid conditions include electrocution ; continued pressure on the chest or obstruction of the upper breathing passages, for example, by debris ; confinement in a poisoned atmosphere (for instance, in an enclosed space containing domestic coal gas, exhaust fumes, or after-damp); and drowning. The first action is to remove the cause of the asphyxia, or to move the casualty from the cause, whichever is the more suitable, and then immediately to begin artificial respiration, preferably by the Schafer method, which is as follows : — The patient should be placed face down with his head turned to one side and his arms forward. The helper should kneel beside the patient facing towards the head and should place his hands on the small of the back, with wrists nearly touching, thumbs together, and fingers passing over the loins on either side. He should swing rhythmically backwards and forwards from the knees at the rate of about twelve double-swings per minute, keeping his arms straight, so that his weight presses the patient's abdomen against the ground and forces his abdominal organs against his diaphragm on the forward swing, pressure being entirely released on the backward swing. The pressure period should occupy two seconds and the period of relaxation three seconds ; to ensure re- gularity the rescuer should count evenly up to five on each double swing. This should be continued until natural breathing returns, when the rhythmic swing of the helper should coincide with the patient's respiratory movements. Artificial respiration may have to be continued for an hour or longer, relays of helpers being employed if necessary. While artificial respiration is being performed, other helpers should undo all tight clothing and wrap coats or blankets round the casualty. Removal from Electrical Contact. In cases of injury due to an electric current, the current should, if possible, be switched off at once. If this is not possible, it is necessary that the helper should himself be protected from becoming electrocuted, and for this reason he must place non-conducting materials between himself and the casualty, and between himself and an earth. Non-conducting materials, which may be available include rubber, linoleum, wood, glass, clothing, or newspaper. They should all be dry. The injured person may be dragged away from the electric medium with a hooked walking stick or a loop of dry rope ; an umbrella should not be used since the metal parts will conduct electricity. Metal and moisture are good conductors of electricity, and therefore the helper should avoid 56 touching the hands, armpits, wet clothing, nailed boots, or metal equipment of the injured person. Burns (other than from Gas) and Scalds. A burn is caused by dry heat, for example by a flame, hot metal, or a strong acid or alkali. A scald is caused by wet heat, for example by steam, boiling water, or boiling oil. General rules for the treatment of all burns or scalds are : — (a) Air should be excluded from the affected part as soon as possible. It should either be immersed in water, preferably at body temperature, or covered with clean cotton wool, lint, or soft clean cloths, and then bandaged. These are only temporary measures to meet the situation until suitable first aid dressings are prepared. (b) If clothing has to be removed great care should be used. If it sticks, it is necessary to cut around the pieces of cloth which adhere to the flesh so as to leave them in position when the garment is removed. If blisters have formed, they must not be broken or punctured, but should as far as possible be protected and kept intact. (c) Suitable first aid dressings may be made from strips of lint or linen about 2 inches wide ; they should be : — either (i) soaked in warm strong tea and allowed to dry ; or (ii) soaked in a lotion made by stirring baking soda in clean warm water. In this case the strips must be kept wet by repeated damping with the lotion which can be poured on over the bandage without necessitating its removal each time. The strength of the lotion should be about 2 tea- spoonfuls of soda to a pint of water ; or (iii) smeared with tannic acid jelly on the surface to be applied to the skin. The dressings, which should slightly overlap, should be covered with cotton wool or soft cloth and lightly bandaged, and the affected part supported. In severe or extensive burns, Shock will be marked and will require attention. The patient must be kept warm. Gas Casualties. Blister Gas. If the eyes have been exposed to vapour or liquid gas, they should immediately be thoroughly washed with warm water or with a weak solution of salt or bicarbonate of soda; the strength in each case should be about one teaspoonful to a pint of water. If apparatus for eye-douching cannot be readily obtained, one of the following improvised procedures should be followed: — (i) The casualty should bend over a bowl containing warm water or one of the mild fluids referred to above, and put the eyes, each in turn, well under water. They should be opened under water and the head moved from side to side. (ii) The eyes should be opened in turn under a gentle stream of water from a tap, or from a rubber or other tube attached to a tap or hot water bottle, the head being moved slightly from side to side, and each eye opened and closed from time to time. Care should be taken to avoid contaminating an unaffected eye. Any part of the skin contaminated with liquid blister gas should be dealt with at once. Where special anti-gas ointment is available, this should be instantly applied in accordance with the directions. In the majority of cases, however, this ointment will only be found at First Aid Posts and Cleansing 57 Stations and in the first aid equipment of Wardens and Casualty Service workers. An alternative method of treatment is therefore suggested employ- ing solvents which are more usually in the possession of the ordinary citizen. Liquid contamination may be removed from the skin by solvents such as petrol, spirit, or naphtha, and, since early treatment is vital, any of these should be used if it is more quickly available than ointment. To apply the solvent, a small piece of cotton wool or rag should be twisted into a pad and held between the finger and thumb, only the end being immersed in the sol- vent; as a further precaution against contaminating the fingers, a pair of oilskin or rubber gloves should be worn if they are available. It is important to avoid spreading the contamination by rubbing or by using an excess of solvent. The solvent only removes the blister gas by dissolving it; it does not destroy it. For this reason a succession of swabs should be used, and the contaminated swabs should be burnt or buried since they are dangerous. Localised areas of contamination on the body should be treated as de- scribed, if the reagents required are readily available ; if not, the affected part should be thoroughly scrubbed with soap and water. In all cases where there has been contamination, it is advisable for the casualty to be washed completely with soap and water, in addition to the treatment described for the affected part. In the case of exposure to vapour only, thorough washing with soap and warm water is sufficient. It must be emphasised that the success of any method of preventive treatment depends upon the speed with which it is applied. Lung Irritant Gas. Whether symptoms are present or not, any person who has been exposed to a lung irritant gas must, from the outset, be spared any further exertion. He must be kept lying down and be protected from chill. He should be removed as a stretcher case. Nose Irritant Gas. The appearance of symptoms from exposure to nose irritant gases is slightly delayed, with the result that they may be felt a few minutes after the respirator has been adjusted. Any temptation to discard the respirator while still exposed to gas must be resisted. If vomiting occurs, the facepiece must not be removed ; affected persons should bend forward, turning the head to one side, and slightly raise the corner of the face-piece at the angle of the jaw while actual vomiting is taking place, dropping it into place between expulsive spasms. It is important that the facepiece should be allowed to fall back into place immediately, before the involuntary intake of breath which follows. Summary Where there are casualties requiring treatment and the Casualty Services are not immediately available, those on the spot, even if they do not know the precise treatment required, will very often be able, with elementary knowledge, to relieve the sufferings and possibly even to save the lives of the wounded. The first consideration must always be to deal with any immediate danger to life. Examples of such dangers are excessive bleeding, interference with normal breathing (through pressure on the chest, obstruction of the air passages by debris or by electrocution), or nearness to moving machinery, tottering buildings, a spreading fire, or a poisoned atmosphere. In all such cases the source of danger must be removed from the casualty or the casualty moved away from the source of danger. After immediate danger to life, the second consideration is to try to avert or minimise injury, and the third to reduce pain and shock and make the casualty as comfortable as possible. 58 It may be convenient to sum up briefly some of the main guiding principles in elementary first aid : — (i) Severe bleeding should be attended to at the earliest possible moment. This does not mean that every cut or wound should have prior attention. Discrimination should be used : the rule applies to pro- fuse bleeding, the continuance of which would endanger life. (ii) The casualty must be able to breathe normally : any cause of difficult breathing must be dealt with ; and artificial respiration, if needed, must be started promptly and maintained. (iii) In cases of gross injury to a limb, whether or not a fracture is recog- nised, and in all cases of injury involving joints, the affected part should be supported and secured by simple methods before the casualty is moved, unless for any reason his life is in danger. (iv) Any person who is, or Jias been, entrapped or buried under debris must be treated on the assumption that the severest crush injuries have been received. These might include fracture of the thigh, pelvis, or spine. (v) A person who is wholly or partly unconscious, or one who is even suspected of suffering from internal injury, must not be given anything to eat or drink. (vi) The indiscriminate use of alcohol in first aid can be dangerous ; it should not be given to persons suffering from any type of injury except on the direct order of a doctor. (vii) All injured persons will be suffering from Primary Shock ; Secondary Shock, coming on some time after injury, may be fatal. Secondary Shock can, to a large extent, be prevented by the simple measures mentioned in this chapter ; it may be brought on or made worse by rough handling and clumsy movement. (viii) Chill should always be prevented ; and the casualty should at all times be handled and moved with the greatest care and gentleness. 59 NOTES ON IMPROVISED SPLINTS When the proper splints are not available, it will often be possible to improvise suitable substitutes in a number of different ways, which will at least serve temporarily while trained persons with proper equipment are on their way. A few examples showing how articles in common use may be made to serve as improvised splints are given in the illustrations which follow. If sufficient bandages are not available to correspond with the illustration, it should be remembered that the important points are to bandage above and below the fracture, and to ensure that the limb is kept rigid. Sketch I. — Simple fracture through middle third of right femur (thigh-bone). A broom used as a thigh splint by placing the handle along the injured limb, with the head of the broom at the feet. Loosely folded pieces of newspaper or other material may be used as padding, placed between the ankle and knee joints, and also at the hip. Folded triangular bandages are shown in the illustration, but the improvised splint may be secured by any other material of sufficient length, such as, for example, neck-ties, belts, or scarves. Sketch //.—Simple fracture through middle third of tibia (shin-bone). The illustration shows an umbrella used as a splint. The ankles and knee joints are padded with loosely folded newspaper. 60 Sketch III. Simple fracture through one or both bones of the forearm. The illustration shows the use of newspaper, folded to the approximate size of an arm splint, so as to be stiff enough to give rigid support. 61 i i tip 2 «J P 3 > *-> llScS •5 go g ia o .2 .5 2 .s &~ 2 w S o cc/3 C/3 ■§ M to C &C' H - 55 c 60 C 5* (A ■»-> D CO CO o 2-c c^ a «* o +-* C3 cct O CO M C XI CO * GO'S 73 C oi CD c 73 CO CO N 4> «S S « 'S'S co O- C cN i X! " —4 O a 6 o £0m o o < C3 u CD a 0- E CO I CO IH O co 8. I 0) 1 *rt co 3 O P O 132 *2 co ctf U - I* i s 2 c Jo-? 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The Handbooks are designed to describe a scheme of precautions which it is hoped will prove effective in preventing avoidable injury and loss of life, or widespread dislocation of national activities. They aim at giving the best available information on methods of passive defence against air attack, and will be revised from time to time in the light of future developments. The Memoranda deal with various aspects of the organisation to be provided by local authorities for public air raid precautions services. HANDBOOKS. No. 1. " Personal Protection Against Gas " (2nd Edition). 6d. (8d.) Gives rules of personal protection, and general knowledge of the nature and dangers of war gases. No. 2. " First Aid and Nursing for Gas Casualties " {3rd Edition). 4d. (5d.) Provides information of both a general and technical nature required by nurses, first-aid parties, and the personnel of first-aid posts, to enable them to carry out their respective duties. Complementary to Handbook No. 1. No. 4. " Decontamination of Materials " (1st Edition). 6d. (8d.) Explains the general principles governing the methods of counter- acting contamination arising from war gases. A text-book for the training of the members of decontamination services. No. 4A. " Decontamination of Clothing, including Oilskin Anti-Gas Clothing, and Equipment from Blister Gases " (1st Edition). 3d. (4d.) This Handbook may be regarded as supplementary to Handbook No. 4, in which it will eventually be incorporated. For this reason, the Handbook is provisional only. No. 8. " The Duties of Air Y/wteas " (2nd Edition). 2d. (3d.) Gives an outline of the duties of air-raid wardens, and of the organisation under which they work. No. 9. " Incendiary Bombs and Fire Precautions " (1st Edition). 6d. (8d.) This handbook, though written primarily for instructors, is designed also to serve as a general textbook on methods of dealing with incendiary bombs and the resultant fires. Demonstrates how the danger from incendiary bombs can be minimised, and why this can only be achieved with the co-operation of the general public and industry. No. 10. " Training and Work of First Aid Parties "(1st Edition). 6d. (8d.) Concerns the organisation, training and work of First Aid Parties. No. 12. " Air Raid Precautions for Animals ** (1st Edition). 3d. (4d.) Intended for the guidance of persons engaged in the care and management of animals. 64 MEMORANDA. No.l. " Organisation of Air Raid Casualties Service " (2nd Edition). 6d. (8d.) No. 2. 44 Rescue Parties and Clearance of Debris " (3rd Edition). 2d. (3d.) No. 3. 44 Organisation of Decontamination Services" (2nd Edition). 2d. (3d.) No. 4. 44 Organisation of Air Raid Wardens' Service" (2nd Edition). 2d. (3d.) No. 6. 44 Local Communications and Reporting of Air Raid Damage" (2nd Edition). 6d. (8d.) No. 7. 41 Personnel Requirements for Air Raid General and Fire Precautions Services and the Police Service " (1st Edition). 2d. (3d.) No. 11. 4 Gas Detection and Identification Service " (1st Edition). 3d. (4d). No. 12. 44 Protection of Windows in Industrial and Commercial Buildings " (1st Edition). 4d. (6d.) No. 13. 44 Care and Repair of Respirators" (1st Edition). 2d. (3d.) Prices are net Copies may be obtained at the addresses given on page iv of the cover, or through any bookseller. Prices In brackets include postage. Wt950. 6/40. 500M S.E.Co. 51/7188 S.O. Code No. 34-9999 SHELTER at home ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY d. AND PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATfoNERY OFFICE June 1941 SHELTER at home AT ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY OGL AND PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE Introduction Not everyone wants to leave home for shelter. Some people can't. Lots of people just prefer to remain in their own house anyway. This inclination is a natural one. It is a sound instinct too, if some protection can be found against the collapse of walls and ceilings. Shelter indoors allows you to sleep at night in reasonable security and in the warmth and comfort of your house. It also provides handy cover should there be a sudden raid in the day time. A direct hit cannot be guarded against in any form of home shelter, but the risk of such a direct hit is very small compared with that of a bomb bursting near enough to damage the house or to demolish it. Protection can be obtained in a house even if a bomb demolishes most of it. The walls, floors and roof of an ordinary house give quite a lot of protection against splinters and blast from a bomb. The idea of an indoor shelter is to make use of this protection and to add safeguards against the other effects of bombs. The chief of these is the danger of the house falling down. People have often been rescued unhurt from the ruins of demolished houses because they had taken shelter under staircases, or tables, that had by chance been strong enough to protect them from the falling ruins of the house. The chief purpose of the indoor shelters described in this pamphlet is to protect the occupants against injury when the bedroom floor, the roof and other debris fall on them. They do not provide such easy emergency escape as a garden shelter, but if you are trapped they protect you from the debris till the Rescue Party releases you. Very often, however, though the house has fallen you will be able to release yourself and walk out. The indoor shelters with which this pamphlet deals are unsuitable for houses with more than two storeys above the shelter room. They are intended chiefly for use in ordinary two-storey houses, but have a margin of strength that will take the weight of an extra storey. 3 TYPES OF INDOOR SHELTER Having chosen and prepared your refuge room, the next question is what sort of a shelter you will put in it. Three alternatives are dealt with in this pamphlet : 1 . The Government steel indoor shelter 2. A commercially made shelter 3. A home-made timber-framed structure v/hich the technical services of the Ministry of Home Security have designed. Government shelters The Government are distributing free to eligible householders an indoor shelter made of steel. It will also be on sale to householders not eligible for free shelter. These shelters, whether free or on sale, will be distributed first in the more exposed areas. Public announcement is made in each area when the local council is ready to receive applications for shelters. The model at present being issued consists of a strong frame, a flat top, a spring mattress forming a floor, and sides of open mesh. The top of the shelter is sheet steel, and the shelter can be used as a table. The mattress is attached to the frame, so that should the shelter be moved when struck by debris, the occupants will be carried with it. The fact that the shelter can move a little helps it to resist the weights falling on it. The four steel mesh sides are so made that they resist blows from debris, such as loose bricks from a demolished wall, but they can all easily be opened from inside. This " table " shelter has been thoroughly tested. The shelter will be supplied in sections and you must put it together your- self. This does not require any special skill or strength. A leaflet of simple instructions, and the necessary tools, will be supplied with the shelter. 10 I ILLUSTRATION NO. 8, The house in the upper photograph had a Government steel table shelter in a downstairs room and was blown up to reproduce the effect of a heavy bomb falling near. The whole house collapsed, burying the shelter under debris. In the lower photo the shelter can be seen still intact. It would have been possible for anyone in the shelter to get out unaided. Top of beams in contact with ceiling or a lew inches below 4 # x f * Braces nailed lo beams, ties and posts with not less than 3 J* wire nails / Hoop iron straps screwed to beams and posts (alternative to dogs) iocr joists A. Posts taken 1 down through to concrete an< nailed to tloor joists Dog or hoop iron strap screwed to post and sill ILLUSTRATION NO. 11. Independent timber framewor* lor a refuge room. If the pos*s are more than 6 ft. 6 in. apart, 8 in. x 4 in. beams are desirable. A home-made shelter You will have noticed earlier in this booklet the statement that people have often been rescued from demolished houses because they had taken shelter under an ordinary table. This was because the table had by chance been strong enough to bear the weight of the falling bedroom floor. A timber framework can be built inside a refuge room to do the same thing, but with certainty, illustration no. ii shows a completed framework in squared 14 timber, illustrations nos 12 and - r -*«**m 1 13 show how it goes into a refuge room. As, however, squared timber is more difficult to get, the use of round poles, as shown in illustration no. 14, is specially recommended. (Poles of larch and Scotch fir can be obtained fairly easily in many districts.) illustration no. 15 shows how this is put together. A refuge room with a framework of this kind to hold up the floor, and a properly barricaded window, gives a high degree of safety. It is best to sleep in the middle of the room under the framework, as there is less chance of your being hurt if parts of the wall fall inwards, though walls moie often subside or fall outwards. The framework is quite different in principle from propping up a floor. When a floor falls it gives a sideways push which is likely to knock props over. The framework is specially designed to be self-supporting and to withstand ILLUSTRATION NO. 13. Plan of a typical refuge room with an independent timber framework. The room is the same as the dining room in Illustration No. i. At leasl 6 clearance *5 ILLUSTRATION NO. 14. Alternative construction of timber framework to that shown in Illustration No. n. Round poles are used instead of squared timber. this. You can make the framework in several ways, so long as the general prin- ciples given here are followed. The dimensions should be such that the posts stand at a distance from the walls approximately one quarter of the width or length of the room ; thus, if the room is 10 ft. wide by 12 ft. long, the posts will be about 2 ft. 6 in. from the side walls and 3 ft. from the end walls. The dimensions can be varied a little if necessary, but do not overdo it. The posts may either be passed through small openings in the floor boards 16 \" x Y (min.) hoop iron slrap Plate Washer (corners may be clenched after lightening bolt) Blocking piece )>" diam. Bolt 1* x Y (min ) hoop iron strap ILLUSTRATION NO. 15. How the framing of round poles is put together. 17 to bear on the solid concrete below, or fixed to a beam or heavy plank screwed to the floor, as shown in illustration no. ii. If the space under the floor is deeper than 18 in. the posts must extend down to the concrete. The two highest beams of the framework must be placed at right angles to the ceiling joists ; their ends should not be nearer to the walls than about 6 in., so as to be safe from the chance of being struck heavily by the wall should it collapse. You can tell which way the ceiling joists run by observing the line of nails in the floor boards in the room above. The beams of the frame- work need not touch the ceiling, but they should not be more than 2 or 3 in. below. Falls of ceiling plaster seldom cause serious injuries, but plaster can be brought down by blast, even if the walls and floors are not damaged. It is a simple matter to catch the pieces of plaster by fixing a layer of wire netting, fishing net, or something similar, over the top of the framework, and fixing it to the walls all round the room. Dust sheets, paper, etc., spread over the netting will prevent most of the smaller pieces coming through the netting. If you cannot get a strong netting, a canopy can be arranged by means of a dust sheet or bed sheet, supported on cords stretched tight from wall to wall over the framework. The construction of the framework is a straightforward job, involving not much more than a saw, hammer and nails. The amateur carpenter or handy- man should be able to do it with someone to help him put up the framework in the room. As none of the pieces of wood is as long as the dimension of the room along which it is to be placed, there should be no difficulty in getting everything into the room. Any local builder or carpenter would be able to do the job in a day or two, using the illustrations as working drawings. Material As rough timbers in 5 in. to 6 in. diameters are not much in demand persons requiring material for A.R.P. purposes should not, as a rule, experi- ence difficulty in obtaining the necessary permit from the Ministry of Supply Timber Control Department, for the purchase of small quantities The same applies to " limbs » in home-grown hardwoods, which are also available in many areas. The Timber Control Orders permit a purchaser to buy up to 20s. worth of timber per calendar month without a licence. Amounts in excess of this require a licence, which can be obtained from the Timber- Control Area Officer. ILLUSTRATION NO. 16. The ho use on the right had a timber framework in the front rooo. The 1,,-ne. work has shghtly twisted but held up the debris. The house on de left has no framewT* and has collapsed. This w.,s an experiment simila, to that in lUustration^o 8 18 As there are only about 12 cu. ft. of timber in a ceiling support as shown iniLLUSTRATiONNO.11, suitable for a room measuring up to 12 ft. by 12 ft. by 9 ft. high, it should not be a difficult matter for anyone to obtain the small quantity of green timber required, especially if a tree, or part of one, is purchased before it is felled, so as to obtain as much timber as possible within the 20$. limit. Alternatively, it is possible to obtain from some Local Authori- ties timber of suitable sizes salvaged from bombed houses. Obtained in the ordinary way, the timber for a single framework costs about £4 ; to this must be added the cost of transporting it to your house. The same amount of salvaged timber should cost from £1 to £3, but will probably need cutting to the right sizes ; transport costs will be extra to this. How to obtain skilled advice For a fee of half a guinea, a consultant appointed by one of the professional institutions of architects, engineers or surveyors will inspect your house and give you a written report stating the best room for a refuge in your house and describing ways within your means by which the protection it gives can be improved. If you want the services of such a consultant ask your Local Authority to show you a list of consultants from which you can choose. If your local council has no such list, you can apply for information to the Secretary, Central Board of Advisory Panel of Professional Consultants, 1-7 Great George Street, Westminster, London, S.W.i. ALWAYS HAVE YOUR CAS MASK WITH YOU — DAY AND NIGHT LEARN TO PUT IT ON QUICKLY PRACTISE PUTTING ON YOUR CAS MASK 1. Hold your breath. To breathe in gas may be fatal.) 2. Hold mask in front of face, thumbs inside straps. 3. Thrust chin well forward into mask. Pull straps as far over head as they will go. 4. Run finger round face-piece taking care head-straps are not twisted. MAKE SURE IT FITS See that the rubber fits snugly at sides of jaw and under chin. The head-straps should be adjusted to hold the mask firmly. To test for fit, hold a piece of paper to end of mask and breathe in. The paper should stick. Arrows i ndtca te points needm g| particular attention J Nov. 25, 1944 AN ANALYSIS OF 259 OF THE RECENT FLYING-BOMB CASUALTIES BY R. C. BELL, M.B., M.R.C.S. Resident Surgical Officer to an EM.S. Hospital In all we dealt with 222 out-patients and 259 in-patients, with 18 deaths. Our story began in June, 1944, when the first large incident occurred near by. Twenty-six casualties were admitted and 12 required theatre treatment. This propor- tion remained fairly constant throughout the series. Altogether we had 83 theatre cases out of 259 admissions, and had to send 35 cases on untreated, most of whom required the theatre. In this first incident no fewer than 16 of the casualties were due to flying glass. It was noticeable how the proportion of glass injuries dropped as the importance of taking adequate cover was realized, while the percentage of crush injuries increased from people being trapped by falling masonry. A. Flying Glass This was the most frequent cause of injury, totalling over 100 casualties in all. Many included severe damage to the eyes. It is noticeable that most of the injuries were above the nipple line, chiefly of the face and neck : a large proportion were received when looking out of windows — a modern version of curiosity killing the cat. We had five cases of perforating wounds of both eyes and ten perforating wounds of one eye. The globe was usually completely destroyed. Many of these injuries were avoidable, and therein lay their great sadness. The penetrating power of flying glass is, in the main, low. It is unusual for it to pierce the deep fascia: usually it lies just under the skin in the fat, but when present in hundreds of pieces it presents a problem which has not yet acquired a satisfactory solution ; nor has the condition made its way into the textbooks of war surgery. Table I. — Glass Description No. Remarks Deaths Lacerations of face, scalp, and neck . . Perforating wounds of eye 77 15 19 T 5 cases bilateral 2T 1 T Cut hands Severe multiple lacerations Other injuries . . 9 6 5 1 HOME OFFICE AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS DIRECTIONS FOR THE ERECTION AND SINKING OF THE GALVANISED CORRUGATED STEEL SHELTER February 1939 Cmn Ccfjrigif tttmvtd (ANDERSON SHELTER) A.R.P. (O) IO \ \ N \ \ \ x \ i CLIP FIXING IjOR REMOVABLE | SHEET Y_ SHEET FIXING Nut. — 4§2 Washer Bolt; SPANNER Back, side sheets. Back, centre bottom sheet. angle section. •Back, centre top sheet (Removable sheet) rved sheets of centre arch, jrved sheets of back arch. Curved sheets of front arch. Front f centre top sheet. . /Front angle section. — "t. — \ J. >ls. Side chart Encjl tjee sections.^ FRAME FIXKjJG \ \ \ Rivet. Front, side sheets: \ Front, centre bottom sheet. Rat-tailed handle for use as a tommy bar. Fig. 3. — The Individual Parts Fig. 4, — Stage 12. Covering the Shelter with Earth. Fig. 4. — Stage 13. The Shelter Complete with Earth Cover. Anderson shelter survives hit: Norwich 27 April 1942 EARTH ARCHING USED TO STRENGTHEN SHELTERS ORNL-5037 Mound height = v half trench width A familiar example of effective earth arching is its use with sheet metal culverts under roads. The arching in a few feet of earth over a thin-walled culvert prevents it from being crushed by the weight of heavy vehicles. 15 Sept 1940: Anderson shelter occupants survived air raid, Ransome Way, Liverpool Anderson shelter occupants survive air raid destruction at Purfleet 17 June 1944: Anderson shelter absorbs blast from VI at Elsenham Rd, East End, London j Family survive without injury in wrecked Anderson shelter (note earth blown off) during London Blitz in 19 40. Damage to the shelter a bsor bed the bla st energy. 7 July 1944: Anderson shelter occupants survive at Tennyson Ave, Plashet Grove Anderson shelter survives, Croydon, October 1 940 that me Anderson garden shelter could withstand a house collapsing on It can be seen In >icture Mr, and Mrs Claque bless their Insistence on going to ground whan homes and those of their neighbours were xluced to rubble Anderson shelter survives at Latham Street, Poplar London, 28 July 1941: My.. Anderson shelter beside crater (August 1940) And They Came Out of It Alive . . . The edge of this bomb crater, 30ft. deep, In a household garden near London, U only 4ft. from the Anderson shelter. But the two people in the shelter during London 9 ! six hour raid— Mrs. Clark and Miss Clark—were unhurt. You see Miss Clark in the picture the damage to the o On O) D a < Jt g-S-a a 53 *4 wi „ 8 ^ o ^ o "Hill < < O 55 s O u w n o * CO 2 C *- CM c £ o) _ o|uP 5= < C U> O 0) Q ? *- .52 > t/> o > ? x £ 8 •? 55>8 o Z u] ^ g § S c s g * g I a 5 85 " Z SSfS i s g * 8 A < sal O O H S * < 5 S £ IS -4 2 £ 1 cms The National Archives 1 g 11 ffffl IsaeUMENT HAS BBCN kmm it? in f it; i ..j ^S^h/AfJX\ „......, C5> £333 9m iJ^^IjM CD/SA 12 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED PER TONNE 0? BCMBS r WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II For World War II the average bomb weight was between 150 - 200 kg, (R.C. 268, Table 6), whereas for World War I the majority of bombs were 12 or 50 kg. TABLE 5 Relative safeties in World War II deduced from population and casualty distribution In the open Under cover In Population exposure Location people killed Relative safety RELATIVE DANGER! % \% 72$ 62? 10# (1 ) A house about 3£ times as safe as in the open. (2) A shelter about twice as safe as a house. Table 6 also shows the location of killed which is implied by each of the possible population exposures. The only evidence available on this point is that, for the day raid on June 13th, 191 6, in which the total number killed was 59, 69»5# of the Pe°p3- e killed in the Pity were in the open. ^ Hurl j [■ill*! .a >, a ■ C « ' L 3 4= ^ jj ^ ■ CI III! 5 El^'-s ^1 g g H 5,™ « * n d „- mtH4M* III 3 □f E'-Cr 3^ rt b s a ft mi ii IlGL 1^ s ?.Sa"i3 Is 5 S S '-1 * ifirilfilSi Jill - U n a si rt 3 1 il|«flMlli!iSlf ' IJjtl ' § ^ fa ill* *ud T*\3 Ml] #l?2a,i , «|i.|l S^lS'a sis Ji nrhsiasw | 3 I'll Mill November 1940 design by C. A. Joy, M. Inst. Me. & C. E., Bexley Borough Engineer (UK National Archives: HO 205/257) ANDERSON SHELTER (Indoors to avoid groundwater flooding, damp and cold) 4.5" partition wall 9" wall Floor boards and joists 4" x 2" 4.5" sleeper wall 6" site concrete MORRISON SHELTER (indoor table shelter) 4" x 2" floor joists Table shelters allowed escape from any side easily, reducing fire risks Patent specification by Prof. John Fleetwood Baker, Ministry of Home Security (National Archives HO 356/10) Structural Defense, 1945, by D. G. Christopher son, Ministry of Home Security, RC 4-50, (1946); Chapters VIII and IX (Confidential). National Archives Chapter VIII summarizes the literature on the design and HO 195/16 types of British shelters and analyzes their effectiveness. Two tier-Morrison shelters UK National Archives: CAB 167 1917 27 ( THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HI8 BRITANNIC MAJESTY* 3 GOVERNMENT ) . 6. Shelter In the homo; The Anderson shelter was originally intended for indoor uso but for a number of reasons Including the danger of fire an outdoor variant was adopted* Experience has shown that the objections to the indoor use of the Anderson or somewhat similar shelter are not so serious as was thought and two designs have been produced whioh can be erected indoors without support. Those new types, although they may give slightlj less protection than a well covered Anderson shelter out of doors, would fill the needs of a largo section of the public , especially the middle class* One design allows the use of the shelter as part of the furniture of the room* 7. I regard sheltors of this typo as of the first importance and wish to provide them on a big scale*- Each shelter will use over 3 owt. of steel and will allow at a pinch two adults and one to two children to sleep inside* For an outlay of about 65,000 tons of ateel, as a first instalment* I could therefore produce 400,000 shelters with accommodation for at least 1,000,000 persons* I should wish to complete such a programme within the first three months of production and thereafter at a similar or increasing rate. From enquirios I believe that manufacture can bo arranged provided steel is suppliod and if the Cabinet approves my policy I shall require their dirootion that the steel he made available* 10* Conclusions . I ask for a general endorsement of the policy I have outlined in this paper and in particular for the agreement of my colleagues: (i) that proposals for building shelters of massive construction should be rejected; (ii) that steel should be made available to carry out the programme outlined in paragraph 7 for the provision of stool shelters indoors; (ill) that the limit of income for the provision of free shelter for insured persons should be raised from £250 to £350 por annum* ,.P.(Q)(41)7. January 15th. 1941* 6v WAR CABINET . AfR RATT* ftfl ftLTER POLICY . Memorandum by the Minister cf Home Security* H.M. MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY. January 15th. 1941 * CO fc-H Sri -P 44 h o 000 H TO *H •p-p U^i 03 T* g o d ,Q „ Pis « £ q © s ©is M ftf © O O AO to #h *H O 2 O c •H © O 3 TO > -3 s id -23 J C IS O Q • *J TO TO *d © 0-P-P4J H q TO O "H TO tuft q © •H © 2« ffl 2 •H TO O 4* C4 TO •P -P +> -P o Salt © g C E TO 'H H q • 2d ^ -P o o 53 © 1 -pC -P O O o « g g to ^5 8 O <4 9 I * 3 o © £ ts o G\ ^ CO © c3 3 © «H © '4 * 2 ILLUSTRATION NO. 8. The house in the upper photograph had a Government steel table shelter in a downstairs room and was blown up to reproduce the effect of a heavy bomb falling near. The whole house collapsed, burying the shelter under debris. In the lower photo the shelter can be seen still intact. It would have been possible for anyone in the shelter to get out unaided. 0) E o o Morrison shelter saves lives of Mr McGregor pictured beside Morrison shelter, as well as his wife and lodger, in collapsed house, York 1942 air raid Effectiveness of Some Civil Defense Actions in Protecting Urban Populations (u) Appendix B of Defense of the US against Attack by Aircraft and Missiles (u) 0R0-R-17, Appendix B 2 is, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 U 16 18 20 DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF CITY, MILES Fig. 10 — Population Density of Washington Target as Function of Distance from Center of City for Three Evacuation Times Issued for the Ministry of Home Security by the Ministry of Information M)MT EDMI 1940- 41 The Official Story of the CIVIL DEFENCE of Britain 1942 London : His Majesty's Stationery Office THE MAN IN THE STREET 67 So far was all this from panic that it took three months for the population of the twenty-eight central boroughs to drop by about 25 percent, from a little over 3,000,000 (the figure before heavy bombing began) to 2,280,000 at the end of November. In a group of the most heavily bombed eastern lx)roughs the pre-war population of 800,000 had fallen to 582,000 before the blitz began ; for four months it had dropped steadily to 444,000 ; by 31st December a fall of 23 per cent. These figures do not spell panic, and a further substantial fall in 1941, after con- tinuous heavy raiding had ceased, completes the evidence that those who went did so in cold blood, for practical reasons as valid for their hard-pressed city as for their private selves. But what did all this mean to the average Londoner? In November, inner London (the county) contained some 3,200,000 people. Not more than 300,000 of these were in public shelter of any kind, half of that number at most in those larger shelters on which the limelight shone so exclusively Nor is this all ; in domestic shelter (Ander- sons, small brick shelters and private rein- forced basements) there were no more than 68 FRONT LINE 1,150,000 people. Thus of every hundred Londoners living in the central urban areas, nine were in public shelter (of whom possibly four were in " big " shelters), 27 in private shelter, and 64 in their own beds — possibly moved to the ground floor — or else on duty. Particular big shelters, and for a few nights the tubes, were overcrowded, but there was public shelter for twice the number who made use of it. In outer London, with a population of some 4,600,000, there were in November 4 per cent, in public shelter, 26 per cent, in domestic shelter, and 70 per cent, at home or on duty. In the last great war there had been out- bursts of hate against the distant enemy, and shops with German names had been wrecked. This time the citizens did not stop for such things. After the first shock of realisation they found no more need for direct recrimination than does the soldier. Like him, they got on with the job and waited their chance. Neither in this nor in any other way was there a sign of instability ; no panic running for shelter, no white faces in the streets (though plenty of taut, grim ones), no nerve disease. In all London, the month of October saw but twenty-three neurotics admitted to hospital. The mind- doctors had rather fewer patients than usual. BLOCKED ROADS. The morning of 12th May : each raid sets the police still another traffic problem. ENORMOUS CRATERS. At the Bank, where the road collapsed into the subway beneath. A temporary bridge was thrown right across it. The outcome may be seen in the following table, which shows coastal bombing to November, 1941, in round figures. Town. Number • of Raids. Civilians Houses Killed. Damaged. Fraserburgh ... 18 40 700 Peterhead 16 36 700 Aberdeen ... 24 68 2,000 Scarborough 17 30 2,250 Bridlington ... 30 24 3,000 Grimsby ... ... 22 18 1 ,700 Gt. Yarmouth ... 72 110 II, 500 Lowestoft ... 54 94 9,000 Clacton ... ... 31 10 4,400 Margate ... 47 19 8,000 Ramsgate ... 41 71 8,500 Deal 17 12 2,000 Dover ... 53 (and shelling) 92 9,000 Folkestone ... 42 52 7,000 Hastings ... ... 40 46 6,250 Bexhill ... ... 37 74 2,600 Eastbourne ... 49 36 3,700 Brighton Hove } 1 1 27 4,500 Worthing ... 29 20 3,000 Bournemouth ... 33 77 4,000 Weymouth ... 42 48 3,600 Falmouth ... 33 31 I,I00 CITY OF COV ENTRY PREVENTION of TYPHOID HB in view oi prr^ent damage to DRAINAGE communication* in the City. %peetal precaution* again** Typhoid Fever arn adviaed: OIL ALL DRINKING WATER In 12 months, 1940-1, the Blitz stray dog Rip (discovered by civil defence rescuers in Poplar, East London after an air raid) sniffed out 100 trapped casualties in London rubble. Irma. Margaret Griffin used Irma and Psyche to find 233 trapped persons STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE STANFORD, CALIFORNIA June, 1953 al Report IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR II: SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING Evaluation of Source Materials Br Robert 0« Shreve SRI Project 669 Prepared for Federal Civil Defense Administration Washington, D. C. For m)« by the 8uperint*ml*nt of Documents, U. 8. Qovtrnmcnt Prlntinc Ofllce Approved : Weldon B. Gibson, Director Economics Research Division Table 1 Report Outline - USSBS Project IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR II: SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING Division I - PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES, FACILITIES, AND PERSONS Volume 1 Summary of Civil Defense Experience Volume 2 Analytical Studies (Restricted) Volume 3 Causes of Fire from Atomic Attack (Secret) — VITAL! ! The documents which should be given wide distribution for civil defense use are listed below, with a brief description: a. USSBS Reports Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan (3 volumes)* Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan (3 volumes)* These reports constitute two case studies of atomic bombing* Civil defense planners should be aware of the facts these documents record in great detail* Their distribution to all civil defense planners and analysts is highly desirable* =9= Effects on Labor in Clydebank of Clydeslde Raids of March 1941 . (REN 23l>) USSBS Target Int. (REN 236) Ministry of Home Security A study of the effects on labor of bombing in a town of 50,000 people in which 76% of houses were rendered uninhabitable, 73% of the popula- tion homeless* An equivalent of 65 city days was utilized in the reconstruction. Ministry of Home Security Effects of German Air Force Raids on Coventry (REN IMl) The city, the attack, casualties, repairs and reconstruction (cost), absenteeism, population movements, and housing occupancy. Six pages and charts and graphs* Twenty percent of houses rendered uninhabi- table or destroyed, a total reconstruction cost of h 3,492,000. Average time lost by worker after November raid was eleven days; average after April raid was 7 days* Nine percent of the workers evacuated to points within roach of the city* An eminent chemist gives the facts about poison gas and air bombing tltc §redy ! THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS 7 antes jCenaall MJL, D.Sc. F.R.S. Professor of Chemistry, University of Edinburgh The civilian has been told that he will have to bear the brunt of another war, that within a few hours from the outset enemy bombers will destroy big cities and exterminate their inhabitants with high explosive, incendiary and gas bombs. What is the truth? Here, in this book, written in language everyone can understand, is the considered opinion of an authority on chemical warfare. Breathe Freely ! THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS JAMES KENDALL M.A., D.Sc, F.R.S. Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh ; formerly Lieutenant-Commander in the United States Naval Reserve, acting as Liaison Officer with Allied Services on Chemical Warfare J938 52 GAS IN THE LAST WAR CASUALTIES IN INITIAL GAS ATTACKS Amount Lethal Used Concentra- Non-fatal Gas Date In Tons tion * injuries Deaths Chlorine Apr. 22, 191 5 168 5 6 15,000 5,000 Phosgene Dec. 19, 1 915 88 5 1,069 120 Mustard July 12, 1917 125 015 2,490 87 (* mg/litre for 10 minutes exposure unprotected) between September 15 and November 11, 19 1 8, 2,000,000 rounds of gas shell, containing 4,000 tons of mustard gas, were fired against the advancing British troops ; our losses therefrom were 540 killed and 24,363 injured. Gas defence had progressed to the point where it took nearly 8 tons of mustard gas to kill a single man ! A GAS ATTACK ON LONDON 109 The first salvo of gas shells often reaches the trenches before the occupants^doirtheir masks, whereas the Londoner will receive ample warning of the approaching danger. IIO GAS IN THE NEXT WAR Th e alarmist and the ultra-pacifist love to quote the fact that one ton oi mustard gas is sufficient to kill 45,000,000 people. This would indeed be true if the 45,000,000 people all stood in a line with their tongues out" waiting for the drops to be dabbed on, but they are hardly likely to be so obliging. One steam- rolIer~would~suffice to flatten out all the inhabrtants of Londo n_if they lay down in rows in front of it, but nobody panics at the sight of a steam-roller. 11 Ever since the Armistice, three classes of writers have been delugmg~the long-suffering British public with lurid descriptions of their approaching extermination These three classes are pure sensa- tionalists, ultra-pacifists and military experts. 12 PANIC PALAVER perpetrators of such articles may not recognize them- selves that ivhat they are writing is almost entirely imagin ary, ~hut they do want to get their manuscript "accepted for the feature page of the Daily Drivel or the We ekly Wail. In order to do that, they must pile on the horrors thick, and they certainly do their best The amount of damage done by such alarmists can- not be calculated, but it islmdoubtedly very great. poison gas has a much greater news value. It is still a new and mysterious form of warfare, it is something which people do not under- stand, and what they do not understand they can readily be made to fear. The recent film Things to Come, in particular, has provided a picture of chemical warfare of the future which shows how simply and rapidly whole populations will be wiped out. Millions of people, perhaps, have been impressed by the authority and reputation of Mr. H. G. Wells into believing that this picture repre- sents the plain truth. 17 Exhibit t g < £ 3) 3 QQ 00 CM CO 1^- o o LO LO CNj CN O O LO LO CNJ CNj o d CO LO d CM CO CO o CD 0) (0 o o to o "D c 5 U) c 3 QQ 15 ■jo t0 or o CM LO CNJ LO CM CO Q. o (0 o ■o c g c 3 QQ 75 "(0 CD CO CM CO 1^ CN LO LO CM CM CD d LO LO CM CM d d LO CO CNJ co d O) c 3 QQ 15 ■jo "to C\| CM (XI i ro (XI 1 1^ 4 LO 00 LO LO LO LO LO LO LO CM CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj do dodo LO LO LO LO LO LO CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj do dodo CO CO ^ O h- CO LO CO CO CM O CO CO CNJ t- co cb t- CO o *-< S i * <0 .2 (0 — IV o 5 S O = Z LL o -g "O "O O 5 "o "o ■ n c c - to .2 > j> a to x > > £ S (0 > o O (0 Q. Q. o o to to o o c c 5 5 CD CO CD n 5 3

< G) - > U-l T— CN ORNL/TM-10423 Technical Options for Protecting Civilians from Toxic Vapors and Gases C. V.Chester Date Published - Hay 1988 Prepared for Office of Program Manager for CHEMICAL MUNITIONS Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland ORNL-DWG 88M-7585 DOWN WIND DISTANCE (km) Fig, 1 Dose vs Downwind Distance for Some Very Toxic Gases ORNL-OWG 88M-7584 1 1 1 I I I CLOUD PASSAGE (h) Fig e 2 Protection Factor of Leaky Enclosures O y- *~ ■ "~ o d-M) 31VH 30NVH0X3-tilV ORNL/TM-2001/154 Energy Division Will Duct Tape and Plastic Really Work? Issues Related To Expedient Shelter-In-Place John H. Sorensen Barbara M. Vogt Date Published— August 2001 Prepared for the Federal Emergency Management Agency Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Prepared by OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6285 managed by UT-BATTELLE, LLC for the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725 Although vapors, aerosols, and liquids cannot permeate glass windows or door panes, the amount of possible air filtration through the seals of the panes into frames could be significant, especially if frames are wood or other substance subject to expansion and contraction. To adequately seal the frames with tape could be difficult or impractical. For this reason, it has been suggested that pieces of heavy plastic sheeting larger than the window be used to cover the entire window, including the inside framing, and sealed in place with duct or other appropriate adhesive tape applied to the surrounding wall. Another possible strategy would be to use shrink-wrap plastic often used in weatherization efforts in older houses. Shrink-wrap commonly comes in a 6 mil (0.006-in.) thickness and is adhered around the frame with double-faced tape and then heated with a hair dryer to achieve a tight fit. This would likely be more expensive than plastic sheeting and would require greater time and effort to install. Because double-faced tape has not been challenged with chemical warfare agents, another option is to use duct tape to adhere shrink-wrap to the walls. Currently, we do not recommend using shrink- wrap plastics because of the lack of information on its suitability and performance. 3. WHY WERE THESE MATERIALS CHOSEN? Duct tape and plastic sheeting (polyethylene) were chosen because of their ability to effectively reduce infiltration and for their resistance to permeation from chemical warfare agents. 3.1 DUCT TAPE PERMEABILITY Work on the effectiveness of expedient protection against chemical warfare agent simulants was conducted as part of a study on chemical protective clothing materials (Pal et al. 1993). Materials included a variety of chemical resistant fabrics and duct tape of 10 mil (0.01 -in.) thickness. The materials were subject to liquid challenges by the simulants DIMP (a GB simulant), DMMP (a VX simulant), MAL (an organoposphorous pesticide), and DBS (a mustard simulant). The authors note that simulants should behave similarly to live agents in permeating the materials; they also note that this should be confirmed with the unitary agents. The study concluded that "duct tape exhibits reasonable resistance to permeation by the 4 simulants, although its resistance to DIMP (210 min) and DMMP (210 min) is not as good as its resistance to MAL (>24 h) and DBS (> 7 h). Due to its wide availability, duct tape appears to be a useful expedient material to provide at least a temporary seal against permeation by the agents" (Pal et al. 1993, p. 140). 3.2 PLASTIC SHEETING PERMEABILITY Tests of the permeability of plastic sheeting (polyethylene) challenged with live chemical warfare agents were conducted at the Chemical Defense Establishment in Porton Down, England in 1970 (NATO 1983, p. 133), Agents tested included H and VX, but not GB, Four types of polyethylene of varying thickness were tested; 2.5, 4, 10 and 20 mil (0.0025, 0.004 in., 0.01 in., and 0.02 in.). The results of these tests are shown in Table 1. Table 1: Permeability of plastic sheeting to liquid agent Breakthrough time (h) Thickness VX H 0.0025 3 0.3 0.004 7 0.4 0.01 30 2 0.02 48 7 Source: NATO 1983, p. 136. The data shows that at thickness of 10 mil or greater, the plastic sheeting provided a good barrier for withstanding liquid agent challenges, offering better protection against VX than for H. Because the greatest challenge is from a liquid agent, the time to permeate the sheeting will be longer for aerosols and still longer for vapors, but the exact relationship is unknown due to a lack of test data. NATO Civil Defense Committee 1983. NATO Handbook on Standards and Rules for the Protection of the Civil Population Against Chemical Toxic Agents, AC/23 -D/680, 2nd rev. Pal, T., G.Griffin, G. Miller, A. Watson, M. Doherty, and T. Vo-Dinh. 1993. "Permeation Measurements of Chemical Agent Simulants Through Protective Clothing Materials,"/. Haz. Mat. 33:123-141. UNCLASSIiafiB no. 9 1- 3 ASSISTANT w»,.^C'«0R FOR SATIOSA'- INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE THE PROBABILITY OF SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF BW AND CW IN THE EVENT OF ATTACKS UPON THE US CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM NIE-18 Published 10 January 1951 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY APPBNDIX B GA AND GB NERVE GASES 1. General. GA and GB are colorless, odor- less, low viscosity liquids, somewhat more volatile than kerosene. They become ef- fective anti-personnel agents when dis- persed as a vapor or invisible fog. GB is approximately 2% times more toxic than GA. 2. Quantities Required for Effective Em- ployment. 2.1 Military Attack. 2.11 Approximately 5 tons of GB used in present munitions would be re- quired to obtain a concentration for 50% lethality, in an open area of one square mile, under favorable weather conditions as described in paragraph 2.14 below. Theoret- ically, some 2V4 times more GA would be required for comparable effectiveness. However, dissemina- tion of GA by munitions to date does not approach this ideal and 15 to 20 times more GA than GB may be needed for 50% lethality. 2.12 The quantities of GA and GB de- livered on the target in a military attack may well be sub-lethal. However, even with as little as 1/10 of the lethal quantity, effec- tive incapacitation and demorali- zation can be obtained. 2.13 Inasmuch as the nerve gases are anti-personnel weapons they would be employed against population centers and military and indus- trial installations where the ob- jective is primarily incapacitation of personnel as contrasted with physical destruction. However, CW may also be employed to sup- plement AW and high explosives. 2.14 Effective dissemination of GA and GB against the foregoing targets requires the following conditions. 2.141 Low or medium wind veloc- ity. 2.142 Shallow layer of cool air be- low a warm layer. 2.143 Openings in the buildings through which outside air can penetrate, such as win- dows or air conditioning in- let ducts (openings can be obtained by employing high explosive munitions concur- rently with CW agents). 2.15 The atmospheric conditions usual- ly present on many cloudy days and at times when inversion is present are suitable for a gas at- tack. Night conditions in times of fair weather are generally more favorable for a CW attack than day conditions. Sunny, hot days in summer time with little or no wind are unsuitable and the use of toxic agent clouds at these times would be inefficient. 2.2 Sabotage Attack. 2.21 When effectively disseminated throughout a confined space of 100,000 cubic feet, about one ounce of GA or about one-half ounce of GB are sufficient to incapacitate or kill substantially all of the people in the area. The most like- ly method of dissemination would be by means of an aerosol bomb type container similar to those used for insecticides. These bombs operate with an auxiliary volatile liquid, which together with the weight of the container would make the weight of the dispenser about five times the weight of the agent; that is, for 100,000 cubic feet the dispenser would weigh about % pound. TOP ODOnil ' P 11 2.22 In the case of thje Pentagon, which has 75,000,000 .cubic feet of en- closed space, 50 lbs of GA or 20 lbs of GB would have to be dispersed throughout the ^ building to cause the above results, assuming no significant extraction by the air conditioning system. This would require 50-10 pound bombs of about 0.6 gallon capacity for GA. Fewer bombs or smaller ones in ■ the ration of 24Vfc to 1 would be needed for GB. i i 3. Effects Produced and Protective Meas- ures. I 3.1 GA and GB produce characteristic physiological effects, jsuch as, contrac- tion of the pupil of the eye, twitching eyelids, tightness of the chest, difficulty in breathing, blurring of vision, twitch- ing of muscles, headache, nausea, vom- iting, salivation and diarrhea. In the case of a lethal dose 1 , the victim loses muscular power and Coordination. In addition to intensification of the fore- going effects, convulsions occur and there is involuntary defecation and urination; distressed breathing; pa- ralysis; unconsciousness; heart slowing, dilating and eventually stopping due to heart muscle failure and asphyxia. In general, death occurs within an hour after exposure to the 1 lethal concentra- tion. 3.2 The physiological effects are greatest when absorbed through the respiratory system following inhalation of the va- pors. However, the 'same effects can be produced by larger doses through mucous membranes, open wounds, and even by a small drop oif the liquid touch- ing the skin. The liquid will penetrate ordinary clothing, i 3.3 Theoretically, complete protection against the nerve gases requires not only a well fitted gas mask but also special impermeable clothing. How- ever, except in the immediate vicinity" of bursts, the concentrations which probably will be encountered will be "such that gas masKs wiu proviae aae- "quate protection for all but a few of the "personnel in the target area, on the other hand, at present there is no quick method of detection of GA and GB for warning and identification. 3.4 GA and GB are easily decomposed by any acid and they hydrolyze very rap- idly in alkaline solutions. Effective de- contamination can be carried out with alcohol solutions of sodium and potas- sium hydroxide, and solutions or pastes of washing soda, lime bleach, and bak- ing soda. Even scrubbing with soap and water is effective to a degree. 3.5 Immediate injection of atropine is ex- tremely effective in counteracting the physiological effects of these gases. 4. References. ' Additional information which may be of assistance to civil defense planning will be found in the following: 4.1 Presentation to the Secretary of De- fense's Ad Hoc Committee on CEBAR 27 January 1950. Submitted by Office of Chief, Chemical Corps. 4.2 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on BW, CW, and RW (Stephenson Com- mittee) to the Secretary of Defense, 30 June 1950. 4.3 Summary Technical Report of NDRC Division 9, Volume 1, Parts I & H. and Division 10, Volume I, Part II. 4.4 Chemical and Toxicologic Data on CW Agents by E. L. Wardell and C. A. Rou- iller. Information Branch, Technical Service Division, Office of the Chief, Chemical Corps, 25 May 1948. UNITED STATES NAVY lie WARFARE DEFENSE ASHORE TECHNICAL PUBLICATION NAVDOCKS-TP-PL-2 REVISED APRIL 1960 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS WASHINGTON 2 5, D. C. TABLE 3-2 Median Lethal and Median Incapacitating Dosages for Selected War Gases Name and symbol Median lethal dosage (ms -min/m3) Median incapacitat- ing dosage (mg-min/m3) Tabun (GA) 400 for resting men 300 for resting men Sarin (GB) 100 for resting men 75 for resting men Soman ff5D\ GB. GA ran Are GB. GA ran ae Distilled mustard (HD) 600 to 1,000 by inhalation; 10,000 by skin exposure 200 by eye effect; 2,000 by skin effect Nitrogen mustard (HN-1) 1,500 by inhalation; 20,000 by skin exposure 200 by eye effect; 9,000 by skin effect Nitrogen mustard (HN-2) 3,000 by inhalation Less than HN-1, but more than HN-3 Nitrogen mustard (HN-3) 1,500 by inhalation; 10,000 by skin exposure (estimated) 200 by eye effect; 2,500 by skin effect (estimated) Mustard (H) 600 to 1,000 by inhalation; 10,000 by skin exposure 200 by eye effect; 2,000 by skin effects Lewisite 1,200 to 1,500 by inhalation; 100,000 by skin exposure 300 by eye effect; 1,500 by skin effect Phosgene (CG) 3,200 1,600 Cyanogen Chloride (CK) 11,000 7,000 Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) Approximately 2,600 Approximately 2,600 The level to which the contamination must be reduced depends on the CW agent that is employed and the type of protective gear that is provided. For example, the Let 50 respiratory dose from GB is 100 mg-min/m^, while the Let 50 dose through the skin of an unclothed person is 12,000 mg-min/m^, and the Let 50 dose through the skin of a person wearing ordinary clothing is 15,000 mg- min/nw. Thus, if personnel can wear masks and still carry out their mission, decontami- nation need not be as complete as if they did not wear masks. TABLE 4-2 RW Contamination Building surfaces or paved, areas 1 hour Radiation dose rate Ir/nr) Residual Firehosing or mm mm mmm m^ ,«fe.4t* Al m m mm Ik « - — mmf street xlusmng Asphaltic concrete 300 1,000 \ nnn 0.07 0.03 01 Portland cement concreie 300 1,000 % nnn 0.04 0.02 n nn ft Tar-and-gravel roofing 300 1,000 ^ nnn 0.03 0.02 n m Composition roofing 300 1,000 3,000 0.04 0.03 0.01 Wood shingle 300 1,000 3,000 0.17 0.10 0.04 Galvanized corrugated steel 300 1,000 3,000 | 0.05 0.02 0.006 Smooth painted surface 300 1,000 3,000 0.04 0.01 0.004 4-50 STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE STANFORD, CALIFORNIA June, 1953 IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK I N WORL D WAR II: SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING Division II t Effects on the General Econca Volume 1: Economic Effects - Germany Part One SRI Project 669 Prepared for Federal Civil Defense Administration Washington, D. C. roved s William Jo Industrial ftt, Chairman Lanning Research Weldon B* Gibson, Director Economics Research Division For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. O. - Price $1.25 O cd CO 0#i as

c: £ +-» CO 0) +-> TO .s +-» QJ ted Car c 8 ■ ■ RCE Me O c o 4-* 4-> (O 4-* V-( qv oo ^ ^ m o • • • • • • m ^ n n ^ o CO c Ctf 0) *4 00 £ CM O CM ffi< CO U 60 » .5 o r—i 4-> •2 CO CQ Q O O o o o o o o o o «h m m m CO CM CO CO fSj nO CsJ ■o 3 O 0> O o u 2 * a, 0) o 0. 04 CM ^ GO ^ O O * • • • * ♦ —t CM CO f 00 c\3 »-h o 12 o CO o > 3 * -It o o o o o o m m Tt< CM 00 Tf« © o A «fc «fc «fc 00 00 o o ^ S 3 3 « c « 10 « c o * CO M ^ 60 rt ™of Offices. Alternatively, any room on any floor below the top floor may be used. Top floors and attics should be avoided as they usually do not give sufficient protection overhead from small in- cendiary bombs. These small bombs would probably penetrate the roof but be stopped by the top floor, though In a house with only two floors they might burn through to the floor and witho " £ Q ctU ?l> choose * , / .Jr . j 1 room on the ground floor so tha% below if not quickly dealt With. Y0U have protection overhead PageS IF THERE SHOULD EVER BE A WAR Strengthening the room If your refiige-room is on the ground floor or in the base- ment, you can support the ceiling with wooden props as an additional protection. The illustration shows a way of doing this, but it would be best to take a builder's advice before setting to work. Stout posts or scaffold poles are placed upright, resting on a thick plank on the floor and supporting a stout piece of timber against the ceiling, at right angles to the ceiling joists, i.e. in the same direction as the floor boards above. How to support a ceiling The illus- tration below shows the detail of how to fix the props The smaller illustration shows how the posts are held in position at the top by two blocks of wood on the ceiling beam. The posts are forced tight by two wedges at the foot, driven in opposite ways. Do not drive these wedges too violently, otherwise you may lift the ceiling and damage it. If the floor of your refuge-room is solid, such as you might find in a basement, you will not need a plank across the whole floor, but only a piece of wood a foot or so long under each prop. Page ij ■ ■ ' EXTRA PRECAUTIONS EXTRA PRECAUTIONS AGAINST EXPLOSIVE BOMBS trenches. Instead of having a refuge-room in your house, you can, if you have a garden, build a dug-out or a trench. A trench provides excellent protection against the effects of a bursting bomb, and is simple to construct. Full instructions will be given in another book which you will be able to buy. Your air raid wardens will also be able to advise. sandbags. Sandbags outside are the best protection if your walls are not thick enough to resist splinters. Do not rely on a wall keeping out splinters unless it is more than a foot thick. Sandbags are also the best protection for window openings. If you can completely close the window opening with a wall of sandbags you will prevent the glass being broken by the blast of an explosion, as well as keeping out splinters. But the window must still be sealed inside against gas. t,m , i,i, EE5EE nviiitj. L A basement window protected by boxes of earth Any bags or sacks, including paper sacks such as are used for cement, will do for sandbags. But if they are large, don't fill Page 30 > o tn o lu a SE £° < Q_ O (J) 0) c o I ■ I I I 1 a a> a x £ LU o ±s "O CO 5 3 O (0 X o E "go c O si 05 > =6 o CO _>» ■a c C 05 05 O E.2> 0^ "go ^ JO _Q Q_ O O CO P c li 2 °- E o c co o co ~ i5 £ O C/) 05 _Q jO O 4— O Q_ X > 05 CD O >* CO CO 05 aj c 05 CO O "D CO 05 "D 3 CO -g CO o H— » Q_ X > o E CO _Q -C IS E 3 go c CO EI ^ lo o c .2> CO LL CQ O CO CO E CO L. O) _ co JS 1 E 2 Q_ m- c E CO 13 _Q c _ 3 CO S E c co £ £ t: i= u ^030 CO CO r- O £ CD (/) E e 2 TO c/) .05 4 Q LU CO CO < _l o (0 E E 3 V) I I I I I ■ £ o CO CO CD CO CO C/) ^ s *- C >, O c > CO c O > lo c o ■ ■ "O _Q tra ssi CD o 0) CD CO C/) I CO as CD o Q_ X 0) c CD o CO c C o c "O S_ ly i vu O c CD CD "D Q. C X CD 0) CD C CD o CO o CO o CO ~ ^ o ^ □ DQ O CO £ • CO CD CO o O "co CO 16 i CO > CO CO o > Q. 3 x: co >> CO > CD — CO CO CO O o _ ■j_ — .— CO O .9? Q CO =3 Z e :r c 5 T3 S3 2 0-e E co C O ^ o °° CO D) o E co £ Q_ CO c c £ 92 - O D).N £ co F £3 -b ■— > (/) E ft \ UJ o CO Al LL CL CO s ' o dx "co cr o ~o CO c o o CO ^5 E >» c ke o "c ce CO CO Q. -Q i < c CO i5 "co o c o o c = O jO CO o — jD O *CD CO c 8 E i h b b b b (w/A)dW3xau NEUTRON DOSE TRANSMISSION 2 4 6 8 10 12 SLAB THICKNESS (INCHES) NEUTRON DOSE TRANSMISSION Report AD295691 »l I I I I I I O 2 4 6 8 10 12 SLAB THICKNESS (INCHES) 2 4 6 8 10 SLAB THICKNESS (INCHES) NEUTRON DOSE TRANSMISSION 0- 70 * Report AD295691 i i i I I 2 4 6 6 10 12 SLAB THICKNESS (INCHES) NEUTRON DOSE TRANSMISSION Report AD295691 2 4 6 8 10 12 SLAB THICKNESS (INCHES) S. Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1 964 ■d d o d 3 I s ss CO rj w § O .2 M CO 03 co d m § 55 1 u ™ £ J d Q i HOXOV.J NOISSIWSNVHX 3SOQ GO _ ifol 'ef&g&rwte £/*€ie&r ORNL-TM-3396 NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE- FIELD ENVIRONMENT RECOMMENDED FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burson, R, L, French, F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A. St raker Table 8. Fi»ion-Product Gamma Ray Exposure During the First 60 Seconds from a Typical TN Weapon at a 100-M Burst Height Slant Range (m) Shock Arrival (sec) Percent Before Shock Percent After Shock 100 KT 538 740 1030 1446 2097 0.3678 0.8187 1.822 4.055 11.02 13.8 20.4 36.2 63.1 95.7 86.2 79.6 63.8 36.9 4.3 300 KT 771 1060 1472 206S 2995 0.5488 1.221 2.718 6.049 16.44 13.7 20.5 38.6 69.8 98.8 86.3 79.5 61.4 30.2 1.2 1 MT 1146 1576 2190 3075 4458 0.8187 1.822 4.055 9.024 24.53 11.1 18.3 38.2 75.3 99.8 88.9 81.7 61.8 24.7 0.2 THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI ♦:♦ REPORT OF THE BRITISH MISSION TO JAPAN PUBLISHED FOR THE HOME OFFICE AND THE AIR MINISTRY BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE LONDON 1946 £ S3 bfi S o s r~ ^3.2 6 Cw o CO !2 d " <« d .f d . "53 o BO tS *3 ^ g S3 8*P if III ° O o i ji^s -4—* f c3 8 *9 2 c5 w 43 S *H » if 1842 I M "* 'S 2 a ft SBo 1—1 3 ^ d 00 CO _, 4> r^Q 43 > 43 d > T>43 © o 3 d d w 8 t; > d co IN'fti g § co <1> s o 1 81 S 3 d a> o 0> •a g to S O c« III ° 9 h 8 2 « o *! o d o> 43 8J 5 O 43 Q n ^co " ^ S ° 6 CO d o 03 c3 o CO d CL co ? 85 I— I o d 8 ^-S 8 J3 U S h P I i ° *T H • H co 3 O a o d- S a o 2 ° S & (L> J3 rd .g d o w bo i « 5 Photo No. 17. HIROSHIMA. Typical, part below ground, earth- covered, timber framed shelter 300 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right. In common with similar but fully sunk shelters, none appeared to have been structurally damaged by the blast. Exposed woodwork was liable to " flashburn." Internal blast probably threw the occupants about, and gamma rays may have caused casualties. Photo No. 18. NAGASAKI. Typical small earth-covered back yard shelter with crude wooden frame, less than 100 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right. There was a large number of such shelters, but whereas* nearly all those as close as this one had their roofs forced in, only half were damaged at 300 yds., and practically none at half a mile from thecentre of damage. Kill flip ij 2 1 cms The National Archives ins 1 1 i 2 Ref.: HO 21S/\\b 3rd October, 1 963 . RCSTRICTCD^^ HOME OFFICE SCIENTIFIC ADVISER'S BRANCH ^ , 1 6 HBSBARCH ON BLAST EFFECTS IN TUNNELS With Speolal Referenoa to the Use of London Tubes as Shelter by P. H. Pavry Summary and Conclusions The use of the London tube railways as shelter from nuclear weapons raises many problems, and considerable discussion of some aspects has taken place from time to time. But - until the results of the research here described were avail- able - no one was able to say with any certainty whether the tubes would provide relatively safe shelter or not. The more recent research here described showed for the first time that a person sheltering in a tube would be exposed to a blast pressure only about ^ as great as he would be exposed to if he was above ground, (in addition, of course, he would be fully protected from fallout in the tube.) Large-Scale Field Test ( 1 /40) at Suf field, Alberta (6) The test is fully described in an A.W.R.E. report ^ . The decision of the Canadian Defence Research Board to explode very large amounts of high explosive provided a medium for a variety of target-response trials that was welcome at a time when nuclear tests in Australia were suspended. A.W.R.E. used the 100-ton explosion in 1S?6l to test, among other items, the model length of the London tube, at 1/40th scale, that had already been tested at Vl17 scale. Blast Entry from Stations There was remarkable agreement with the */n7th scale trials: "maximum overpressure in the train tunnels was of the order of yrd the corresponding peak shock overpressure in the incident blast. The pres- sures in the stations were about V6th those in the corresponding incident blast (6) 1 /W>th Scale Experiment to Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on the London Underground System. A.W.R.E. Report E^/62. (Official Use Only.) 100 ton TNT test on 1000 ft section of London Underground tube at Suf field, Alberta, 3 Aug 1961 Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, "1/ 40th Scale Experiment to Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on the London Underground System" , Report AWRE-E2/62, 1962, Figure 30. (National Archives ES 3/57.) 200 FT FROM GROUND ZERO 400 FT FROM GROUND ZERO 100 PSI OUTSIDE 20 PSI OUTSIDE 30 PSI IN TUBES 7. 2 PSI IN TUBES 15 PSI IN TUBE STATIONS 4. 3 PSI IN TUBE STATIONS Aldwych Underground tube station as Blitz shelter, 8 October 1940 CO c ^ o a x a> D E o a> O) D ■ > a> o o > o a> o o a x P a a> o 1 l*"* *A ^ ^ ^ O 5 vgoui Aliuom § 1 1 ° .2 Ch CO ro X w CO o (4 o | o bp H -p r-4 CO 03 CO , (0 > O M to PJ *o aJ ,p aj n O aj o ^ o] o £ V H O ^ rQ j) as •* i ca -p x: to >i -03+3 -p ti O O a> o a ^ .p 5 cd »n +> co u -p -p O Cd «T3 c rH U O d 8| O ^, X -P 'ft fj Q ^ C -P 4) n 0) O 03 •rf O Q> O *4 H w « W 0303 *r4flJ U #• si £ 4$ . Jf £ C O O J? C2 Crown Copyright Reserved AIR MINISTRY AP 3349 RESTRICTED The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person not authorized to receive it. WO Code No. 26/GS Trg Publications/2329 PRECAUTIONS AGAINST NUCLEAR ATTACK 1957 (Superseding Precautions Against Atomic Attack, 1952 (WO Code No. 8769)) Promulgated by Command of the Army Council, Promulgated by Command of the Air Council, Telegraph pole burnt on the side facing the flash. Note where foliage has acted as a shield Shelter 100 yards from the centre of damage — Nagasaki Protection against fall-out 101. Except in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear explosion a reasonably accurate prediction of the area of fall-out can be made in time for a warning to be issued to units in the areas in which it is likely to fall. Given a reasonable warning it may be possible to evacuate the area before the fall-out arrives. In any case simple precautionary measures can greatly reduce the hazard to life. 102. Exposure to the radio-active radiations from fall-out can be reduced by taking sheltei and by using simple decontamination procedures until such time as persons can leave the area. In areas where radio-active contami- nation is heavy it may be necessary to remain under cover for as long as 48 hours before the radiations will have fallen, by natural decay, to levels at which it will be safe for persons to move about, either to leave the aiea, or, in the case of rescue teams from other areas, to enter it. 103. The estimated degree of protection against the residual radiation to be obtained from buildings, trenches, etc, in a fall-out area is shown at Table 7 Table 7. Estimated degree of protection against the residual radiation to be obtained from various buildings, trenches, etc, in a fall-out area Type of building or shelter Slit trench with light board or corrugated iron overhead Slit trench with 1 ft of earth overhead Slit trench with 2 ft to 3 ft of earth overhead Nissen hut One storey brick house Two storey brick house Three storey brick house Average two storey house in a built up area Basements INSIDE dose expressed as a fraction of the OUTSIDE dose i vii5 to shs i A to its , At to T in zhf to sis dependent upon wall thickness and shield- ing afforded by neigh- bouring houses dependent upon shield- ing afforded by neighbouring houses DOMESTIC NUCLEAR SH ELTERS Advice on domestic shelters providing protection against nuclear explosions A Home Office guide A & r / Type la earth -covered doors-over trench shelter Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch (Home Defence College, Easingwold, York, 1 980) HI Type 2 indoor Morrison shelter UK Ministry of Home Security, "How to Put Up Your Morrison 'Table' Shelter/ Fig. 3, 1942: UK Home Office, "Domestic Nuclear Shelters: Technical Guidance," Fig. 80, 1982: Fallout radiation is shielded by dense materials on and around shelter Type 3 outdoor Anderson shelter Type 4 reinforced concrete shelter (Nevada bomb test) Fig. 12.54 in Glasstone Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1957 Tl/53 copy No. Id 14 PACES UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/1 T I /53 mJSSSL^j I MINISTRY OF SUPPLY ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT REPORT No. Tl/53 DECLASSIFIED FOR PR.' BY AWE ALDERMASTOfv TOP SECRET ^ Sf. W B.M ^KOVERrslf-fCt^X. and ir'Suended only for the perianal information of hka and of thote .office n under hirtV whoie duu'u it »n ecn.^H. ts personally responsible for iu MM CUMdh and that iu concerns arVdiscloted to_tl>etfe officers and to them only. >v document will be kept in a lockeVufe not in actual use. \ A..W.R.E. Aldermaston Berks. May. 1953 3.2 Blast D»ro»p* Outdoor peak overpressure was 51 psi at 500 yds, 25 psi at 665 yds and 1 psi at 1 ,000 yds 3* 2. 1 Anderson S helters 3 psi extended to 2,000 yds Standard Anderson Shelters, with sandbag covering and "blast wall construction were located at 460, 510, 600, 920 and 1,130 yards from ground zero* Mean blast pressures, in pounds/sq. inch, recorded inside the shelters are shown in the following table. Distance (yds. ) Presentation Front Side Rear 460 m NR NR 510 38 27 40 600 28 21 28 920 16 7 14 1130 8.5 4 5-5 Front presentation implies blast wall facing towards event. Rear « » •» »• M away from event. Side " " shelter side on to event. Shelters at 460, 510 and 600 yards suffered damage including demolition of blast walls, removal of sandbag covering and some displacement of the corrugated iron. At 920 and 1,130 yards the shelters suffered relatively little damage. Civil defence authorities consider that there might have been aome 50^ survival from blast damage of personnel in shelters at 460 yards and some 90 per cent at 600 yards, fatal casualties being_ _ mainly due to seoor ^"^y friA gt effects (e.g. deb ris) and not to oirecl, eff ects on the person of the blast pressure itself. ~ The front presentation appears the most hazardous, due to the collapse of the blast wall into the shelter. At such distances, however, the survival from the effects' of gamma flash would have been virtually ^ (Mode eMxft oveK /s tnei>e?> tp&frTttffT) At 920 and 1,130 yards there would have been no casualties from blast, and incidentally, little risk from the effect of gamma flash. -5- UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/2 ANDERSON SHELTER TESTS AGAINST 25 KT NUCLEAR NEAR SURFACE BURST (2.7 METRES DEPTH IN SHIP) AWRE-Tl/54, 27 Aug. 1954 SECRET -GUARD ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT (formerly of Ministry of Supply) SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT OPERATION HURRICANE (Monte Bello Islands, Australia— October, 1952) 130 x 10" 7 7x 10 6 13- 5 x 10° p_ R 3 + R 2 + R p is the maximum excess pressure in p.s.i. and R is the distance in feet Left: Fig. 12.3, Andersons at 1800 ft after burst. Right: Fig. 12.4, Andersons protected by blast walls at 2760 ft. 12.1. Blast Damage to Anderson Shelters Sandbags failed to provide any earth-arching protection At 1,380 feet, Fig. 12.1, parts of the main structure of the shelters facing towards and sideways to the explosion were blown in but the main structure of the one facing away from the explosion was intact, and would have given full protection. At 1,530 feet, Fig. 12.2, the front sheets of the shelter facing the explosion were blown into the shelter but otherwise the main structures were more or less undamaged, as were those at 1,800 feet, Fig. 12.3. At 2,760 feet, Fig. 12.4, some of the sandbags covering the shelters were displaced and the blast walls were distorted whilst at 3,390 feet, Fig. 12.5, the effect was quite small. At these distances, the shelters were not in direct view of the explosion owing to intervening sandhills. SECRET-GUARD 29 13. The Penetration of the Gamma Flash 13.1. Experiments on the Protection from the Gamma Flash afforded by Slit Trenches 13.1.1. The experiments described in this section show that slit trenches provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From the point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the most important results of the trial. 13.1.2. Rectangular slit trenches 6 ft. by 2 ft. in plan and 6 ft. deep were placed at 733, 943 and 1,300 yards from the bomb and circular fox holes 2 ft. in radius and 6 ft. deep were placed at 943 and 1,300 yards. The doses received from the flash were measured with film badges and quartz- fibre dosimeters in order to determine the variation of protection with distance, with depth and with orientation of the trench and the relative protection afforded by open and covered trenches. In general, the slit trenches were placed broadside-on to the target vessel but at 1,300 yards one trench was placed end-on. Two trenches, one at 733 and one at 943 yards were covered with the equivalent of 1 1 inches of sand. Table 13.1 Variation of Gamma Flash Dose on Vertical Axis of Trench Type of trench Rectangular broadside-on open Rectan- gular end-on open Circular open Rectangular broadside-on covered Distance (yards) ... 1,300 943 733 1,300 1,300 943 943 733 Surface dose (Roentgens) 300 3,000 14,000 300 300 3,000 3,000 14,000 Depth below ground level (inches) 6 12 24 • * • 36 48 60 72 150 75 33-3 23 (20) 1,000 430 150 70 43 (37-5) 584 216 100 61 (46-7) 230 150 60 31-6 20 13-6 (8-6) 214 120 54-5 30 17-7 10-7 7 1,200 545 188 86 48-5 (33-3) (75) 47-6 • 25 13 7-7 (3-5) (140) (56) (31) (23) — Entries in brackets are extrapolations or estimates. Trench air raid shelter in Kent hop field 15 Aug 1940 Exercise Desert Rock VI (Nevada, 1955), 6 ft trench at 4,000 yds from GZ 1 HB-8 The house at Main and Elm Streets. Two typical colonial two-story center haft frame dwellings were placed at 3,500 and 7,500 feet from the bomb tower. I FC 0,4 —Operation Doorstep— Yucca Hot. Nev., Mar. 17, 1953 J - 1 HA-1 1 House No. I. from the camera tower from which the dramatic collapse pic- tures were token. The Post Office truck to the left, although it lost all windows and suffered body damage, was driven away fater, os was the car in the rear of the house. Entry to the basement was mode through the corner at lower center. I FCD A— Operation Doorstep— Yucca Flat, Nev., Mar. 17, I953J X-19 This mannequin can only stay in the position in which he was placed, staring through the window at coming disaster. A real occupant of this house could IFCDJl—Operafion Doorstep— Yucca Flat, Nev., Mar. 17, 1993.1 LSA-2 3,500 feet from ground zero. The house overhead is totally destroyed, some of it has fallen into the basement, but the mannequin in the lean-to shelter is undisturbed. The photo was taken from ground level, looking info the basement through the gap between the basement wall and the broken floor timbers. I FCD A — Operation Doorstep — Tucea Flat, Nev., Mar. 17, 1953. J f" The National Archives , HO 12* /Ul HOME OFFICE ^ SCIENTIFIC ADVISER'S BRANCH (Paper at Tripartite Thermal Effects Symposium, Dorking, October 1964) I&NITION AND FIRE SPREAD IN URBAN AREAS F0LL0V/IN& A NUCLEAR ATTACK &. R. Stanbury INITIAL FIRE INCIDENCE 0.72 mlle8-gB=^ c >C height " / fireball \ / 1 MT groundburst \ x^Shie^ding^ Thermal pulse precedes the blast wave Assuming that buildings on opposite aides of a street which is receiving heat radiation from a direction perpendicular to its length are of the same height we take the average depth of a floor to be 10 ft. Effeot of Shielding: Estimation of the number of exposed floors Distance from explosion miles Angle of arrival o oc Width of street (units of 10 ft.) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 3 4 5 13* 10 8 •5 .5 •5 •5 .5 •5 1 .5 • 5 1 1 .5 1.5 1 1 1.5 1.5 1 2 1.5 1 SPREAD OF FIRE From last war experience of mass fire raids in Germany it was concluded that the overall spread factor was about 2; i.e. about twice as many buildings were destroyed by fire as were actually set alight by incendiary bombs Number of fires started per square mile in the fire -storm raid on Hamburg, 27th/28th July, 1943 102 tons H.E. h8 tons, 4 lb. magnesium 40 tons, 30 lb. gel. 100 fires 27,000 bombs 3,000 bombs 8,000 on buildings 900 on buildings 1 ,600 fires 800 fires 2,500 fires in 6,000 buildings However, the important thing to note is that the total number of fires stsrted in each square mile (2,500) was nearly half that of the total number of buildings; in other words, almost every other building was set on fire When the figure of 1 in 2 for the German fire storms is oompared wits the figures for initial fire incidence of ro 1 in 1 5 to 30 obtained in the Birmingham and Liverpool studies it can only be oonoluded that a nuclear explosion could not possibly produce a fire storm. SECONDARY FIRES FROM BLAST DAMAGE IN LONDON Fire situation from 1 .499 fly bombs in the built-up part of the London Region (Fires from 1 ton TNT VI cruise missiles, 1944) Number of fly bombs Ply Bombs Caused No fire Small fire Medium fire Serious fire Major fire Grand Totals 1,499 804 609 75 7 4 Th4 large proportion started no fires at all even in the most heavily built-up areas. All these fly bombs fell in the summer months of 1 944 which were unusually dry. In winter in this oountry in residential areas there are many open fires whiob may provide extra sources of ignition. The domes tio occupancy is a low fire risk however, and as the proportion of such property in the important City and West End areas is small this should not introduce any serious error, More- over, in winter, the high atmospherio humidity and the correspondingly high moisture oontent of timber would tend to retard or even prevent the growth of fire. Takata, A.N., Mathematical Modeling of Fire Defenses, IITRI, March 1970, AD 705 388. 20 40 60 80 100 I20 MINUTES AFTER DETONATION ADA038738 Secondary F1rts Secondary fires are those that mult from airblest damage. Their causes include overturned gas appliances , broken gas lines* and elec- trical short-circuits. McAuliffe and Moll (Reference 1 ) studied secondary fires resulting from the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and compared their results with data from conventional bomb- ings, explosive disasters, earthquakes, and tornadoes. Their major con- clusion was that secondary ignitions occur with an overail average fre- quency of 0.006 for each 1000 square feet of floor space, provided air- blast peak overpressure is at least 2 psi. The frequency of secondary ignitions appears to be relatively insensitive to higher overpressures. Based on surveys of Hiroshima and Nagasaki buildings. FREQUENCY OF SECONDARY IGNITIONS AS A FUNCTION OF MLDING TYPE Type of Structure Frequency of Secondary Ignitions (for each 1 ,000 square feet of floor area) Mood 0.019 Brick 0.017 Steel 0.004 Concrete 0.002 MULTIPLYING FACTOR FOR TYPES OF BUILDING OCCUPANCIES Type of Occupancy Mult10ly1ng Factor Public 0.4 Mercantile 0.5 Residential 0.5 Manufacturing 1.0 Miscellaneous 10.0 MULTIPLYING FACTOR FOR TIME OF DAY Time of Day Multiplying Factor Night 0.5 Day (other than mealtimes) 1.0 Mealtimes 2.0 1 • Secondary Ignitions in Nuclear Attack , J. McAuliffe and K. Moll, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California 94025, SRI Project 5106 (AO 625173), July 1965. OFFICE OF THE AIR SURGEON NP-3041 MEDICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS The Report of the Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan; Volume VI By Ashley W. Oughterson George V. LeRoy Averill A. Liebow E. Cuyler Hammond Henry L. Barnett Jack D. Rosenbaum B. Aubrey Schneider July 6, 1951 [TIS Issuance Date] Army Institute of Pathology UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Technical Information Sorvico, Oak Rid go, Tonnossoo Thle document contains information affect- ing the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U. S. C. ?t and 32. as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents In any manner to an unauthorized parson is prohibited by law. RESTRICTED 3 _C ra « ^ '1=^ .2 5 = J JJ _ E x 5 B 5-- s ,* a o , — t _ — >— =s w — *" ^ 5? 5 1I g "a "2 "3 o ^'3 Q C rt ^ qj ■■ — _D > JC m ^> C, LtJ £ « ei - i g is O 3 rt £ - 2-5 = ^ _^ CL D fi "Z =-2 * * 3 i* £ S s e = £ ti O c O 2 = n fi £ 3 I ;j||J e-s a ■2 S frg.I 8 « ^ £ c o ^ (j =■ — M3 c E E B4 e 2=5 — ■ J U * O £ C "3 C O U « £ ~ * ~ 5s ■e y o S I E u ■ -w o -fi « ~ £ ^ ■a = O C o U U 5 C J3 ^' E E >. L-. ■ 53' s = S >, t; mi- r€ = 5 £ n q fl r= O ^ e j j -c w o t ^ ^ ^ _ ^ S 3 • S H *rt C t; - u c u u p. £ Kj5 U 3 O e?; ^ * B o m Q 11 1 o °: ! il \\ 1 £ 3 £ H 4 22" i : i v ii I Ji 4 d a o U 16 AD689495 MASS BURNS National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C. 1969 Dr. Edward L. Alpen (U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory): About this question of the spectral dependence of radiant energy, I think Dr. Haynes may have given you the impression that white light does the trick. There is later work which tends to refute that. The work done at Virginia used cut-off filters. The effectiveness of all energy above a certain wave length or below a certain wave length was measured. At the upper end the most effective and the least effective were mixed together and made it appear that infrared was not too good in producing burns. When you subdivide the spectrum, the most effective energy in producing a flash burn is the infrared above about 1.2 microns. The importance of this, and the only reason I make an issue of it, is that a very important source of flash burn, both in civilian life and under wartime disaster conditions, is radiant energy burns from flaming sources. We have done a great deal of research on this subject for the U. S. Forest Service, because radiant energy burns are important in forest fires. Energy in the wave lengths of 0.6 to 0.8 micron is about one- eighth as destructive as the rest of the spectrum. But long wave length radiation above one micron is extremely destructive, and the most effective of all. 49 Dr. Alpen : Anything that shields out radiation above one micron is extremely effective in preventing burns to the skin. 50 EFFECTS OF SPECTRAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIANT ENERGY ON CUTANEOUS BURN PRODUCTION IN MAN AND THE RAT Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-46 25 April 1955 by E.L. Alpen CP. Butler S.B. Martin A.K. Davis U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY San Francisco 24, California For human skin the reflectivities and critical energies for production of a standard burn are the following: filter "A", X = max 0.42/.., r = 24.4 + 3.5 per cent, Q = 3.20 ± 0.37 cal/cm 2 ; filter »B", ^max ~ 0.55/;, r ~ 40.9 + 3.8 per cent, Q = 3.25 ± 0.28 cal/cm 2 ; filter "C", X max = 0.65/x, r = 56.9 + 2.5 per cent, Q = 9.9 ± 2.1 cal/cm 2 ; filter "D", Nnax = 0.85^, r = 53.4 + 2.2 per cent, Q = 14.0 + 1.1 cal/cm 2 ; filter "F" ( X max = 1.7 H, r = 17 + 0.60 per cent, Q = = 2.50 cal/cm 2 (approx.). The ranges shown are standard deviations. The significance of the optical properties of skin has been discussed and the property of the high transmission of skin in the region 0.7 to 1.0 has been presented. Fatsia japonica shadow on electric pole, Meiji Bridge RANGE, MILES FROM GROUND ZERO dc-p-1060 NONSEISMIC REINFORCED- CONCRETE BUILDINGS 4 6 8 K) 20 40 60 BLAST EFFECTS overpressure (p«i> Radii of MAE's in feet 8 700 5, 500 5, 700 7, 300 8,700 9,200 7,300 MAE's in square miles CO o O ^ CD O us IO o © CO CO CO 00 • • eg CO > D> - H CM TJ H ■H +> f3 CO W PQ CO CO u H •H U CD -P ■H u u H o ■H -p -H a -H (D O a "ft ® CD O ■H U H a u o CO a o u (U «— I u & a ■H -p M Q CD H °^ - o • a ft , o o 2 s s s s s s r o «» as ft* S s 3 : S □ < > o 1 1 I I I I I I l< ooooooooo lj l |uaoi90D|ds!a |D|pi 5 Z E i o E c := o c o a> 1 £ a a> O o co tr> ro — 0) s m (O - r-.if>ro— a>coMia» teeiitiii Million nutiMi. lim m ii MMIIIM MllltMK IM MM MM' •Mtllftl him. ilHIIWMNf imimiii* inn mmi itwnitti mm mm MM! MIM MM I MM I MMI MM i MB ■MM Iff M MIM IMM MMIMMI MM MMI MMI MMI IMM t IM I MIMMr IMM IMM MIM MMI WMMM* MJMMW HMtUUMirtlMUIIIMlMMMillM 4 20 18 £ 16 « h 1,0 10 20 40 THERMAL EXPOSURE (col/cm 2 ) 80 100 Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN-1058-1 Hellbrann^/. Hamburg / INTENSE / FIRESTORMS / I Darmstadt NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS ^ (HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI) Aamori • Barmen * Freiberg » . Hiroshima • Fukui \ . Solingen . Frtadrickshafen I Aachen . Ulm ' T&yama ;Chosi Fukuyama I > Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy Over 2.9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec. 1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) = energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water - 252 calories Severe firestorms require 600 BTU/sq. mile/second FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 AVERAGE Fl RE SEVERITY (Millions of 8TU per sq. mile per second) T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction, Proceedings of the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation; October, 1967. 100 REALISTIC CITY HUMIDITY (UNLIKE NEVADA DESERT) CVJ i X UJ u § -I a. X X - t o ac - a: o SATEEN, BLACf IKT I0KT IMT OMT 100 KT WEAPON YIELD "technical OBJECTIVE AW-7, critical radiant exposures for persistent IGNITION", JULY I960, J. BRACCIAVENTI & F DEBOLO AD-249476; DASA-1194 UCRL-TR-231593 Thermal radiation from nuclear detonations in lawrence ur b an environments LIVERM ORE NATIONAL LABORATORY Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded estimates, Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in burn injuries may be greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6]. We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a 'radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction Jun6 7, 2007 of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux. Thermal radiation shadowing in modern high-rise cities RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE Durham, North Carolina Final Report R-85-l CRASH CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM STUDY by AD0403071 \? : April 30, 1963 Prepared for OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - D-2 - Feasibility In the typical household, some materials vlLl generally be available for covering windows against thermal radiation* One half roll of aluminum foil would 2 cover about 25 ft and would provide very effective covering for 1 to 2 windows (those most likely to face the blast)* Sufficient quantities of either light colored paint, Bon Ami, or whiting would be available In most households to cover windows* Aluminum screens attenuate from 30 - 50% of the thermal radiation and hence screens should be closed or installed* 2 Hie amount of water per square foot required to dissipate 25 cal/cm of thermal radiation can quickly be calculated from the heat of vaporization of water (580 cal/gm)* Allowing 90% losses due to absorption or spillage, one 2 gallon of water Is sufficient to wet 10 ft of material so that It can withstand 2 25 cal/cm of direct thermal radiation (i*c* , the radiation Is normal to the material surface at all points)* Since the average dally water consumption per service (Reference 3) Is about 700 gallons, It Is apparent that the wetting of Interior flammables (piled up curtains , furniture, etc*) Is feasible In most cases when used In conjunction with the other measures* 3* Statistical Abstracts of the United States * Washington* U* S* Government Printing Office* 1962* Message from the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Scotland For over 30 years our country, with our allies, has sought to avoid war by deterring potential aggressors. Some disagree as to the means we should use. But whatever view we take, we should surely all recognise the need - and indeed the duty - to protect our civil population if an attack were to be made upon us ; and therefore to prepare accordingly. The Government is determined that United Kingdom civil defence shall go ahead. The function of civil defence is not to encourage war, or to put an accept- able face on it. It is to adapt ourselves to the reality that we at present must live with, and to prepare ourselves so that we could alleviate the suffering which war would cause if it came. Even the strongest supporter of unilateral disarma- ment can consistently give equal support to civil defence, since its purpose and effect are essentially humane. Why bother with civil defence? Why bother with wearing a seat belt in a car? Because a seat belt is reckoned to lessen the chance of serious injury in a crash. The same applies to civil defence in peacetime. War would be horrific. Everyone knows the kind of devastation and suffering it could cause. But while war is a possibility - however slight - it is right to take measures to help the victims of an attack, whether nuclear or 'conventional 5 . But isn't it a waste of money in these days of nuclear weapons and the dreadful prospects of destruction? No. It is money well spent if it shows people how they can safeguard themselves and their families. But surely there is no real protection against a nuclear attack? Millions of lives could be saved, by safeguards against radiation especially. But civil defence is not just protection against a nuclear attack. It is protection against any sort of attack. NATO experts reckon that any war involving the UK is likely at least to start with non-nuclear weapons. Indeed, while no war is likely so long as we maintain a credible deterrent, the likelihood of a nuclear war is less than that of a 'conventional' one. But doesn't civil defence get people more war-minded, thus increasing the risk of conflict? That is like saying people who wear seat belts are expect- ing to have more crashes than those who do not. Taking civil defence seriously means seeking to save lives in the catastrophe of an attack on our country. To Sum Up The case for civil defence stands regardless of whether a nuclear deterrent is necessary or not. Radioactive fallout is no respecter of neutrality. Even if the UK were not itself at war, we would be as powerless to prevent fallout from a nuclear explosion crossing the sea as was King Canute to stop the tide. This is why countries with a long tradition of neutrality (such as Switzerland and Sweden) are foremost in their civil defence precautions. Civil defence is common sense Further information: Nuclear Weapons ISBN on 34055 X HMSO £3.50 (net) Protect and Survive ISBNo 11 3407289 HMSO sop (net) Domestic Nuclear Shelters ISBN on 3407378 HMSO 5op (net) Domestic Nuclear Shelters - Technical Guidance ISBN 1 1 34073786 HMSO £5.50 (net) Proceedings of the Symposium held at Washington, D. C. April 19-23, 1965 by the Subcommittee on Protective Structures, Advisory Committee on Civil Defense, National Academy of Sciences- National Research Council Protective Structures for CIVILIAN POPULATIONS 1966 THE PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT RADIATION AFFORDED BY CORE SHELTERS IN A TYPICAL BRITISH HOUSE Daniel T. Jones Scientific Adviser, Home Office, London Protective Factors in a Sample of British Houses (Windows Blocked) Protective Factor < 26 36% 26-39 28% 40-100 29% > 100 7% 1. Six sandbags per tread, and a double layer on the small top landing. 96 sandbags were used. 2. As (1), together with a 4-ft-high wall of sand- bags along the external north wall. 160 sandbags were used. 3. As (2), together with 4-ft-high walls of sandbags along the kitchen/cupboard partition wall and along the passage partition. 220 sandbags were used. KITCHEN "A very much improved protection could be constructing a shelter core. This mesas a walled shelter built preferably inside the itself, in which to spend the first critical radiation from fallout would be most dangerous by thick- when the The full-scale experiments were carried out at the Civil Defense School at Falfield Park. < 2 ) In the staircase construction, the shelter con- sisted of the cupboard under the stairs, sandbags being placed on treads above and at the sides. A 93 curies cobalt- 60 source was used. gzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz £2 SITTMG ROOM Zzzaa 9 in. brick walls contribution Protective The windows and doors were not blocked r/hr/c/ft 2 Factor Position Ground Roof House only £2 15.0 8.4 21 Lean-to £2 10.4 2.4 39 Staircase cupboard: Stairs only sandbagged N2 29.2 5.3 14 Stairs and outer wall sandbagged N2 16.4 4.6 24 Stairs, outer wall, kitchen wall and corridor partition N2 6.8 1.8 47 sandbags 24 in. x 12 in. when empty; 16 in. x 9 in. x 4 in. when filled with 25 lb of sand. 1. Civil Defence Handbook Mo. 10, HMSO, 1963. 2. Perrymaa, A. D., Home Office Report CD/SA 117. Lean-to shelter 85 polythene sandbags partition wall between sitting and two doors, VC^^ dining rooms 6 ft 6 in. x \S^s 2 ft 8 in. Vt_S eoAV^S floor area 21 sq ft. BLAST AND OTHER THREATS Harold Brode The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California Chemical High-Explosive Weapons As in past aerial warfare, bombs and missiles carrying chemical explosives to targets are capable of extensive damage only when delivered in large numbers and with high accuracy. Biological Warfare Most biological agents are inexpensive to produce; their effective dissemination over hostile territories remains the chief deterrent to their effective employ- ment. Twenty square miles is about the area that can be effectively covered by a single aircraft; large area coverage presents a task for vast fleets of fairly vulnerable planes flying tight patterns at modest or low altitudes. While agents vary in virulence and in their biologic decay rate, most are quite perishable in normal open-air environments. Since shelter and simple prophylactic measures can be quite effective against biological agents, there is less likelihood of the use of biological warfare on a wholesale basis against a nation, and more chance of limited employment on population concentrations —perhaps by covert delivery, since shelters with adequate filtering could insure rather complete protection to those inside. Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons, like biological weapons, are relatively inexpensive to create, but face nearly insurmountable logistics problems on delivery. Although chemical agents produce casualties more rapidly, the greater amounts of material to deliver seriously limit the likelihood of their large-scale deployment. Furthermore, chemical research does not hold promise of the development of significantly more toxic chemicals for future use. Radiological Weapons The advantages of such modifications are much less real than apparent. In all weapons delivered by missiles, minimizing the payload and total weight is very important. If the total payload is not to be in- creased, then the inclusion of inert material to be activated by neutrons must lead to reductions in the explosive yield. If all the weight is devoted to nuclear explosives, then more fission-fragment activity can be created, and it is the net difference in activity that must be balanced against the loss of explosive yield. As it turns out, a fission explosion is a most efficient generator of activity, and greater total doses are not achieved by injecting special inert materials to be activated. Perret, W.R., Ground Motion Studies at High Incident Overpressure, The Sandia Corporation, Operation PLUMBBOB, WT-1405, for Defense Atomic Support Agency Field Command, June 1960. The Neutron Bomb The neutron bomb, so called because of the deliber- ate effort to maximize the effectiveness of the neu- trons, would necessarily be limited to rather small yields— yields at which the neutron absorption in air does not reduce the doses to a point at which blast and thermal effects are dominant. The use of small yields against large -area targets again runs into the delivery problems faced by chemical agents and ex- plosives, and larger yields in fewer packages pose a less stringent problem for delivery systems in most applications. In the unlikely event that an enemy desired to minimize blast and thermal damage and to create little local fallout but still kill the populace, it would be necessary to use large numbers of care- fully placed neutron-producing weapons burst high enough to avoid blast damage on the ground, but low enough to get the neutrons down. In this case, how- ever, adequate radiation shielding for the people would leave the city unscathed and demonstrate the attack to be futile. The thermal radiation from a surface burst is expected to be less than half of that from an air burst, both because the radiating fireball surface is truncated and because the hot interior is partially quenched by the megatons of injected crater mate- rial. SUPERSEISMIC GROUND -SHOCK MAXIMA (AT 5 -FT DEPTH) Vertical acceleration : ~340 AP S /C L ± 30 per cent. Here acceleration is measured in g ! s and over- pressure (AP S ) in pounds per square inch. An em- pirical refinement requires Cl to be defined as the seismic velocity (in feet per second) for rock, but as three fourths of the seismic velocity for soil. OUTRUNNING GROUND-SHOCK MAXIMA (AT-10-FT DEPTH) Vertical acceleration : a ym ~ 2 x 10 5 /C L r 2 + factor 4 or -factor 2. Acceleration is measured in g's, and r is the scaled radial distance— i.e., r = R/wl/3 kft/(mt)l/3. Data taken on a low air-burst shot in Nevada indicate an exponential decay of maximum displacement with depth. For the particular case of a burst of ~~ 40 kt at 700 ft, some measurements were made as deep as 200 ft below the surface of Frenchman Flat, a dry lake bed, which led to the following approximate decay law, according to Perret. 6 = 6 Q exp (-0.017D), where 6 represents the maximum vertical displace- ment induced at depth D, 6q is the maximum dis- placement at the surface, and D is the depth in feet. MODEL ANALYSIS Mr. Ivor LI. DAVIE S Suffield Experimental Station Canadian Defense Research Board Ralston, Alberta, Canada Nuclear- Weapon Tests In 1952 we fired our first nuclear device, effec- tively a "nominal" weapon, at Monte Bello, off north- west Australia. To the blast loading from this weapon we exposed a number of reinforced- concrete cubicle structures that had been designed for the dynamic loading conditions, and for which we made the best analysis of response we were competent to make at that time. Our estimates of effects were really a dismal failure. The structures were placed at pressure levels of 30, 10, and 6 psi, where we ex- pected them to be destroyed, heavily damaged with some petaling of the front face, and extensively cracked, respectively. In fact, the front face of the cubicle at 30 psi was broken inwards; failure had occurred along both diagonals, and the four tri- angular petals had been pushed in. At the 10-psi level, where we had three cubicles, each with a different wall thickness (6, 9, and 12 in.), we ob- served only light cracking in the front face of that cubicle with the least thick wall (6 in.). The other two structures were apparently undamaged, as was the single structure at the 6-psi level. In 1957, the first proposals were made for the construction of the underground car park in Hyde Park in London. The Home Office was inter- ested in this project since, in an emergency, the structure could be used as a shelter. Consequently a request was made to us at Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (A.W.R.E.) to design a structure that would be resistant to a blast loading of about 50 psi, and to test our design on the model scale. Using the various load- deformation curves obtained in this test, an estimate was made of the response of the structure to blast loading. Of par- ticular interest was the possible effect of 100 tons of TNT, the first 100-ton trial at Suffield in Alberta. 34 p.s.i. Dynamic tests, Monte Bello cubicles. A total of seven more models was made; six were shipped to Canada and placed with the top surface of the roof flush with the ground and at positions where peak pressures of 100, 80, 70, 60, 50, and 40 psi were expected. The seventh model was kept in England for static testing at about the time of firing. The results were not as expected. In the field, the four models farthest from the charge were apparantly undamaged; we could see no crack- ing with the eye, nor did soaking the models with water reveal more than a few hair cracks. The model nearest the charge was lightly cracked in the roof panels and beams, and one of the columns showed slight spalling at the head. This model had been exposed to a peak pressure of 110 psi. Davies, I. LI., Effects of Blast on Reinforced Concrete Slab3, and the Relationship with Static Loading Characteristics (U). United Kingdom, Operation BUFFALO - Target Rcsponcc Tests, AWRE Report T U6/57 ( CONFIDENTIAL report), August 1957. Wood, A, J., The Effect of Earth Covers on the Resistance of Trench Shelter Roofs (U). United Kingdom, Operation BUFF AID- Target Response Target Response Tests, AWRE Report T 47/57 (CONFIDENTIAL report), August 1957. O f Brien, T. P., Rowe, R. D. , and Hance, R. J., Tho Effect of Atomic Blast on Wall Panels (U). United Kingdom, IWE-36 ( CONFIDENTIAL report), April 1955- Walley, F. , Operation TDTEM Group 13 Report: Civil Defense Structures (U)I United Kingdom, JVE-111 ( CONFIDENTIAL report), May 1957. Davies, I. LI., and Thumpston, N. S., The Resistance of Civil Defense Shelters to Atomic Blast (U). United Kingdom, IVE 35 (UNCLASSIFIED report), March 1955. Davies, I. LI., The Resistance of Civil Defense Shelters to Atomic Blast: IV Final Report on Experiments vith Reinforced Models of Heavily Protective Citadel Shelter Type CD12 (U). United Kingdom, JVE-101 (CONFIDENTIAL report), May 1950. Davies, I. LI., Performance Test on Model Oarage - Shelter Roof System. SES 100 Ton TNT Trial-Suf field, Alberta, August 1961 (U). United Kingdom, AWRE Report No. E 2/63 (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY), March 1963. Worsfold, W, E. , Effects of Shielding a Building from Atomic Blast ( U) . United Kingdom, JWE-16U (CONFIDENTIAL report), Sugust 1958. Trimer, A., and Maskell, E. G. B., Operation BUFFALO Target Response Tests - Structures Group Report: The Effect on Field Defenses (U). United Kingdom, FWE-2^1 (CONFIDENTIAL report), December 1959* United Kingdom, The Effects of Atomic Weapons on Structures and Military Equipment (U). FWE-tt (SECRET report), July 195**. Foreword If the country were ever faced with an immediate threat of nuclear war, a copy of this booklet would be distri- buted to every household as part of a public information campaign which would include announcements on tele- vision and radio and in the press. The booklet has been designed for free and general distribution in that event. It is being placed on sale now for those who wish to know what they would be advised to do at such a time. May 1980 Protect and Survive ISBN o 1 1 3407289 If Britain is attacked by nuclear bombs or by missiles, we do not know what targets will be chosen or how severe the assault will be. If nuclear weapons are used on a large scale, those of us living in the country areas might be exposed to as great a risk as those in the towns. The radioactive dust, falling where the wind blows it, will bring the most widespread dangers of all. No part of the United Kingdom can be considered safe from both the direct effects of the weapons and the resultant fall-out. The dangers which you and your family will face in this situation can be reduced if you do as this booklet describes. If there is structural damage from the attack you may have some time before a fall-out warning to do minor jobs to keep out the weather - using curtains or sheets to cover broken windows or holes. If you are out of doors, take the nearest and best available cover as quickly as possible, wiping all the dust you can from your skin and clothing at the entrance to the building in which you shelter. HOME OFFICE CIVIL DEFENCE Manual of Basic Training VOLUME II BASIC METHODS OF PROTECTION AGAINST HIGH EXPLOSIVE MISSILES PAMPHLET No S LONDON-. HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONER Y OFFICE 1949 SIXPENCE NET Domestic Shelters (for household use) (a) anderson shelter. This shelter was designed for erection out- side the house. It consisted of 14 gauge corrugated steel sheets, steel angles, ties and channel irons. It was normally sunk about 3 ft. into the ground and covered over with earth to a minimum depth of 1 5 in., which, with the 14 gauge corrugated sheet gives the equivalent of 18 in. of earth. The standard shelter was 6 ft. 6 in. by 4 ft. 6 in. by 6 ft. high. It was designed to shelter six persons, but was capable of being lengthened to accommodate eight, ten or twelve persons; or of being shortened to accommodate four persons. Unless the entrance was screened (within 1 5 ft.) by a building or existing wall, a screen wall had to be provided. Trouble was sometimes exper- ienced due to flooding by subsoil water in which case the below ground portion was tanked by a lining of cement concrete. The shelter was, on occasions, erected on the surface, which involved casing it in cement concrete. The result was efficient but expensive. (b) morrison shelter. This shelter was designed for use in a house and its chief function was to protect the occupants from being crushed by the collapse of the building. Protection against blast and fragments was provided by the walls of the house, which were sometimes specially thickened for this purpose. It consisted of a steel table measuring 6 ft. 4 in. long by $ ft. toj in. wide. It provided sleeping accommodation for two adults and a child, or a considerable number of small children in a sitting position, when used as a school classroom shelter. (t) STRUTTED REFUGE ROOM — STRUTTED BASEMENT. The object of this form of shelter was the same as the Morrison shelter, i.e. to provide strutting to prevent the collapse of the room and to use the walls as pro- tection against blast and fragments. Strutting was either steel or wood and the design and strength suited to the weight to be supported. (d) SMALL TRENCH OR SMALL SURFACE SHELTER IN GARDEN. This type of shelter needs no special comment. *3 DNA EM-1 PART I DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY EFFECTS MANUAL NUMBER 1 CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1 JULY 1972 HEADQUARTERS Defense Nuclear Agency Washington, D.C. 20305 DNA EM-1 PART I CHANGE 2 1 AUGUST 1981 DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY EFFECTS MANUAL NUMBER 1 CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PART I PHENOMENOLOGY HEADQUARTERS Defense Nuclear Agency Washington, D.C. 20305 EDITOR PHIUP J. OOIAN SRI INTERNATIONAL FOREWORD This edition of the Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons represents the continuing efforts by the Defense Nuclear Agency to correlate and make available nuclear weapons effects information obtained from nuclear weapons testing, small-scale experiments, laboratory effort and theoretical analysis. This document presents the phenomena and effects of a nuclear detonation and relates weapons effects manifestations in terms of damage to targets of military interest. It provides the source material and references needed for the preparation of operational and employment manuals by the Military Services. The Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons is not intended to be used as an employment or design manual by itself, since more complete descriptions of pheno me no logical details should be obtained from the noted references. Every effort has been made to include the most current reliable data available on 31 December 1971 in order to assist the Armed Forces in meeting their particular requirements for operational and target analysis purposes* Comments concerning this manual axe invited awl should be addressed: Director Defense Nuclear Agency ATTN: STAP Washington, D, C. 20305 C. H, DUNN Lt General, USA Director •v Shielding is most effective when the ob- stacle is between the target and ground zero. I Obstacles that are considered in the as- seJSnrcnt of the effects of shielding from air blast are local obstacles, such as ravines, con- structed slots, or revetments (the effects of laige terrain features on blast waves are discussed in paragraphs 2-38 through 2-41 of Chapter 2). The importance of shielding is well documented. Comparisons of damage between shielded and unshielded vehicles exposed to blast from both nuclear and chemical explosions are available. The effectiveness of an obstacle in shielding a target generally results as much from its capa- bility to reduce the target movement as from its ability to modify the blast environment. Figure 14-8 illustrates this point. When the obstacle is between the blast wave and the target most of the impulse or translations! force that induces motion (drag loading) does not act on the target. When the obstacle is "behind'* the target, the translational force initially applied to the target is the same as it would have been without an obstacle, but the obstacle not only can modify later translations! forces (as a result of shock wave reflection), but it can restrict movement, the major cause of damage. The overpressure effects of crushing and fracturing still occur in both cases, and these effects provide lower limits for damage ground distances. Most damage resulting from low yield weapons is caused by overpressure impulse rather than translation, even for unshielded tar- gets, and, since overpressure impulse is not alter- ed drastically by shielding, the effects of shield- ing are relatively minor for such weapons. How- ever, most damage caused to non-shielded targets by higher yield weapons results from the translational effects of dynamic pressure. Since shielding can reduce translational effects sub- stantially, it can be quite effective as a protec- tion from large yield weapons. Damage to shielded targets results largely from overpressure effects, for which damage distances scale as the cube root of the yield (W 1/3 ), while damage to unshielded targets results largely from total im- pulse effects (including those of dynamic pres- sure), for which damage distances generally scale as W° A . The effects of shielding are illustrated in Figure 14-9, in which damage distances for shielded targets have been scaled as W l/3 , and those for unshielded targets by W° 4 . gl^ 14-5 Effects of Ground Surface Conditions ^ Ground surface conditions affect dam- age in two ways: by modification of the blast parameters; and by modification of target re- sponse. Trom lotionol Embankment (a) No translation because Translational Ferca is not opplisd (b) No or littla translation because restricts Figure 14-8. The Effect of Shielding 14-12 A parameter that is useful for calculating ther- mal response of materials is the characteristic thermal response time r , given by the equation r o = P c p L2 / k sec > where k is thermal conductivity (cal-sec* 1 cm'^C 1 ), pC p is heat capacity per unit volume (p = density in g-cm" 3 and C s specific heat at constant pressure in cal-g* 1 C l ), and L is the thickness, in centimeters, of the layer of material. The quantity a This equation is useful, but it is -by no means exact. The ified heat-flow analysis from which this equation is derived neglects the effects of radiation and convection heat losses from the surfaces of the exposed sample. It also assumes an isotropic medium, i.e.. a medium whose structure and properties in the neighborhood of any point are the same relative to all directions through the point. It also neglects the changes in thermal prop- erties that occur as the exposed material heats, volatifees, chars, and bursts into flame. The heat absorbed by the wood before it begins to scorch is equal to the product of the incident radiant energy. Q, and the absorption coeffi- cient, A. is called thermal diffusivity (cm 2 /sec). Use of this quantity simplies the previous equation to 9-16 Oi sec. For any particular material exposed to a rectangular pulse of length r, the previous equation can be transformed to give a character- istic thickness 6 = \/ckt cm. for which the characteristic time is equal to the pulse duration. If a thick slab of this material is exposed to a pulse of length r. the temperature rise at the surface is the same as would be pro- duced by uniformly distributing the absorbed thermal energy in a slab of thickness 6. and the peak temperature rise at depth 6 in the thick slab is about half as great as the peak tempera- tmejjse at the surface. For example, consider a block of red pine that is exposed to 1 5 cal/cm 2 from a rec- tangular pulse of 3 seconds duration. From Table 9-1. 6 = y/ocr = V(24 x 10 3 )(3) = 0.085 cm. 9-17 where AT is the peak lemperature rise at the surface The parameters that define the thermal pulse may be separated from those that define the material properties, and For a fixed rectangular pulse. Q!\'T\s a con- stant, and the equation may be written A7*. = (A* » ( V^) Sustained ignition only occurs when higher radiant exposures raise the tempera- ture throughout the thickness of the cellulose to a level that is sufficiently high to sustain the flow of combustible gases from breakdown of the fuel. It is difficult to supply sufficient energy with short pulses, since a large amount of the energy that is deposited is carried away by the rapid ablation of the thin surface layer. This transient flaming phenomenon is typical of the response of sound wooden boards to a thermal pulse. 9-19 Table 9-1. Thermal Properties of Materials' Materials Density, p (gm/cra 3 ) Specific Heat, C (cal/gm * % C) (cal/sec • cm • *C) Conductivity, k Diffusivity, ct (cm 2 /sec) insulating Materials Air OiA v irr* 3P.«tO A JU OA 0.55 x KT 4 V.£«; 7Ci 4.0 X AO HV* x 10"* 001M 04 1.2 X 10" 4 25 x 10" 4 -A IV flrtr^ /rnmtnnn r»st\ E>1 Hit \LUIilJJIUII IW/ 1 8 7 Io. X 10" 4 1 V 18 x 10* 4 A IV Celluloid I 4 X io- 4 10 x IO -4 fVittAn cat**n arppn VUHUll, gfCCIJ V, /V 35 1 c X IO" 4 2 5 x IO* 4 A J V Fir Dottolas- sorinc growth 0.29 0.4 2. X 10" 4 17. x IO" 4 summer growth 1.00 0.4 5. X io- 4 12. x IO" 4 Fir, white 0.45 0.4 X IO" 4 14. x 10" 4 Glass window 2 1 0.2 10 X IO" 4 43 x 10" 4 Granite 2.5 0.19 OO. v A ict 4 140. x 10* 4 Leather sole 1.0 0.36 3 R v A 10" 4 11. x 10" 4 Maho&anv 0.53 0.36 A 10" 4 16. x 10" 4 Ma nle l*Jtl L/l V 0.72 0.4 4.5 X io- 4 16. x 10" 4 Oak 0.82 0.4 5.0 X io- 4 15. x IO" 4 Pine* white 0.54 0.33 3.6 X io- 4 18. x 10"* Pinp rpd 51 04 5. X IO" 4 24 x IO" 4 IxUUUClf 114 J U 1 7 5 3.6 X to* 4 60 x 10" 4 4 4.1 X IO" 4 16 x IO* 4 Metals (100°C) Aluminum 2.7 0.22 0.49 1.0 Cadmium 8.65 0.057 0.20 0.45 Copper 8.92 0.094 0.92 1.1 Gold 19.3 0.031 0.75 1.2 Lead 11.34 0.031 0.081 0.23 Magnesium 1.74 0.25 0.38 0.87 Platinum 21.45 0.027 0.17 0.29 Silver 10.5 0.056 0.96 1.6 Steel, mild 7.8 0.11 0.107 1.2 Tin 6.55 0.056 0.14 0.38 Miscellaneous Materials Ice (0*C) Water Skin (porcine, dermis, dead) Skin (human, living, averaged for upper 0.1 cm) Polyethylene (black) 0.92 0.492 54. x IO" 4 120. x IO" 4 1.00 1.00 14. x IO" 4 14. x IO" 4 1.06 0.77 9. x IO" 4 11. x 10" 4 1.06 0.75 8. x io* 4 30. x 10" 4 0.92 0.55 8. x icr* 17. x tar 4 9-18 If the pulse is of long duration, the igni- tion threshold rises because the exposed material can dissipate an appreciable fraction of the energy while it is being received. For very long rectangular pulses an irradiance of about 0.5 cal * cm* 2 sec* 1 is required to ignite the cellulose. Heat supplied to the material at a slow rate is just sufficient to offset radiative and convective heat losses, while maintaining the cellulose at the ignition temperature of about 300°C. 9-19 Most thick, dense materials that ordinar- ily are considered inflammable do not ignite to persistent flaming ignition when exposed to transient thermal radiation pulses. Wood, in the form of siding or beams, may flame during the exposure but the flame is extinguished when the exposure ceases. ■ 9-25 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL MARINE CORPS FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL FM 101-31-1 FMFM 11-4 STAFF OFFICERS' FIELD MANUAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY FEBRUARY 1968 650 rad total dose contour at H+4 for 100-KT weapon dU Km 9 «n J 650 rad total dose contour at H+4 for 10-KT weapon Initial effects circles i 3^km 3 13 knot steady wind 1% km 650 rad total dose contour at H+4 for 1-KT weapon Scale 1:250,000 Figure 4-6. Comparison of initial effects and residual effects from 100-, 10-, and 1-kiloton surface bursts. EFFECT RISK LEVEL VULNERABILITY CATEGORY UNWARNED EXPOSED WARNED EXPOSED T H E R M A L Negligible 1° burn 2.5 pe kilotons s to t rcent 0.01 tare 0.1 skin 1 10 100 1000 1° burns 2.5 per W unde cent 1 r sui 10 nmer 100 uniform 1000 cal/cm 2 0.85 1.0 1.15 1.3 1.5 1.75 Q 3.6 4.5 6.3 8.8 Moderate 1° burns 5 perce kilotons to b nt 0.01 are s 0.1 kin 1 10 100 1000 1° burns 5 per W unde cent 1 r sui 10 nmer 100 uniform 1000 cal/cm 2 .95 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.75 2.0 Q 4 5.2 7.2 10 Emergency 2° burn 5 perc kilotons s to 1 ent 0.01 bare 0.1 skin 1 10 100 1000 2° burns 5 perc W unde ent 1 r sui 10 nmer 100 uniform 1000 cal/cm 2 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.9 4 Q 4.7 6.1 8.8 12.5 Figure 6-1. Troop safety criteria. FM 101-31-3 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL STAFF OFFICERS FIELD MANUAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FEBRUARY 1963 ATOMIC DEMOLITION MUNITIONS on the surface SEVERE DAMAGE RADII-METERS YirlA I tc LU _KT Materiel classification ALFA/ .5 BRA VO/ 1 DELTA/ 5 ECHO/ 10 GOLF/ 50 HOTEL/ 100 Tunnels and mines Heavy masonry or concrete dams and bridges 50 50 125 175 225 300 Tanks and artillery Locomotives Supply depots Engineer earthmoving equip Field fortifications 75 100 175 250 450 600 Engineer truck-mounted equip Earth-covered surface shelters Blast-resistant reinforced concrete bldgs 100 100 200 250 400 525 Military vehicles Railroad cars Communications equip Truss and floating bridges Monumental-type multistory wall -bearing bldgs Heavy steel frame industrial bldgs Multistory, reinforced concrete frame bldgs 150 200 375 500 950 1,250 Oil storage tanks Multistory, reinforced concrete bldgs (small window area) Multistory, steel frame office bldgs Light steel frame industrial bldgs 250 300 475 650 1,125 1,425 Multistory, wall-bearing bldgs (apt house type) Parked combat aircraft 375 450 800 1,000 1,700 2,125 Wood frame bldgs 375 650 1,050 1,325 2,275 2,875 | Figure 12. L FIRE FIGHTING FOR 1 *™ IOUSEHOLDERS Folded newspapers may not take lire, but loosely crumpled ones will. The* answer? Get rid of trash. A wet mop or broom will snuff out small fires. So will a burlap bag or a small rug soaked in water. Buckets of water and sand are essential. Water Is an effective fire fight- ing agent because it smothers and cools at the same time. A mended Reprint June, 1940 Crown Copyright Reserved Air Raid Precautions HANDBOOK No. 9 (15/ edition) INCENDIARY BOMBS AND FIRE PRECAUTIONS Issued by the Ministry of Home Security LONDON PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 3 sheet Plug. magnesium alloy Fig. i — Typical Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb. JSafefypin -Fuse, magnesium alloy Fig. 2— Typical Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb. Sectional Drawing. Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb 15 Seconds After Ignition. 45 Seconds Fire Controlled by Water Clothing on fire. Never allow a person whose clothes are on fire to remain standing for a moment. Fatalities nearly always arise from shock of burning about the face and head. If the person starts to run, trip him up at once. Roll him on the floor or in a coat or blanket if you have one handy. If your own clothes catch fire, clap your hand over your mouth, and lie down and roll. FIRE-BOMBS rained on London They did not all fall on roads THE LUFTWAFFE SOUGHT A KNOCK-OUT BLOW. The first impact of the attack fell on the docks. The great day raid of 7th September, 1940, which was continued through- out the night and renewed on many nights after, left miles of fires blazing along either bank of the Thames. This is St. Katherine's Dock on the night of nth September. Restricted For Official Use Civil Defence TRAINING PAMPHLET NO. 2 (3rd Edition) OBJECTS DROPPED FROM THE AIR Issued by the Ministry of Home Security Crown Copyright Reserved LONDON HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 1944 Copies will be sold only on written application by a Clerk to a local authority, a Chief Constable, a principal of a public utility company, or by County Secretaries of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, British Red Cross Society, and St. Andrew's Ambulance Association to H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at any of the following addresses: York House, Kings way, London, W.C.2; 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh; 39-41 King Street, Manchester 2; I St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; or 80 Chichester Street, Belfast. Price 6d. net INCENDIARY UNIT FUZE t BODYi T DELAYED ACTION EXPLOSIVE UNIT I diameter 20.7" long . _IN FLAMMABLE ALLOY CASE MAIN INCENDIARY PILLING ♦CAP (PRIMER) WHICH FIRES MAIN INCENDIARY FILLING. DETONATOR ^0 F a 6 dNO.A ft y FILLING AND TRA IN LEADING TO TIME fuze; WHICH FIRES ^DETONATOR WHICH IN TURN FIRES MAIN EXPLOSIVE :harge STEEL EXPLOSIVE .CONTAINER NOSE COVER Figure 12A —German Incendiary Bomb with Explosive Nose MASS BURNS Proceedings of a Workshop 13 - 14 March 1968 Accession Number : AD0689495 Sponsored by The Committee on Fire Research Division of Engineering National Research Council and the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army Published by National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C. 1969 Abridged S0ME principles of protection against burns FROM FLAME AND INCENDIARY AGENTS Janice A. Mendelson, M. D. , M. M. Sc., (LTC, MC, U. S. Army) Chief, Biomedical Department Biophysics Laboratory Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland Flame agents are special blends of petroleum products, usually in thickened form, that ignite easily and can be projected to a target. Methods for the throwing of flame were devised by the Greeks in 429 B.C. (Siege of Plataea) when destructive flammable mixtures of pitch and sul- fur were used. Ml (Napalm) . Ml thickener is a coprecipitated aluminum soap. The name was derived from the naph thenic and palm itic acids that were its major constituents. Napalm B , used by the Air Force, is intended as a replace- ment for the M2 thickener. It is not true napalm, being com- posed of polystyrene, gasoline, and benzene. It is not a gel, but is a sticky, visco-elastic liquid. It has a longer burning time than the Ml, M2, and M4 thickened fuels, and, therefore, possibly better incendiary action. Unlike the Ml, M2, and M4 thickeners, which can be quite easily brushed off the skin, the Napalm B is sticky and the polystyrene itself burns, its burning time being longer than that of the petroleum products. Therefore, this does have the required characteristics to produce more severe burns than unthickened fuel. Troops are instructed to remain covered with no skin exposed until after the flash and flame in the high heat zone have been dissipated and then throw off the cover and remove any burning particles from their clothing. Blankets or items such as an army field jacket have been shown to give real protection. Two thicknesses of the Army shelter half tent will hold burning fuel for more than 10 seconds. Tent canvas and truck tarpaulins which have been treated with fire-resistant material will withstand direct hits with burning fuel and will hold the burning particles for sufficient time (more than 30 seconds) to permit personnel to escape. Foxhole covers improvised of brush with as little as 2 inches of earth on top will successfully withstand burning fuel. The Army plastic poncho is not a satisfactory cover because it melts rapidly and burns when hit with flaming fuel. This would increase the severity of burns received by an individual. Foxholes and weapon positions can be modified to afford adequate protection for anything except a direct hit with a fire bomb. Metal incendiaries include those consisting of magnesium in various forms, and powdered or granular aluminum mixed with powdered iron oxide. Magnesium is a soft metal which, when raised to its ignition temperature (623° = 1,150°F), burns vig- orously in air. Magnesium has a burning temperature of about 1,982°C (3,600°F) depending upon the rate of heat dissipation, rate of burning, and other factors. Its melting point is 651°C, so it melts as it burns. The liquid metal, burning as it flows, drops to lower levels, igniting combustible materials in its path. Burning stops if oxygen is prevented from reaching the metal or if the metal is cooled below the ignition temperature. Magnesium does not have the highest heat of combustion of the metals, but none of the other metals have been successfully used singly as air-combustible incendiaries. In massive form, magnesium is difficult to ignite. Therefore, a hollow core in the bomb is packed with thermate and an easily ignited mix- ture which supplies its own oxygen and burns at a very high temperature.* a. Thermite incendiaries . 1 Thermite is essentially a mixture of about 73 per cent powdered ferric oxide (Fe2<)3) and 27 per cent powdered or granular aluminum. The aluminum has a higher affinity for oxygen than iron has, and if a mixture of iron oxide and aluminum powder is raised to the combustion temperature of aluminum, an intense reaction occurs: Fe203+2AL-* AL203+Fe + heat. Under favorable conditions, the thermite reaction pro- duces temperatures of about 2,200°C (3,922°F). This is high enough to turn the newly formed metallic iron into a white hot liquid which acts as a heat reservoir to prolong and to spread the heat or igniting action. Defense against incendiaries, as outlined in a U.S. Army publication is summarized as follows: Incendiary bomb clusters may contain a per- centage of high explosive incendiary bombs so precautions should include this possibility. A brick wall offers adequate protection against small explosive incendiary bombs. Incendiary bombs can be scooped up with shovels and thrown into a place where no damage will be done. Sandbags and sandmats can smother bombs and reduce effects of fragmentation. Loose sand helps to smother fires started by the bomb. Prompt defensive and corrective action makes a very great difference in the severity of injuries resulting from any of these agents. 1. , "Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents." Dept. of the Army Tech. Man ., TM 3-215, Dept. of the Air Force Manual 355-7, Depts. of The Army and Air Force, 1963. Abridged THE BURN SURFACE AS A PARASITE WATER LOSS, CALORIC DEMANDS , AND THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS Carl Jelenko, III, M.D. Department of Surgery University of Maryland School of Medicine and Hospital Baltimore, Maryland Water is Lost through Burned Skin If, during the first 48 hours after injury, no more fluid is given to an extensively burned patient than he would need in health, the un- compensated loss of fluid from his circulation may cause shock, and if sufficiently severe, death. Heat is Lost Necessitating a High Food Intake To make matters worse, evaporation of moisture from the wound surface saps not only the body's water stores but its energy stores as well. When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re- sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more water loss and the more heat or energy loss. How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished? Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for Thermal Burns ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462 August 2008 By Patrice Wendling Elsevier Global Medical News CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit. The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician, explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association. Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing removal. 47 kt Greenhouse Easy, Eniwetok Atoll, 1951. Brick house, 3 psi peak overpressure 0.6 second Impact + 1.0 second Afterward THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY The Effects of The Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Volume I Physical Damage Division May 1947 G. CAUSE AND EXTENT OF FIRE 1 . Conditions Prior to Attack The city of Hiroshima was an excellent target for the atomic bomb from a fire standpoint : There had been no rain for three weeks; the city was highly combustible/consisting principally of .Japa- nese dome* tic- type structures; it was r instructed over flat terrain; and 13 square miles (including streets) of the 20.5-square-milc city was more than 6 percent built up (i. e., covered by plan ■rata of buildings). The remainder of the city comprised water areas, parks and areas built up below 5 percent. Sixty-eight percent of the 13- ■quare-mile area was 27 to 42 percent built up and the 4-equare-mile city center was particularly dense, 93.6 percent of it being 27 to 42 |M»rcent built up. a. Fire Department. Public fire equipment had been little improved in anticipation of wartime fires. Private fire equipment had been aug- mented somewhat but instruction to home occu- pant* in its use had been limited to training in combating incendiary bombs. 13 a. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible structures and materials by heat directly radiated by the atomic bomb and by other ignition sources developed the following: (1) The primary fire haz- ard was present in combustible materials and in fire-resistive buildings with unshielded wall open- ings; (2) six persons who had been in re in forced - concrete buildings within 3/200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton black-out curtains were ignited by radiant heat; (3) a few persons stated that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs, thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were afire immedi- ately after the explosion; (4) dark clothing was scorched, and, in some cases, reported to have burst into flame from flash heat; (5) but a large proportion of over 1 ,000 persons questioned was in agreement that a great majority of the original fires was started by debris falling on kitchen char- coal fires, by industrial process fires, or by electric short circuits. A. Hundreds of fires were reported to have started in the center of the city within ten minutes after the explosion. Of the total number of buildings investigated 107 caught fire, and, in 60 instances, the probable cause of initial ignition of the buildings or their contents was established as follows: (1) 8 by direct radiated heat from the bomb (primary fire), (2) 8 by secondary sources and (3) 53 by fire spread from exposing buildings. 14 e. Damage to Rolling Stock. Of the 123 trolley care operated by the company, 20 percent were damaged by fire and 45 percent by blast. Of the 86 motor busses, fire damaged 21 percent and blast 26 percent. Radiant heat from the bomb ignited cars and busses within 1.500 feet of GZ. Total damage to cars extended a maximum of 5.700 feet from GZ, heavy damage to 8,400 feet and alight damage to 12,500 feet. Busses wen* totally damaged at 4,000 feet and heavily damaged 5,500 feet from GZ. d. Damage to Overhead Sy*tem. Blast and fire damaged 11.4 miles of the overhead transmission system including damage to 500 wood and 100 steel poles. So damage occurred to concrete poles, the nearest of which were 6,000 feet from GZ. Wood poles were damaged at a maximum distance of 4,500 feet from GZ, and steel poles at 3,500 feet. Overhead transmission cable was downed by blast at 8,000 feet. 21 3. Conditions on Morning of Attack a. The morning of 6 August 1945 was clear with a small amount of clouds at high altitude. Wind was from the south with a velocity of about 4\i miles per hour. Visibility was 10 to 15 miles. 6. An air-raid "alert" was sounded throughout Hiroshima Prefecture at 0709 hours. Reports of the number of planes causing this alert were con- flicting. The governor of the prefecture stated that four B-29s were sighted, while the Kure Naval District reported three large planes. c. The aircraft apparently came out over Hiroshima from the direction of Bungo Suido and Kunisaki Peninsula, circled the city, and withdrew in the direction of Harima-Nada at 0725 hours. "All-clear" was sounded at 0731 hours. d. The following circumstances account in part for the high number of casualties resulting from the atomic bomb: (1) Only a few persons remained in the air-raid shelters after the "all-clear" sounded. (2) No "alert" was sounded to announce the approach of the planes involved in the atomic- bomb attack. (3) The explosion occurred during the morning rush hours when people had just arrived at work or were hurrying to their places of business. This concentrated the population in the center of the city where the principal business district was located. (4) Many persons residing outside the city were present for reasons of business, travel and pleasure. (5) National volunteer and school units were mobilized and engaged in evacuation operations. 84 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY The Effects of The Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Volume II Physical Damage Division Dates of Survey: 14 October- 26 November 1945 Date of Publication May 1947 4. The city, consisting principally of Japanese do- mestic structures, was highly combustible and densely built up. Sixty-eight percent of the 13- square-mile city area was 27 to 42 percent built up and the 4-square-mile city center was particularly dense, 94 percent of it being 27 to 42 percent built up. All the large industrial plants were located on the south and southeast edges of the city. 8. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible structures and materials by directly radiated heat from the atomic bomb and other ignition sources was obtained by interrogation and visual inspec- tion of the entire city. Six persons who had been in reinf orced-concre te buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton black-out curtains were ignited by flash heat. A few persons stated that thin rice paper, cedar bark roofs, thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were afire immediately after the explosion. Dark clothing was scorched and, in some cases, was reported to have burst into flame from flash heat. A large proportion of over 1,000 persons ques- tioned was, however, in agreement that a great majority of the original fires were started by debris falling on kitchen charcoal fires. Other sources of secondary fire were industrial-process fires and electric short circuits. 9. There had been practically no rain in the city for about 3 weeks. The velocity of the wind on the morning of the atomic-bomb attack was not more than 5 miles per hour. 10. Hundreds of fires were reported to have started in the center of the city within 10 minutes after the explosion. 4 D. THE CONFLAGRATION 1. Start of Fit* b. Direct Ignition by the Atomic Bomb. (1) Six persons wore found who bad been in reinforced* concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of AZ at the time of the explosion and who stated that black cotton black-out curtains were blazing a few sec- onds later. In two cases it was stated that thin rice paper on desks close to open windows facing AZ also burst into flame immediately, although heavier paper did not ignite. No incidents were recounted to the effect that furniture or similar objects within buildings were ignited directly by radiated heat from the bomb. 21 (8) Scores of persons throughout all sections of the city were questioned concerning the ignition of clothing by the flash from the bomb. Replies were consistent that white silk seldom was af- fected, although black, and some other colored silk, charred and disintegrated. Numerous in- stances were reported in which designs in black or other dark colors on a white silk kimono were charred so that they fell out, but the white part was not affected. These statements were con- firmed by United States medical officers who had been able to examine a number of kimonos avail- able in a hospital. Ten school boys were located during the study who had been in school yards about 6,200 feet east and 7,000 feet west, re- spectively, from AZ. These boys had flash burns on the portions of their faces which had been directly exposed to rays of the bomb. The boys 1 stories were consistent to the effect that their clothing, apparently of cotton materials, "smoked," but did not burst into flame. Photo 36 shows a boy's coat that started to smolder from heat rays at 3,800 feet from AZ. 24 PHOTO 36: jacket outdoors near City Hall (building 28) , 3800 ft from AZ PlltlTl) 3ft IX. JHmmw partly Inarm*! cv*t ** Iwjr »hn in / / / / / Ind Bu ustriol IdingV ■® Dome " Buildii stic »gs / / / / / -i / / 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Probability of Fire Spreod- Percent 90 100 US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY FIRE SPREAD VS. BWLT-UPNESS HIROSHIMA, JAPAN FIGURE 4 -IT 42 ISO 120 110 100 00 i " i - m • — Q 60 SO 40 30 CO 10 PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD ACROSS VARIOUS EXPOSURE DISTANCES \ \ 1 1 \ \ \ \ — \ — \ \ -A V v j ** Probotiity of Fire Sprodd- Percent U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY FIRE SPREAD VS. EXPOSURE DISTANCES HM09HMA, JAPAN FIGURE 5 -JX Table 5. — Fire-resistive building data (fire) Building Ma. Coordinates Distance from AZ (feet) Distance from OZ (feet) 1 4H 2,100 700 2 4H 2, 100 800 6 5H 2. 100 600 7 5H 2,100 600 8 5H 2,100 600 9 5H 2,100 600 10 5H 2,100 600 11 511 2,100 700 12 5H 2,100 700 18 5H 2,200 1,000 10 5H 2,200 1,000 20 5H 2,200 1,000 21 5H 2,300 1,300 22 5H 2,300 1,100 23 5H 2,300 1,200 24 5H 2,400 1,300 25 5H 2.400 1,400 26 5H 3,000 2,300 27 6H 3,100 2,400 28 6H 3,800 3,300 31 6H 5,300 4,900 32A 6H 5, 100 4,700 32B 6H 5,200 4,800 32D 6H 5,000 4,600 32E 6H 4,700 4,200 32F 6H 5,000 4,600 320 6H 5,200 4,800 32H 6U 5,300 4,900 33 6H 5,600 5,300 38 5H 2,900 2,100 39 51 3,200 2.500 40 5H 3,200 2,500 41 5H 2.600 1,700 43 5H 2,800 2,000 44 5H 2,700 1,800 45 5H 2,700 1,800 47 5H 3, 100 2,300 48 5H 3.300 2,600 49 61 3,600 3,000 50 51 3,600 3.000 51 51 3,700 3,200 59 51 4,500 4, 100 61 51 4,000 3,400 1 62 51 4,100 3,600 64 %l 5,300 4,900 65 31 5,300 4,900 67 3H 5,000 4,600 74 3H 6,300 6,000 76 3G 6,200 5,900 79 30 6,100 5,800 85 4G 3,800 3,300 86 50 2,800 2,000 03 SO 2,500 1,500 05 4Q 2,300 1,200 06 50 2,000 400 100 6G 2,100 800 101 50 2,600 1,700 1130 71 7,700 7,400 122 5J 6,700 6,400 120 3G 6,000 5,600 132 6Q 5,700 5,400 133 5J 6,200 5,900 134 4J 6.300 6.000 135 5J 6,800 6,500 Occupancy Office.... do do... Bank-.- do Office do do ... .do Bank do _ Office Bank Office.. do Bank Art museum. Office Library Office Hospital Classrooms Library Classrooms laboratories Classrooms. Laboratory Kitchen Laboratory Office ...do ...do Department store Classrooms Telephone exchange. . . . Department store Bank Beer hall Hospital _ Office _ Newspaper plant Bank Office Radio station Residence Hospital. Office Electrical laboratory. do Telephone exchange Classrooms Warehouse Classrooms Clothing store Office Warehouse Cigarette i Bank do Warehouse. Mercantile. Office Bank Fire shutters on wall open- ings No No Yes.... Yes.... Yes... Yes ... Yes... No No Part... Yes.... Part.... Yes.... Part.... No Yes Part.... Part.... Part.... No No No Yes No No No No No Part.... No Part.-- No No Part ... Yes Yes No No Part No ..... Part Part No No... No... No... Yes.. No... Yes... Yes- Yes. . No.... Yes... No.... No.... No.... Yes.- No.... Yes... No... Yes... No... Yes... Yes... Unprotected wall openings exposed to AZ at zero Yes Yes Probably no . Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes.... Probably no. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes... Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes. Yes... Yea Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes.. Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Probably no.. Probably no. . No Yes Yes Yes Probably no.. Yes Probably no... Yes No Yes Yes Yes o 20 10 6 10 10 10 30 10 10 20 10 15 10 10 25 10 10 25 50 75 25 5 30 30 12 6 90 20 10 50 20 35 5 20 6 90 40 30 15 30 30 125 30 6 125 125 30 10 5 60 5 12 60 100 Probable cause of initial ignition Fire spread.. ....do -...do — .do _ --do Fire spread. Primary Primary. Fire spread Primary . Fire spread... No fire Fire spread ... ....do. Secondary Fire spread.. . ....do. do ..-do —do —do.. Primary — .do Secondary. Fire spread (Primary Fire spread. Primary Fire spread. Fire spread No lire Fire spread. --do —do Secondary-. No fire Fire spread Fire spread.. No fire.. Fire spread .... No lire Fire spread... —do .—do. No fire.. B-2 B-3 B-3 2 3 B-3 2 3 B-3 B-5 B-4 3 2 4 B-7 B-3 2 B-5 4 B-4 B-3 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 B-4 B-3 4 B-7 B-3 3 3 3 B-3 2 7 3 B-3 B-3 2 2 B-2 4 1 B-2 1 2 3 3 2 B-3 B-3 2 2 1 2 B-2 B-i 4 3 B-2 Stories burned (after blast damage) 1-2 60% B, 100% 1-3. ... 70% B, 100% 1-3. ... 1-2 1-3 1-3 1-2 1-3 B-3 B-5 75% 1-2, 100% 3-4.. 1-3 1-2 1-4 1-7.... 5% 2, 100% 3 1-2 40% B, 100% 1-5— 1-4 80% B-l, 100% 2-4.. None 1-2 _ 1-2 1-3 1-3 1 None 1-2 None B-3 1-4 B-7 75% B, 100% 1-3 ...... 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-2 1-7 1-3..... _. 15% B, 100% 1-3 .... None.. - 1-2 1-2 Second only 50% 1-3, 90% 4 None... 70% B-l, 100% 2 1 1-2 25% second only None 1-2 B-3 1-3 1-2 1-2 None None.. None B-l J 1-4 80% 1, 100% 2-3 None Areas in thousands square feet " JO a burned loor area g s 1 S c & jj 4.2 3.5 83 27.3 24.3 89 16.6 15.3 92 5.7 5.7 100 9.0 9.0 100 4.9 4.2 86 2.5 2.5 100 9.8 9.8 100 15.8 16.8 100 46.4 46.4 100 29.9 25.2 84 4.5 4.5 100 7.3 7.3 100 20.4 20.4 100 43.3 39.0 90 32.8 5.2 16 5.4 5.4 100 52.0 46.5 88 13.4 13.4 100 93.4 84.9 91 88.6 2.8 2.8 100 3.7 3.7 100 103.3 103.3 100 39.5 39.5 100 2.0 2.0 100 3.0 3.0 3.8 3.8 100 62.6 10.4 10.4 100 32.0 32.0 100 78.9 78.9 100 26.4 25.1 96 36.1 36. 1 100 4.3 4.3 100 8.0 8.0 100 15.3 13.2 86 9 o 2.9 100 14. 7 14. 7 100 9.1 K 24. 5 100 Oft 7 19. 2 72 1A 9 ID. 1 o. 5 8.3 100 2.2 2.2 100 15.9 5.3 33 83.4 50.0 60 1.7 13.2 10.6 80 15.9 15.9 100 14.4 14.4 100 14.2 LI 8 11.5 2.9 2.9 100 49.5 49.5 100 12.4 9.3 75 3.0 3.0 100 4.3 4.3 100 D». 5.1 16.2 15.0 15.0 100 3.0 3.0 100 4.8 4.5 94 9.0 SOURCE: USSBS's Secret report, 'The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan," vol. 2 Only 8 of 64 non-wood buildings had thermal flash ignition evidence, 3 had blast damage induced fire, and 28 were ignited by firespread from wood homes. (4) It was reported that a cotton black-out curtain at an unprotected window in the east stair tower of Building 85 (3,800 feet from AZ) smoked and was scorched by radiated beat from the bomb but it did not burst into flames. All windows other than those in the stair tower were pro- tected by closed steel-roller shutters. There was fire damage in a few telephone relay units in the second story but this was caused by electrical short circuits when debris from windows was blown into the equipment by blast. (5) A man who was in the third story of building 26 (3,000 feet from AZ) stated that radiated heat from the bomb ignited cotton black-out curtains at unprotected windows in the west wall and thin rice paper on desks. According to his recollec- tion, all stories were afire five minutes after the attack. On the other hand, two men who were working in Building 28 (3,800 feet from AZ) stated that there was no primary fire in this building, the windows of which were not equipped with fire shutters. Black-out curtains at all windows were drawn back and no fires started in them. Accord- ing to the same men, fire spread into the building by flying brands from the south nearly two hours after the attack. 47 (10) Fire fighting with water buckets was re- ported inside only four buildings (24, 33, 59, and 122) and probably prevented extensive fire damage in them. In Building 24, fire was started in contents of a room at the southwest corner of the second story by sparks from trees on the south side about 1 li hours after the attack. Men inside the building extinguished the fire and probably prevented further damage in the first and second stories (Photo 85). A little later, contents in the thin! story were ignited by sparks from the outside and were totally damaged. This fire was beyond control before it was discovered, but did not spread downward through open stairs. At Build- ing 33, sparks from the west exposure, which burned in early evening, set fire to black-out curtains in the west wall and to waste paper in the fourth story of the northwest section of the building. Twenty persons were on guard in the building awaiting such an occurrence and the fires were quickly extinguished while in the incipient stage. At Building 59 sparks from the south exposure ignited a few pieces of furniture in the first and third stories and black-out curtains in the first story about 2 hours after the attack. These fires were extinguished by men inside and negligible damage resulted. A few window frames in the east and west walls and 2 or 3 desks in the first story of Building 122 were ignited by radiated heat and sparks from the west and northeast exposures. These fires were extinguished quickly and damage was negligible. 58 A. SUMMARY 4. The mean areas of effectiveness (MAE) of the atomic bomb for structural damage about ground zero (GZ) and the radii of the MAE's for the several classes of buildings present were computed to be as follows: MAE's Radii ot in square MAE's miles in feet Multistory, earthquake-resistant 0.03 500 Multistory, steel- and reinforced- concrete frame (including both earthquake- and non-earthquake- resistant construction) . 05 700 1-story, light, steel-frame 3. 4 5, 500 Multistory, load-bearing, bnck-wall _ _ 3. 6 5, 700 1-story, load-bearing, brick-wall 6. 7,300 Wood-frame industrial-commercial (dimension-timber construction) a 5 8,700 Wood-frame domestic buildings 9. 5 9,200 Residential construction 6.0 7,300 96 STRUCTURAL DAMAGE BY BLAST TO MULTI-STORY, STEEL- AND REINFORCED- CONCRETE " FRAME BUILDINGS (BASED ON TOTAL FLOOR AREA) MAC FOR ALL STEEL'S REINFrCONCr FRAME BLD6S -0.05 80 Ml MAC FOR EARTHQUAKE-RESISTANT BL0G8 ONLY »0 .03 80 Ml Table 1. — Building data, 9teel- and reinf orccd-concrete-f rame [Areas in thousands of square feat] i 5H 51 5H 6H 5H 5H 5H 51 51 51 61 51 61 31 31 3H 3Q 40 50 40 50 7J 7J 7J 7J 5J 6H 6H 5H 5H 5H 50 5G 5G 4J 3H 30 71 1 4H Office 2 4H do • 6H do 8 5H Bank 1 6H Office 11 6H do 18 5H Bank 19 5H - — * - - — - m mm mm m m ^mmmmmmm* 20 6H Office 21 5H Bank 22 5H Office 23 5H do 24 5H Bank 26 6H Office 27 5H 28 6H Office.... 81 AH Hospital 32A 6H 32B m Library 82D 6H Classroom laboratory 32E AH 33 6H Office — do ..-do Department store... Classrooms Telephone exchange Department store.... Beer hall Newspaper. Office Radio station Residence Hospital... Office Electrical laboratory . Warehouse Telephone t Clothing store Type m § s E 9 E S 00 > i « 2 CQ > i s « I < 8 J a El 1.7 2 V-l R 2.100 El 8.3 2/3 V-l R 2,200 El 5.1 3 V-l R 2, 100 El 5.3 1/3 V-l R 1100 El 2.1 2/3 V-l R 1100 El 4.6 3 V-l R 1100 El 10.1 5/2 V-I R 1200 El 8.8 4 V-l R 1200 El 1.5 3 V-l R 1200 El 5.5 1/2 V-l R 1300 El 4.7 4 V-l R 1300 El 5.4 7 V-l R 2,300 El 10.6 3 V-l R 1400 El 9.2 5 V-l R 3,000 El 5.3 2/4 V-l R 3, 100 El 21.3 4 V-l R 3,800 El 27.5 3/4 V-l R 5.300 El L4 2 V-l R 5, 100 El 1.9 2 V-l R 5.200 El 34.4 3 V-l R 5,000 El 13.2 3 V-l R 4,700 El 11.2 4 V-l R 5,600 El 2.6 3 V-l R 1900 El 15.6 3/4 V-l N/R 3,200 El 9.9 7 V-l R 3,200 El 7.2 3 V-l R 1600 El 16.3 1/3 V-l R 1800 El 2.6 1/3 V-l R 1700 El 4.8 3 V-l R 3.100 El 11 7 V-l R 3,000 El 10.3 2/3 V-l R 3,000 El 9.9 1/3 V-l R 3,700 El 4.8 2/3 V-l R 4,500 El 4.2 2 V-l R 4,000 El 1.1 2 V-l R 4, 100 El 6.8 2 V-l R 5.300 El 20.8 4 V-l R 5.300 El 6.6 2 V-l R 6,300 El 7.7 2 V-l R 6,100 El 4.8 3 V-l R 3.800 El 3.8 3 V-l R 1800 El 12.4 ? V-l R 1300 El 4.1 S V-l R 1000 El 23.7 3 V-l R 8,800 El 23.7 3 V-l R 8.900 El 23.7 3 V-l R 9.000 El 23.7 3 V-l R 9,200 El 2.6 2 V-l R 6.700 E2 4.5 3 v-a R 1100 E2 1.6 3 V-3 N 3.100 E2 3.3 2 V-3 R 1400 E2 .9 2 V-3 N/C 1800 E2 1.6 2 \-3 R 3.300 E2 1.6 2 V-3 R 1500 E2 1.5 2 V-3 R 1 100 E2 2.2 2 V-3 R 1000 El 9.0 1/2 V-3 N/C 6,600 A14 1.7 1 V-l R 5,000 A % 4 15.9 1 V-4 R 6,200 A1.2 54.6 1 V-l R 7,700 A1.2 54.9 1 V-l R 7,800 AX 4 21.1 1 V-l R 8,900 A1.2 11.6 1 V-4 R 9.000 3 o 4.2 27.3 16.6 9.0 4.9 9.8 45.0 29.9 4.6 7.3 20.4 43.3 32.8 510 13.4 93.4 88.6 18 3,7 103.3 39.5 616 10.4 310 78.9 26.4 36.1 4.3 15.3 14.7 21.5 26.7 16.2 &3 2.2 15.9 83.4 13.2 14.4 14.2 110 49.5 114 71.1 71.1 71.1 71 1 5.1 15.8 4.1 5.4 1.9 19 19 3.0 4.3 14.0 1.7 15.9 516 54.9 21.1 11.6 Building damage— floor area I A 6u Mixed Blast Fire 1.8 1. 1 j 5. 3 1. 1 1 1.9 2, 7 5. 7 1. 6 4.6 11 .2 0. 8 4.4 1.7 A A W. V 13 0. 6 3.9 3.0 10.8 0.7 4.1 2.1 3 1.9 1 a 1 4.3 4.9 1.7 19 4.9 Superficial Content < Internal lire Peroent Cause 3 5 90 Fire. 24.3 90 Do. 15.3 95 Do. 9.0 100 Do. 4.2 90 Do. 9.8 100 Do. 46.4 100 Do. 25.2 90 Do. 4.5 100 Do. 7.3 100 Mixed. 204 100 Fire. 39.0 90 Do. 5.2 30 Mixed. 46.6 90 Fire. 13.4 100 Do. 84.9 96 Do. 25 Debris. 18 100 Fire. 3.7 100 Do. 103.3 100 Do. 39.5 100 Do. 15 Blast -de- bris. 10.4 100 Fire. 310 100 Do. 78.9 100 Do. 25.1 96 Do. 36. 1 100 Do. 4.3 100 Do. 13.2 80 Do. 14.7 100 Do. 24.5 100 Do. 19.2 80 Do. 10 Blast 8.3 100 Fire. 12 100 Do. 5.3 40 Mixed. 50.0 70 Do. 10.6 80 Fire. 14.4 100 Do. 1.1 50 Mixed. 30 Debris. 49.5 100 Fire. 9.3 75 Do. A V A V 15.8 100 Mixed. 16 60 Do. 5,4 100 Fire. 1.9 100 Mixed. 19 100 Fire. 19 100 Mixed. 3.0 100 Fire. 4.3 100 Debris. 14.0 100 Fire. 10 Exposure. 15.9 100 Fire. 103 EDGE OF FIRE AREA GROUND ZERO EDGE OF FIRE AREA 17 k_ 22 7 1 inn j 1 1 V ^^^otffiat ^ MM Ml N/SM/ FIELD \ it X Divisions , CominanderY j?«*> /A^SM -Quarters A Oirit^j*- - M ilitary;. ^~,0fM Police// HONK AW A ■BAB*! umiyobmT U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team No, 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALY8I3 Sheet No* 1 Building No.: 24. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 1,300, (AZ): 2,400. NAME: Bank of Japan, Hiroshima branch. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforoed-cooerete frame (steel core). Number of Stories: 8 and basement. JTG class; El. Roof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood lath. Walls: Reinforced concrete (13-inob) and stone (6-inch). Floors: Reinforced concrete. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal (exterior) wood (in- terior). Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Much stronger — steel core construction. OCCUPANCY: Bank. CONTENTS: Bank and office equipment furnishings. DAMAGE to building: Only minor damage— top story burned out, partitions, sash, trim blown out in two lower stories. Cause* Fife. To Contents: Destroyed in third story— moderate debris and blast damage in first and second stories, none in basement. Cause: Fire and debris (about equally). TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet) : 32,800. Structural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — . Superficial: — . Contents: 30 percent. REMARKS: Glass removed from skylight (20 by 20 feet) and light steel-frame structure and roof covered with 12 to 18 inches of sand and cinders. Note.— Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 24. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers. 8hut: Part Effect of blast: Blown in. FLOOR OPENING8: Enclorcd Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast Stairs: Part Steel rollers No None— doors open. Elevators: Yes Metal and W. O. No Bent. EXP08URE: Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remarks N 25' No C Yes M-foot concrete wall be- tween. E 25* No K Yes Building 25 (14-foot wall between). S — No — — No eiposure. W I2V Yes C Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex- posures. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 32,800 square feet. Floor area burned: 5 f 200 square fee*; 16 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Fire only in room at southwest corner of second story and in entire third story. No fire in building right after bomb, but afire at 1000 hours. Fire in room in second story extinguished with water buckets. 217 U. 8. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS 8mr No. 1 Building No.: 69. Coordinates: 51. Distance from (GZ): 4400, (AZ): 4,500. NAME: Gelbl Bank Co., Hiroshima Branch (in use at time of bomb ss the Higsshi Police Stat ion) . CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Number of stories: See sketch. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: 7-ineh reinforced concrete. Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete monolithic— medium window. Floors: Reinforoed-conerete beam and slab— parquet and tile. Framing: Reinforoed-conerete beam and slab. Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Sheet metal on wood framing. Condition, workmanship and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Appreci- ably stronger than United States design. OCCUPANCY: Police station (office). CONTENTS: Office equipment. DAMAGE to building: Minor damage only— sash blown out and hung ceilings partially stripped. To contents: Blight dsmage to contents from blast and debris. Cause: Blast. TOTAL FLOOR AREA 'square feet): 16,200* Structural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building. Structural: Superficial: Contents: 10 percent. REMARKS: Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 59. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in east wall and third story of south and west walls (wired glass in all windows). Effect of blast: Blown in at west wall, bent at south wall. FLOOR OPENINGS: Auto Enclosed Fire doors matte Effect or blast Stain: Yes Metal No Kent slightly. Elevators: EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Kemnrks All exjxwures hurried. PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex- posures. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total Hour area: 10,200 square feet. Floor area burned: square feet ; |x»rr<»nt (after blast damage). REMARKS: Sparks from south exj>osure ignited few- pieces of furniture in first atid third stone* and cotton blackout curtains in first story about 1030 hours. Fires weic extinguished with water buckets by people inside. Negligible (ire damage resulted. Some of exposing buildings had just been removed prior to the bomb. N 1 SO- Yea C Yes E OT Yes C Yes S 3C Partial C Yes IOC w 6C Yes C Yes 341 Accession Number : AD0689495 DC- P- 1060-1 PREDICTION OF UK BAN CASUALTIES AND TIIE MEDICAL LOAD FROM A HIGH- YIELD NUCLEAR BURST L. Wayne Davis Paper prepared under Contract No. N0022867C2276 (Work Unit No. 241 1H) Sponsored by Office of Civil Defense Office of the Secretary of the Army through Technical Management Office U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory Delivered at Workshop on Mass Burns National Academy of Sciences Washington, D. C. March 13-14, 1968 The Dikewood Corporation 1009 Bradbury Drive, S. E. University Research Park Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106 A. DEVELOPMENT OF "BLAST" MORTALITY CURVES FROM JAPANESE AND TEXAS CITY DATA A great deal of new information has been gathered concerning the biological effects of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during World War II. The data from over 35, 000 case histories were col- lected on magnetic tape, and the results of the analysis were published in DC-FR-1054 (Ref. 3). For people in or shielded by structures in Japan, the blast and initial-nuclear radiation were the dominant immediate effects. By examining a set of theoretical initial-nuclear-radiation mortality curves developed for Hiroshima and Nagasaki and comparing them with the total mortality curves, it could readily be seen that the initial- nuclear radiation played a large role in the deaths of thermally- shielded people located fairly close-in (at the high mortality levels) in the light structures. It is also an important effect even in the concrete structures. By further comparing the mortality curves for Hiroshima and Nagasaki plotted as a function of overpressure (Figs. 1 and 2), it can readily be seen that the initial- nuclear radiation was more important or dominant in Hiroshima than in Nagasaki. As another boundary condition, the Texas City mortality curves, given in Fig. 3, show the results of blast alone for a lower yield of 0. 67 kt. [S.S. Grandchamp at Texas City exploded in 1 947. It contained 2.3 kt of ammonium nitrate in 100-lb paper bags, but only the 0.88 kt in No. 4 hatch was tamped and exploded after catching fire. TNT equivalent was 0.67 kt.] (*u«9J«d) AJLIIVIUON (4U»3J»d) AinvidOW :£:==== silisrssSr iiHHIittliiiHi liifiiiiiiiiiiiii (4U«3J»d) AXIIVXdOW (iu»OJ»d) Ainviwow (4U93JM)) Aanrw wo Ainviaow FIG. 30 FIRE MORTALITY CURVES PEAK POWER DENSITY (I0 6 Btu/mi 2 ttc) 22 20 18 x 16 o 14 c T. E. Lo mm as son and J. A. Keller. "A macroscopic view of fire phenomenology and mortality prediction/ 1 Dikewood Corp., report DC- TN-1058-1, December 1966 (Paper presented at the Symposium on Mass Fire Research conducted February 6-9, 1967 under the auspices of the Panel N-3, Thermal Radiation, of the Technical Cooperation Program)* HeHbrann^/. Dresden » Hamburg I I INTENSE / FIRESTORMS (GERMAN CELLARS) NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS j (HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI) * Aamori # \ • Barmen ^% Freiberg V . Hiroshima *Fukui \ . Solingen . Friedrickshafen 1 1 Aachen . uim ' Toyama ; Chosi . Nagasaki Fuku Y< Darmstadt \ * \ Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy Over 2.9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec. 1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) = energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water = 252 calories Severe firestorms require 600 BTU/sq. mile/second FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES i i l 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 AVERAGE FIRE SEVERITY (Millions of BTU per sq. mile per second) Lommasson and Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality Predictions, Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN- 1058-1, December 1966. J, A, Keller, A Study of World War n German Fire Fatalities , DC-TN-1 050-3, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1966. R. Schubert, Examination of Building Density and Fire Loading in the Districts Eimsbuettel and Hammerbrook of the City of Hamburg in the Year 1943 (20 volumes, in German), Stanford Research Institute; January, 1966. L. Wayne Davis, William L. Baker, and Donald L. Summers, Anal- ysis of Japanese Nuclear Casualty Data, DC- FR- 10 54, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1966, L. Wayne Davis, Donald L. Summers, William L. Baker, and James A, Keller, Prediction of Urban Casualties and the Medical Load from a High- Yield Nuclear Burst , DC- PR- 1060, The Dikewood Corporation; to be published, (Classified) Ashley W. Oughterson, et al. , Medical Effects of Atomic Bombs , NP-3036 toNP-3041 (Vols. I- VI), Army Institute of Pathology; 1951. The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, Report No. 92 (Vols. I-III), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Divi- sion; May, 1947. Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan, Report No. 93 (Vols. I-III), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Divi- sion; June, 1947. Willard L. Derksen, et al. , O utput Intensities and Thermal Radiation Skin Injury for Civil Defense Shelter Evaluation , Special Report for Blast and Thermal Subcommittee of the National Academy of Science, U. S. Naval Applied Science Laboratory; October 16, 1967. J. Bracciavcnti, W. Derksen, et al. , Radiant Exposures for Ignition of Tinder by Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Weapons , Final Report on DAS A Subtnsk 12.009, U.S. Naval Applied Science Laboratory; July 5, 1966. S. B. Martin and N. J. Alvares, Ignition Thresholds for Large-Yield Nuclear Weapons, USNRDL-TR-1007, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory; April 11, 1966. G. H. Tryon (Editor), Fire Protection Handbook, Twelfth Edition, National Fire Protection Association, Boston; 1962. C. C. Chandler, T. Storey, and C. Tangren, Prediction of Fire Spread Following Nuclear Explosions . PSW-5, U. S. Forest Service, Forest and Range Experiment Station, Berkeley, California; 1963. Kathleen F. Earp, Deaths from Fire in Large- Scale Air Attack, with Special Reference to the Hamburg Firestorm . CD/SA 28, Home Office, Scientific Advisers' Branch, London; April, 1953. MEMORANDUM RM-3079-PR 1963 403 337 DISASTER AND RECOVERY: A HISTORICAL SURVEY Jack Hirshleifer PREPARED FOR: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND MlilD, SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA •12- As at Hamburg, people proved tougher than structures. Almost 70 per cent of the buildings in Hiroshima were destroyed, compared with around 30 per cent of pop- ulation.* The Research Department of the Hiroshima Municipal Office is reported to have estimated the population in the city as 407,000, in Hiroshima (Hiroshima Publishing Company, 1949), 1 These proportions are the estimates used by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey report. The Hiroshima Municipal Office calculations show an even greater disparity, reporting 22 per cent of population killed and missing but some 89 per cent of buildings as destroyed or needing reconstruction (Hiroshima ) . -13- Oci August 7 power was generally restored to surviving areas, and through railroad service commenced on August 8. Telephone service started on August 15* Hiroshima was also not a dead city. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey reported that plants responsible for three* fourths of the city's industrial production could have resumed normal operations within 30 days (the newer and larger plants in Hiroshima were on the outskirts of the city, and both physical premises and personnel generally survived). 1 By mid* 1949 the population had grown to over 300*000 once more, and 2 70 per cent of the destroyed buildings had been reconstructed* USSBS, "The Effects of Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki," p. 8. AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL STRESS Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense Irving L. Janis The RAND Corporation First Edition NEW YORK • TORONTO • LONDON McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC. 1951 CHAPTER 2 EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE POPULATION At both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, disaster struck without warning. Whether intended so or not, an extraordinarily high degree of sur- prise was achieved by both A-bomb attacks. At the two target cities, prior to the bombing, there had been relatively little anxiety about the threat of heavy B-29 raids. When the planes carrying the A-bomb arrived over their targets, the population was almost completely unprepared. At the time, not even a light air raid was expected. People were caught at home, at work, out on the city streets, calmly going about their usual daily affairs. When the first A-bomb was dropped, on August 6, 1945, very few residents of Hiroshima were inside air-raid shelters. An all-clear signal from a previous alert had sounded less than half an hour earlier and the normal routine of community life had resumed. Shortly after eight in the morning, when the explosion occurred, the working-class population was arriving at the factories and shops. Many workers were still out-of-doors en route to their jobs. The majority of school children, along with some adults from the suburbs, were also outside, hard at work building firebreaks as a defense against possible incendiary raids. Housewives, especially in middle-class families, were at home, preparing breakfast. Only a few minutes later, their flaming charcoal stoves were to create hundreds of local fires, adding to a general conflagration of such intensity that even if the assiduous labor of Hiroshima's school children had been completed, the fire storm still would have been beyond control. At Nagasaki, three days later, the populace had heard only vague reports about the Hiroshima disaster. Here again, people were at 4 EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB 5 work in factories and offices, tending their homes, engaging in their normal daily activities. A few hours earlier a raid alert had been canceled; before the raid signal could be repeated, the bomb had already exploded. Only 400 people out of a population of close to a quarter of a million were inside the excellent tunnel shelters that could have protected some 75,000 people from severe injury or death. It is generally recognized that the element of surprise was an important factor contributing to the unprecedented casualty rates at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of those who were exposed to lethal gamma radiation, struck down by flying debris, or trapped in col- lapsed buildings would not have been killed if they had been warned in time to flee to the outskirts of the city or if they had been in adequate shelters. Thousands of people who were out-of- doors or standing in front of windows would have been protected from incapacitating flash burns if they had been under any sort of cover. 1 Whether or not they suffered severe injury, those who survived the explosion were also affected by the element of surprise in quite another way. The absence of warning and the generally unprepared state of the population undoubtedly augmented the emotional effects of the disaster. "I was just utterly surprised and amazed and awed." This brief remark, by a newspaper reporter who was living in Naga- saki at the time of the disaster, epitomizes the way in which survivors described the terrifying events to which they were so suddenly exposed. Of great importance in the predispositional set of the population is the fact that there was not a state of readiness to face danger or to cope with the harsh exigencies of a major catastrophe. The stage was well set for extreme emotional responses to dominate the action. It is against this background of psychological unpreparedness that the emotional impact resulting from the atomic disasters should be viewed. 1 USSBS Report, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1946. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons Samuel Glasstone Editor Revised Edition Reprinted February 1964 Prepared by the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Published by the UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION April 1962 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D.C. - Price J53.00 (paper bound) Foreword This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant govern- mental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working on the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information. Secretary of Defense Chairman Atomic Energy Commission BASIS FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION 12.11 In Japan, where little evasive action was taken, the survival probability depended upon whether the individual was outdoors or inside a building and, in the latter case, upon the type of structure. At distances between 0.3 and 0.4 mile (530 and 700 yards) from ground zero in Hiroshima the average survival rate, for at least 20 days after the nuclear explosion, was less than 20 percent. Yet in two reinf orced- concrete office buildings, at these distances, almost 90 percent of the nearly 800 occupants survived more than 20 days, although some died later from radiation injury. These facts bring out clearly the greatly improved chances of survival from a nuclear explosion that could result from the adoption of suitable warning and protective measures. Table 12.29— ARRIVAL TIME FOR PEAK OVERPRESSURE Explosion yield Distance ■ (miles) 1 KT 10 KT 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT (Time in seconds) 1 4. 3 3. 6 3. 7 2. 5 1. 5 2 9 8. 1 7. 4 6. 5 5. 12.35. The major part of the thermal radiation travels in straight lines, and so any opaque object interposed between the fireball and the exposed skin will give some protection. This is true even if the object is subsequently destroyed by the blast, since the main thermal radiation pulse is over before the arrival of the blast wave. 12.36 At the first indication of a nuclear explosion, by a sudden increase in the general illumination, a person inside a building should immediately fall prone, as described in § 12.30, and, if possible, crawl behind or beneath a table or desk or to a planned vantage point. 12. 72 Because of its particulate nature, fallout will tend to col- lect on horizontal surfaces, e.g., roofs, streets, tops of vehicles, and the ground. In the preliminary decontamination, therefore, the main ef- fort should be directed toward cleaning such surfaces. The simplest way of achieving this is by water washing, if an adequate supply of water is available. The addition of a commercial wetting agent (detergent) will make the washing more efficient. The radioactive material is thus tranf erred to storm sewers where it is less of a haz- ard. S. Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1962: Explosion yield 20 kilotons 1, 760 1 megaton 6, 500 Time after Distance from Height of burst detonation ground zero Height of stem (feet) (seconds) (miles) (feet) 3 0. 87 185 11 3. 2 680 20 KILOTON AIR BURST 3 SECONDS BLAST WIND 180 MPH NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION PRIMARY BLAST WAVE FRONT REFLECTED BLAST WAVE FRONT 6 PSI MACH STEM OVERPRESSURE MILES q At 10 seconds after a 20-kiloton explosion at an altitude of 1,760 feet the Mach front is over 2Y 2 miles from ground zero, and 37 seconds after a 1-megaton detonation at 6,500 feet, it is nearly 9% miles from ground zero. The overpressure at the front is roughly 1 pound per square inch, in both cases, and the wind velocity behind the front is 40 miles per hour. 342 THERMAL RADIATION AND ITS EFFECTS Nevada in 1953. 12 calories per square centimeter ignitable after exposure to a nuclear explosion 7.59 The value of fire-resistive furnishing in decreasing the num- ber of ignition points was also demonstrated in the tests. Two identical, sturdily constructed houses, each having a window 4 feet by 6 feet facing the point of burst, were erected where the thermal radiation exposure was 17 calories per square centimeter. One of the houses contained rayon drapery, cotton rugs, and clothing, and, as was expected, it burst into flame immediately after the explosion and burned completely. In the other house, the draperies were of vinyl plastic, and rugs and clothing were made of wool. Although much ignition occurred, the recovery party, entering an hour after the explosion, was able to extinguish the fires. 7.76 It should be noted that the fire storm is by no means a special characteristic of nuclear weapons. Similar fire storms have been re- ported as accompanying large forest fires in the United States, and especially after incendiary bomb attacks in both Germany and Japan during World War II. The high winds are produced largely by the updraft of the heated air over an extensive burning area. They are thus the equivalent, on a very large scale, of the draft of a chimney under which a fire is burning. Because of limited experience, the conditions for the development of fire storms in cities are not well known. It appears, however, that some, although not necessarily all, of the essential requirements are the following: (1) thousands of nearly simultaneous ignitions over an area of at least a square mile, (2) heavy building density, e.g., more than 20 percent of the area is covered by buildings, and (3) little or no ground wind. Based on these criteria, only certain sections — usually the older and slum areas — of a very few cities in the United States would be susceptible to fire storm development " Weapon test report WT-775, Project 8.1 1 b, ENCORE nuclear test, Nevada, 1953: Decayed White Decayed + fence washed trashed No trash kindling Trash kindling for fire Effect of 12 calories/sq cm thermal flash: NO FIRE BURNED AFTER 15 MINUTES 6' x 6' wood frame houses IMMEDIATE IGNITION WT- 774 Copy No. 135 A UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS March -June 1953 Project 8.11a INCENDIARY EFFECTS ON BUILDING AND INTERIOR KINDLING FUELS ( ENCORE EFFECT REPORT ) 27 kt at 2,423 feet altitude, 19% humidity (DASA-1251) (Note: cities humidity is -50-80%) RESTRICTED DATA This dc - "it contairs restricted data as define., ^e Atomic Energy Act oi 1946. Its Er*. -iHttal or the dfsclosure of its cent sat* in any manner to an unauthorized (gersoff is prohibited. HEAOQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND, ARMEO FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT SANOIA BASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO CONFIDENTIAL Weapon test report WT-774, Project 8.1 la, Incendiary effects on buildings and interior kindling fuels ENCORE test, Nevada, 1953 10' x 12' wooden houses with 4' x 6' windows 17 calories/sq. cm thermal flash Immediate room flashover during thermal pulse ("Encore effect") in inflammables-filled house while fire-resistant fabrics in other house survived! LEFT HOUSE: fire-resistant furnishings RIGHT HOUSE: non-fire resistant furnishings (woolen rugs and clothes, vinyl plastic draperies) plus inflammable magazines and newspapers ■ £ i Smouldering armchair extinguished 1 hour after detonation, when recovery party arrived at house EFFECTS OF 1 PSI OVERPRESSURE ON IGNITIONS From: Goodale. Effects of Air Blast on Urban Fires URS 7009-14 Dec. 1970 (AD 723 429) Blast winds both cool burning material and upset flame convection system. 50% of burning curtains are extinguished by 1 psi overpressure 100% are put out by 2.5 psi. Note that burning LIQUIDS in high-wall trays are not put out by blast waves, but this is not relevant to city fires. Burning beds can continue to smoulder until extinguished with water. THERMAL RADIATION FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS Harold L* Brode The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California P-2745 August 1963 -17- We have all had the frustrating experience of trying to light a fire with green, moist, or wet wood. Just as wet wood can't be easily induced to burn, so thick combustibles are not easily ignited* Even a dry two-by-four burns reluctantly and stops burning when taken out of the fire* It is a different matter with a shingle or a bunch of kindling! Density also plays a role, a heavier combustible being harder to ignite than lighter-weight material. Of course, the chemistry of the material to the degree that it influences kindling temperatures and flammabllity, is an important parameter. Modern plastics tend to smoke and boil - to ablate but not to ignite in sustained burning - while paper trash burns readily. Just as most materials are not particularly sensitive to the sun* s thermal radiation, and are not highly inflammable nor even ignitible, the surfaces exposed to the thermal intensity of a nuclear explosion are generally not given to sustained burning* Very Intense heat loads may mar or melt surfaces, may char and burn surfaces while the heat is on, but may snuff out immediately afterward. -l8- PRIMARY AND SECONDARY FIRES FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS Although thermal radiation would start many fires in urban and in most suburban areas, such fires by themselves would seldom con- stitute a source of major destruction. Outside the region of exten- sive blast damage, fires in trash piles, in dry palm trunks, in roof shingles, in auto and household upholstery, drapes, or flammable stores are normally accessible and readily controllable* By the very fact that these fires start from material exposed to the incident light, they can be easily spotted and, in the absence of other dis- tractions, can be quickly extinguished. Where the blast effects are severe and damage extensive, little effective fire fighting is likely. A SURVEY OF THE WEAPONS AND HAZARDS WHICH MAY FACE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WARTIME Harold L. Brode P-3170 June 1965 -15- Most exposed surfaces in the city ere non- combustible end much of the remainder is not ignitable by thermal flash. Although many fires could simultaneously stert wherever build- ing interiors ere illuminated by the bomb thermal energy, they ere not likely to be inmed lately beyond control, end will often go out unattended as they exhaust the available fuel (as in trash barrels or isolsted wood piles or even pieces of paper on tables or floors) . Hanging non-flamneble shields over window openings and removing likely fuels from exposed positions could also help. RAND CORPORATION HIROSHIMA John Hersey New Yorker of 31 August, 1946 I A NOISELESS FLASH At exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning, on August 6th, 1945, Japanese time, at the moment when the atomic bomb flashed above Hiroshima, Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, a young member of the surgical staff of the city's large, modern Red Cross Hospital, walked along one of the hospital corridors He was one step beyond an open window when the light of the bomb was reflected, like a gigantic photographic flash, in the corridor. He ducked down on one knee and said to himself, as only a Japanese would, " Sasaki, gambare ! Be brave !" Just then (the building was 1,650 yards from the centre), the blast ripped through the hospital. The glasses he was wearing flew off his face ; the bottle of blood crashed against one wall ; his Japanese slippers zipped out from under his feet— but otherwise, thanks to where he stood, he was untouched. Dr. Sasaki shouted the name of the chief surgeon and rushed around to the man's office and found him terribly cut by glass. Starting east and west from the actual centre, the scientists, in early September, made new measurements, and the highest radiation they found this time was 3.9 times the natural " leak." SO, LIKE BERT VOL) TO AVOID THE THINGS FLYING THROUGH THE /AIR... ...AND TO KEEP FROM GETTING CUT OR EVEN BADLY BURNED. AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL STRESS Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense Irving L. Janis The RAND Corporation 1951 EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB 13 Time from flash to blast = 4 sec at 1 mile: A substantial proportion of the respondents in Hiroshima and Nagasaki reported having reacted immediately to the intense flash alone, as though it were a well-known danger signal, despite the fact that they were unaware of its significance at the time. A num- ber of them said that they voluntarily ducked down or "hit the ground" as soon as the flash occurred and had already reached the prone position before the blast swept over them. 14 REACTIONS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI From the above discussion, it is apparent that some of the sur- vivors immediately perceived the flash as a danger signal. It also appears that for those who were not located near the center there was an opportunity to take protective action that could reduce injuries from the secondary heat wave and from flying glass, fall- ing debris, and other blast effects. It is noteworthy that some survivors evidently failed to make use of this opportunity, as is to be expected when there has been no prior preparation for it. In a later chapter on the problems of civil defense, we shall have occasion to take account of these findings, since they suggest that casualties in an A-bomb attack might be reduced if the population has been well prepared in advance to react appropriately to the flash of the explosion. AD Al 05824 DNA5593T GLASS FRAGMENT HAZARD FROM WINDOWS BROKEN BY AIRBLAST E. Royce Fletcher Flying glass injured to 3.2 km in Hiroshima, 3.8 km in Nagasaki. 3.2 mm thick window glass fragments striking walls 2.1m behind the windows in nuclear and high explosive tests gave: 10 fragments /m 2 for 6.3 kPa (0.9 psi) overpressure 100 f ragmen ts/m 2 for 29 kPa (4.2 psi) overpressure 1,000 f ragmen ts/m 2 for 65 kPa (9.4 psi) overpressure Figure 10 10 c 5 ■ U l I DUCK AND COVER Window Wall (2.1m behind window) Measured distribution density - exp( -0.09374 a o 6.7 mm thick glass o 0.2-0.3 mm thick glass degrees ) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 Angle below lower edge of window, degrees AECU-3350 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF BLAST FROM BOMBS. GLASS FRAGMENTS AS PENETRATING MISSILES AND SOME OF THE BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GLASS FRAGMENTED BY ATOMIC EXPLOSIONS By L Gerald Bowen Donald R. Richmond Mead B. Wetherbe Clayton S. White Table 5, 1 Statistical Parameters and Predicted Penetration Data for Missiles from Traps at Various Ranges from Ground Zero 30 kt TEAPOT -APPLE 2 nuclear test, 1955 Distance from Ground Zero, ft Maximum overpressure, psi Number ot traps Total number of glass missiles Geometric mean missiles mass, gms Standard geometric deviation in mass Geometric mean missile velocity, ft/sec Standard geometric deviation in velocity Per cent of total missiles expected to penetrate A verage number of missiles per sq ft Missiles per sq ft expected to penetrate 4,700 5,500 10, 500 5.0 3.8 1.9 6 2 5 2129 320 37 0. 133 0. 580 1.25 3. 01 3. 47 3. 35 170 168 103 1.27 1.25 1.25 3.9* 12.8* 100.9 45.5 3. 9* 5. 3* 0. 4* 2. 1 0. 006* ♦ Computed from individual evaluation of each missile The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1 964) GLASS Peak Median Median Maximum overpressure velocity mass number per (psi) (ft/sec) (grams) sqft 1.9 108 1.45 4.3 5. 170 0. 13 388 £ 2,000 8 a o H W S2 1,000 Peak 1,000 2,000 DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (FEET) overpressures on the ground for 1-kiloton burst GLASS PENETRATING ABDOMINAL CAVITY Probability of penetration (percent) Mass of glass fragments (grams) 0. 1 1. 60 99 Impact velocity (ft/ sec) 235 410 730 140 245 430 cue for surviva OPERATION CUf A.E.C. NEVADA TEST SITE MAY 5, 1955 A report by the FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY HAROLD L. GOODWIN, Director > Atomic Test Operations, PCD A The time of travel of the shock wave is not generally understood by many persons. The concept of "duck and cover," which would still be of great value in case of attack without warning, is based on the comparatively large time interval between the burst and arrival of the shock wave at a given point* 92 BIOMEDICAL EFFECTS OF THERMAL RADIATION by dr. herman elwyn pearse, Professor of Surgery at the Uni- versity of Rochester. Consultant to several Government depart- ments, notably the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of Biology and Medicine. Consultant to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project After the Bikini test, I was asked to go to Japan as a consultant for the National Research Council to survey the casualties in Nagasaki and Hiro- shima. 140 Then we observed the healing of the wounds, and *we found again that the wounds healed in the same manner, as those that we had produced in the laboratory. There was some difference in these lesions from the ordi- nary burns of civil life, but I would predict, from what I learned from experi- ments, that the difference is on the good side. The burns look worse; they are often charred, but they may not penetrate as deeply, and the char acts as a dressing, nature's own dressing. 142 For example, if you have 2 layers, an undershirt and a shirt, you will get much less protection than if you have 4 layers; and if you get up to 6 layers, you have such great protection from thermal effects that you will be killed by some other thing. Under 6 layers we only got about 50 percent first degree burns at 107 calories. 143 If we can just increase the protection a little bit, we may prevent thousands and thousands of burns. . . . For example, to produce a 50-percent level of second-degree burns on bare skin required 4 calories* When we put 2 layers of cloth in contact, it only took 6 calories. But separate that cloth by 5 millimeters, about a fifth of an inch, and it increases, the protective effect 5 times. The energy required to produce the same 50-percent probability of a second- degree burn is raised up to 30 calories. So if you wear loose clothing, you are better off than if your wear tight clothing. 144 OSTI ID: 4411414 «-e& STUDIES OH FLASH BURNS: THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BT 2, k AND 6 LAYER FABRIC COMBINATIONS George Mixter, Jr c , M Do and Herman E Q Pearse, Mo D* THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER ABSTRACT Fabric interposed "between a carbon arc source and the skin of Chester White pigs increased the amount of thermal energy required to cause 2+ turns* For the 2, k and 6 layers of fahric studied this increase was 3<>6, 38 and over 10*1- cal/cm 2 respectively when the inner layer of fabric was in contact with the skin Separation of the inner layer from the skin by 5 ram increased the protective effect of the 2 layer combination from 7.t to 29 cal/cm 2 , provided the outer layer was treated for fire retardation If the outer layer was not so treated, sustained flaming occurred which in itself added to the thermal buxn INTRODUCTION In the past, work in this laboratory has been directed toward a study of flash burns in unshielded skin* It is well known from the atomic bombing in Japan that this type of bum was modified by clothing „ A laboratory analysis of the protective effect of fabrics against flash burns was begun (5) by shielding the skin with a few representative fabrics and their com- binations 1. 2 Layers 2 k Layers a. light green oxford olive green sateen knitted cotton underwear thin cotton oxford wool-nylon shirting b. light green oxford (HPM) knitted cotton underwear knitted cotton underwear 3o 6 layers olive green sateen thin cotton oxford mohair frieze rayon lining wool-nylon shirting knitted wool underwear 5o M©rton, J Q EL, Kingsley, Ho D , and Pearse* Ho E c , "Studies on Flash Bums: The Protective Etfect® of Certain Fabrics", Surgery, Gynecology aM Obstetrics , gjj., ^97~5©1 (April 1952) ADB951 673 WT-770 This document consists of 64 pages 1 QQ No. - ^ J of 295 copies, Series A OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Project 8.5 THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED TEST ANIMALS BY FABRIC ASSEMBLIES REPORT TO THE TEST DIRECTOR by uraat' ------ -•-».. ■»*»«» »*w>>#ft fliK%g sterling and Staff Reo«Ai>co..V'. BV authority 0pW.Jy.&iJ^ZfJ^i^^/j^^ dl9 Aa Reatriotedj^rTn Foreign BV fcB|^^ontains restricted data as definecnnT^ll^fc^^j^rgyAct of 1954. Its transmittal or^^MM^^^of its contents in any manner to an unCT^tized Quartermaster Research and Development Laboratories Army Medical Service Graduate School Walter Reed Army Medical Center University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project 4.1.2 Fa ctors Contributing to the Greater Degree of Thermal Protection in the Field, There are several conditions encountered in the field, espe- cially at the higher energy levels, but nob duplicated la, the labora- tory (at least not up to the present time) that may account for the fact that like amounts of thermal energy did not produce comparable results in the laboratory and in the field* First, the thermal energy is delivered much more rapidly with the explosion of an atomic bomb than it is in the laboratory. Second, due to smoke obscuration the animals in the field actually received a smaller percentage of the total energy delivered than they did in the laboratory. Third, the blast wave following the explosion tended to extinguish flames and remove char, whereas no such wave was present in the laboratory tests. Fourth, where the heat reached the fabric layer next to the skin, uniform drape (or spacing) provided additional protection in the field. (2) Motion pictures of clothed animals, exposed to 50.0 and 33.5 cal/cm 2 on Shots 9 and 10 respectively, showed heavy clouds of black smoke enveloping the animals within 120 ms of the explosion. (3) The blast wave following the explosion, which has not been duplicated in laboratory applications of thermal energy, has two possible protective effects. First, it can be expected to extinguish flames induced by the radiation in assemblies not treated for fire resistance, thus removing a source of high heat. Although the blast wave may not actually extinguish bhe flame in all cases,* it can be expected in general to have this effect. Second, the blast wave would tend to remove any char which, if allowed to remain, would act as a heat reservoir and increase the likelihood of a severe burn. 46 Fig. 3.5 Destruction of Outer and Second Layers of Pigs 1 Uniforms (Shots 9 and 10) r ioo L M ao eo § 40 I toh HOT - f ET FIRE RESISTANT 50 /SO OUTER LAYER O SECOND LAYER OH ooo ooo o g too 5 •© eo c 40 o 2 to I TEMPERATE • • * OUTER LAYER SECOND LAYER -L. X -4. tO 40 60 SO 100 col. / so, cm. O - oo o tO 40 60 60 col. / sq. cm. 100 WT-1441 f bis document consists of 50 pages. 1 OPERATION Kl. 1 75 ol 185 copies, Series A PLUMB BOB NEVADA TEST SITE .MAY-OCTOBER 1957 Project 8.2 oX the/ 7 Mr/965 AVAILABLE COPY WILL NOT ^SflMTT FULLY LEGIBLE BKP^C^V^uy^"' rj^HODUCTIOr WILL BE W-i£fr REQUESTED BY USEH3 Ci DDG PREDICTION Of THERMAL PROTECTION of UNIFORMS, and THERMAL EFFECTS on a STANDARD-REFERENCE MATERIAL (U) Issuance Date: May 2, 1960 HEADOUARTEftS FIELD COMMAND DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY SANDIA BASE. AlBUOUERQUE. NEW MEXICO & jun? iast> This material contains Information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title 16, U. S. C, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In anv manner m art unauthorised person !. hlblterl uy law. 1.2.2 Comparison of Skin-Simulant Response and Burns to Pigs. The Improved NML skin simulant, molded from silica-powder-filled urea formaldehyde, has the thermocouple embedded at a depth of 0.05 cm In order to give burn predictions based on maximum temperature attainment. The basic criterion is a rise of 25 C or more for a second-degree burn to human skin or for a 2+ mild burn to pig skin. This criterion is based on the assumption of (1) the equivalence of a minimal white burn on the rat skin (or a 2+ mild burn in pig skin) to a second-degree burn In human skin, (2) an initial skin temperature of 81 C, and (3) correspondence of the thermal pro- perties of pig, rat, and human skin. The accuracy of such a burn prediction in terms of indicent radiant exposure is estimated to be ± 10 percent. A skin-simulant temperature rise of 20 C or greater is estimated to correspond to a first-degree human burn or a 1+ moderate pig skin burn, and a rise of 35 C is estimated for a third-degree human burn or a 3+ mild pig burn. The latter estimations, probably accurate to ± 20 percent, are based on pig-burn data obtained at the Uni- versity of Rochester (Reference 6). 12 CONFIDENTIAL TABLE 2.1 RADIANT ABSORPTANCES OF SKIN SIMULANT AND STANDARD FABRICS Specimen Radiant Absorptancc Skin simulant, bare 0.72 Skin simulant, blackened 0.95 Poplin, Shade US, S-oz/yd* 0.63 Sateen, gray, 9-oz/yd 2 0.91 15 CONFIDENTIAL NOTE: These pigs were strapped to tables and could not beat or roll out outer garment ignition unlike humans 4 • 13 16 20 Equivalent Field Rodiont Exposure, col /cm* Addendum No. 1 /or DNA 1240H-2, Part 2 HANDBOOK OF UNDERWATER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS 21 January 1974 M. J. Dudagh DASIAC General Electric Company-TEMPO 816 State Street Santa Barbara, CA 93102 CHAPTER TITLE VOLUME 2 - PART 2 18 SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL CASUALTIES: EFFECTS OF UNDERWATER SHOCK ON PERSONNEL PAGE 18-1 19 August 1973 CHAPTER 18 16.7 THERMAL AND NUCLEAR RADIATION EFFECTS ON SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL 18.7.1 Casualty and Risk Criteria Table 18-2 CDC NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION CRITERIA New Thermal Radiation Criteria Risk Criteria for Burna Under Summer Uniforms to Warned. Exposed Personnel 7. Incidence Mechanism 10KT cal/cm 100KT cal/cm 2 1000KT cal/cm 2 Negligible Moderate Emergency 2.5 5 5 1° burn 1 burn 2° burn 3.1 3.7 6.3 4.2 5.0 8.8 5.8 6.8 12 Time to Ineffectiveness Casualties due to 2nd Degree Burns 7. Incidence 10KT cal/cm 2 100KT cal/cm 2 lOOOKT cal/cm 2 24. hr 50 38 53 73 Personnel Risk and Casualty Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Effects ACN 4260, U. S. Army Coitfcat Developments Command Institute of Nuclear Studies. August 1971 When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re- sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more water loss and the more heat or energy loss. How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished? Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for Thermal Burns ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462 August 2008 By Patrice Wendling Elsevier Global Medical News CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit. The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician, explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association. "Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back," Mr. Clopton said in an interview. "We just wanted to get the word out about the success we've had using plastic wrap for burn wounds," he said. Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing removal. "I can't recall a single incident of its causing trouble for the patients," Dr. Kealey said. "We started using it as an answer to the problem of how to create a field dressing that met those criteria. I suppose that the use of plastic wrap has spread from here out to the rest of our referral base." Although protocols vary between different localities, plastic wrap is typically used for partial- and full-thickness thermal burns, but not superficial or chemical burns. It is applied in a single layer directly to the wound surface without ointment or dressing under the plastic and then secured loosely with roller gauze, as needed. Because plastic wrap is extruded at temperatures in excess of 150° C, it is sterile as manufactured and handled in such a way that there is minimal opportunity for contamination before it is unrolled for use, said Mr. Clopton of the emergency care unit at Mercy Hospital, Iowa City. However, it's best to unwind and discard the outermost layer of plastic from the roll to expose a clean surface. ADA383988 November 2963 Second printing May 1964 Unclassified Version SURVEY OF THE THERMAL THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Prepared for: OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. By: Jack C. Rogers and T. Miller SRI Project No. MU-4021 Approved: ROBERT A. HARKGR, DIRECTOR MANAGEMENT SCIENCES DIVISION OCD REVIEW NOTICE This report represents the authors' views, which in general are In harmony with the technical criteria of the Office of Civil Defense. However, a preliminary evaluation by OCD indicatos the need for further evaluation of the fire threat of nuclear weapons and formulation of promising research and action programs. NOTE: discrepancies are due to HUMIDITY differences , ENCORE nuclear test (Nevada desert) humidity was ONLY 19% U o 4* cd U i * rH m c • (D : a « iH a S t! o o 2 ri « 3 2 a o ft 5 S & o 2 2 H o g - 1 & S s 1 •ft 00 CI OS ■rl & ■a § 4* >» o > *H t« c* > 2 5 8 2 (0 CI 10 K CD 4* I- 0) > •Hi (A 2 bfi 0) (A i I o 1 0> c E & 2 JO CO CO c CD 4> 0? 4* u (A CD Martin, S. B. , On Predicting the Ignition Susceptibility of Typical Kin- dling Fuels to Ignition by the Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Det- onations, Tech. Report 367, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif., April 1959. (U) UCRL-TR-231593 Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Detonations in Urban Environments R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, B. Whitlock June 7, 2007 Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded estimates. Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in bum injuries may be greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6]. We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a "radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux. 6. L. Davisson and M. Dombroski, private communication; "Radiological and Nuclear Response and Recovery Workshop: Nuclear Weapon Effects in an Urban Environment 2007," M. Dombroski, B. Buddemeier, R. Wheeler, L. Davisson, T. Edmunds, L. Brandt, R. Allen, L. Klennert, and K. Law, UCRL-TR-XXXX (2007), in review. 11 HOME OFFICE SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE Volume I PAMPHLET No. 1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 1956 The probable fire situation in a British city 35 Japanese houses are constructed of wood and once they were set on tire they continued to burn even when knocked over. In this country only about 10 per cent, of all the material in the average house is combustible, and under conditions of complete collapse, where air would be almost entirely excluded, it is doubtful whether a fire could continue on any vigorous scale. 40 It seems unlikely from the evidence available that an initial density of fires equivalent to one in every other building would be started by a nuclear explosion over a British city. Studies have shown that a much smaller proportion of buildings than this would be exposed to thermal radiation and even then it is not certain that continuing fires would develop. Curtains may catch fire, but it does not necessarily follow that they will set light to the room; in the last war it was found that only one incendiary bomb out of every six that hit buildings started a continuing fire. From a 10 megaton bomb, with its longer lasting thermal radiation (see paragraph 21), it takes about 20 calories per square centimetre to start fires because so much of the heat (spread out over the longer emission) is wasted by conduction into the interior of the combustible material and by convection and re-radiation whilst the temperature of the surface is being raised to the ignition point. But the distance at which 20 calories per square centimetre can be produced is only 11 miles, so that the scaling factor for a 10 megaton airburst bomb is therefore 11 and not 22. 43 For a ground burst bomb, however, several other factors contribute to a further reduction in the fire range. Apart from an actual loss of heat by absorption into the ground and from the pronounced shielding effect of buildings, the debris from the crater tends to reduce the jadiating temperature or trie fireball ana a greater proportion of the energy is consequently radiated in the infra red region of the spectrum" r — this proportion being more easily absorbed b y the atmosphere. 44 An important point in relation to personal protection against the effects of hydrogen bomb explosions is that because the thermaT radiation lasts so long there is more time for people who may be caught in the open, ana who may be well beyond the range of serious ganger trom blast, to rush to cover and so escape some part of the exposure. For example, people in the open might receive second degree burns (blistering) on exposed skin at a range of 16 miles from a iu megaton ground burst bomb (8X2— see paragraph 24). If. however, they could take cover m a few seconds they would escape this damage. Moreover, at this range the blast wave would not arrive tor another minute and a half so mat any effects due to the blast in the open (e.g. flying glass, etc.) could be completely avoided . csnfie: TECHNICAL LIBRARY of the Clftsamcaac'i &7_9*I Dale - " ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT HANDBOOK o o 00 on CAPABILITIES of ATOMIC WEAPONS DJi.. •>.'. . . . !!) A* J^jkv!** 1 interval:- u. Avfi'-- "i.. , rt,v J DBCL AC ' J ' SECRET 10,3 Damage Criteria 10.31 The tables presented in this section show various target items, their criteria for different degrees of damage and pertinent remarks. The items are listed in alphabetical order for each type of military operation. An attempt is made to give the source of the data by use of numbers to the right of the damage criteria* The key of this numbering system is indicated below: a* full-scale test data (including Hiroshima and Nagasaki • .(1) b. Estimates made from scale experiments . • • . (2) c # Theoretical analysis •••••• ••••(3) d. Consensus of qualified persons •••••••••(b) 10.32 For those items not included in Table VIII, select the listed item most similar in those characteristics* discussed previously as being the Important factors in determining the extent of. damage to be expected. Perhaps the most important item to be remem- bered when estimating effects on personnel is the amount of cover actually involved. This cover depends on several items; however, one factor is all important, namely, the degree of forewarning, of an Impending atomic attack. It is obvious that only a few seconds warning is necessary under most conditions in order to take fairly effective cover. The large number of casualties in Japan resulted for the most part from the lack of warning. - 81 - SECRET C IN N I E N T I AL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TECHNICAL MANUAL TM 23-200 REPARIMENI IF THE NAVY OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03400.1B DEPARTMENT RF THE AIR FORCE AFL 136*1 NAVMC 1104 REV CAPABILITIES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS (U) Prepared by Armed Forces Special Weapons Project DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1957 C IN N I E N T I AL 46MIULNIIAL Personnel in structures. A major cause of personnel casualties in cities is structural collapse and damage. The number of casualties in a given situation may be reasonably estimated if the structural damage is known. Table 6-1 shows estimates of casualty production in two types of buildings for several damage levels. Data from Section VII may be used to predict the ranges at which specified structural damage occurs. Dem- olition of a brick house is expected to result in approximately 25 percent mor- tality, with 20 percent serious injury and 10 percent light injury. On the order of 60 percent of the survivors must be extricated by rescue squads. Without rescue they may become fire or asphyxi- ation casualties, or in some cases be subjected to lethal doses of residual radiation. Reinforced concrete struc- tures, though much more resistant to blast forces, produce almost 100 percent mortality on collapse. The figures of table 6-1 for brick homes are based on data from British World War II expe- rience. It may be assumed that these predictions are reasonably reliable for those cases where the population is in a general state of expectancy of being subjected to bombing and that most personnel have selected the safest places in the buildings as a result of specific air raid warnings. For cases of no prewarning or preparation, the number of casual ties is expected to be considerably higher. 6-2 Glass breakage extends to considerably greater ranges than almost any other structural damage, and may be expected to produce large numbers of casualties at ranges where personnel are relatively safe from other effects, particularly for an unwarned population. Table 6-1. Estimated Casualty Production in Structures for Various Degrees of Structural Damage 1-2 story brick homes (high ex- plosive data): Severe damage Moderate damage Light damage Killed outright Percent 25 <5 Serious Injury (hospi- taliza- tion) Percent 20 10 <5 Light injury (No hos- pitaliza- tion) Pertent 10 5 <5 Kote. These percentages do not include the casualties which may result from fires, asphyxiation, and other causes from failure to extricate trapped personnel. The numbers represent the estimated percentage of casualties expected at the minimum range where the specified structural damage occurs. Personnel in a prone position are less likely to be struck by flying mis- siles than those who remain standing. 6-3 Table 6-2. Critical Radiant Exposures for Burns Under Clothing (Expressed in eal/em 2 incident on outer surface of cloth) Clothing Burn 1 KT 100 KT 10 MT Summer Uniform 1° 8 11 14 (2 lavers) 2° 20 25 35 Winter Uniform 1° 60 80 100 (4 lavers) 2° 70 90 120 6-4 LI SECTION ill THERMAL RADIATION PHENOMENA 3.1 General For a surface burst having the same yield as an air burst, the presence of the earth's surface results in a reduced thermal radiation emission and a cooler fireball when viewed from that surface. This is due primarily to heat transfer to the soil or water, the distortion of the fireball by the reflected shock wave, and the partial obscuration of the fireball by dirt and dust (or water) thrown up by the blast wave. UNNULNIIAL 3-1 Measurements from the ground of the total thermal energy from surface bursts, although not as extensive as those for air bursts, indicate that the thermal yield is a little less than half that from equivalent air bursts. For a surface burst the thermal yield is assumed to be one-seventh of the total yield. 3-2 =slant range (yds). ^AAAIfiftMttXlAL 3"~3 The differences between the air burst and surface burst curves are caused by the difference in apparent radiating temperatures (when viewed from the ground) and the difference in geometrical configuration of the two types of burst . 50 mile visibility and 5 gm/m 3 water vapor. 10 mile visibility and 10 gm/m 3 water vapor. 3.3 Radiant Exposure vs. Slant Range a. Spectral- Characteristics. At distances of operational interest, the spectral (wavelength) distribution of the incident thermal radiation, integrated with respect to time, resembles very closely the spectral distribution of sunlight. For each, slightly less than one-half of the radia- tion occurs in the visible region of the spectrum, approximately one-half occurs in the infrared region and a very small fraction (rarely greater than 10 percent) lies in the ultraviolet region of the spectrum. The color temperature of the sun and an air burst are both about 6,000° K. A surface burst, as viewed by a ground observer, contains a higher proportion of infrared radiation and a smaller proportion of visible radiation than the air burst, with almost no radiation in the ultraviolet region. The color temperature for a surface burst is about 3,000° K. A surface burst viewed from the air may exhibit a spectrum more nearly like an air burst. 2,000 4,000 7,000 10,000 20JOOO 40,000 7Q&O G q FIGURE 3-5B ATMOSPHERIC TRANSHISSIVITY VS. SLANT RANGE-AIR AND | i i i I 1 1 • IPOO 2,000 4,000 7,000 10,000 20,000 40,000 70,000 Slant Ron«t (YordO 12.3 r n ii nifcfttiTi 1 1 «HnffrniLN i wii iiL Table l£-2. Critical Radiant Exposure Values far Various Material* Material Tent material: Canvas, white, 12 oz/yd 1 , untreated Canvas, OD, 12 oz/yd 1 , flame-proofed Packaging materials: Fibreboard, V2S, BT 850 psi, laminated Fibreboard, V3S, BT 275 psi r laminated Fibreboard, V3C, BT 850 psi, corrugated Fibreboard, W5C, BT 200 psi, corrugated Plywood, douglas fir 0i in.) Airship material, aluminized, N-113A100, 16 oz/yd 3 Airship material, aluminized, N-113A70, 19.4 oz/yd* Airship material, aluminized, N-128A170, 8 oz/yd 1 Doped fabrics (used on some aircraft control surfaces) : Cellulose nitrate covered with 0.0015" thick aluminum foil. Cellulose nitrate, aluminized Plastics: Laminated methyl methacrylate USAF window plastic (J4 in.) Vinylite (opaque), Vi in. thick Sand: Coral Siliceous Sandbags: Cotton canvas, dry* filled Wood, white pine ■■ White pine, given protective coating Construction materials: Roll roofing, mineral surface Roll roofing, smooth surface Damage Destroyed. Destroyed. Flames during exposure Flames during exposure Flames during exposure Flames during exposure Flames during exposure Aluminum surface discolored. Aluminum surface destroyed . Fabric destroyed Aluminum surface discolored. Aluminum surface destroyed- Fabric destroyed Delaminates Fabric destroyed Sporadic flaming— . Persistent flaming. Surface melts... Bubbling {Dense smoking. Flaming Explosion* Explosion* Failure 0.1 mm depth char. 0.1 mm depth char. Surface melts Flaming during exposure. Surface melts Flaming during exposure. Critical radiant exposure Q„ (cal/sq cm) I KT 12 5 9 7 6 5 9 20 24 27 10 15 20 2 5 60 73 240 3 20 15 11 10 10 40 8 22 4 9 100 KT 10 MT 21 ! 9 I 16 13 11 10 16 35 43 47 IS 27 35 4 10 80 6 120 430 4 20 27 19 18 18 71 14 40 7 16 •"Popcoraing." 7.1a SECTION VII DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES 7.1 General Tunnels in solid rock are difficult to destroy by explosions of nuclear weapons. In this case, the shock wave is transmitted through the rock. When it reaches the tunnel the wave is reflected as a tensile wave, and there is a tendency for the rock to spall or become detached from the rock- tunnel interface. Use of tunnel linings materially reduces this spelling. Mass crushing of the rock and filling of the tunnel occurs closer to the burst point. 7.4 Field Fortifications a- Air Blast Air blast is the controlling damage-producing mechanism for destruction of field fortifications, including those reinforced, revetted or covered. Definitions of severe, mod- erate, and light damage levels to various types of field fortifications are given in table 7-4. These damage levels are based upon various degrees of collapse and structural failure except for un- revetted trenches and foxholes, which have dam- age levels based on degree of filling caused by collapse of the walls and by filling with dust and debris. Areas covered with loose material, such as sand and gravel, may provide sufficient dust and debris to completely fill a trench or foxhole, whereas areas with stable vegetation or areas of dry silty soil may not provide significant quanti- ties of dust and debris to appreciably fill a trench or foxhole. Collapse of the walls of foxholes and trenches by air blast and air induced ground shock is usually not significant except at ranges less than those shown for severe damage in figure 7-22* Table 7-4. Damage Criteria for Field Fortification* Description Severe Unrevetted trenches and fox- The trench or foxhole is holes with or without light at least 50 percent cover. filled with earth. FIGURES 7-20—7-22 The curves in figure 7-22 are based on results of tests run in a consolidated dry sand and gravel soil. Trenches and foxholes in damp soil with stable vegetation or dry eilty soil will receive moderate and severe damage at ranges less than those shown in figure 7-22. The curves of figure 7-22 are for average rectangular foxholes with the longitudinal axis perpendicular to the direction of air blast propagation. Damage will be equal or less for other orientations. Given: A 50 KT burst at an altitude of 1,000 feet. Find: To what horizontal distance there is a 50 percent probability of severe damage to an unrevetted foxhole in a dry, consolidated sand and gravel soil. Solution: 680 yards. Approximately 20 psl peak overpressure Table 7-8. Damage Criteria for Underground Structures Structure Damage Damage distance Remarks Relatively small, heavy, well designed under- ground targets. Relatively long, flexible targets, such as buried pipelines, tanks, etc. (Severe t Light [Severe < Moderate... Light \%R. 2* i#R* 2R m 2H to 3ft. Collapse. Slight cracking, severance of brittle external connections. Deformation and rupture. Slight deformation and rupture. Failure of connections. (Use higher value for radial orientation of connections.) Note, i?.- Apparent Crater Radius. UNOBSTRUCTED (DESERT) TERRAIN (NO ENERGY LOSS FROM BLAST BY WORK) FIGURE 7-10A SEVERE DAMAGE TO REINFORCED CONCRETE FRAME OFFICE BUILDINGS 200 400 000 800 1.000 1.200 1.400 1,600 GROUND RANGE (yard*) 2.1c (1) FIGURE 2-6 GROWTH OF THE MACH STEM Region of Moch Reflection Region of Regulor Reflection FIGURE 2-7 MACH STEM HEIGHT (I KT) Horizontal Range (yards) FIGURE 4-21 JjMHWHTini 4-54 (SUOIOJJH) PJ9JA |D|0± - p|«JA uoittu 4-38 Center Thick- Wind Yield height ness Radius speed (kt) (ra) (m) (km/hr) 1 2,840 1760 10 7,000 3060 100 11,700 5340 920 39.6 2400 70.2 6000 72.0 Rainout through entire cloud 1 v s as 6 E ^ bo g il ■ mm W 00 iO J1 oo "8 . 5 e S E S CO w 4) C o 2 § *2 1 s 3 K 8 3 2 C s .a 2 < 2 CM ^ ^ ■ * _ ^ 15-ktBuffalo-1 ^ (AWRE-T28/57, p. 26) 1 mm TWO FALLOUT PARTICLES FROM A TOWER SHOT AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE PARTICLE ON THE LEFT IS A PERFECT SPHERE WITH A HIGHLY GLOSSY SURFACE; THE ONE ON THE RIGHT HAS MANY PARTIALLY-ASSIMILATED SMALLER SPHERES ATTACHED TO ITS SURFACE. BOTH PARTICLES ARE BLACK AND MAGNETIC AND HAVE A SUPERFICIAL METALLIC APPEARANCE. THIN SECTION AND RADIOGRAPH OF A FALLOUT PARTICLE FROM A MODERATE-YIELD TOWER SHOT AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THIS PARTICLE IS COMPOSED OF A TRANSPARENT GLASS CORE WITH A DARKLY COLORED IRON OXIDE GLASS OUTER ZONE. MOST OF THE RADIOACTIVITY IS CONCENTRATED IN THE OUTER ZONE I 1 mm 1 C.E. Adorns. The Hature of Individual Radioactive Particles ♦ IV. Fallout Particlee From A.B*D- of Operation UPSEOT-KNOTHOIB* U.S» Kaval Badio- logical Defense Laboratory Beportj USNRDL-ttO, February 2h, 195k THIN SECTION AND RADIOGRAPH OF A FALLOUT PARTICLE FROM A SMALL-YIELD SURFACE SHOT AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE PARTICLE IS A TRANSPARENT YELLOW-BROWN GLASS WITH MANY INCLUSIONS OF GAS BUBBLES AND UNMELTED MINERAL GRAINS. THE RADIOACTIVITY IS DISTRIBUTED IRREGULARLY THROUGHOUT THE GLASS PHASE OF THE PARTICLE 1.2 KT JANGLE-SUGAR NEVADA SURFACE BURST C»E* Adams , »t al. The Nature of Individual Radioactive Particles. I. Surface and Underground A.B.D. Particles From Operation JANGLE • U.S. Naval Radiological Defease Laboratory Report, USNRDL-37V, November 28, 1952 thin section and radiograph of an angular fallout particle from a large-yield surface shot at the eniwetok proving grounds. this particle is composed almost entirely of calcium hydroxide with a thin outer layer of calcium carbonate, the radioactivity has collected on the surface and has diffused a short distance into the particle 1 mm * V USNRDL-TR-IQ49 29 July 198b AD641480 REMOVAL OF SIMULATED FALLOUT FROM ASPHALT STREETS BY FIREHOSING TECHNIQUES by L.L.Wiltshire W.L.Owen In general, removal effectiveness Improves with increased particle size range and increased mass loading, ibr the expenditure of an effort of k nozzle-minutes (12 man-minutes) per ICr ft , results ranged as follows: Particle Size Range Nominal Mass Loading Removal Effectiveness (uj (g/ft g ) (Residual Fractio n), H - 88 4.0 0.16 2k.O 0.07 350 - 700 4.0 0.005 2k.O 0.003 U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY SAN FRANCISCO * CALIFORNIA 94135 Radiation protection factors in modern city buildings DCPA Attack Environment Manual, ch. 6, panel 18 TRINITY GROUND ZERO: 8000 R/hr at 1 hour TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REP CRT - AFSWP NO. 507 RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT HAZARDS FROM SURFACE BURSTS OF VERY HIGH YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS by D . C . Borg L. D. Gates T. A. Gibson, Jr. R. W. Paine, Jr. MAY 195 k HEADQUARTERS, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT WASHINGTON 13, D. C. e. Passive defense measures, intelligently applied, can drasti- cally reduce the lethally hazardous areas. A course of action involving the seeking of optimum shelter, followed by evacuation of the contaminated area after a week or ten days, appears to offer the best chance of survival. At the distant downwind areas, as much as 5 to 10 hours after detonation time may be available to take shelter before fall-out commences. f . Universal use of a simply constructed deep underground shelter, a subway tunnel, or the sub-basement of a large building could eliminate the lethal hazard due to external radiation from fall-out completely, if followed by evacuation from the area when ambient radiation intensities have decayed to levels which will permit this to be done safely. vii Table II Total Isodose Contour; 500r from Fall-out to H+50 Hours Yield (MT) 15 1 10 60 Downwind extent (mi) 180 52 152 3^0 Area (mi 2 ) 5hO0 470 3880 17,900 SANDIA REPORT SAND2009-3299 Unlimited Release Printed May 2009 Analysis of Sheltering and Evacuation Strategies for an Urban Nuclear Detonation Scenario Larry D. Brandt, Ann S. Yoshimura Executive Summary A nuclear detonation in an urban area can result in large downwind areas contaminated with radioactive fallout deposition. Early efforts by local responders must define the nature and extent of these areas, and advise the affected population on strategies that will minimize their exposure to radiation. These strategies will involve some combination of sheltering and evacuation actions. Options for shelter-evacuate plans have been analyzed for a 10 kt scenario in Los Angeles. Results from the analyses documented in this report point to the following conclusions: • When high quality shelter (protection factor ~1 or greater) is available, shelter-in-place for at least 24 hours is generally preferred over evacuation. • Early shelter-in-place followed by informed evacuation (where the best evacuation route is employed) can dramatically reduce harmful radiation exposure in cases where high quality shelter is not immediately available. • Evacuation is of life-saving benefit primarily in those hazardous fallout regions where shelter quality is low and external fallout dose rates are high. These conditions may apply to only small regions within the affected urban region. • External transit from a low quality shelter to a much higher quality shelter can significantly reduce radiation dose received if the move is done soon after the detonation and if the transit times are short. I Evacuation From SF-10 a 2. •>150 rem »>300 rem 10 2 4 6 8 Time Evacuation Begins (hrs) Figure 12. Departure time sensitivities for informed evacuations from shelters with SF=4 Sandia National Laboratories « 3 a w B § 8 IT* 1 £ CO 43 If O 3 N W Ifl CD CM cq 00 00 ^ ia *o t> • • • C* CO 0> N l» N M M CO t- 00 t~ 00 00 00 • •••••• 00 OOHHrt««^ ih in o o o o rH © O © I ! I F. Titus, Penetration in concrete of gamma radia- tion from fallout. NBS Report 6143, (Sept. 4, 1958;, AEC Report ITR-1477 (Oct. 22, 1957). The lead shield prevents fallout material from settling directly on detector "A," while at the same time shielding against the intercepted material I0 5 10* I0 3 uJIO* .60 4-» -M «« 00 * « 4-* 4-» 4-» og.2 «S ^ o a o u O D CO O Q .5 c<~ 3 I — 4 O 4-* Oi o ° J3*a a> £43 D "O o> co c cc2oo P-M t? O 'ail 4> 3^ +-■ O G> r> m Oi O a CO rj U co » •53 p,«oo o afc o s o 00 ! iv o 8 iS 5 ^ " a3 g 2 w lie Cm o d^3 ^ CO O 4) IS o 00 o o 00 00 o o a KJ v> c"2 •9g •So P o c t5 3 If «*5 J 6 3 O 00 d O o CO d CO SP 43 d f*1 00 43 d o O 00 43 d 11 Salt slurry droplet translucent white CRYSTALS WATER INSOLUBLE SOLIDS ENLARGED PARTICLE WATER SURFACE BURST A Fallout Forecasting Technique With Results Obtained at the Eniwetok Proving Ground E. A. Schuert, TJSNRDL TR-139, United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif. Time variation of the winds aloft In most of the observations made at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, the winds aloft were not in a steady state. Significant changes in the winds aloft were observed in as short a period as 3 hours. This variability was probably due to the fact that proper firing conditions w T hich required winds that would deposit the fallout north of the proving ground, occurred only during an unstable synoptic situation of rather short duration. 4.5 megaton Navajo /HEIGHT LINES FORECAST "HOT LINE* 60,000 FORECAST AREA OF FALLOUT ^ / m MEASURED ISODOSE RATE CONTOURS 15,000- Comparison of fallout forecast with test results SURFACE ZERO o 20 40 60 NAUTICAL MILES HEIGHT LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED HEIGHT OF ORIGIN FOR VARIOUS SIZES SIZE LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED PARTICLE SIZE FROM VARIOUS HEIGHTS HOT LINE = HEIGHT LINE FROM BASE OF MUSHROOM DISC (MAXIMUM FALLOUT) 4.5 MT NAVAJO (5% FISSION), 7.54 STAT. MILES W 4.5 MT NAVAJO (5% FISSION), 21.0 STAT. MILES N 100 200 300 400 500 TIME SINCE DETONATION (MIN) Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D. 6 11 16 21 TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR) Characterization of Fallout, Project 2.63 LAND SURFACE BURST A Fallout Forecasting Technique With Results Obtained at the Eniwetok Proving Ground E. A. Schuert, USNRDL TR-139, United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif. 2.36 g/cu cm irregular in shape Falling speeds (feet/hour) Altitude 75 /x 100/i 200^ 350 jit 8,060 3, 360 3,870 4, 200 8, 910 5,040 5, 980 6,910 7, 700 6,960 11,700 14, 400 18,600 24,400 27,800 21,600 27, 100 35, 300 47, 200 61,900 20 40_ 60 80 5 megaton Tewa f 75,000 Comparison of fallout forecast with test results NAUTICAL MILES HEIGHT LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED HEIGHT OF ORIGIN FOR VARIOUS SIZES SIZE LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED PARTICLE SIZE FROM VARIOUS HEIGHTS HOT LINE = HEIGHT LINE FROM BASE OF MUSHROOM DISC (MAXIMUM FALLOUT) 5 MT TEWA (87% FISSION), 7.84 STAT. MILES WSW 100 5 MT TEWA (87% FISSION), 59.3 STAT. MILES NW 1 150 300 450 600 TIME SINCE DETONATION (MIN) 12 17 22 27 32 TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR) Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D. ; Characterization of Fallout WT-1316 ft maximum dose r Depth: Maximum dose rate Distance Value from (r/hr) GZ (ft) Maximum contour distance from GZ (ft) 500 r/hr 300 r/hr 100 r/hr 540 900 2200 4900 12,500 21 ft at crater lip 7500 r/hr at H+l hour Contour area (sq mi) -^jjjj — Laurino, YL K*, and L G. Poppoff, 1953: Contamination r/hr r/hr patterns at Operation JANGLE. U. S. Nav. Had. Def. 0.05 0.15 0.55 Lab. Rep. USNRDL-399, 28 pp. 500 r/hr Olttonet From GZ.Y.r* 1 g mph mean wind speed 1.2 kt SUGAR test (Nevada surface burst) 610 m Source: weapon test report WT-414 Gamma dose rate (R/hr) Gamma dose (R) 610 m- Downwind distance I 914 m r 1220 m 1 3350 m '14650 m ^ ] 1830 2440 m 610 m * y 914 m 3350 m 4650 m 1220 m 1830 m 2440 m I 10 100 1000 10* Time after burst (seconds) 1.2 kt UNCLE test (5.2 m underground, Nevada) Source: weapon test report WT-414 Gamma dose rate (R/hr) Gamma dose (R) 1000 Li- 610 m 914 m 1220 m 1830 m-J 2440 m 3350 m~ 4270 m ■610 m 43 TR's indicated, on the average, 0.85 ±25 percent of the survey meter readings 60 observed/calculated ratio varies from 0.45 at 11.2 hours to 0.66 from 100 to 200 hours, to 0.56 between 370 and 1,000 hours. Stotion Location ui io-i HOW ISLAND PLATFORM F HOW ISLANO MONITORING PTS Height 25 FT 3 FT Station F at How Island 2.08 x 10" fissions/ft 2 (Table B.27) ■ TABLE B. 1 Till nun r/hr 23 0. 0055 24 0.0086 26 0. 013 27 0. 051 30 0.47 46 1.09 62 2. 67 130 2.17 200 1.17 400 0.54 Instrument not operated HOW ISLAND STATION Standard Stotion Minor Array (Cone height: 10ft) Station K i Untvtn Oround VP Standard Platform Major Array (Platform height: 25 ft station F . ^OWl.NOST.T.ON^. I' Buried Tray and ■ Survey Point Array (Numbered points indicate survey and buried AOCt locations! SCALE (FT) 2 1 j \ ' 5: 50 IOO 200 10-3 10 10 s TIME SINCE ZUNI (HR) WM317 Figure B.7 G amma-ionization-decay rate. Site How. 10 -8 10 -9 I Sio CO -10 w 10 -11 2 a io" 12 10 -13 10 -14 ZUNI LAGOON TEWA LAGOON ZUNI CLOUD \ RAJ DIOACTIVE D SURF BCAY RATE ACE BURST — \ \o \\ X v \ \ \ TEWA LAGOON" ZUNI CLOUD \X X X \\ ^fe. x ** A ^ x ^ — X \\ ^ X ' -;\ x *v \\ X \ X X \ \ZUNI CLOUD ^X X — ZUNI \\\ \\\ LAGOON \ >N \ y NAVAJO \\ — X / % TEWA CLOUD FLATHEAD TEWA X^ X ■ X^ X ovX n X X V\ w lagoonNVV Triffet an i i nun d LaRiviere, W 1 i i nun r-1317 (1961) , 1 i i Mini p. 112 i i linn 1 1 llllll 10 .1 10 10' TIME (HR) 10* 10 4 ooo o o *n oj o «n cm — 3JLVH 3anSOdX3 IVIOI JO lN30d3d 1. Total fission yields add up to 200% (2 fission fragments per fission) — 2. Minimum (at mass ~115) is shallower for higher neutron energies 3. Data apply to fission by the lowest possible energy (thermal) neutrons The reason for the peaks at masses -100 and -140 was discovered by Marie Goeppert Mayer in 1948: nuclei with "magic numbers" of 2, 8, 20, 50, 82, or ■ 1 26 neutrons or protons have high stability due to closed shells of 2, 6, 1 2, 30, 32, and 44 nucleons (nucleons, unlike electrons, have spin-orbital interaction) — I J 1 I I I I I I I I I I 76 82 88 94 100 106 112 118 124 130 136 142 148 1 54 160 MASS NUMBER Radioactivity in the Marine Environment (1971), page 13 Specific activity of 15 Mt Bravo fallout (depletion of volatile decay chains) 10 10* 10 Fallout particle diameter (microns) a 9 e 7 1 x a 53 C a a - O a o\ cr y x ts vo • • • * »0 ^ ~ oo *o ^ »o oo Strontium-89 Krypton-90 y% g ec * Kubidium-90 y short^ strontium -9° 31 As expected from the earlier discussion, strontium exhibits very definite fractionation. On one series of air samples collected at 1*0,000 feet at Operation CASTLE after the Bravo shot, the R value for strontium-89 was 0.35* For a fall-out sample collected on land at ap- proximately 80 miles from the burst point, the R value for strontium-89 was O.lU. 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U O U U -2 o o ^ &s ^ ^ 2 W) N CO O .!2 i— 00 IV W> -H- 3 o "5 CO - 5 D CO V) —J CO * "O U. U* CO U O CO ■D O 2 a ^ CN CN • * * M- O O D O > 0) a co 0) a E a CO "5 o o CO O _Q UJ O O co uL CO o O 3 >- co ■D "6 c O CO *J= 3 U IV lO CO CO O U) U> CO 2 Q. ^ c 3 10 ? if ck "O -D |B S c »• 5 C ,«2 I E 2 o >. 111 >;£ E S o ^ CN ^ i E E E "° c ° ° £ o *- £ E a E U D w O) (D 0) O) ^ 3 &g "D w co a> .-9 z >. c o DOC 0) U co 3 00 t CO D Q- CN JZ a o u 2 o S £ log ^ 3 O o So E £ M il RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN pages 1689-1691 A. B. R. E. HP/R 2017 ATOMIC EXEBGY RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT The Radiological Dose to Persons in the U. K. Due to Debris From Nuclear Test Explosions Prior to January 1956 By N. G. Stewart, R. N. Crooks, and Miss E. M. R. Fisher Activity from Neutron Capture Although several different radioactive elements may be created by the capture of neutrons in materials close to the reacting core of a weapon, the only signifi- cant reactions to produce gamma-ray emitters are those associated with the natural uranium which may be used as the tamper material of the bomb. neutron (low energy) + U-238 U-239 Np-239 Chemical analysis of the debris shows that in general about one neutron Is captured in this way for every fission that occurs, both in nominal bombs and in thermonuclear explosions. The U 239 decays completely before reaching the U.K. but at four days after time of burst the Np 239 disintegration rate reaches a peak relative to that of the fission products and accounts for about 60% of the observed activity at that time. In addition to this, a smaller number of the neutrons in a thermonuclear explosion undergo an (n,2n) reaction with U 238 to form 6.7 day U 237 which is also a 0,7) emitter. neutron (high energy) + U-238 2 neutrons + U-237 O < O o a: us CL <0 40 — 20 O O X U-287 — Np-239 th L 1 1 1 I 0.4 0.8 1.2 PHOTON ENERGY, Mev 1.6 MeV/PHOTON p O CO o p CJ1 o o ■ o bo o b ro Ul H m 8 - o o ro o o s o o 8 M O o o CJ1 o - BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR HEARINGS BEFORE THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON KADIATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENEBGY CONGRESS OP THE UNITED STATES EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR JUNE 22, 23, 24, 25, AND 26, 1959 PART 1 Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy N UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 43338 WASHINGTON : 1959 O 6 H m o o ifl m O O vO rf m nO o o o o o » o o o o o > & m m rg ^* o o >s GO U ft) a *- -3 ^ S o •) ^ ^ ^1 ™ 2! c <^ F— I (\J ■— I 1— I r— « 1— < M > p o IB P H d ■H-t o H D <: H co D CQ W U <; co Pi W H IK O to O H CO -h 2 8 W r- H U in o o m in O ff^ >0 ^ ro >fl * • • • * * ^00000 u ft) CS W ft) ft) > x! x! ™ Tl i* (3 #—4 C\l i-H i-H i-H 00 00 3 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR "WAR 197 the induced radiation in uranium 238. We can refer to a British report which indicates that around 60 percent of the total activity at jE days — activity m this case is the number of disintegrations — is due to the uranium 239 and neptunium 239 j that are produced, as the British say, in either large or small weapons. 1 believe part of the hump on the curves m the early times, say around 4 days, is largely Hue to this. EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 205 Dr. Tkhtet. Yes. I thought this might be an appropriate place to comment on the variation of the average energy, it is clear when vou think of shielding, because the eft'ectivenes^soFshieldi ng depends directly on the averag e energy radiation from the depositeoTiimteriaT As 1 mentioned, "Dr7 Cook at our laboratory has done quite a bjF ^f. work on this. What it amounts to is that at one hour the average energy is about one Mev. This appears, by the way, in the tables that are in my written statement but that I did not present orally. Representative Holefield. Mev. means? Dr. Teiffet. Million electron volts. At 2 hours it drops to 0.95. At a half day, to 0.6. At 1 week it drops to 0.35. Then it begins to go up again. At 1 month, it is 0.65, 2 months 0.65. The meaning of this is simply that there is a period around 1 week when if induced pro ducts are important m the bomb, there are a lot oi" radiati ons emanating from these, but the energy is low so it operates to reduce the average energy m this period and shielding is immensely more elective. EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 217 Strontium 90, for example, has 33-second krypton as its birth predecessor ; cesium 137 derives from a fission chain headed up by 22-seeond iodine, followed by 3.9-minute xenon. Because of their vola- tile or gaseous ancestry in the fireball or bomb cloud a number of the high- yield fission products are formed in finely divided particles. Some of these are so small that they are not subject to gravitational settling, and in fact they remain suspended in the earth's atmosphere for many years, providing 6 that they reach the stratosphere at the proper latitude. In any event such fission products would be depleted in the local fallout. For example, the irradiation of uranium 238 w ith „low . Mev_._jyeu trofrs forms neptun ium ^^T^^^^E^^^^^^^J^Ml IZIIIE ^af^r^Bora ygetMaH^r~ At_higher neutron energies, such as ce rta in types of ther monuclear weapons ■produ ce? naturaFuranium unde rgoes an^n^n)~reYcHon 'TagF^sT on in T7^/ The data of R." J. has^a fission cross, sectio n of OLgJbarn fr^StaBMev., thereafte r climbin g to a plateau jvai ue oQZF 13T3!eY f ~Atl3.6 Mevrthe re Is ""a threshoIiOor "the (^n,2n)~r^ctiorrand the reactiojThasa cr^£s ^tion of 1.4 b arns injbh e range "oTTO Mev. The ready identification of U 237 i n f allout ^points To fast~5ssion of IfT^g ^s a^iaih ener^ source in high-yield me gaton-class weapons. 6 See E. A. Mar tell, "Atmospheric Circulation; and Deposition of Strontium 90 Debris," Air Force Cambridge Research Center paper (July 1958). See also W. F, Libby, "Radio- active Fallout/' speech of Mar, 13, 1959. T Variation of Gamma Radiation Rates for Different Elements Following an Underwater Nuclear Detonation/' J. Colloid, Science, 13 (1958) , p. 829. e "Reaction Cross Sections of U 238 in the Low Mev, Ranse/' UCRL 5323 (Aug. 15, 1958). o 0) in a © VI 0> o 03 © 03 t/5 >» 03 03 5/5 03 a >» 03 03 03 60 3 8 S N o3 o bJO do SPECTROMETRY ANALYSIS OF GAMMA RADIATION FROM FALLOUT FROM OPERATION REDWING Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL- TR- 1 46 29 April 1957 by W. E. Thompson Nuclear Rc.diation Characteristics R. L. Mather. Head Nucleonics Division A. Guthrie, Head Scientific Director P.C. Tompkins Commanding Officer and Director Captain Richard S. Mandelkorn, USN U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY San Francisco 24, California Fig. I TABLE 1 Sampl Site Designation Abbreviated Designation Std High Gain Cain Collector Type Collector Location From GZ Std Cloud AA Shot Cherokee AB Filter Paper Cloud Std Cloud BA BB YFNB "Whim" 1 FA How F. 61 GA GB YAG 40 B- \H HA HB How F-67 1A IB YAG 40 B-6 JA JB Std Cloud KA KB YAG 3Q C-36 LA LB YFNB- 13- E- 56 KiA MB NA NB Std Cloud OA OB YFNB- 13-E- 54 PA PB YFNB- 13-E- 56 RA RB YAG 39 C-21 SA YAG 39 C-36 GA QB Std Cloud TA TB YAG 39 C-36 UA UB YFNB- 13-E- 56 VA VB Y3-T-1C-D WA YFNB- 13-E- 54 XA XB YAG 39 C-21 YA YB Shot Zum Filter Paper Deck(a) occ( fa ) OCC OCC OCC Shot Flathead Filter Paper OCC OCC OCC Shot Navaho Filter Paper OCC OCC OCC OCC Shot Tewa Filter Paper OCC OCC Seawater\ c J OCC OCC Cloud 10 mi ENE 13 mi ENE 52 NNW 13 mi ENE 52 mi NNW Cloud 29 mi NNE 7.5 mi WNW 7.5 mi WNW Cloud 8.5 mi W 8.5 mi W 21 mi NNW 2 1 mi NNW Cloud 24 NNW 10 mi SW 10 mi SW 24 mi NNW (a) Picked up at random from deck of YFNB- 29. (b) Open- close collector (c) Evaporated sample from large open tank on deck. TKBLt t AbMUtc Phato. ISUn^rd G*.*>. M»Uu,r. «1 PbMonft P«r SftCoad Ft U»« for tftcft S«mpi> Tim* Aft** Hi 191 11% 24 2 262. S «*.s S9T.S S3 242 4)4 790 1295 357 NA 51. S OA 413 57* 1SW 0.75 * I0 tc * 3.3i* s 0.60 * ID 2.70 * S 0.46 * 10 l.»0ft s 0.21 * 10 1. 13* 5 0.30 * 10 0,72 * S 0.24 * 10 0.6* • 10 0.24 * 15 0.5* * 10 0.i9 * 10 0,46 4 10 0.15 * IS D.30 * 10 0.10 * IS 0.19 * to 0.05 * 20 0.07 * IS J. 71 ft 5 »0 i.ia 4 20 3. J 1 * 5 Q.»3 * 20 0,92 * 20 2.4$ 4 4 »0 0.10 * 25 i.*s * io >0 0.41 * 20 o.w * 1 s 0.21 4 20 0.12 * 30 0,65 * 20 0.2* * 20 0. 11 * 20 0.17 * 20 0.1 1 * 35 0.04 * 30 0.0S * 2S o.o* * IS 0.02 * SO Q.02 4 SO o.os * 25 0.2Q * 10 0.50 ft 10 0.0 J * 20 0.13 4 20 0.0 s * 20 1 1.44 * 10 S.J4* f 4.21 4 10 1.07 * 15 5.70 * 15 0.54 ft 20 0.32 * 20 O.JO * 30 0.22 * 20 0.1* ft 20 0.7S 4 10 0.52 * IS 0.10 * 2* O.Ofc 4 40 0.4T 4 20 0,15 * IS 0.01 4 2S 0.05 * 20 1.93 * 10 0.42 * 10 0.41 * 10 0.3* * IS 0.25 * li 0.01 * 20 0.03 4 30 0.01 * 40 1.07 4 10 0.14 4 20 0.04 4 40 0.02 4 40 0.S4 * 20 0.70 * 25 0.39 4 tg 1.62* 4 1.37* 4 O.St 4 b 0.S5 * 6 Q.34 * 10 0.31 4 (0 0.32 4 10 0.22 * 10 0.18 * ti 0-14 * IS 2.62 * 4 2.17* 1 1.71 ft 4 1.32* 5 0.74 * 10 0.46 * 10 O.U * 20 0.05 4 30 o.o2 * n l.ib ft 6 0.T0 * 10 0.52 * 10 0.24 * U 0.23 4 10 0. J 6 * 13 0.12 * 20 0.1) * 25 O.Ob 4 25 0. 06 4 10 0.04 * SO 2.SS * 7 2.04 * S I. 31 * S 1 .06 - 10 0.43 * 10 0.2* * J S 0.06 • 25 0.02 4 40 0. 02 * SO O.U * JO 0.0* * 33 0. U5 * 30 3.02 * 40 Q.J* * 30 J, 41 * IS 2.7 J 4 10 2.41 * 20 1. ttt 6 20 J.20 * 15 ^.6* * 20 0,39 * 30 0.22 * 30 0.12 * 30 0.66 * IS J.*7 * 20 0.24 * 20 0.22 4 1 5 0.10 4 30 0.02 4 1J 0.49 * 10 0.32 * 15 0.16 4 20 0.J2 * 40 0.02 4 SO 0.4O 4 IJ 0.26 * 15 O.J» * 20 0,0* • 30 1.1S * 10 0.17 4 10 0.10 4 30 0.02 * 40 0.14 * IS 0.S9 • 10 0.08 * 25 0.04 * 30 6.27 4 10 2.32 * 5 1.14* S 0.76 4 10 0.44 4 10 0.13 • 15 0.04 4 IS 0.02 * 30 »0 2.71 • 20 3.00 * 20 ).ll * 10 0.83 * 10 0.»9 * 10 0.67 * 10 0.4 7 4 10 0.23 4 10 0.20 * 20 Q. 51 4 0 D.S6 * 5 0.12 * i5 0.10 * B 0.0* * 25 0.03 4 25 >0 0,02 • 40 0.41 4 30 316 * 25 ti.tw * 40 3.40 * 20 0.1 4 * 40 0.1 4 * I 5 j.14 * 25 v.15 ft 20 ,.36 • 30 0,01 * 10 >0 0.0 I • V- 0.4? 4 30 0.14 4 30 0,13 * IS 0.01 4 0.14 4 0.04 * J. 02 * 9.*J 4 15 f.70 * 2J t.SO * 25 4.27* 7 3.n * io 1,-7 4 10 0,7* 4 IS 0.36 * 20 0,20 « 25 0.05 4 30 u.j 3 4 SO 2.2V * 10 1.28 * 20 0.63 4 IS 0.31 4 IS 0.13 * 30 2.31 * iO I.I 1 4 10 0.5* ft 10 0.21 4 IS 0.02 * SO 0.0) * so ;.2* * « 0.32 * 0.14 4 -<0 0.16 * 0.J6 • 35 >/.IO* 0.02 4 40 v.Qi * O.uS * 35 0.11 * 0.02 4 10 J * (J.14 * 15 0.05 * JO 0.0! * 2S o.j . * 30 »0 »0 >>0 2.7b 4 25 0.85 * 40 J .56 4 iO 0.16 * 30 0.21 4 20 O.iy * 20 0.13 * 10 O.U * 15 0,70 * 30 0.42 * SO ■0.1 t ft 50 OA S 4 JO 0.06 4 £0 OJV * 35 0.22 4 30 O.M 4 20 O.Ot * 30 0,01 4 40 0.02 * K 0.26 ft 10 0.16 * U 0.14 * IS 0.1 1 * IS 0.1 1 ft 20 0.10 * 25 0.01 * 25 0.06 * 30 0.0 3 * 50 O.S2 * IS 0.4 * 10 0.32 * 10 0.14 t 20 t 22 * 14 LSI « J 5 0.<»S * 2o 0.24 * 20 0.14 * 30 0.15 4 10 O.U? * 10 0.10 * 30 0.O-, ft 10 0.03 * 30 0.03 * 40 2.32 * 15 Q.S* * IS 0.2v * IS 0.17 * 20 0.12 * 20 0.01 * JO O.01 * 15 0.23 4 20 0,01 * 40 0.92 * U 0.71 * 10 0.26 * 15 Q.iQ * ) i 0.05 * 30 >0 0.20 * 25 0.10 ft 30 O.Oo » 40 0.04 4 40 0.13 4 14 0.04 * 20 0.O3 4 25 3.67 * S 1.94 * 5 0.*1 * 5 0.51 * 10 0.22 * 25 0.0* * 30 0.05 4 IS 0.02 4 «S 1.06* 5 0.72 4 .0 O.J* * 10 0.27 ft ,0 0.0? ft 20 1.11 ft 5 0.5S 4 10 4.3) 4 10 0.1* * 35 0.03 * 35 >0 6.10* 5 2.56 * 10 0.76 4 IS 0.44 ft 14 0.01 4 40 0.1* * 30 0.23 « 30 0.1Q 4 40 0.05 ft 40 1.90 ft 20 J .13 • 30 0.41 * 20 u.lj ft 20 0.1 v< * 20 0.1 J 4 20 3.59* 5 1.52 ft 10 0.54 4 10 0.26 ft 10 0.O6 * 30 0.07 * 30 1.B8 t O.Sfc * 0.31 * 0.16 « 25 0.04 ft 30 0.02 ft 30 0.1* ft 10 0.07 ft 30 0.04 ft 40 0.02 ft 30 1 .35 « 20 0.56 * 20 0.40 ft 10 0.30 4 20 0.25 ft 14 0.10 « 15 0.04 4 20 0.03 * 40 0,39 4 IS 0.07 ft 30 0,05 ft 40 0.0* * 20 0.02 ft 50 0.02 * 50 (t.aa 4 io 0.36 * 20 0.21 ft 30 O.U * 25 >0 0.57 4 20 0.32 ft 15 0,15 * 20 J.Q-f * 20 0.03 ft 40 0.55 * IS 0.20 4 15 0.0* * 30 0.03 * 40 0.02 4 40 0.01 ft SO 3.04 4 20 0.13 * 10 0.j2 * 50 0.09 * 30 0.0. * 23 O.U 4 25 0.05 * 40 0.02 ft 40 0.11 4 40 O.O* ft 40 0,04 4 50 20 * 20 0.16 * 20 0.12 * 20 0.09 * 25 0. 06 * 20 0.07 * 30 0.17 * 25 O.U * 25 0.20 * 30 0.12 * 30 »0 »0 »0 0.J6 * 30 0.18 ft 10 0.17 ft 30 0.06 4 30 >0 2. if * 10 I ,8b • 10 1.59 * 15 J .44 ft IV 0.91 * tZ O.bS * IS 0.47 * 20 0.27 * 20 . 0.16 ft 25 O.JS * 30 t, 02 ft 45 0.21 * 30 0.16 * 30 0.07 4 30 0.07 4 40 0.01 * SO >0 0.»2 * 20 0.60 4 IS 0.33 * 10 0.23 * 20 .54 * 10 0.37 * 10 a. jo * io 0.26 ft 10 20 4 12 Q.IO 4 IS 0. lb * 20 0.21 * IS a. ir t 20 3.32 * 2.16 * 1.4* !.03 < 0.24 • D. 24 % 0.J2 4 20 10 0.4* * 25 0.1* * 20 0.25 * 20 0.10 ft 30 0.10 * 20 S.52 4 10 J. 18 ft 10 3.69 * tJ 2.34 * IS 0.20 ft 20 0.1 7 4 20 0.0* ft 25 »0 »0 0.64 * 40 »0 0.30 * SO O.J 9 * 40 0.1 3 4 30 0.04 * 50 >0 Vj* ft 30 0.16 * 35 0.12 ft 30 0.13 * 3 5 0.0* ft 30 0.14 ft L5 C.27 ft 20 O.U * 20 J. 04 4 30 I .6? * IS 0.7b ft 10 C.60 * iO 0.59 ft IS 0.4* ft 10 a. 32 * io O.Jfc ft I* 0.12 ft 15 0.12 * 10 0.2S ft 15 3.10 4 20 >0 0.17 * 15 0.05 * 40 0.15 ft 25 0.04 4 SO 0.09 * 25 0.O6 * 20 * >Q 0,60 * 10 >0 0.34 ft 15 ?0 0.1 i ft 25 0.0* ft 25 O.U * 20 >D 0.02 * SO .0.11 * 35 O.J3 * IS # Q.07 ft 40 0.30 ft 15 .0.07 • 10 0.35 ft 25 0.05 4 40 0.23 * I 5 0.02 * 40 OS ft 10 0.01 * 50 ,0.« * 10 .3.60 * 50 „0,42 * 45 .j.36 * 35 0.07 4 40 .0.1 • 4 40 ,0.1. * 40 ,0.06 * 40 ,O.0S * 40 0.03 * 40 0.14 * 30 0.10 4 20 0.07 * 30 2.09 * IS l.»6 * 10 1.10 * 10 1.03 * 10 0.95 * 10 3.65 * IS 0.5* * IS 0.34 * IS 0.26 * 20 0.42 * 10 0.77 > 6 0.4b ft 10 0.29 * 10 O.il * 15 0.20 * IS 0.13 * 20 0.10 * 25 0.05 * 25 0.06 * 25 0.03 * 50 ;,57* 5 1.95-ft 7 I .12 ft .0 0. 95 ft 10 D.57 * li O.lb ft 15 0.07 ft 24 0.04 ft 40 0,0b * 35 0.04 * 40 »0 »0 1.3* ft 20 0.S6 * 20 0.»J * 15 O.BS * 15 0.61 ft 10 0,49 * 10 0.31 * IS 0.2b * 15 D.I 1 ft 25 0.10 * 20 0.02 4 40 0.20 4 25 0.16 ft 10 0.0* ft 25 0.04 * 35 t 10 2.i* * 15 1.32* U) Q.iS * 50 0.12 * 40 0.32 * 30 0.25 * 30 0.15 ft 30 0.21 * 35 U.21 6 20 0.1 7 * 40 0.05 4 30 0.04 4 40 2.5b 4 5 0.79*. S 0.42 4 5 0.24 6 (5 0.15 * 15 0.04 4 25 0.62 ft 10 0.i7 ft 12 0.2* ft 15 0.22 4 1 5 0.18 ft 20 0.(5 * 20 0.11 * 20 0.08 ft 40 0.07 ft 10 0.0b * 40 2.05 ft 10 0.»1 ft 10 0.52 ft 20 0,10 ft 15 6.32 * 10 3.51 ft 10 3 . S-* * 30 2.7b ft 15 2.90 * 15 2.90 * 10 2.7V ft 10 2. 37 > 10 1 .8s * 10 J . t>t> ft 10 0.41 ft 10 0.39 * 10 0.31 * .0 0.15 ft 10 2.2* ft 10 0.92 * 5 0.54 * 5 0,0 ft JO 0.30 * iO 0.21 * 10 Q.iu * IS 0.20 * 20 *0.08 * *0,07 ft 0.41 ft 10 0.37 * 25 J. 31 4 25 3.27 * 20 0.2b 4 20 0.11 * 10 l). 10 * 30 j. 02 4 50 0.0) * 25 . u .oj 4 40 *o.u*iS 0,04 * 30 ,0-11 4 10 0.10*40 >o &.o* • so *0 42 * 30 2.14 * 10 V24*2o t.*J*IO 0.16 ft 10 1. 11 * 10 0.10 * 40 l.04> * IS 0.05 * 30 0.62 * 15 0.30 ft 20 O.Sl * 10 >0 0.30 * 15 >0 0.01 ft 35 >0 0.22 4 20 0.14 * 25 >0 0.20 ft 3U 0.41 * 30 Q.J4 4 40 0.06 * 40 0.21 * 25 0,01 ft 50 0.10 * 15 >0 0.02 ft 50 0.22 * 20 0.S2 ft 10 0.6<, * 10 0.12 4 35 0.54 * 10 0.41 * 15 >0 0.20 ft 20 0.19 * 20 >0 >0 0.18 ft 20 0.18 * 20 >0 0.05 * 25 0.O5 4 30 >0 0.03 * SO 0.10 * 25 0.24 4 20 0.12 * 20 0.0* 4 20 0.12 ft 20 19 * 10 0.06 ft 30 0.09 ft 24 0.21 * 20 0,04 4 35 0.03 ft 45 0.12 * 35 >0 0.0* * 30 0.10 4 30 >0 O.02 * 30 0.05 ft 40 0.1 1 * 15 0.15 * IS 0.05 * 20 0.0» * 20 0.01 ft 40 0.06 • 25 0.04 * 25 0.06 ft 20 1.93 * 20 i.bi 6 5 4.83 * 5 0,9? * JO 4.09* S 1.66 4 5 >0 3.17 * 10 2.69* 5 2.26 * 10 1.99 ft 10 > >0 0,36 * 25 1.0 3 * 10 0.94 ft 15 >0 >0 0,50 ft IS 0.73 * 15 >0 >0 0.2* ft 25 0.43 * 25 >0 0.09 * 40 0.37 ft 20 0.06 4 40 0.07 ft 45 0.33 * 20 0.05 4 30 0.06 ft 45 0.30 ft 20 0.02 * 40 0.02 * SO 0.10 * 20 >0 .0.67* 5 0.6J * 10 >0 0.32 * 40 0.36 ft 15 0.40 ft 15 0.06 * SO 19 * 20 0.2b ft 25 0.04 4 SO 0.10 * 30 0.21 * 20 0.04 6 40 0.02 * 50 0.02 * 40 6.1S * 10 >0 w.jj * 20 .50 * 15 0.17 * 30 31 * IS 0.0 b * tO 0.26 * IS 0.05 * 40 0.24 * 20 >0 0.02 * 40 0.24 * IS 0.01 * 50 o.n * to 0.O2 * SO 0.02 * 50 •«.04* 40 >0 0.1S * 25 0.23 * 20 *U.Ob * 50 0,0y • 30 0.1* * 14 Vo* * 40 0.07 * IS j, 15 ft 15 0.04 * JO 0.03 * *0 u.JO * 2i 0.44 4 30 1.6* 4 IU 2.36 4 10 0.24 * 30 >0 .66 * 20 1.61 * )C 0.06 * 40 O.U * 45 0.9b • ID >0 X) >0 j.yO * IS o.o* * » 0.7* * IS 0.07 * 40 0.*1 * 20 >0 >0 O.iO 4 50 0.29 * 40 >.»7 ft 45 '0.20 ft 40 Vlb ft 40 T 0.10 ft 4u 0.10 4 0.07 i 0.0 3 ft 40 0,12 4 40 0.1 1 0.0* ft 15 0.54 * 40 0.01 ft 50 0.37 * 30 0.07 » 40 0,03 * 3* 0.0* * 35 0.1J 4 30 - „ 0.15 * 3C 0-0* * >° 0.17 * 30 0-3« * JJ 0.12 * 40 0.36 * 45 0.07 * 40 0-03 * 4Q O.OS * 50 O Oi * S3 0.02 4 50 0.04 * 20 0-01 * 24 0.29 * 25 0.16 * 45 0.07 * SD 0,09 * 30 0.0* * 10 0.0* * 34 0.03 * 45 >0 >0 0.04 4 40 0.01 • so 0.07 * 45 0.04 4 i ,46 4 i ■>o 0.27 ft 3 tO. 16 * 40 0.0* ft 5 >0 0.09 * 2. >0 0.05 ft 4; 0.03 « 1 (ft) S*« Tftble 1 or *xpi*m«tk *6br«n*ta4 <«»|aftUw. (b) LiJftft 4**L|B*lioia w«rir dixft not f»ftc«4«ftr il> r«pr«*ftbl »a acuu^fttft ft..«r*7 cft.U6ri.tion. T*« ftftftTfy tft r^iadmd oli u> 1M utirtti 10 k*r m«r«ly ft* * llnft »*•* ttfi C*tlw «(Wib«T. {e) Crrer* i^fttfrd ir« u> *•««**. * ta«Ut»Ut *» « TABLK 1 I. i* MUiuwi *f Pbawta Par Sacood P*r Lio» tor C*ch Sampl* 410 ... 003 960 1 040 1 100 1 170 1240 IJ70 1600 1690 2fV) - 4.92 * JO 0.** a 7 O.M a 20 - - .2 5 * 10 - ~ - 0,77 * 6 0,62 a 10 •a t>,|4 a Oil * it) - 0.25 a 10 - - 0.46 * 10 0.47 a 1 2 O.OB ± ^0 0.25 a 10 ~ 0.29 * 10 .24 a I 5 0.27 a 10 0.21 * 14 0.22 a 15 Z 0.2) a l b z OJO * 1) 0.18 a 20 - - - - - - - - 0.23 * IS - - 0,13 * 20 0.1* * 20 - - - - — 0.10 * 25 0.1) * 20 - - 2 a JO - - - 0,05 * 25 0.01 * 40 - - 20 a 10 - 0.0* * 2) 0.O7 a 30 - - 0.154 1 5 - 9.03 * 54 0.1>6 a 40 - - 0.1 1 a 20 ~ * 2.57 * 5 2.05 a 10 - 0.54 * 20 > 73 4 fl .. 1.9»4 7 1 .41 a 7 0.3t a 20 0,3^* I 5 0.21 4 40 0.31 * 1 56 a 5 22 a 20 * 1,32 * 10 1.15 a ID 0.38 4 20 0.20 a 40 0.27 a 25 0.18 4 1 5 0.62 * 4 - 0.44 A 10 O.S3 * 10 0.24 a 25 . J S 4 30 - 0.2? * J 5 - 0.12 a 25 0.6? * 5 - - O.ST * 10 0,52 a 20 e.jfc » is 0.30 a 15 O.Q? * 40 z 0.10 * 30 _ 0.54 a 10 z - 0.07 * 25 0.14 a 20 Jo. 01 4 so - - - - 0.36 * 1 5 - - - 0.04 * 40 0.O9 a 20 0.O7 a 50 - ft a In - - 0.06 a 35 0.O7 a 30 >0 - u . u b a jo - 0.04 * 40 0.O8 a 30 - - - - ■ * - 0.0b a 20 - - - - > ■>0 4.7Q * 10 6,32 4 10 * 11 0.14 a 20 - - 6. ft a 5 2.1 t * IS 3.53 « J • 11 0.7* a 20 — Q.66 a 25 1 , 1 a 20 0.59 4 25 3 .62 4 j 0.59 * .38 * 20 1.32 a 20 3.3* a 30 * ! 0.67 4 20 .50 a ZQ ■ 0.9S 4 20 >0 3 .93 a 10 M 4 24 0.11 a 50 2.7b 4 15 0.21 a 30 >0 0.59 4 25 1.60 4 10 0.43 4 35 .JL A 15 0.32 a 40 2.*0 * 15 ,0.30 * 44 0.30 a 20 - 0.62 * 10 O.bb a 25 1.36 * 15 0,48 4 35 "!i * J* 0.32 • 30 2.90 a 10 # Q.29 4 40 0,2^ 4 10 - 0,50 a 30 0.50 * JO * >rt n H * aO 2.79 4 10 ♦,•7 4 45 1 1 a 30 ~ 0,6 3 a 20 41 * 10 015 * JO 2.37 a 1 Jo. 20 a 40 0.09 a 50 34 4 40 0.4 1 * 20 26 * 40 !ji * is* o!il • 34 1.89 6 10 |0.14 4 40 C'.il a 40 0.30 a 30 0.16 a 25 0.07 4 40 _ .26* it - 1.66 4 10 T e,io 4 40 0.04 4 50 - - - 0.2) a 40 0.24 a 40 - 0.07 a 30 O.I 3 4 40 - 0.J0 a 30 0.41 * J p 0,10 4 40 0,05 * 30 - - 0.01 a 40 0.12 a 25 0.154 15 — O.OS * 30 0.39 4 10 0.07 a 40 0.D5 a 30 - 0.08 a 40 0.12 a 25 0,12 4 15 .04 * JO 0.33 4 10 0.03 4 40 0.03 a 40 0.08 * 40 0.0* a )0 0.03 * 35 z .OS * 33 0.35 a 10 >0 >0 - - 0.07 a 40 0.09 * 30 - - - 0.2.1 a 20 0.44 4 1 5 0.22 4 40 - - - - 0.15 a 30 - r 42 4 10 0. 1 T a 40 0.41 a 15 0.14 * 40 - - - - - - 0.36 4 10 18 ~ 0.0 S 4 30 0.35 a 10 >0 - - 0.12 4 1 5 0.07 4 30 • *° 0.04 a 40 0.32 a 1 5 - - - ~ 0.04 * 40 0,06 * ti 0.04 4 35 4.7* * 5 2.21 a 10 0.36 4 30 0.53 4 25 0.91 i • .IT * tt 0.71 a * 0.42 * 0.2* a 20 0.2 3 4 25 0.9 -J 4 3 D.42 a 5 0.54 4 5 0.21 4 30 0.14 a 25 - - - - - - 0.B1 a 5 - - 0,43 * LO 0.12 * 40 O.U a 35 0.85 « 10 0.14 a IS O.JO a lO >0 0.0* 4 30 z : : 0.61 a 10 - 0.04 a 25 0.23 a 10 >0 0.^7 a 40 - - - 0.34 * J5 - - 0.02 a 30 fl*?n * 0.03 a 30 ft fl\ * 2^ 0.02 * 54 0.20 4 20 - * - 0.74 a 7 O.U a 10 >0 _ _ _ _ 0.20 a 15 _ - 0.02 a 20 W.OI 4 20 0.03 4 40 0.08 a 20 O.iO a 20 0.51 4 10 >0 0. 68 4 ,0 0.30 * 15 0.07 a 40 0.32 a 10 oj * Si 0.22 4 20 >0 0.03 * 30 0.18 4 15 0.14 4 25 0.02 4 40 0.0 r * JO 0.20 a 31/ 0.41 * k 30 0.09 a 5 0.0a * 40 0.23 i > Z5 0.06 a 35 0.03 4 54 0.30 * 15 >0 0.0 5 a 40 0.02 4 50 0.22 - r 20 0.04 4 44 0,01 a 50 0.12 4 10 0.6^ * 10 >0 0.07 a 30 Ua 35 0.54 4 10 0.41 * i IS 0.07 4 40 0.20 a 20 0.19 4 20 0.03 4 34 >• 0.18 4 20 0.18 4 20 0.06 * 35 0.05 a 25 0.05 i 30 0.04 6 35 0.03 i 50 0.02 * 50 0.24 a 20 0.31 ■ 20 0.13 4 34 0.12 4 20 19 4 30 0.14 4 )f 0.04 4 JO 0.09 4 25 0.21 4 . 20 0.17 a 34 0.08 a 30 0.0) a 45 0.12 4 i 35 0,12 4 44 0.06 a 45 0.0* a 30 0.10 4 i 30 0.C4 4 40 0,02 a 30 0.05 i r 40 0,C3 4 44 O.U a 15 0.15 i t IS 0.07 * 40 0.03 a 40 0.05 a 20 0.08 - k 20 0.05 4 40 0.02 a 40 0,01 a 40 0.06 * k 24 0.02 4 50 0.04 4 25 0,06 4 i 20 0.04 4 20 0.02 4 25 914 10 5.61 4 5 4.83 i k 5 >0 0.50 a 50 97 4 JO 4.09 * 5 3.66 1 k 5 >0 *4 J. 17 a jo 2 .69 i k 4 >0 0.70 a 50 2.26 a 10 1.99 i i 10 d.43 a 2J 34 4 25 1.03 a 10 0.94 i k 14 0.65 4 44 0.36 4 15 •0 0.50 a 15 0.73 i k 15 >0 0.20 4 20 •0 0.2* a 25 0.4) 1 k 25 >4 0.14 * 30 »0 0.09 4 40 0.37 k 20 >0 0.11 a 44 0.07 a 45 0.33 1 k 20 0.15 4 44 0.07 a 20 0.06 a 45 0.30 J k 20 >0 O.OJ a 50 0.02 4 54 0.30 t 20 0.04 4 45 0.47 4 5 0.61 t k 10 0.29 4 25 12 4 44 0.34 4 IS 0.40 * k 14 0.16 4 45 0.09 4 30 >4 4 40 0.19 * 20 0.26 * k 25 0.07 a 50 0.01 a 10 4 a » 0.1O a SO J. 21 - k 20 >0 0,04 4 35 2 a 50 0.02 4 44 8.15 i k 30 0.06 4 SO 0,03 a 45 u.jJ 4 20 0.50 J k 15 0.08 4 30 0.1 T a 3J 31 ' i 15 0.06 6 *0 0.26 i k 14 >9 0.J5 4 40 0.24 i k 20 >0 0.44 * 44 0.02 4 50 U.24 k 15 Jl 4 50 0.17 k 2Q 0.02 4 50 0.02 fc 40 5.02 * 44 0.15 4 25 0.23 h 24 Q.i)7 4 44 0.34 4 i5 0.0? 4 30 U.l* i 1< 0,07 a 35 j. 14 ■ 15 0.03 a 5J U.10 k 20 1 .68 4 2U 2.36 k 10 0.4b a 24 -4 0.66 a 2g 1.61 i k 10 >• 0.27 4 30 -4 * 40 012 4 45 0.46 4 k 10 tO. 14 4 44 0.0* 4 50 -4 J.*0 i k L5 >0 0.0s 4 24 6 M 0.7* < b 15 >0 0.05 4 40 J. 07 a 44 0.81 k 20 0.40 4 25 0.I8 4 24 0.04 * 30 l.l* 4 lO 0.8b a I0 0.52 a 20 >0 0.46 4 20 0.39 a 30 0.29 4 40 0.20 4 45 0.I4 4 44 TO Ob * 40 0.25 4 SO fO. 27 * IS f0.i* 4 25 TO. 01 * 30 TO. 08 4 44 tO.04 4 44 TO. 04 * M •G.Q* 4 44 40.04 4 44 0.68 a 10 0.27 a J5 0. i 4 a 20 0.04 * 30 0.1 3 * 25 0.14 * 20 0.15 • 25 0.19 * 20 O.tl * 25 0.04 a 40 0.34 a L 0.^1 4 14 0.43 4 15 0.3) a 20 0.06 * 30 0.03 a 30 D.I v * 20 0.16 a 2S 0,09 * 45 0. 09 * 30 1 .58 4 10 1. bOi 5 1.72* 5 1 .81 * 3 1.74 a 5 1.27 * 10 I.Ob * 15 0,79 4 23 0.52 a 20 0.1 9 a JO 0.14 4 30 0.2 7 a 20 0.28 a 20 u.24 a 15 0.21 * 15 O.ib a 25 0.21 a 10 0.1 T * 14 0.14 a 20 0.08 * 24 >0 "0 0.0) * 25 0.18 a 20 J. 16 a 20 0.14 a 25 0.07 a 30 2.41 a 5 1.70* 5 1.06 a 10 0.86 4 24 0.26 * 20 0.14 4 25 0.37 4 24 0.16 4 30 JTrrora iLat«4 *r* pare**. * Ja*it*t4a a* «Mr|r mhklt 20. 34 4«v 6»J*a Ua* 4*a if « 6»a t 8»«Ucj*«i a* a*arfy ■41ft 20-34 m« 4b**a Ua* Aaaifoatioa. PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF SLURRY PARTICULATE FALLOUT COLLECTED DURING OPERATION REDWING U. S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY San Francisco 24, California Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-170 5 May 1957 by N.H. Farlow W.R. Schell Table 1 Slurry Fallout Particle Data Time of Arrival Ship Interval station (H+hr) No. of Particles Measured Average NaCl Mass (pg) Average EL0 Mass ^(ug) Average Density ±Std.Dev. (g/cc) Average. . Diameter**' ±Std.Dev. Flathead 1 to 3 TFNB-29 4tol0 0,06 0.08 1.28t0.1 57*6 7 to 9 - u£*33i 50tt> 5 2 0.42 0.62 1.29*0.01 112*2 11 to 12 'TAG^O 10 0.94 1.20 1.35±0.05 129*16 15 to 18 YAG-40 3to4 0.50 0.69 1.34*0.08 121*6 Totals 67 to 76 1.30*0.01 Havaho 1 to 3 TPNB-13 5to20 7.77 7.94 1.38*0.04 272±14 3 to 5 YAG-39 9tol4 7.62 4.49 1.50*0.1 229*24 5 to 6 LST-611 H 1.61 1.83 1.41*0.04 166±6 7 to 9 YAG-40 4tol0 1.25 1.08 1.45*0.04 142*22 9 to 10 YAG-40 5to23 o.u 0.60 1.31*0.02 110+5 10 to 11 YAG-40 lltol5 0.66 0.50 1.43*0.03 111±4 11 to 12 YAG-40 33 0.30 1.32*0.01 94** 12 to 13 YAG-40 28 0.31 0.31 1..37±0.01 96±2 13 to U YAG-40 6 0.17 0.27 1.28*0.02 86*7 14 to 15 YAG-40 5 0.10 0.18 1.30±0.03 75*2 15 to 18 XAG-40 13toU 0.06 0.32 1.15*0.02 84*4 Totals 133 to 182 1.35±0.01 (a) The diameter of the spherical slurry droplet at the time of arrival UNCLASSIFIED AD232901 CAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL FALLOUT PARTICLES Research and Development Technical Report US NRDL- TR - 386 17 September 1958 J. L. Mackin P.E. Zigman D.L. Love D. MacDonald U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY SAN FRANCISCO 2 4 CALIFORNIA ONCUSSIFIEI TABLE 2 (ZUNI, barge YFNB-29; see Table B8 in WT-1317) Weight, Activity, and Fission Values for the Sized Fraction* From the 10DX SampI* (YFNB29/ 17 km from ZUNI) Sise Weight Fissions Bang* Gram* Percent Percent Total per Bras (p) ef Total of Total (id*) (10») >iooo 37.70 41.8 15.8 21. 500-1000 If 1.91 1*6.0 60. 250- 500 4.97 5.5 19.8 26. li 100- 250 3.51 3.9 10.7 Ik. 50- 100 0.60 0-9 3.0 <50 1.38 1.5 n 7.1 5.1 Total 90.27 131. X.5 TANS W (ZUNI: BIKINI /HOW ISLAND, YFNB29, YAG40; TABLE 3.9 IN WT-1317) Mean Values for Several Quantities, for Altered and Unaltered Particles i i 1 1. 1 1 1 1 - »■ 1 1. ■ i, — Melted coral sand Unmelted coral sand Quantity Altered Unaltered Ko. of " * No. of ^^^^ Samples Value Samples . Value fiep/gaCxlO 1 *) & 3-8 * 3.1 9 0.090 + 0^2> Ba£W>-B value 5 0.090 + 0.068 8 2.1 + 1.2 SxS9-B value 7 0.018 + 0.010 10 O.65 + 0.17 The data of Table k show that the value of fissions/gran vaa much larger la the altered particles than in the unaltered particles. The R value data Indicates that the altered particles vera markedly depleted la Ba^-Lalto, whereas the unaltered particles vera enriched in Bal^-La 11 * R values With respect to fractionation of radionuclides it has long been accepted that the mass €9 and mass 11*0 chains vhich exist for long time periods ss nchle gases, halogens and alkali metals* would condense late and therefore disproportionate with respect to less volatile, elements* 0a the basis of long-lived gaseous precursors it would be predicted that the altered or salted particles would exhibit low R values for both chains, with the 89 smaller, of the two* This was verified by the mean B values given in Table 4, which were 0.090 and 0.018 for the 140 and 89 chains, respectively. The corresponding values for the unaltered particles of 2.1 and O.65 indicate that this latter class of particles nay be important as a scavenger of these nuclides. It is also of Interest to compare R values obtained in this study with values obtained on gross fallout samples. The latter data gave Ba^^O R values and Sr^ R values of 0.10 and 0.04 respectively** in the lagoon samples. The low R values for the gross sample from the lagoon area are similar to B values obtained with altered particles and suggests a lagoon fallout composed primarily of altered particles. This suggestion is sup- ported by the WHIM sample fission/gram data (described above) • * BaJ-W is formed by the decay of the radioelements Xe 1 ^ (16-eec half- life) and Csl* j£6-sec half -life); Srv9 i 8 fonasd by the decay of the redioelements £ro9 (3.16-ain half -life) and Rb°9 (15.4-min half-lif e) . ** p.D. LaRiviere> USEHDL, personal communication. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NUWEP) (U) DOD/DFOISR TCm$ECRETCO? Copy No Case No. T.S. TV fcument No. / OCTOBER 1980 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 ncpDODucnoH or ti ii o documcht i n m i olc on m n*nT i c prohib i ted cxccpt with pcnM i ooioN or THE t ccu iN Gorr i cE - Clawified by USO(P) Review on Oct200Q Extended by USD(P) Reason 2-3Q1C S, 6 & 7, DoO 5200.VR TOR INTCftNAL UOC IN TMC OCPAflTMCMT Or 0Cmy3C ONLY 1^ Copy / fr - OUSDIPh 1:35343/80 TOP SECRET V) ON c » S£C EE/ CCN.r t- 1 1 32 8 3 IV, STRATEGY FOR EMPLOYMENT A. Flexibility (U) The U.S. must have the capability to respond appropriately and effectively to any level of Soviet aggression, over the continuum of nuclear weapon employment options, ranging from use of a small number of strategic and/or theater nuclear capable weapon systems In a contingency operation, to a war employing all elements of our nuclear forces In attacks against a broad spectrum of enemy targets. The ability to respond with selectivity to less than an all-out Soviet attack In keeping with the needs of the situation Is required In order to provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with suitable alternatives, strengthen deterrence, and enhance the prospects of limiting escalation of the conflict. In addition to pre-planned options we need an ability to design employment plans on short notice In response to the latest and changing circumstances. To advance the goal of flexibility, planning will provide an objective-oriented series of building block options for the employment of nuclear weapons In ways that will enable us to employ them consonant with our objectives and the course of the conflict. J^ef As It evolves, the building block approach should provide plans which satisfy a hierarchy of targeting objectives and which will provide the NCA an Improved capability to employ nuclear weapons effectively In as measured and controlled a manner as feasible in case of a limited conflict. It should provide complementary elements which can be combined In an Integrated and discrete manner to provide larger and more comprehensive plans for achieving politico-military objectives In specific situations. The building block approach places emphasis on the Individual elements, their objective utility, and our ability to employ them separately or In total. However, this does not Imply that the total plan be finely divisible—practical realities cannot be Ignored. The desire for enhanced flexibility In employment must be balanced by practical consideration of the Increased complexity incurred In planning and operations, the need to avoid compromising the effectiveness and workability of the larger options, and the need to maintain a responsive decisionmaking and force execution process. Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL 1999 DDB-1 900-1 87-88 June 1988 6 The Economic Slowdown Trends in Soviet GNP, 1965-85 Average annual percentage growth 4 - 2 — 1966-70 1971-75 1975-80 1981-86 A Heavy Defense Burden The Ratio of Selected Soviet to US Cumulative Weapons Production, 1975-85 ICBMs and SLBMs Cruise Missiles Fighter Aircraft Tanks Figure 1. Gorbachev's Domestic Imperative THX WH1TC MOUSE SC s»eRBe» s engrave January 17, 1983 ./^./ftf H&Uonat SccwuXy Peow«n wt'wrnm. iC C356 D**«etive AtuwbCA 75 frO. Tftn t^ Hi a aii se toff u.s. relations with ths ussr cs> U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism* and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict recioroeitv outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. task* are: Y ' 1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas — particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more plura- listic political and economic system in which the power of ^*Jni«i e ?^ r 2i i ? 9 . eUt€ " 9"duaUy reduced. The U.S. recognises that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to thi * * nd capacity to engage in To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to IIU «u* 9 J eWSnt * Vhieh ***** enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a procesiof political succession. (S) * cle2r?v r t «°miS« e,,l ^ t . fehiS thr *« fold strategy, the U.S. must convey vou?d I^L^; ™ unacceptable behavior will incur costs that cl*i; ?Z 9 * ? y 9 ht the 4am * ***** the ™« aake Jzfi *° the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior «W 2™* t *. th * Possibility of an East-West relationship that pirTL*f* n ? *"P orta,lt benefits for the Soviet Union. It is the i»^!liL 1,RPOrt !S t **** this ae ***9* conveyed clearly during time for f ^!rn^ J ' Since * his may * particularly opportune lessors ™ ** t0 ****** the P° lici * s °* Breihnev^s 3. Classify on: OADR lIMflLlPCUOnL tjJ^^^ e u in* m k c *2 ** 8"g V * D *4<4| o 41 M 31 41 V > H O > « u V * o M M *J o -o p E II v v a IT 2 * * * * M *-*4 £* O £ 4i , fi §> it g h U Aii'o S c I ax: a o *J *H -H a a a c o 4* M 3 |p |t O « T) « M < V H U 3 «1 Tf * « U £ C Ml *4 > *h > o q h • X! 4 U II *s ** u o U M *l H H 3 U *i H £ ft *H * 4* O £ e « t* 4* -H i > 41 ut ^ u m -o < -f4H •a 4* u C H O « 3 * 41 t> *H • U *H d iH J5 40 *0 ** 4» c * M — * O 4 II *M || XI 4f « A H P 4 o •H O « ^ 41 C H 4 4 4 H > G 4i ^ « ii s a** 6 ii 41 ♦I *4 U o a u *o 5 O *J n II * V * •H U &* u c sa O «"l ■4 V O C -4 m u ** o II X £ il « M 41 «l u *o 41 W « COO x: v a? E ** vl 1 e 41 u 9 VI C tl 10 a c 41 31 41 > o*o O I U>JC c 9* O u 41 41 M a s cu a «4 41 H *> 4* VI O P > VI 4* « It 4 O C II 1 4^1 a 4 II m to o o*o i i i LA-14066-H History UNCLASSIFIED Tracing the Origins of the W76: 1966-Spnng 1973 (U) Betty I. Perkins November 3, 2003 Derived from: LA^OQQ, Rev. B f 9/02 ^Los Alamos NATIONAL LABORATORY Los Alamos NM 87545 iu UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 7. Yield: The Confetti Argument Agnew felt that the yield of the W68 was too low to be really effective. In addition, in terms of the overall total yield available from all the W68 warheads, the W68 design was very costly in terms of the amount of required special nuclear materials. In an April 1972 TWX to Assistant Director for Safety and Liaison (Division of Military Application) Colonel Robert T. Duff, Agnew reported that he was worried about maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent Agnew noted, "It occurs to me that as we go to lower and lower yields in our strategic missile warheads and the Soviet Union builds up a better and bett er rivij dafepsg position, the reality of this deterrent may become questionable, mm If the Soviet leadership believes TffiCEhen our strategic deterrcfirmirhavrio^ deaTof its force. If our MIRV trend continues we'll be threatening to throw confetti at a potential aggressor. Confetti has high penetration and survivability but little deterrent power." 281 In a letter dated October 10, 1972, to Giller. at that time Assistant General Manager for National Security, Agnew again noted several reasons why low yield warheads might not be the best solution for maximizing the deterrence capability of the stockpile. He reported that considering the number of required submarines and the low efficiency in their use of special nuclear material, the low-yield warheads weie not very cost effective. Moreover, Agnew pointed out that for the Hiroshima device, the effects on Hiroshima in terms of loss of substantial buildings and the people in them "wasn't all that impressive." In terms of loss of life, the USSR had lost more than ten million people in WWIL Although the Soviets had an extensive civil- defense network in place, even if that did not work to reduce loss of civilian lives, the Soviets might not mind losing a few people, Agnew wrote, " Again, to me, to continue to increase warhead numbers at the cost of a decrease in yield per warhead could eventually lead to no deterrence in the minds of those we hope to deter." Agnew stated, "I feel very strongly that we should endeavor to convince the DoD that what they should have on the next round is a mix of yields. (b)(3) 8. Capability Agnew in his August 10, 1972, letter to Camm pointed out that the Los Alamos group had been developing suitable technology applicable to the new strategic missile warheads. He wrote, "In summary then, we have been working very hard to provide the very latest technology in warhead designs incorporating the most advanced minimum weight hardening techniques to provide an optimum warhead for the next round of strategic missile warheads, In fact, our work has been of such outstanding quality that we have been invited by Admiral Levering Smith to ft M. Agnew, University of California, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, to BY3/Colonel Robert T. Duff, US AF, Assistant Director for Safety and liaison, Division of Military Replication USAEC, Wash., D.C. (SRD) (Apri l 14, 1972), pp. 1-U1 1 , Drawer 56, Fol der 1 of 4^. UNCLASSIF 1 T JL UNCLASSIFIED 3, Reservoir Designs to Provide Minimum Helium in the Boost Gas In a March 1969 memo, primary designer R. Canada outlined the problems that were the result ofthe formation of 3 He from the decay of ttV rritjnm uyri in the primary's boost gas. (3> 291 R, Canada to Distribution, Subject: ^He in Weapons," W-4-2518 (SRD) (March 10, 1969), 5 pp., A99-0I9, 199-13. LA-14066.H CLASSIC iiiJL) rv-59 ■ Tup - Se cr r f 1974 CIA report on emerging USSR superiority: ME 11-3/8-74 Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict SUMMARY THE USSR'S CURRENT STRATEGIC SITUATION 1. The Soviets are pressing ahead with a broad range of programs for the near-tenn deployment of much improved offensive sys- tems for intercontinental conflict In addition they are gradually improving their deployed strategic defenses, and are vigorously pursuing the development of advanced technology ap- plicable to strategic forces. — In offensive forces, they are focusing on improving the accuracy, flexibility, and survivability of their ICBMs and SLBMs and on MIRVing their ICBMs. Four new ICBMs, three with MIRV payloads, are being flight tested. A mobile version of one of the missiles probably is being developed* Hardened launch control cen- ters are being constructed at missile com- plexes, and a standby airborne command post for the Strategic Rocket Forces prob- ably now is operational. New classes of nuclear-powered ballistic missile subma- rines with long-range missile systems con- tinue under construction, and a new multipurpose bomber is starting to be de- ployed. Additional ICBMs and SLBMs are in the preflight stages of research and development — In defensive forces, the Soviets are im- proving the capability of forces already deployed and are developing new sys- tems. Older fighter-interceptors and sur- face-to-air missile systems are being phased out gradually as improved equip- ment is introduced. Current research and development activity includes programs for antisubmarine warfare, an antiballis- tic missile system which can be deployed much more rapidly than the one now operational, an endoatmospheric bal- listic missile interceptor, and the applica- tion of lasers to strategic defense. % These developments follow a series of large-scale deployment programs over the past ten years which have provided the Soviets with a reliable deterrent and have brought about world recognition of the USSR's status as a superpower roughly on a par with the US. Through these earlier programs, the USSR has largely eliminated previous US quanti- tative advantages in strategic offensive forces. TC5 063093-74/1 6 T o p Sec r e t Figure 1 Historical Trends in Selected Aspects of Strategic Forces ICBM and SLBM Launchers Defensive Forces thousands thousands (Not Additive) r ^ r THE DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C 20505 APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of National Intelligence Estimate 11-3/8-76 , "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s" FROM George 8ush 1. The attached National Intel! igence Estimate is the\ official appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence. This Estimate , including its italicized statements of differing views by members of The National Foreign Intelligence Board, was drafted and coordinated by professional intelligence officers of the US Intelligence Community and was approved by me with the advice of the Board. 2. The judgments arrived at in this Estimate were made after all parties to the Estimate had the benefit of alternative views from the various elements of the Community and from panels of experts from outside government on a few selected subjects. The assembling of the panels of outside experts, and the consider- ation of their views, was agreed upon by me and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as an experiment, the purpose of which was to determine whether those known for their more somber views of Soviet capabilities and objectives could present the evidence in a sufficiently convincing way to alter the analytical judgments that otherwise would have been presented in the attached document. The views of these experts did have some effect. But to the extent that this Estimate presents a starker appreciation of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives, it is but the latest in a series of estimates that have done so as evidence has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs in the strategic offensive and defensive fields. NIE 11-3/8-76 Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s ~ ~ "019305" J op Secr e t * Historical Trends in Selected Aspects of Strategic Forces Figure 1 ICBM and SLBM Launchers thousands 2.5 Soviet 1966 68 On-Line Missile Weapons* thousands 6r 1 - Soviet -1 L _l L 1966 68 70 72 74 76 On-Line Missile Throw Weight nwBJoo. pounds 10 p million kilograms 1966 thousands 10 •8 Defensive Forces (Not Additive) Soviet SAM Launchers Soviet Interceptors US Interceptors \ __US SAM 1966 68 70 72 74 76 Launchers Intercontinental Bombers and On-Line Bomber Weapons (NotAddHfve) 4 h 3 2 1 US Bomber Weapons US Bombers 1966 68 Soviet , Bomber Weapons _ Soviet '6 Bombers On-Line Equivalent Megatons thousands (m^^s and Bombers) 8 6 J 1_ 1966 68 70 72 74 J I 76 * Excludes IC8M a'fo launchers under construction or conversion sod SLBM launchers on SSSNs undergoing sea trials, conversion, or shipyard overhaul. Missile payloads composed of MRVs [which are not independently targetabte) are counted as one RV. 5CCRLT 17 •TCS $53 121 - 70/ i top- Secret NTE 11-3/8-80 Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s mmBrn^t ClAMBIORlCflL- PART ONE — KEY JUDGMENTS PREFACE These Key Judgments consist of two sections. This year the Direc- tor of Central Intelligence has added his own key judgments (section A), which have not been coordinated with the Intelligence Community. He does not hold major disagreements with the key judgments coordinated by the Intelligence Community agencies (section B) or with the basic analysis in the Estimate. He does not believe, however, that the findings in section B adequately emphasize those areas of key importance to the President and his; principal advisers on foreign policy. His key judg- ments, therefore, address what the basic Estimate tells us about the following four issues of cardinal importance to US policy on strategic forces: — How the strategic capabilities of the two sides compare. — What actions the Soviets may take as they view the comparative strengths of the strategic forces. — Whether and how the balance of strategic forces prompts the Soviets to pursue strategic arms control agreements with the United States. — Whether or not the advantages that the Soviets seem to have in ICBMs through 1986 would induce or pressure them to exploit what they might perceive as a "window of opportunity" before those advantages may be erased toward the end of this decade. A. KEY JUDGMENTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Soviet Perceptions of the Strategic Environment 1. The comprehensive nature of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive programs, the emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on ca- pabilities to fight a nuclear war, and assertions that general nuclear war can be won indicate that some Soviet leaders hold the view that victory in general nuclear war is possible. The Soviets assert that a general nuclear war will probably be brief, but we believe that they have A-l op Seen.! Fig lire J Comparison of Soviet and US Forces for Intercontinental Attack, 1970-80 Number of Delivery Vehicles 2.000 2,000 1,300 1,000 500 J I ' ' ' t I ' 1 I T ^ 1970 72 74 76 78 30 Midyear J ir ■ Top GlulI 1 res cccc'wj/: A-5 3ALUHTHblE CBORCTBA MATEPHAJIOB 3KCn03MUHOHHyK> A03y pdAHdLlMM OC/ia6/lHK)T BABoe Maiepna/ibi tojiujhhoh 6emoH- 12 KupnuH-11 epyHm- 12 depeeo-10 3 FOR EXTERNAL PUBLICATION Radio Moscow in Mandarin to China, Nov. 3, 1978. "However, the fact is that China's digging deep tunnels can never pro- tect the Chinese masses from nuclear bombing or even protect them from conventional heavy bombs." ********** Radio Moscow World Service in English, Nov. 16, 1978 "The U.S. Administration is going to launch a 5-year program of civil defense. - - - The only real safety for the Americans is strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union, not bomb shelters." FOR INTERNAL PUBLICATION Moscow Voyennyye Znaniya in Russian No. 5, May 1978, p. 33. "It is appropriate to say that we still meet people who have an incor- rect Idea about defense possibilities. The significant Increase in the devastating force of nuclear weapons compared with conventional means of attack makes some people feel that death 1s inevitable for all who are in the strike area. However, there is not and can never be a weapon from which there Is no defense. With knowledge and the skillful use of contemporary procedures, each person can not only preserve his own life but can also actively work at his enterprise or institution. The only person who suffers is the one who neglects his civil defense studies." Robert Scheer with Enough S HOVELS ' Reagan,Bush & Nuclear War "Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top... It's the dirt that does it... if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it'.' —IK. Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces "President Ronald Reagan had been in office less than a year when he approved a secret plan for the United States to prevail in a protracted nuclear war This secret plan, outlined in a so-called National Security Decision Document, committed the United States for the first time to the idea thut a global nuclear wur cun be won!' With these words Robert Scheer, the distin- guished national reporter for the Los Angeles Times, begins this astonishing revelation of how a handful of Cold Wur ideologues— led by the President himself— have reversed the longstand- ing American assumption that nuclear war means mutual suicide. Robert Scheer's aim in With Enough Shovels is to expose the deadly course on which we are now embarked, a course thut categorically rejects the strategic assumptions thut prevailed from Presi- dents Eisenhower through Carter and thut sus- tained the Nixon-Kissinger program of detente— a program which our current lenders call "appease- ment!' Leon Gourg i SOVIET STRATEGY USSR CIVIL DEFENSE With a Foreword by AMBASSADOR FOY D. KOHLER LEON GOURE is a Professor of International Studies and Director of Soviet Studies at the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami. A graduate of New York University, Columbia University School of International Affairs and Russian Institute, and Georgetown University, he is the author of Civil Defense in the Soviet Union, The Siege of Leningrad, and Soviet Civil Defense 1969-70. He has also co-authored Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy, and Soviet Penetration of Latin America among others. 1st printing 2nd printing . April 1976 August 1976 Civil defense youth training CHART 4— Schematic Diagram of the Relocation of Dispersed Workers and Evacuated Persons and Plants. Foreword by Foy D. Kohler Dr. Leon Goure has devoted many years of study to Soviet civil defense and other war-survival policies and activities in the USSR. The area was one of his specialties while serving as a Senior Analyst for the RAND Corporation from 1951 to 1969, and he has continued his researches since joining the University of Miami in 1969 as Director of Soviet Studies and Professor in the Center for Advanced International Studies. xi As a part of our work program for this larger undertaking, the Center has held a series of special conferences wherein we have subjected our methodol- ogy and research findings to critical review by outside experts, including au- thoritative academic and governmental specialists on Soviet affairs and high- ranking policy-action officers from Defense, State and other agencies directly concerned with U.S. -Soviet relations. At two of these conferences, special attention has been given to the Soviet war-survival problem: One in June 1975 included an exploration of how war- survival capabilities fit into the Soviet appraisal of the present and future "correlation of world forces." The second, held in January 1976, included a thorough examination of the implications for U.S. security interests and U.S. policy choices of what Moscow is actually doing in the war-survival area. xii Nearly all of the experts at our conference viewed the reasoning behind the overkill concept as "absurd." One cited as an example an article in the April 6, 1975 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in which the author argued that with its present stockpile of nuclear weapons the U.S. could destroy the world's popu- lation "twelve times over." The author's calculation was arrived at by multi- plying the casualties per kiloton in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the total number of kilotons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and then dividing by the number of people living in the world. Such a calculation was characterized as com- pletely misleading. Leaving aside such questions as how many U.S. weapons would survive a Soviet attack on this country and how many of the residue could be delivered on target, "it implies that means can be devised to collect the entire target population into the same density as existed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and keep them in a completely unwarned and hence vulnerable pos- ture. A statement of identical validity is that the world's inventory of artillery shells, small arms ammunition, or for that matter, kitchen knives or rocks can kill the human population several times over." xiv It was recalled that more than 10 billion pounds of TNT was dropped on Germany, Japan and Italy during World War II. This equalled more than 50 pounds for every man, woman and child in the three countries. Arithmetically considered, the result should have been the total annihilation of one and all of these. During the Vietnam War, more than 25 billion pounds of TNT were dumped on North and South Vietnam (15 billion by air and some 10 billion by other means) for an average of some 730 pounds for each of a total population of 34 million and an average of 3,000 pounds for each person in prime target areas; yet the U.S. was unable to kill enough people or to disrupt economic life, transportation and communications sufficiently to even avoid a humilitating defeat in the war. xv The basic issue, it was agreed, is how Moscow intends to exploit the situa- tion politically. The Soviet risk calculations and ability to use its military power for political purposes are already being increasingly influenced by Moscow's perceptions of asymmetries between the U.S. and Soviet war-survival versus assured destruction capabilities. According to Moscow's view, these asymmet- ries are of great strategic significance for making Soviet power credible as a deterrent and as an instrument of policy. Soviet spokesmen have given clear indication of their awareness of the lack of a war-survival program in the U.S. as well as of the vulnerability of the U.S. arising from the high degree of concen- tration of its population and industry in a few areas of the country. It is inevita- ble, therefore, that the Soviet leadership will perceive this asymmetry between the Soviet Union and the U.S. as altering the balance of forces in Moscow's favor, and as affecting the credibility of the respective strategic deterrence and war-fighting postures of the two countries. In effect, with its growing war-survival capability, the Soviet Union could well conclude that the U.S. threat of "massive retaliation" has no credibility except as an act of sheer desperation. In crisis situations, this factor could decisively influence both sides' risk calculations and consequently their rela- tive ability and willingness to hold a hard line. The Soviet Union could confront the U.S. with its ability to keep Soviet population and resource losses within acceptable limits, all the more so if it carries out the evacuation of its cities, as against the certainty of U.S. losses of 50 percent or more of its population and of a very large portion of its industry. This would place the U.S. at a great disadvantage in the management of the crisis and in its negotiations with the Soviet Union. Instead of a "balance of terror" which equally restrains both sides, the "terror" would be mainly on the part of the U.S. and, faced with the possibility of national "suicide," the public reaction to it would be likely to deprive the President of any flexibility in his policy choices in dealing with Moscow. xvi C00012335 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 23, D. C. CIA 12 March 1962 1 2 MAR mi MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT ; "Some Factors Affecting the Planning of a Modern Offensive Operation", by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov 1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought " (" Voyennaya Mysl ") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander. 2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office. Following Is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Sense Factors Affecting the Planning of a Modern Offensive Operation", written "by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov. This article appeared in the i960 Second Issue of a special version of Voyenpaya Mysl ( Military Thought ) which is classified TOP SECBffiT by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. Weakening the nuclear strength of an opposing grouping of the enemy and depriving him of his capability to use nuclear weapons is one of the most important tasks, whose correct solution ensures the success of the offensive operation as a whole. The mass utilization of nuclear weapons in short periods of time is the only way to achieve decisive destruction of the fire power of an opposing enemy grouping, destruction of his main nuclear/missile and aviation means, and also disruption of the control of troops and the disorganization of work of the rear services. Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans) * * * * ♦ * ETOPOB n. T., HIJIflXOB H. A., AJIABHH H. H. rPAJKAAHCKAH OBOPOHA H3A. 2-e, nepepaGoTaHHoe ^onymeno Mhhhctcpctbom Bbicmero h cpeAHero cnen,HajibHoro o6paaoBa- Him CCCP b Kaiec-TBe y^eCHHKa ajih BbicmBX vh66hi>iz 8aBeAeeHfi» H3flATEJIbCTB0 «BbICUIAfl fflKOJIA* Mockbi - 1970 CIVIL DEFENSE (Grazhdanskaya Oborona) A uthors P. T. Yegorov, I. A. Shlyakhov, and N. I. Alabin Publishing House for Higher Education (Vysshaya Shkola) Second Edition, Moscow (1970), 500,000 copies The presence of apertures in walls (windows, doors) has an influence on the destruction of buildings and structures since the wave, easily destroying them, penetrates quickly into the building, and the reflected pressure [outside] is compensated by the overpressure within. 36 In addition, nuclear blasts create electromagnetic fields, which generate surges in underground lines and in high-wire lines and radio station antennas, and also generate radio waves propagated over a wide area. The induced current and voltage may be propagated by wires over a wide area and cause damage to insulation, electrical and radio equip- ment may burn out, and personal injuries may occur. It is necessary to implement engineering technical measures in civil defense in order to provide protection from secondary damage. 54 3. Methods of Protecting the Population by Dispersal and Evacuation 3.1 Organization and Planning of Dispersal and Evacuation During the Great Patriotic War [World War II] , to protect productive capacity, we transported entire enterprises, including their workers and employees, to the deep rear from areas of direct combat; that is, we evacuated industry. The evacuation of people, enterprises, and capital equipment was directed by the Soviet [Council] on Evacuation, which was organized by a decree of the CC of the CPSU and by the Council of People's Commissars of the 24th of June, 1941. Under the direction of the government, all national departments and administrations organized special sections and commissions on evacua- tion. On-site, the evacuations were supervised by Party and Soviet organs. A priority system for evacuating enterprises, people and material goods was established. The first enterprises to be evacuated were large ones with defense significance. (The evacuation included workers, employees and their families, and factory equipment.) From July through November 1941, over 1000 industrial enterprises moved into the interior of the country. Evacuation from the forward areas of the Don Basin, Stalingrad, and the northern Caucasus was also conducted in the summer of 1942. A characteristic feature of the evacuation of that time was that it took place over 1000 kms. from the front lines, into areas inaccessible — at the time — to enemy attack. However, this evacuation was only partial in character, since a significant part of the population remained in the territory occupied by the German-fascist invaders. Under conditions of a nuclear missile war, civil defense must solve the problem of defending the population through a series of measures, which include dispersal and evacuation of people from cities that are likely to be targets of missile strikes by the enemy. 72 CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION APRIL 28, 1076 Printed for the dm of the Joint Committee on Defense Production 74-307 O 3. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON t 1976 HEARING ON CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR WEDNESDAY APRIL 28, 1976 U.S. Senate and U.S. House op Representatives, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Washmgton, B.C. The committee met at 10 :05 a.m. in room 5302, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William Proxmire, vice chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators William Proxmire and John Sparkman. Senator Proxmire. The committee will come to order. Today's hearing inaugurates a review by the Joint Committee on our Nation's civil preparedness. It is the first such congressional review in over two decades. By civil preparedness, we mean those mainly civilian measures by. which we seek to protect the lives and property of our citizens. This is the first function of any government. A government which cannot meet this fundamental test of defending its people and the national treasure is not likely to survive for very long. In subsequent hearings, the committee will examine the adequacy of Federal, State, and local preparedness programs, including plans for fallout shelters, strategic evacuation, preparedness exercises and drills, civil defense stockpiles, and continuity of government. Like- wise, the Joint Committee will inquire into the organization of the Government for preparedness. It will also review the Nation's indus- trial and economic preparedness in terms of the defense industrial base. This is an especially timely undertaking. Over the past 2 years the United States nas been moving from a declared nuclear policy of mutual assured destruction to one of flexible response, or limited nuclear war. In the minds of some eminent strategists, this implies a lowering of the nuclear weapons threshold, a quickening of the trigger finger on the missile launch console, and an increased probability of un- controlled nuclear conflict. But to other equally qualified experts, this shift in strategic doc- trine, this shift to larger numbers of more flexible, or more versatile and accurate weapons and control systems does not undermine deter- rence of nuclear war; instead, it enhances deterrence. Well, it cant be both ways and whenever you have such a complete divergence in expert opinion, it is time for a careful review of the facts. (l) 2 These hearings are also timely in that there are increasing rumors of a civil defense gap, with the Soviet Union well in the lead. In this year's annual report, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated that, and I quote: An asymmetry has developed over the years that bears directly on onr stra- tegic relationship with the Soviets and on the credibility of onr deterrent postnre. For a number of years, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources to their civil defense effort which emphasizes the extensive evacuation of urban popu- lations prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the construction of shelters in out- lying areas, and compulsory training in civil defense for well over half the Soviet population. The importance the Soviets attach to this program at present is indicated not only by the resources they have been willing to incur in Its support, but also by the appointment of a deputy minister of defense to head this effort Now, the term "asymmetry" used by the Secretary sounds to a non- expert like me like a four-bit word for "gap." We have heard a great deal over the years about gaps that never materialized or proved unimportant. Yet we have spent a lot of money to eliminate the non- existent or the insignificant. It is for tliis reason that the committee last week published the declassified text of the 1957 Gaither Report which invented the first missile gap. 3 STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL NITZE, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND MEMBER OF THE SALT DELEGATION Mr. Nitze. Mr. Chairman, my interest in the questions which this committee is discussing began in 1944 when I was asked to be a direc- tor of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The required qualification of the directors was that they have no prior knowledge of military strategy or of air power, and could thus be presumed to be unbiased in appraising the effects of the immense U.S. strategic air effort in World War II. I spent the next 2 years in Europe and then in the Pacific in intensive work, in association with what I believe to have been the best talent available to this country, to try to understand something about both subjects. In the Pacific portion of the survey, as Vice Chairman, I was in effective command of the operation, includ- ing the detailed study of the effects of the weapons used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since that time much has changed. Weapons have increased in yield and missiles now have an intercontinental range. But these changes are hardly as revolutionary as the changes brought about by the role of effective air power in World War II and of the introduction of nuclear weapons in its closing phase. After all, the largest number of our nuclear reentry vehicles today are Poseidon warheads, each of which has an equivalent megatonnage less than twice that of the weapons used at Hiroshima ana Nagasaki. At Hiroshima and Nagasaki there was no air-raid warning and very few people availed themselves of the crude civil defense racili- ties which were available. Most of those that did, even at ground zero, in other words, directlv under the explosion, which was at the optimum height of burst, survived. The trains were operating through Hiro- shima 2 days after the explosion. 5 Let me paraphrase from an interchange I had in 1960 with Colonel Lincoln, head of the faculty at West Point, on this subject : The Russians are careful students of Clausewitz. I do not believe they would ever ignore either the danger that a war once started might escalate to the full violence which the pure theory of war might indicate; on the other hand, they would never forget that war is a tool of policy and that every effort must be made to avoid letting it so escalate. 1 i In this connection the following quotation from Communist of the Armed Forces in November 1975 is pertinent : "The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons leave war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war moves beyond the control of policy, ceases to be an instrument of policy and does not constitute its con- tinuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary." On the other hand, I can well imagine that they might consider a controlled nuclear conflict in which significant military targets, but not urban-industrial targets, are the initial objects of attack, if they thought war unavoidable. In conclusion, I would like to comment on this committee's print containing the Gaither Report of 1957. I have now read that report for the first time in nearly 20 years. I am impressed — especially m light of the information then available to the Gaither committee — by the care and comprehensiveness of that committee's examination of the problems assigned to it for study. I note in contrast the cavalier imprecision reflected in the foreword pre- pared by this committee's staff. It is not true that the Gaither Report ignored arms control, nor is it true that the report spoke of U.S. strategic inferiority as then a fact To the contrary, the Gaither Report described the United States as then "capable of making a decisive attack on the U.S.S.R." In view of SAC's vulnerability "to a surprise attack in a period of lessened world tension," the Gaither Report also noted the U.S.S.R.'s capability to make "a very destructive attack on this country." The report then observed, "As soon as SAC acquires an effective 'alert' status, the United States will be able to carry out a decisive attack even if surprised," and it anticipated that juncture "as the best time to negotiate from strength, since the U.S. military position vis-a- vis Russia mijgjht never be so strong again." In attempting to disparage the Gaither committee's analysis, the staff foreword cites a subsequent estimate "* * * that at the time of the Gaither Report the Soviet Union probably had fewer than a dozen op- erational ICBMs." In fact, at the time of the Gaither Report — only a few weeks after the sputnik launching — the Soviet Union obviously had no operational ICBMs. The Gaither Report made no assumption to the contrary. Indeed, it postulated 1959 as the probable year the Soviet Union would first have operational ICBMs ; in fact, they first became operational in 1960. What was crucial at the time was not only the question of how many ICBMs would be operational when, but even more importantly the question of the speed with which the U.S. Air Force could achieve adequate early warning facilities and an appropriate alert posture. The Gaither Report focused attention on those questions. 9 STATEMENT OF HERMAN KAHN, DIRECTOR, HUDSON INSTITUTE 10 It is not true that the Democrats raised the issue of a missile gap against the Republican administration. That was a Republican state- ment. The Republicans predicted the Russians would have 300 missiles by 1960. But at the same time, the Republican administration said this wouldn't make any difference, because we had 2,000 bombers and they were more important than 300 missiles. The great contribution of the Gaither Report, as Paul just said, was to make clear that if the Soviets had 300 missiles and we did not have any kind of warning system, then we might not have 2,000 bombers, because they could be destroyed by a surprise attack while still on the ground. I also made clear, that while the Soviets probably would not have 300 operational missiles in 1960, if they did have them, we would be in trouble — that is, despite the predictions by the Republican administra- tion we did not think they had such a force — but we were not sure. What does one do when the other side may be able to do something in the near future and if one waits until he is certain before reacting, it is too late, while if one reacts early it may turn out to have been unnecessary? 11 Let me also make a remark about a release I saw from this committee which listed a series of predicted gaps which did not occur. In at least half the cases, people were rather clear that the gap might not occur, but they were not sure. [Additional remarks :] But they felt they had to worry about it ahead of time and even make some preparations because they could not afford to wait until all the facts were in. Let me ask a question : What do you do if the other side exhibits a weapon system and has the production capability? You are not quite sure what he is going to do. Do you wait until he does it or do you worry about it? In general this is a very complicated issue. In some cases, we almost have to make preparations ahead of time, even though they may be wasted. In other cases, we should wait until we are more sure ; in still other cases, one just hopes for luck. But one should not, in my judg- ment, downgrade responsible officials who get concerned under such circumstances. I might also draw attention to some studies clone by Albert Wohl- stetter. It is pointed out in these studies that in most cases, we have underestimated rather than overestimated U.S.S.R. future capability. I will ask that this report be sent to the committee. If you look at the record, there has been more a problem of under- estimation than overestimation. This is true in terms of the number of missiles the Soviets have had over time and in terms of Soviet capa- bility on all kinds of other issues. We tend to remember the discussion when some hysterical people overstate the problem ; then it turns out to be wrong. I would argue this is not at all the characteristic problem. 12 Probably an even better prototype for the situation we are thinking about is pre- World War II. After World War I, much of the world became sick of war, and war became "unthinkable" to most people, particularly in the victorious "Allied Powers." Strategists and pub- licists talked about poison gas and knock-out blows; they thought all the capital cities would be destroyed by poison gas in the first few days of a war. They did not understand the idea of limitations in warfare — of mutual deterrence even after hostilities have broken out. When Hitler got elected in 1933, people became interested in larger defense budgets. Then he marched into the Ehineland and, of course, defense budgets increased slightly. Then there was the Anschlus and then Munich, and more substantial increases in military budgets. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia, everybody got deeply con- cerned. Then, finally, there was the invasion of Poland, the formal declaration of war and then 7 months of more or less "phony war." As a result there was opportunity on both sides for 7 months' of full-time war production, before the war really opened up. We would argue that similar possibilities should be considered today. Nobody is interested in jumping into a nuclear war today. Nobody is going to want to execute the usual picture of nuclear war, in which each side presses every button and goes home. It is extraor- dinarily difficult to believe such a scenario. It might happen. But I would be willing to bet, if this were a bet- ting matter, 50 to 1 against it. On the other hand, the situation might arise in which there was a declaration of war, followed by a phony war, or a serious confronta- tion in which there were credible threats of war. By the way, in such a confrontation, the following dialog tends to occur. Both sides are saving to the other side, "There is absolutely nothing at risk which justifies this terrible danger to which we are subjecting each other and the rest of. the world. It is clear that whatever we are arguing about is simply not worth the risk of a thermonuclear war. Therefore, one of us has to be reasonable-and it isn't going to be me." 13 Finally, a last point. When we write scenarios for nuclear war, we find it difficult to write a credible scenario which doesn't involve months or weeks of warning. I would guess we are as good at writing scenarios as anybody in the world. We have certainly written as many. I want to warn the committee, on the other hand, that when we looked at World War I, we didn't find that scenario plausible. The mere fact we can't write a plausible scenario for a war doesn't mean it can't occur, because one can find historical examples to the contrary. Nevertheless, every scenario we write for nuclear war involves days, weeks or months of tension. Evacuation, last moment mobilizations are extraordinarily possible. By the way, evacuations occur not as a result of secret intelligence or in any attempt to try to outrun the missiles or the bombers. The New York Times and the Washington Post provide the warning perhaps days before the attack. People or governments then get frightened and decide to decrease their vulner- ability to attack. The idea is, can you exploit such warning if it is printed in the papers ? 21 TYPICAL STRATEGIC MOBILIZATION SCENARIOS Of the four scenarios given below, the first two are history, the third used to be the great fear of NATO, and the fourth is probably the great fear of the War- saw Pact. 1. The "phony war," 1940 (5 months) : (a) Pre-crisis arms competition (UK, France, Germany and the U.S.S.R.K (b) A major series of political-military crisis — Militarization of the Rhineland (1836) ; Anschluss (Austria) (1938) ; Sudeten crisis (1938-39) ; War in Poland (1939). (c) De-escalation and negotiation (antagonists began a rapid buildup fearing a resumption of full scale conflict) . 2. Korea (195KWS3) : (a) Pre-war politico-military crises — Soviet invasion of Iran (1946) ; Soviet takeover of East European nations (1945-48) ; Berlin blockade (1948) ; Soviet intervention in Turkey and Greece ; Soviet military buildup, post WW-IL (b) Major turnabout in U.S. policy — Factor of four increase in defense expenditures in 18 months ; Massive emphasis on strategic preparedness, especially active defense. 3. Successful Soviet attack on W. Berlin and subsequent de-escalation. 4. Uprising in East Germany gets out of control and escalates. 22 CHARACTERISTICS OF A SPECIAL MOBILIZATION SCENARIO : A FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR BY THE U.S. 1. The declaration would have solemn and especially great significance for our enemies, allies, and neutrals. 2. The information transferred would have : (a ) Unambiguous factual content of great importance ; Ob) Undeniable implications and symbolism ; (c) Highly uncertain interpretations or implications. 3. Its existence would preempt "ordinary" crisis negotiation and deny the stability of any recent fait accompli. 4. In some extreme crises it could be temporizing — a declaration is not a spasm response — and lead to deescalation of actual fighting. 5. But it implies a rapid response to any increased use of force. 6. It tends to force a decision by allies to cooperate actively. 7. It would justify many peripheral actions (blockades, interdiction, property confiscation, internment of hostile aliens, etc.). 8. It would tend to unify the national response — and increase defense spend- ing enormously through mobilization. 9. It would convey the unambiguous message that a format peace treaty will be required to settle all the important issues. ROLE OF RESEARCH FOR MOBILIZING ACTIVE DEFENSES 1. Missile defense probably would be the most important and expensive effort. 2. Lead-time reduction becomes extremely important. 3. A program is required to facilitate rapid massive procurement of mutually ^reinforcing systems — Boost phase interception ; Mid course interception ; Terminal interception. 4. A capability may soon be needed to support a war in space. 5. A capability is required for integration into other— ihigh priority strategic mobilization programs — Air defense ; Civil defense. Major research objective: design systems which are highly effective, mutually supporting and which can be rapidly deployed at high levels of expenditure. Appendix I Paul Henry Nitze In the spring of 1969, Paul Henry Nitze was appointed the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union ; a position he held until June 1974, at which time he resigned. Mr. Nitze resigned from his duties as Deputy Secretary of Defense on January 20, 1969, a position he had held since July 1, 1967, succeeding Cyrus R. Vance. Mr. Nitze was serving as 57th Secretary of the Navy when he was nominated by former President Lyndon B. Johnson on June 10, 1967, to become Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on June 29, 1967. The late President John F. Kennedy nominated Mr. Nitze to be Secretary of the Navy on October 14, 1963. At that time he was serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), having assumed that position on January 29, 1961. He began his duties as Secretary of the Navy on November 29, 1963. Graduated "cum laude" in 1928 from Harvard University, Mr. Nitze subse- quently joined the New York investment banking firm of Dillon Read and Com- pany. In 1941, he left his position as Vice President of that firm to become financial director of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. From 1942-1943, he was Chief of the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare, until named as Director of Foreign Procurement and Development for the Foreign Economic Administration. During the period 1944-1946, Mr. Nitze was Vice Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. He was awarded the Medal of Merit by Presi- dent Truman for service to the nation in this capacity. For the next seven years, he served with the Department of State, beginning in the position of Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade Policy. In 1948, he was named Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In August, 1949, he became Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and Director the following year. Mr. Nitze left the federal government in 1953 to become President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation in Washington, D.C., a position he held until January 1961. Mr. Nitze is Chairman of the Advisory Council of The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., and also serves on the Board of Trustees of the University. He holds memberships on the Board of Directors of Schroders, Inc., in New York, and Schroders, Ltd., in London, The American Security and Trust Company of Washington, D.C., Northwestern Mutual Life Mortgage and Realty Investors of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and is Chairman of the Board of the Aspen Skiing Corporation. Herman Kahn Herman Kahn was born in Bayonne, New Jersey, in 1922. He received a B.A. from UCLA in 1945 and an M.S. in physics from the California Institute of Technology in 1948. He was associated with the Rand Corporation before becom- ing in 1961 the principal founder and director of the Hudson Institute, a re- search organization studying public policy issues, with headquarters in Croton- on-Hudson, N.Y. His international reputation as a strategic warfare analyst or, as the New Republic put it, one of "the prophets of strategic reality," is based on his work at the Institute and on his books: On Thermonuclear War (1960), Thinking about the Unthinkable (1962), On Escalation (1965 and, revised Pelican (77) 143 Statement op E. P. Wigner 1 for the Joint Committee on Defense Production 1 Dr. Wiener is a Nobel Laureate and an emeritus professor of physics at Princeton University and hns lonp been associated with civil defense issues. He edited a 1968 study Who Speaks for Civil Defense t THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL DEFENSE This writer became convinced of the possible effectiveness of civil defense measures when he served as a member of the General Advisory Committee to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 144 Are the U.S.S.R. and China the onlv countries with elaborate and well developed civil defense systems? No — most of the peace-loving countries also have such systems, based on blast shelters, and their yearly expenditures per person on such defense is about 15 times greater than ours. This has been, so far, about 400 per person a year. Inciden- tally, the Swiss civil defense repeats our President Kennedy's message : (Civil defense) "is insurance we trust, will never be needed" — its greatest accomplishment is, according to the Swiss, that it will not have to be used, that it will divert the aggressive instincts of possible opponents. It is easy to conclude that an effective civil defense is not only desir- able, it is also possible. IS CIVIL DEFENSE NECESSARY? What is the principal danger that threatens us in the present absence of an effective civil defense ? It is the possibility of the U.S.S.R. evacu- ating its cities, dispersing their population, and then making demands on us, under the threat of a nuclear attack, approximating those made by Hitler or Czechoslovakia which led to the Munich pact. This left Czechoslovakia essentially defenseless. 145 THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CIVIL DEFENSE The argument which we heard after the U.S.S.R. civil defense efforts became generally apparent was that our installation of protection for our people would only induce the U.S.S.R. to augment its aggressive capability. We now know that such augmentation took place even though we did not organize a vigorous civil defense effort. One of the two arguments we now hear, the civil defense is too expensive, seems almost ridiculous. If Switzerland, Sweden, etc., even China, can afford the more costly, the blast shelter method, we with the highest per capita national wealth, can also surely afford the defense of our people. The other argument, in the words of one of the most learned opponents of civil defense, S. Drell, is that it would lead to an "escalation of the ap- prehension from the mood of today, vis-a-vis the dangers of a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union." Should the appre- hension of the danger not be greater now, where we have no effective defense, than it would be when we have such defense? Or is it pro- posed that we should lull the common people into ignorance of the true situation? It is remarkable also that the U.S.S.R. is not criticised for fostering the "apprehension" of its own people. One must conclude that the varying arguments against civil defense have little validity. 146 A FEW PROPOSALS RELATED TO OUR DEFENSE The first change I would advocate is to stop maintaining that a nuclear war would be the end of mankind. Such a statement may give the impression to an opponent that he can achieve anything by threat- ening with a nuclear war. After all, he would argue, tlie opponent (that is us) will make any sacrifice to avoid the "end of mankind". Hence, if he is threatened with extinction he will give in, particularly if the threat comes from a party which does not believe that the war precipi- tated by him will lead to the "end of mankind". Instead of such a blatantly incorrect statement, it would be better to subscribe to Chuy- kov's doctrine that "knowledge and the skillful use of modern protec- tive measures" will make it possible to provide effective protection. At least, we could adhere to Kissinger's earlier (1957) statement : "While it (civil defense) cannot avert the traumatic effect of vast physical destruction, its efficient operation may make the difference between the survival of a society and its collapse." The second measure which I consider to be urgent is to establish better contact with the people at large. This makes it desirable for DCPA to expand its staff by the employment of people who can es- tablish a contact with the population at large, who can speak and write the truth convincingly. One of the functions of these advisors would be to help the high schools to give instruction on the nature of nuclear explosions and the defense against the effects of these. This is a subject which is foreign to most present high school teachers, and the advisor could and should help them to acquire the necessary knowledge. After all, the Federal Government now intends to support the local schools and can well suggest that these contribute to the protection of the country. The high school instruction on civil def ense — obligatory in the TJ.S.S.R. — would be very useful since, after all, we learn best when we are young and we learn most non-elementary facts from our teach- ers. But even more generally, the establishment of a close contact be- tween those who protect our freedom, and those whose freedom is pro- tected, would be very desirable ; and acquainting people at large with the methods and effectiveness of. civil defense would provide an avenue toward this goal. It may not be easy to find people who know about the methods and effectiveness of civil defense and who are also able and interested in communicating this and much other knowledge to the people at large, but every effort should be made to find such people and support them. The last suggestion I wish to make is that the DCPA budget should certainly not be cut. It should steadily be increased until, in a few years, it reaches the per capita level of other peace-loving and non-expansion- ist countries, such as Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, etc. For reasons given in the rest of mv statement, this would be of decisive importance for maintaining a valid, widely endorsed, and vigorous defense effort for our country — and it would support all freedom-directed nations. Their independence does depend to a certain degree on our strength and our ability to stand up for them. The examples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland — to mention only a few — show that such in- dependence does not come freely. Let me end on a bit more hopeful tone which is. however, as sincere as wasthe rest of my statement. This is the hope that an effective civil defense may not only protect our country and our freedoms, but it may (Gross exaggerations, assuming Nevada desert type terrain with no thermal shadows by city skylines , no duck and cover, no clothing and fraudulent blast effects data which ignores Hiroshima's evidence)