China Strategic Competition in Technology: Analysis and Outlook ******************************************* ** Machine translated from original Chinese ******************************************* Author/Source: Peking University Institute for International and Strategic Studies Research Group Since the end of 2017, the united states has undergone a major shift in china policy, and trade frictions and technological competition have gradually become the focus of bilateral relations. china strives to strengthen its independent innovation capabilities, master key core technologies, and become an innovative country. the united states suppressed china on the grounds that "china forced us companies to transfer technology and stole us intellectual property rights". advanced technology has become the main stage for competition and competition between china and the united states. First, the overall analysis of the comparison of technical forces between china and the united states. IN RECENT YEARS, CHINA'S OVERALL TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH HAS GRADUALLY INCREASED, BECOMING AN INFLUENTIAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER. HOWEVER, FROM A SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER TO A SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER, CHINA STILL HAS A LONG WAY TO GO. WHETHER FROM THE HORIZONTAL RANGE OR VERTICAL GAP, THE UNITED STATES' TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH IS STILL LEADING THE WORLD. SOME KEY BASIC INDICATORS REFLECT THE BASIC SITUATION OF THE COMPARISON OF TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: (1) KNOWLEDGE CREATION IS THE BASIC INDICATOR FOR MEASURING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH, WHICH IS INTUITIVELY REFLECTED IN THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES AND CITATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PAPERS. A NUMBER OF AUTHORITATIVE STATISTICS, INCLUDING THE NATURE INDEX, SHOW THAT IN RECENT YEARS, FROM THE NUMBER OF CONFERENCE PAPERS AND PEER-REVIEWED JOURNAL ARTICLES, CHINA HAS CONTINUED TO GROW RAPIDLY, AND THE GAP WITH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN NARROWING, AND EVEN SURPASSED THE UNITED STATES IN SOME RANKINGS. HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER AND ORIGINALITY OF HIGHLY CITED PAPERS, CHINA STILL LAGS BEHIND THE UNITED STATES BY A LARGE MARGIN. (2) FINANCIAL INPUT IS THE FOUNDATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION. IN TERMS OF TOTAL R&D EXPENDITURE, THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG BEEN THE WORLD'S FIRST. SINCE 2008, CHINA'S R&D EXPENDITURE HAS INCREASED RAPIDLY, WITH AN AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE MUCH HIGHER THAN THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES, AND THERE IS A TREND OF CATCHING UP WITH OR EVEN SURPASSING THE UNITED STATES. CHINA'S RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INTENSITY HAS INCREASED RAPIDLY, BUT THERE IS STILL A CERTAIN GAP COMPARED WITH THE UNITED STATES. CHINA'S INVESTMENT IN BASIC RESEARCH IS STILL MUCH LOWER THAN THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. (III) THE CORE OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION LIES IN TALENTS, AND THE LEVEL OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE QUALITY OF THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT ARE THE KEY TO TESTING WHETHER THE COUNTRY CAN ATTRACT AND RETAIN TALENTS. AT PRESENT, CHINA LEADS IN THE NUMBER OF R&D PERSONNEL AND POTENTIAL R&D PERSONNEL. IT IS EXPECTED THAT BY 2025, THE NUMBER OF STEM DOCTORAL GRADUATES IN CHINA WILL BE CLOSE TO TWICE THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES HAS A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF QUALITY ADVANTAGE UNDER THE PREMISE OF ENSURING A CERTAIN QUANTITY. AMONG THE VARIOUS RANKINGS, U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION HAS AN OVERWHELMING ADVANTAGE. DUE TO THE IMPACT OF THE US GOVERNMENT BAN AND THE NEW CROWN EPIDEMIC, THE NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES HAS GENERALLY DECLINED IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, BUT THE UNITED STATES IS STILL THE PREFERRED STUDY DESTINATION FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS. ITS RELATIVELY RELAXED AND INNOVATIVE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT IS ALSO FAVORED BY SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL TALENTS, AND A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF OVERSEAS STUDENTS CHOOSE TO STAY IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER OBTAINING A DOCTORAL DEGREE IN STEM FROM A US UNIVERSITY. (4) PATENT APPLICATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS REFLECT THE SCALE OF NATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL OUTPUT TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. CHINA HAS SURPASSED THE UNITED STATES IN THE NUMBER OF ANNUAL PATENT APPLICATIONS (INCLUDING "THE NUMBER OF PATENT APPLICATIONS BY APPLICANTS OF NATIONALITY" AND THE "NUMBER OF PCT PATENT APPLICATIONS" REFLECTING THE QUALITY OF PATENTS), AND THE GAP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF PATENTS VALID AND THE UNITED STATES HAS GRADUALLY NARROWED. HOWEVER, THE PATENT TECHNOLOGY FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES IS MORE COMPREHENSIVELY DISTRIBUTED AND OF HIGH QUALITY, WHILE CHINA'S PATENT STRUCTURE IS RELATIVELY SINGLE AND OF LOW QUALITY. IN TERMS OF PATENT CONVERSION RATE AND CONVERSION EFFICIENCY, THERE IS STILL A SIGNIFICANT GAP BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, BUT THE TREND OF GRADUALLY NARROWING IS GRADUALLY EMERGING. (5) THE DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN AND LEADING THE FORMULATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IS THE EMBODIMENT OF THE NATIONAL LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE COMPREHENSIVE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE INDUSTRY. THE UNITED STATES HAS LED THE FORMULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL STANDARDS IN RECENT DECADES, AND HAS FORMED A SYSTEM ADVANTAGE IN THE MARKET AND HAS A GREAT RIGHT TO SPEAK. WITH DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, CHINA HAS ACCELERATED ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE FORMULATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND ACHIEVED "BREAKTHROUGHS AT POINTS" IN SOME INDUSTRIAL FIELDS. OVERALL, CHINA HAS MADE REVOLUTIONARY BREAKTHROUGHS IN SOME KEY INDICATORS, AND THE OVERALL GAP BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN NARROWING, BUT THE UNITED STATES STILL MAINTAINS ITS OVERALL AND KEY ADVANTAGES. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THESE KEY INDICATORS CAN ONLY REFLECT THE GENERAL SITUATION OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD OF BASIC RESEARCH AND APPLICATION TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, AND CANNOT COMPREHENSIVELY AND ACCURATELY SHOW THE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE OF THE COMPARISON OF TECHNICAL FORCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. SINCE THE INCREASE OR DECREASE OF TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE ABILITY TO INNOVATE, AND INNOVATION HAS NON-LINEAR CHARACTERISTICS, ANY INDICATOR MAY DEVIATE IN THE PROCESS OF INNOVATION. THEREFORE, EVEN IF ALL INDICATORS ARE COMPARED AND ANALYZED, WE STILL CANNOT SIMPLY REGARD THEM AS A TRUE MANIFESTATION OF THE POWER OF TECHNOLOGY. NATIONAL INNOVATION IS A DYNAMIC SYSTEM ENGINEERING, INVOLVING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALL LEVELS OF "GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, ACADEMIA, RESEARCH AND APPLICATION". IN THE MODERN COMPLEX INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM, INNOVATION IS OFTEN NOT COMPLETED BY A SINGLE SUBJECT, NOR CAN IT BE ACHIEVED IN A SINGLE TIME. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE INDICATORS, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND USERS, STRATEGIC DECISIONS, ETC. HAVE A PROFOUND IMPACT ON INNOVATION ABILITY AND TECHNICAL STRENGTH. Information technology, artificial intelligence, and aerospace are the three representative areas of sino-us technology competition. these three areas are not only of great importance at the level of science and technology and economics, but also directly related to the interaction between china and the united states at the level of national security and strategy. the following is a focused analysis of each of these three areas. Second, the field of information technology (I) THE COMPARISON OF CHINA'S AND US TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH IN THE THREE MAJOR AREAS OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, OPERATING SYSTEMS AND INDUSTRIAL SOFTWARE IS THE KEY FOUNDATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW GENERATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY, AND IT IS ALSO THE FOCUS OF SINO-US COMPETITION IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. AMONG THEM, INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PROVIDE THE HARDWARE BASIS FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT IS THE CORE MEDIUM OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT APPLICATION AREAS OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS; OPERATING SYSTEMS AND INDUSTRIAL SOFTWARE ARE IMPORTANT SOFTWARE GUARANTEES FOR BUILDING VARIOUS TYPES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ITS INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY. THE THREE MAJOR AREAS ARE CLOSELY CONNECTED AND INFLUENCE EACH OTHER. THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT INDUSTRY HAS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBAL HIGH DIVISION OF LABOR AND INTERDEPENDENCE. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES RELIES ON FOREIGN COMPANIES IN WAFER MANUFACTURING AND OTHER ASPECTS, IT STILL HAS OVERALL TECHNICAL ADVANTAGES; THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS ALSO TRYING TO STAY AHEAD OF THE CURVE BY INCREASING INVESTMENT IN THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT INDUSTRY. IN CONTRAST, CHINA'S INTEGRATED CIRCUIT INDUSTRY IS IN A PERIOD OF RAPID DEVELOPMENT, HAS BASICALLY ACHIEVED FULL COVERAGE OF THE PRODUCT FIELD, BUT THERE ARE ALSO MANY BUT NOT STRONG, THE PHENOMENON OF HOMOGENIZATION AND LOW-LEVEL REPEATED CONSTRUCTION IN THE INDUSTRIAL FIELD IS SERIOUS, AND THE DEPENDENCE ON THE IMPORT OF CORE EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS IS HIGH. IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION, THE GAP BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH IS RELATIVELY SMALL. AMONG THEM, CHINA HAS CERTAIN PATENT ADVANTAGES IN THE FIFTH GENERATION OF MOBILE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (5G), AND HAS BEGUN TO LAY OUT AND EXPLORE THE NEXT GENERATION OF TECHNOLOGY; BUT IN RECENT YEARS, THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO BEGUN TO CATCH UP BY INCREASING GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND COOPERATING WITH ALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME, ALTHOUGH CHINESE ENTERPRISES HAVE THE TOP LEVEL IN THE DESIGN OF VARIOUS COMMUNICATION MODULES, THEY ARE STILL SUBJECT TO SOME KEY COMPONENTS SUCH AS RF FRONT-END CHIPS, AND THEIR INDEPENDENT CONTROLLABILITY NEEDS TO BE FURTHER IMPROVED. IN ALL KINDS OF OPERATING SYSTEMS, THE UNITED STATES HAS OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES AND MASTERS CORE TECHNOLOGIES SUCH AS THE KERNEL. IN CONTRAST, ALTHOUGH CHINA'S DOMESTIC INDEPENDENT OPERATING SYSTEM OCCUPIES A CERTAIN MARKET SHARE, IT LACKS CORE COMPETITIVENESS AS A WHOLE. U.S. COMPANIES ALSO MAINTAIN A LEADING POSITION IN MOST INDUSTRIAL SOFTWARE CATEGORIES. CHINESE COMPANIES OCCUPY A CERTAIN DOMESTIC MARKET SHARE IN DATA-SENSITIVE SOFTWARE SUCH AS ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, BUT IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO BREAK THROUGH IN THE GLOBAL HIGH-END MARKET; IN TERMS OF R&D DESIGN AND GENERAL TOOL SOFTWARE (SUCH AS EDA SOFTWARE), WHICH ARE MORE CRITICAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, THERE IS STILL A BIG GAP BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. (II) SECURITY ISSUES IN RECENT YEARS, THERE HAVE BEEN MORE AND MORE FRICTIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OVER NETWORK AND DATA SECURITY, WHICH HAS ALSO MADE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ISSUES INCREASINGLY SECURE. IN THE FACE OF CYBER ATTACKS, BOTH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE SUFFERED MANY LOSSES IN RECENT YEARS; BUT GIVEN THE POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY BLOCKADE AND THE MATURITY OF THE SECURITY INDUSTRY, CHINA NEEDS TO MAKE MORE EFFORTS IN CYBER AND DATA SECURITY IN MOST CIVILIAN AREAS. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES HAS USED NETWORK AND DATA SECURITY AS AN EXCUSE TO SUPPRESS CHINESE COMPANIES SUCH AS HUAWEI AND TO EXAGGERATE THE CHINESE THREAT ON A GLOBAL SCALE, MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, AND THE TREND OF POLITICIZATION AND CAMPING HAS EMERGED. GIVEN THE DYNAMICS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, SINO-US CONCERNS ABOUT NETWORK AND DATA SECURITY AND THE LACK OF MUTUAL TRUST WILL BE DIFFICULT TO IMPROVE IN THE SHORT TERM, AND THE POLITICAL COLOR OF TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION MAY FURTHER INTENSIFY AS BOTH SIDES INCREASE INVESTMENT. (III) TRAINING AND COMPETITION IN THE TRAINING AND COMPETITION OF TECHNICAL TALENTS IN THE FIELD OF PERSONNEL TRAINING IN THE FIELDS OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, OPERATING SYSTEMS, AND INDUSTRIAL SOFTWARE, THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF HIGH-END TALENTS AND A SHORTAGE OF COMPOUND TALENTS IN CHINA. ALTHOUGH MANY UNIVERSITIES IN CHINA HAVE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED RELEVANT COLLEGES OR MAJORS, AND GOVERNMENTS AT ALL LEVELS HAVE ACTIVELY PROMOTED THE INTEGRATION OF INDUSTRY AND EDUCATION, THE GAP WITH THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY-RESEARCH COOPERATION, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOLOGY IN RELATED FIELDS IS STILL LARGE. IIN TERMS OF BASIC RESEARCH ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, CHINESE UNIVERSITIES HAVE MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN RECENT YEARS, AND THE RELEVANT RANKINGS HAVE REPEATEDLY REACHED NEW HIGHS, BUT AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES STILL HAVE CERTAIN TALENT TRAINING ADVANTAGES IN SOME CUTTING-EDGE TECHNOLOGY FIELDS. (IV) COMPETITION IN TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND NORMS STANDARDS STANDARDS AND NORMS IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MAINLY REFER TO THE GUIDING STANDARDS AND NORMS FORMULATED BY RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS OR MECHANISMS THROUGH CONSULTATION. IN RECENT YEARS, ALTHOUGH CHINESE ENTERPRISES HAVE ACHIEVED CONCENTRATED BREAKTHROUGHS IN MORE IMPORTANT AND WIDE-RANGING AREAS SUCH AS 5G COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS, THEIR INTERNATIONAL VOICE IN TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCT STANDARDS IN MANY SUBDIVISIONS SUCH AS MEMORY AND VEHICLE-GRADE CHIPS IS STILL LIMITED. IN ADDITION, DUE TO THE LACK OF FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGES, CHINA IS ALSO RELATIVELY LAGGING BEHIND THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF "SOFT STANDARDS" COMPOSED OF FACTORS SUCH AS CORE TECHNOLOGY ADVANTAGES, MARKET PENETRATION AND USER ACCEPTANCE. (5) THE CURRENT SITUATION AND CHALLENGES OF "TECHNOLOGICAL DECOUPLING" The "technology decoupling" between china and the united states has a huge impact on china's information technology industry. at present, as more and more chinese entities are subject to us sanctions and chinese companies such as huawei are frequently suppressed by the us in the international market, there has been a trend of "dual-track" in global information infrastructure and even technological development. the daily research and development and operation of sanctioned chinese enterprises and institutions have been restricted, and some students of sanctioned universities have difficulty studying in the united states. in this context, the normal business practices and cooperative exchanges between some unsanguated chinese entities and the united states and other countries have also been hindered. in contrast, the direct impact of "technology decoupling" on the us information technology industry at this stage is not obvious. Third, the field of artificial intelligence (i) Comparison of sino-us technological strength in the field of artificial intelligence, the scientific and technological strength of china and the united states is far ahead of other countries and regions in the world. the united states has the advantage of computing power and algorithms, and china benefits from the huge and diverse big data at home. at present, the strength of artificial intelligence in china and the united states can be measured from three aspects. in terms of basic scientific research, the number of published and cited artificial research papers in china and the united states is equal, but the united states has obvious advantages in original and pioneering research. in terms of industrial technology, the united states is the original party of core technologies such as artificial intelligence chips, algorithms, and machine learning, and is still significantly ahead of china, which is still making rapid progress. thanks to the open knowledge sharing of the scientific community, the gap between china and the united states in software, models, and algorithms is limited. in terms of applied technology, china and the united states have their own advantages. based on the advantages of massive data accumulation and user experience, china is ahead of the united states in the technology field of product-driven research and development (such as face recognition, speech recognition, computer vision, and image diagnosis technology). the united states has introduced machine learning technology in biosynthesis and drug research and development, and has made major breakthroughs. the united states is also leading the way in advancing the military application of artificial intelligence technology. (ii) Security issues in the context of intensified strategic competition among major powers, security issues in the field of artificial intelligence have become more and more prominent, and even have the tendency to be over-secured and politicized. at the national level, the military application of artificial intelligence is directly related to the country's defense security and military strength, and its commercial application is related to economic prosperity and social development. both the trump and biden administrations have elevated ai to the strategic height of national security and development, viewing china as an imminent threat to america's long-term technological superiority. at the domestic political level, as some institutions and personalities claim that the 2016 us election was interfered with by false information and intelligence activities of foreign forces, artificial intelligence was linked to the domestic political security of the united states for the first time, causing american social vigilance. the maturity and popularity of ai surveillance technology has also triggered criticism from the united states of china's human rights situation, privacy security, and "digital authoritarianism." these factors have exacerbated the ideological color of the competition for ai technology between china and the united states, and have also increased the political sensitivity of issues such as cybersecurity, data security and cross-border transmission, information dissemination and public opinion supervision. (iii) Technical talent training and competition the united states is the first choice for global artificial intelligence professionals to receive higher education and choose employment. in terms of talent education and training, american universities have established a full set of artificial intelligence professional talent systems and laboratories earlier. china has only begun to catch up in the past three years, but it is still far from it. the total number of ai practitioners in china is growing rapidly, but the number of high-end r&d talents is currently far less than that of the united states. china is a major source of undergraduate talent in the field of artificial intelligence, but it is not a popular place of employment. of china's top ai talents, 34 percent are employed domestically and about 56 percent are employed in the united states. among the chinese who went to the united states to study artificial intelligence, 88% were employed in the united states after graduation, and only 10% returned to china for employment. although the overall exchange of scientific and technological talents between china and the united states has weakened due to the "politicization" of the trump administration, in the field of artificial intelligence, the academic community is still willing to openly share scientific results. in the field of artificial intelligence, there seems to be no obvious wave of chinese scientists returning home due to the deterioration of sino-us relations. (iv) Competition of technical standards and norms artificial intelligence has brought common governance challenges to all countries, but the international discussion around artificial intelligence technical standards and governance norms highlights the power game and political concept differences between major powers. while it is difficult to advance regulatory legislation in the united states, the united states actively participates in international discussions on technology governance and standards and strongly opposes any chinese proposals. the united states is also seeking to forge an ideological "democratic technology coalition" that works with so-called "like-minded" countries on regulations and standards to limit the use of ai technology in china and its international promotion. china is increasingly active in science and technology diplomacy and participates in international dialogues on ai ethics, governance and technical standards. however, due to the lack of overall coordination among the relevant ministries and commissions of the central government, there are inconsistencies in the voice and participation of chinese representatives on different international platforms. (v) the current situation and challenges of "technological decoupling". The biden administration still regards artificial intelligence as one of the core technical areas of strategic competition with china, basically continuing the "decoupling" measures of the trump era. however, in addition to the us government's technology export controls, investment audits and other restrictive measures, the cooperation and exchanges between chinese and american enterprises and scientists in the field of artificial intelligence have not been interrupted. in march 2021, the u.s. national security council on artificial intelligence released its final report, recommending "targeted isolation" measures to safeguard u.s. national security, open source technology ecology, and intellectual property rights. optional measures are nothing more than more targeted export controls and investment reviews, reducing dependence on china's technology, and advancing international technical standards and norms that are consistent with u.s. values. this may represent the mainstream thinking of the current us government. Fourth, the aerospace field (I) Comparing the technical strength of China and the United States, the international aerospace pattern presents the characteristics of "one superpower and many strong". In the field of space transportation, manned spaceflight, satellite navigation and communications, deep space exploration, etc., the United States is absolutely leading, while China has an independent technology and equipment system, and europe and Russia are the second echelon. In the field of aviation, aero engines, avionics, aviation materials and other key links, the United States as a whole to maintain the lead, China is developing rapidly, with Russia, Britain, France as the second echelon. The interdependence between China and the United States in the aerospace field is relatively weak, and the competition between technology and security is gradually heating up, but the industrial competition relationship is highly asymmetrical. (II) Security Issues Space and space security is a complex of airspace security and space security. Both China and the United States have introduced "space strategies" that regard the two as a unified whole. Competition in space-air security focuses on two major areas: one is military aviation, with a focus on aero engines, avionics, missiles and missile defense, and hypersonic weapons; The second is space security, based on space transport and situational awareness capabilities, with anti-satellite capabilities as the hotspot. At present, the United States is far ahead in these two aspects, and China is developing rapidly in the field of military aviation, with Russia, Britain, and France as the second echelon; In the field of space security, China can form a "quasi-tripolar pattern" with the United States and Russia. Space security and nuclear security are closely linked, highly complex and sensitive. Under the circumstance that the United States has a clear superiority in air and space military strength, it has long pursued the doctrine of "space control", which makes China feel threatened. The United States has also accelerated its efforts to militarize outer space. The Trump administration officially established the Space Force and launched a new version of the Defense Space Strategy, which clearly regards China as an imaginary enemy in the field of space security. China actively promotes the defense capacity building of "air-space integration", strengthens air-space security cooperation with Russia, jointly proposes a code of conduct against the militarization of outer space, and frequently confronts the United States at UNITED Nations disarmament conferences. (III) Comparison between technical personnel training and R&D system In the long run, talent and R&D system are the basic factors that determine the competitiveness of the Aerospace field between China and the United States. From the perspective of the strength of talent training institutions, American universities occupy the forefront of astronomy, space science, geophysics, atmospheric sciences and other disciplines in the world, and China's top universities only reach the level of the second and third echelons. In the discipline of engineering, Chinese universities have certain advantages. However, in terms of capital investment and the number of professional and technical personnel, the United States is much higher than China. In terms of research and development, China takes the "national team" as the main force, and funds and technical resources are concentrated. In the United States, the government and private entities go hand in hand, through project procurement to achieve government-enterprise synergy, while competition between enterprises to provide innovation momentum, especially in recent years, SpaceX and other emerging companies as the leader. In the process of research and development, Since the 1980s, China has learned from the Western scientific research management system and gradually explored a relatively mature "pre-research - trial production - mass production" mechanism, which is no longer fundamentally different from its American counterparts. Competition in technical standards and norms Both China and the United States are participants in the global commercial aerospace and civil aviation industries, but their market share and competitiveness are very different. In terms of commercial spaceflight, the United States commercial rocket launch capabilities are unique in the world, and GPS occupies more than 60% of the global satellite navigation market share, so it has the largest voice in these two industries. In the civil aviation industry standards, the United States has the world's largest number of aviation technology patents, although China has rapidly narrowed the gap with the United States, but the core patents are limited, the market conversion rate is not high, and in key areas such as civil aviation passenger aircraft engines still rely on imports. TThe United States also has great influence over the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which sets global civil aviation standards. However, in recent years, China's Beidou navigation system and civilian UAVs have made great progress, the international market share has increased rapidly, and the Chinese enterprise DJI has even become the world's leading civilian UAV manufacturer, which is expected to become a global industry rule shaper. (V) The Current Situation and Challenges of "Technological Decoupling" Due to the "Wolff Amendment" and the clampdown of the Wassenaar mechanism, aerospace has long been one of the high-tech fields with the weakest foundation and the lowest degree of interdependence in sino-US cooperation. In the field of aerospace technology and military aviation, China can independently develop a large and complete technical system under the condition of approaching "technical decoupling" from the United States, although there is a time lag and quality gap compared with the United States, but there is no "generation difference" in most technologies, and even in individual projects, it can be equal. However, in the civil aviation industry, which relies on market players and obeys business logic, china's disadvantages are extremely obvious. china basically relies on the purchase of complete machines or core components from western countries such as the united states, which mainly produces peripheral parts, and due to the investment review of the united states, trade restrictions and china's own position in the industrial chain, it is difficult for chinese companies to obtain core technologies through acquisitions. V. prospects for sino-us technological competition (i) the trend of the balance of technological forces there are two types of representative views on the "competition" of technological forces between china and the united states. one category believes that china is about to become a global leader in various key technology areas. the other argues that china's scientific and technological prowess is (grossly) exaggerated, and that china's innovation environment is not yet sufficient to sustain progress. the analysis results of the above three areas show that china has developed rapidly in a number of sub-technical fields, striving to catch up with the world's advanced level and achieving a leading edge in some subdivisions. however, china's disadvantages in some segments are still very obvious, and there are technological gaps and "stuck necks". relatively speaking, the leading fields in the united states are more comprehensive and have deep technical accumulation. this article argues that this is basically a reflection of the overall trend of the balance of technological power between china and the united states. taking the united states as the benchmark, china has formed a basic situation of "following up" in most fields, "running together" in a few fields, and "leading" in a very small number of fields. in the process of long-term competition and evolution, the united states has developed a series of institutional arrangements and innovation systems. despite the uncertainties of the future, the united states will remain the world's number one scientific and technological power for some time to come. "crossing the river by feeling the united states" is an important experience of scientific and technological innovation in china and even other countries in the world in the past few decades. once the goal of the united states is lost, whether china can continue to lead scientific and technological innovation in all aspects is the concern of some scholars in china's scientific community. this concern does not stem from the denial of the independent innovation ability of china's scientific and industrial circles, but from the long-term observation and rational understanding of the level of science and technology and innovation ability of the united states. in the future, china may narrow the generation gap with the united states in more technical fields and achieve "independent control" in some key technologies, but achieving comprehensive transcendence is a fairly long process and faces arduous challenges. in fact, the situation of "china surpassing the united states", "china continues to lag behind the united states", and "china and the united states go hand in hand" may exist in various (subdivided) fields at the same time. at present, china may be ahead of the united states mainly in the fields of communication technology, port machinery and rail transit; in the fields of biotechnology, agriculture and animal husbandry breeding, fine chemicals, industrial software, chip manufacturing, medical equipment, civil aero engines, etc., the gap between china and the united states is large; in emerging technologies such as brain-computer technology, quantum information technology, and artificial intelligence, many countries, including china and the united states, are mobilizing resources to compete for a leading edge. (ii) prospects for "technological decoupling" "sino-us relations have entered a stage of long-term competitive coexistence, with competition as the mainstay and cooperation as a supplement. in this context, in the future, the united states is very likely to adopt the strategy of "precision decoupling" and "precise linkage", that is, selecting specific strategic technology areas, enhancing the accuracy of decoupling and linkage, and striving to achieve a balance between national security, economic benefits and technological advantages. the basic idea of the us side is to resolutely decouple from some core technologies that china urgently needs but cannot achieve self-sufficiency; deregulation of export controls in technology areas of comparable level between the two countries is "even possible to turn chinese companies to domestic suppliers, counterproductively" because of the decoupling. the current us government has not yet fully determined the boundaries of "decoupling", but has formed a certain consensus on key technologies and products such as chips and their manufacturing equipment, artificial intelligence. the "linked" field is basically limited to low-tech and low-value-added industries. the u.s. strategy of "decoupling" will also be accompanied by the formation of the "democratic nations science and technology alliance", which will try to isolate china. this competition for political leadership, which is closely related to national strength and the international order, has greatly and profoundly affected the trend of the balance of technological power between china and the united states, greatly increasing the difficulty of china to purchase key products, obtain advanced technologies and introduce high-end talents from third countries. the impetus for technological decoupling has evolved from one-way to two-way. the starting points of china and the united states are different, but they have moved towards a common goal, which objectively promotes the trend of "two-way decoupling". whether it is at the technical or industrial level, both china and the united states are facing the losses caused by "decoupling", and at present, china's losses may be even greater. Under the background of the spread of the "sense of technological crisis" in the us political circles and the strict implementation of technology export controls by the united states to china, china should strive to stabilize the areas of superiority with an open academic exchange mechanism, continuous investment in research and development, extensive international scientific and technological cooperation, solid construction of a talent system, effective transformation of scientific and technological achievements, and firm determination to innovate independently, so as to keep the gap in backward fields not further widened and narrowed as much as possible, and actively compete for a dominant position in the emerging fields with fierce competition. this can become a strategic line of thinking for china to deal with the "science and technology war" at present. *** this article is a condensed version of the interim report of the Institute for International and Strategic Studies of Peking University", "research on sino-us economic and trade science and technology competition", and the annotations are omitted. this report was curated by wang jisi, dean of the institute of international and strategic studies of peking university and professor of the school of international relations, zhao jianwei, a doctoral student at the school of international relations of peking university, wrote the first and fifth sessions, hu ran, a doctoral student at the school of international relations of peking university, wrote the third section, and zhang chengyang and zhang yike, research assistants of the institute of international and strategic studies of peking university, wrote the fourth and second sessions respectively. The full text was co-authored by zhao jianwei. ***