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Brazil in the Emerging World Order
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_This article, which examines Brazil's approach to Ukraine and China,
is part of an ongoing series on U.S. statecraft and the Global South
developed by the Carnegie Endowment's American Statecraft Program. For
other articles in the series, click here._
"Nobody can stop Brazil from continuing to develop its relationship
with China," Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva insisted
during a 2023 visit to Beijing.1 Under Lula, Brazil will not pick a
side in the growing standoff between Washington and Beijing, even as
Brasília seeks to enrich its ties with both countries.2 Meanwhile,
Brazil's approach to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has chafed officials
in Washington, as Lula has advocated for peace negotiations that
Washington views as counterproductive and naïve. The war in Gaza also
brought the United States and Brazil's differences to the fore in
October 2023, as Brazil led the charge for a ceasefire at the UN
Security Council but was shut down by a U.S. veto.3
Brazil has a tradition of foreign policy independence and nonalignment
that dates back many years, but its desire for autonomy has
crystallized amid the broader U.S.-China standoff and as Brazil's
political and economic weight has grown. Brazil wants to avoid a world
order structured only by great power competition and instead hopes for
a multipolar order where states its size have more say in
international institutions and greater influence overall. In Brazil's
view, the emergence of new powers, especially China, promises an era
of "benign multipolarity" in which the power of the West is reduced
and the influence of rising nations is enhanced.4
### Brazil's Approach to the War in Ukraine
Lula told reporters in Washington in February 2023 that Brazil would
not be sending weapons or ammunition to Ukraine. "I don't want to go
join the war," Lula said. "I want to end the war."5 Brasília opposed
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in four UN resolutions but has not joined
the U.S.-led coalition against Russia. To the contrary, Lula sought to
assemble a "peace club" of neutral nations to mediate negotiations
between Russia and Ukraine to end the war.6 At the Munich Security
Conference that same month, Brazilian diplomats presented their peace
plan to more than twenty countries. Lula and his foreign policy
adviser Celso Amorim have also pitched their peace plan directly to
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir
Putin.7
U.S. officials see the initiative as misguided and counter to U.S.
efforts to push Russia back to its February 2022 lines.8 Washington
was especially peeved by Brazil's welcome of Russian foreign minister
Sergei Lavrov to Brasília in April 2023, and by Lula's suggestion that
Putin might attend the 2024 G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro without risk
of arrest on the charges brought by the International Court of
Justice—a statement he later backpedaled on.9
Other Brazilian statements on Ukraine have been frustrating to the
Biden administration, such as when Lula told reporters during his
Beijing trip that Washington should "stop encouraging war and start
talking about peace."10 But Brazil is not completely on Russia's side.
It condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations and
clearly opposes Russia's violation of international law and the
principle of national sovereignty. It was also the only BRICS nation
to support the UN resolution demanding a withdrawal of Russian troops
from Ukrainian territory. But Brazil abstained from a later resolution
to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, on the grounds
that excluding Russia would damage the chances of reaching a
diplomatic resolution to the war.11
Brazil's economic relationship with Moscow looms large in shaping its
approach to Ukraine. Brazil depends on Russia for a quarter of its
fertilizer imports, which it needs for its massive agricultural
industry.12 Agriculture is the mainstay of Brazil's economy,
accounting for nearly one-third of its gross domestic product.
Brasília is also the world's largest agricultural net exporter and
relies on nitrogen fertilizer to maintain its output.13 Although this
is not the only driver of Brazil's policy, Brazilian officials will
note that if Russia were to stop sending its fertilizer, there could
be major economic impacts, not only in Brazil, but on global food
security, as Brazil feeds some 10 percent of the global population.14
Beyond these economic interests, Brazil's position on Ukraine tracks
with its long-standing diplomatic tradition. Brazil has long
criticized unilateral sanctions, such as the sanctions on Cuba, and
does not consider any sanctions that the UN Security Council has not
endorsed to be legal.15 Brazil also does not typically provide lethal
assistance to conflicts. Lula's initiative to find peace in Ukraine
aligns with his self-identification as a peacemaker, a vocation that
Lula once pursued while attempting to broker a nuclear fuel swap deal
with Iran, much to Washington's annoyance. As a man who prides himself
on being able to speak to anyone and sees Brazil as a bridge between
nations, Lula may see brokering peace in Ukraine as a big finish to
his long career.16
### Brazil's Approach to U.S.-China Competition
Brazil's open embrace of Beijing has also irritated U.S. officials,
especially because Lula criticized the U.S. dollar's role as the
global reserve currency during his trip to Beijing.17 Brasília has
made it clear that it rejects the imposition of a binary choice
between Beijing and Washington. "I am not going to get into a cold war
with anyone," Lula said in February 2023, insisting that Brazil wanted
"splendid" relations with both superpowers.18
Ties between Brazil and China deepened in 2009 when they came together
to form BRICS, which plays an important role in Brazil's foreign
policy, even as the group has grown more anti-Western in its rhetoric
and approach to the world. Brazilian leaders see BRICS as a platform
that can elevate the influence of the Global South and build out new
alternatives to Western financial institutions like the IMF and World
Bank. For instance, when Argentina's economic crisis worsened in the
spring of 2023, Lula suggested that the BRICS New Development Bank
send loans to Buenos Aires, while saying that the IMF should "remove
its knife from Argentina's neck."19
Brazil's relationship with China is primarily economic. China buys
roughly one-third of all Brazilian exports, including most of its
soybeans and beef.20 This agricultural trade relationship has made
China increasingly reliant on Brazilian commodities, but it has also
created a powerful pro-China lobby in Brazil. The Brazilian
agribusiness caucus in particular has an interest in ensuring that
relations with its top customer remain friendly, as became clear when
former president Jair Bolsonaro was forced to moderate his hardline
stance against China in the face of their opposition.21 Even on the
local level, Brazilian politics are linked to trade cycles with
China.22 This complicates Brazilian leaders' decision-making when it
comes to China and limits the scope of actions they can take.
But the United States is also critically important to Brazil. At the
2023 UN General Assembly, Biden and Lula announced their Partnership
for Workers' Rights, a bilateral agenda for protecting workers that
they hope to expand to other countries. The two countries collaborate
on climate change, although Brazil has been disappointed with the
level of funding that the United States has provided for the Amazon
Fund to protect Brazil's gigantic rainforest.23
Washington has also signaled, but not announced, that it would support
Brazil's membership in an enlarged UN Security Council, but Brazil
would like to see a more enthusiastic endorsement.24
Although Brazil has a strong pro-China lobby, many Brazilians have
reservations about China's international behavior and trust the United
States more than China when it comes to issues like peacemaking and
security.25 Some also worry that their country will drift too far into
China's orbit.26 Therefore, just as Brazil's domestic politics make it
difficult for its leaders to distance themselves from Beijing, so too
do they make it unlikely Brazil will get too close to China. Brazilian
leaders will probably maintain a delicate balance between Washington
and Beijing.
Moreover, both China and the United States are important sources of
foreign investment for Brazil. Brazil has not officially joined
China's Belt and Road Initiative, but it still regularly receives more
Chinese investment than any other country in Latin America.27 Chinese
companies have invested about $71 billion in Brazil since 2007.28 Yet
the United States remains Brazil's top source of foreign investment;
in 2021 it held a stock of $191 billion.29 Brazil thus has every
economic incentive not to attach itself to just one superpower, nor
will it allow one power to determine its relationship with the other.
For example, Brazil's pursuit of technology cooperation with China,
despite U.S. attempts to dissuade such cooperation, shows Brasília's
unwillingness to moderate its relations with China at Washington's
bidding. U.S. officials have tried, unsuccessfully, to convince Brazil
to exclude Huawei from its 5G networks.30 During his April 2023 visit
to China, Lula made a point of touring a Huawei research facility and
stating that Brazil has "no prejudice with the Chinese."31 He also
wants to build a Chinese semiconductor factory. When asked about U.S.
attempts to discourage collaboration with China in this area, foreign
policy adviser Celso Amorim asserted that Brazil is "not afraid of the
big bad wolf." 32
Despite skepticism about China in some areas, Brazilian leaders see
China's rise as a positive development insofar as it offers a means of
soft balancing against the United States and tempering U.S.
unilateralism. Lula has in fact stated his commitment to work with
China to "balance world geopolitics."33
Brazil is an active participant in the G20 and will host the 2024
summit meeting. Brazil is also active in the Organization of American
States, the Inter-American Development Bank, IMF, World Bank, and WTO,
and it insists that it does not want BRICS to be seen as the
counterweight to these institutions.34 Moreover, even as Brazil
encourages other developing countries to build alternative global
governance frameworks, it has reservations about BRICS expansion.
Brazil supported Argentina's membership, but worried that adding other
new members would diminish its own influence in the group.35 This
preference could eventually bring Brazil to loggerheads with China,
which is much more enthusiastic about expansion.
Brazil is moving up the ranks of the global system with the objective
of taking on a greater role in geopolitical agenda-setting. Overall,
it has sought, like many emerging powers, to maintain its sovereign
independence in international affairs, and it sees China's rise as
more helpful than harmful to this objective.
### Notes
1 Meaghan Tobin and Lyric Li, "Lula Tells Xi 'Nobody Can Stop' Brazil-
China Relationship," _Washington Post_ , April 14, 2023,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/14/brazil-china-lula-xi-
jinping/.
2 Celso Amorim, "Brazil and the Global South," in _Latin American
Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment
Option_ (Anthem Press, 2023), 251-262.
3 Rafael Kruchin, "Lula's Quest for a Diplomatic Balance Amid Israel-
Hamas War," _Americas Quarterly_ , October 18, 2023,
https://americasquarterly.org/article/lulas-quest-for-a-diplomatic-
balance-amid-israel-hamas-war/.
4 Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, "The Benign Multipolarity: Brazilian
Foreign Policy Under Dilma Rousseff," _Journal of International
Relations and Foreign Policy_ 2, no. 1 (March 2014),
http://jirfp.com/vol-2-no-1-march-2014-abstract-2-jirfp.
5 Tara John, "Lula Says Brazil is No More Divided Than the US as He
Meets Biden," CNN, February 10, 2023,
https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/10/americas/brazil-president-lula-
interview-intl-latam/index.html.
6 Pedro Rafael Vilela, "Lula Suggests Group of Nations to Negotiate
Peace for Ukraine, Russia," Agencia Brasil, January 31, 2023,
https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2023-01/lula
suggests-group-nations-negotiate-peace-ukraine-russia.
7 Simone Iglesias, "Brazil's Lula Intensifies Diplomatic Push for
Peace in Ukraine," February 23,2023, _TIME_ ,
https://time.com/6258071/brazil-lula-ukraine-war/ _;_ "Brazil's Lula
Discusses Peace Effort With Zelenskiy in Video Call," Reuters, March
2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/brazils-lula-discusses-
peace-effort-with-zelenskiy-video-call-2023-03-02/ _;_ "Brazil Envoy
Met Putin to Push Ukraine Peace Talks," Reuters, April 3, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-envoy-met-putin-push-ukraine-
peace-talks-cnn-brasil-2023-04-03/.
8 Peter Baker and Jack Nicas, "Biden and Lula Swap Insurrection
Stories and Vow to Guard Democracy," _New York Times_ , February 10,
2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/10/world/americas/biden-lula-
brazil-us.html.
9 Associated Press, "Brazil's Welcome of Russian Minister Prompts U.S.
Blowback," _Politico_ , April 18, 2023,
https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/18/brazil-russia-ukraine-kirby-
blowback-00092485.; Tom Phillips, "Lula Backpedals on Suggestion Putin
Could Attend G20 Without Fear of Arrest," _Guardian_ , September 11,
2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/lula-
putin-g20-brazil-arrest.
10 Duarte Mendonca, "US Should Stop 'Encouraging' Ukraine War,
Brazilian President Says," CNN, April 15, 2023,
https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/15/world/brazil-president-ukraine-war-
intl/index.html.
11 "UN General Assembly Resolution on the Suspension of Russia's
Membership in the Human Rights Council," Brazilian Ministry of Foreign
Relations, April 7, 2022, https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-
area/press-releases/un-general-assembly-resolution-on-the-suspension-
of-russia2019s-membership-in-the-human-rights-council.
12 Jack Nicas and Andre Spigariol, "Good News For Food, Bad News For
War: Brazil Buys Russian Fertilizer," _New York Times_ , May 8, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/08/world/americas/brazil-russian-
fertilizer-sanctions.html.
13 Constanza Valdes, "Brazil's Momentum as a Global Agricultural
Supplier Faces Headwinds," U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic
Research Service, September 27, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-
waves/2022/september/brazil-s-momentum-as-a-global-agricultural-
supplier-faces-
headwinds/#:~:text=The%20University%20of%20S%C3%A3o%20Paulo's,at%20%24
14 Gabriel Araújo, "Brazil Feeds Some 10% of World's Population,
Research Finds," Reuters, March 4, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-grains/brazil-feeds-some-10-of-
worlds-population-research-finds-idUSL2N2L23F6.
15 "Brazil's President Calls U.S. Economic Embargo on Cuba 'Illegal,'
Condemns Terrorist List Label," Reuters, September 16, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-president-calls-us-
economic-embargo-cuba-illegal-condemns-terrorist-list-2023-09-16/.
16 Brian Winter, "Q&A: Brazil's Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira on the
'Lula Doctrine,'" _Americas Quarterly_ , March 23, 2023,
https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/qa-brazils-foreign-minister-
mauro-vieira-on-the-lula-doctrine/.
17 Joe Leahy, "Brazil's Lula Calls For End to Dollar Trade Dominance,"
_Financial Times_ , April 13, 2023,
https://www.ft.com/content/669260a5-82a5-4e7a-9bbf-4f41c54a6143.
18 Tom Phillips, "'Brazil is Back': Lula to Visit Xi as He Resets
Diplomatic Relations With China," _Guardian_ , March 24, 2023,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/24/lula-xi-jinping-visit-
china-brazil-diplomatic-relations-reset.
19 "Lula Says He's Started Talks With BRICS Bank to Help Argentina,"
_Buenos Aires Times_ , May 3, 2023,
https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/lula-says-hes-started-talks-
with-brics-bank-to-help-argentina.phtml
20 "Brazil," Observatory of Economic Complexity,
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/bra.
21 Oliver Stuenkel, "Brazil-China Ties to Face Test Under Bolsonaro,"
_Americas Quarterly_ , October 29, 2018,
https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-china-ties-to-face-
test-under-bolsonaro/.
22 Daniella Compello and Francisco Urdinez, "Voter and Legislator
Responses to Localized Trade Shocks From China in Brazil,"
_Comparative Political Studies_ 54, no. 7 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020970233.
23 Christopher S. Chivvis, "Why Brazil's Relationship With the United
States Isn't Taking Off," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
August 24, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/08/24/why-brazil-
s-relationship-with-united-states-isn-t-taking-off-pub-90432.
24 Cede Silva, "Biden Signals Support for Latin American Seats on the
UN Security Council," _Brazilian Report_ , September 21, 2023,
https://brazilian.report/liveblog/2022/09/21/security-council-biden-
latin-america/.
25 Laura Silver, Christine Huang and Laura Clancy, "Views of China,"
Pew Research Center, July 27, 2023,
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/views-of-china/;
Francisco Urdinez and Pietro Carlos de Souza Rodrigues, "Trapped in
Proto-Bipolarism? Brazilian Perceptions of an Emerging Chinese-
American Rivalry," _Rising Powers Quarterly_ , Vol. 2, no.,2 (2017):
105-123,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318865195_Trapped_in_Proto-
Bipolarism_Brazilian_Perceptions_of_an_Emerging_Chinese-
American_Rivalry.
26 Marcos Strecker, "The Risk of Lula's Visit to China," April 14,
2023, _Istoé_ , https://istoe.com.br/o-risco-da-visita-de-lula-a-
china/.
27 American Enterprise Institute, "China Global Investment Tracker,"
https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.
28 Chinese Investments in Brazil, 2022, China-Brazil Business Council,
August 29, 2023, https://www.cebc.org.br/2023/08/29/numero-de-
projetos-chineses-no-brasil-bateu-recorde-em-2022/.
29 U.S. Department of State, "US Relations With Brazil," August 21,
2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-brazil/.
30 "Brazil May Face 'Consequences' If It Gives Huawei 5G Access, Says
U.S. Ambassador," Reuters, July 29, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-brazil-5g/brazil-may-
face-consequences-if-it-gives-huawei-5g-access-says-u-s-ambassador-
idUSKCN24U20X.
31 "Lula Courts Chinese Tech For Brazil, Brushes Off 'Prejudices,'"
Reuters, April 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/brazil-
paves-way-semiconductor-cooperation-with-china-2023-04-14/.
32 Lisandra Paraguassu, "Lula to Seek Chinese Semiconductor
Technology, Investment in Beijing," Reuters, March 24, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/technology/lula-seek-chinese-semiconductor-
technology-investment-beijing-2023-03-24/.
33 Bryan Harris, "Lula Vows Partnership with China to 'Balance World
Geopolitics,'" _Financial Times_ , April 15, 2023,
https://www.ft.com/content/766ed3aa-3f51-4035-8573-43254c9756d5 ; Joe
Leahy, "Brazil's Lula Calls For End to Dollar Trade Dominance,"
_Financial Times_ , April 13, 2023,
https://www.ft.com/content/669260a5-82a5-4e7a-9bbf-4f41c54a6143.
34 "Brazil's Lula in Favor of Argentina Joining BRICS Bloc," Reuters,
August 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/brazils-lula-says-
brics-not-meant-challenge-g7-us-2023-08-22/.
35 Lisandra Paraguassu, "Brazil Now Main Holdout Against BRICS
Expansion," Reuters, August 2, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-now-main-holdout-against-brics-
expansion-sources-say-2023-08-02/.
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