(DIR) Home
Why Brazil's Relationship With the United States Isn't Taking Off
(HTM) Source
----------------------------------------------------------------------
_For the latest_ _Pivotal States_ _event, a new series that examines
alternative U.S. foreign policy approaches to the world's key
nations,_ _American Statecraft Program_ _director Christopher S.
Chivvis was joined by_ _Margaret Myers_ _, director of the Asia &
Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue, and __Matias
Spektor_ _, professor and associate dean at the Fundação Getulio
Vargas's School of International Relations, to discuss Washington's
strategic alternatives in its relations with Brazil._
_This Q & A was adapted from a transcript __of the event_ _and has
been edited and condensed for clarity. For past episodes from our
series, click here._
**Chris Chivvis:** Why does Brazil matter to the United States?
**Matias Spektor:** Historically, Brazil has been very cooperative
with the United States, yet this is a relationship that never really
took off—even when the two sides have a lot of interests in common and
they share a similar view of what's going on. For example, for the
first time in many years, the [Joe] Biden administration and the
administration of [Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva] have a common read of
what's happening in Venezuela, yet even then they find it very hard to
cooperate. Brazil matters because when Brazil moves in the region, it
affects America's interests in the one part of the world where the
United States is unrivaled.
All the geopolitical changes are beginning to unsettle this—in
particular, Chinese influence in the Americas. China has been
investing big time in Latin America for twenty years, not least
because the United States invited China twenty years ago to invest big
time in Latin America.
There's another side to this—why Brazil matters moving forward—and
these are two very important things that people in Washington normally
don't talk about. The first one is that in the next twenty years,
Brazil is going to be a major, major player with the United States in
providing food to the rest of the world. And in the context of the
geopolitical changes we are seeing, these will make Brazil matter all
the more.
The second one is that Brazil is now becoming a big player in the oil
field. Brazil was never a significant oil exporter, but it's becoming
one. And although this was never the case before and therefore there's
no track record of U.S.-Brazil cooperation on the oil front, this is
something that will impose itself in coming years.
Then there is the issue of climate change. Brazil is a major driver of
deforestation, and this is not something Brazil can deal with on its
own, partly because it needs money to compensate those losers if
deforestation were to come to an end. But [also] partly because
there's so much political interest at the local level in Brazil for
deforestation that Brazil will need international cooperation big time
to turn the tide.
There's another element to this: deforestation in Brazil is linked to
the global supply chain of cocaine and other drugs and is related to
transnational crime. So the issue of climate change in Brazil
intersects with transnational crime, which is one of the biggest items
in America's relationship with Latin America.
And finally, Brazil matters for procedural reasons, because [the
United States] needs Brazil's cooperation if it wants to get things
done in the UN General Assembly or in the World Trade Organization.
For example, NATO operations in the South Atlantic require procedural
cooperation with Brazil. Brazil is very, very weak internationally,
but it can make things more difficult.
**Chris Chivvis:** How should the United States approach Brazil's
deepening relationship with China?
**Margaret Myers:** We've seen attempts by two administrations
now—especially the [Donald] Trump administration—to try to dissuade
Brazil from engaging with China in various areas, especially those of
security concern to the United States, [such as] 5G and Huawei. It
resonated to a degree with the [Jair] Bolsonaro administration, and
there were some efforts to consider purchasing other equipment—at
least by the government or by certain parts of the Brazilian military.
But Lula made it very clear during his visit to China that
collaboration was very much on the table. These attempts [at
dissuasion] just haven't made a dent. And it's not just in Brazil—it's
across the entire region. . . .
That said, there are areas where Brazil and the United States can
cooperate in policy setting, agenda setting, nuclear policy, space
policy—areas of interest to Brazil where [Washington] or may not align
with China. It's a matter of thinking about this a little bit more
strategically and understanding really what would appeal to Brazil.
**Chris Chivvis:** How should U.S. policymakers understand this
apparently open-ended relationship between Brazil and China? Is it
really open-ended or are there natural limits, as Margaret was just
suggesting?
**Matias Spektor:** I think Margaret is spot on.
First of all, Brazil is increasingly dependent on China, and China is
increasingly dependent on commodities coming from Brazil, and China is
very exposed to Brazil. For example, [at least 12 percent] of energy
distribution is now owned by Chinese capital in Brazil. But the
relationship is not an easy one.
China treats Brazil in a manner that is very top down. Meetings at the
BRICS are very scripted. Brazil finds itself having very little room
to maneuver with China. Brazil can have a far more flexible set of
conversations with the United States than it can with Beijing. Beijing
has a very set view of where Brazil fits in the global pecking order,
and it's not at the top of that pecking order, and it's not at the top
of Beijing's regional pecking order in Latin America. Beijing has far
closer ties with other countries in the region, even if Brazil is the
biggest [country].
There's another set of constraints, and I think it's very important
for U.S. policymakers to understand this because it shapes the way any
Brazilian leader is bound to deal with China. In the past twenty
years, there's been the birth of pro-China constituency groups [in
Brazil]. . . . Brazilian leaders increasingly have their hands tied
simply because China is such an important economic magnet, and
breaking that is going to be really tricky.
Now, if you think the future of U.S.-China relations is relatively
peaceful, these constraints needn't be a problem. Brazil will become
more enmeshed, more interdependent with China. Lots of Brazilian
interest groups will derive their bread and butter from trade with
China and Chinese finance, and we won't see a problem.
This is exactly what the [Bill] Clinton administration had in mind.
Then, subsequent administrations encouraged China to come to Latin
America to join the Inter-American Development Bank, for example,
because it was a useful way to have excess capital coming from China
fill a void that the United States was not willing or able to fill
itself.
The problem is that if we think that the future of U.S.-China
relations is going to be more conflictual, then we're in deep trouble.
Then, the United States will have a big incentive to try to push and
shove countries in Latin America—and Brazil in particular—to sever
ties with China. They won't be able to do it, because domestically
this will be politically impossible, and the United States will have
very little choice but to play regional hegemony and lay down the law.
**Chris Chivvis:** [The environment is] a very complicated domestic
political and economic problem for Brazil. What are the things that
the United States could really do in order to help reduce or even halt
deforestation of the rainforest?
**Margaret Myers:** I think there is a sense within the United States
right now that more does in fact need to be done, and a realization
that the $500 million commitment to the Amazon Fund really did fall
short of what Brazil would've hoped for. Especially when you look at
the numbers that China tends to throw around—which are quite large,
[though] they don't always come to pass. The Biden administration is
now looking to increase this amount by mobilizing something in the
neighborhood of $1 billion to support land restoration. So if that
materializes, it will hopefully make more of a difference for the
Amazon and for the bilateral relationship.
But the tools that the United States has at its disposal right now are
limited, and they're not quick. And this is something that applies to
the whole of Latin America, as countries look for assistance from the
United States and to engage with the United States. There is interest
in diversifying partnerships. But if the finance isn't there, if it
isn't there in the right amount, then that ends up being problematic.
So I would say that there are some restrictions on our toolkit that
will make more engagement, including in the climate space, a little
bit difficult.
**Chris Chivvis:** How does it look from a domestic political economy
perspective in Brazil?
**Matias Spektor:** Brazil's deforestation problem and climate problem
in general is gargantuan, partly because so many millions of people
depend on carbon emissions for their living. Land use is the major
driver of carbon emissions in Brazil. So transitioning to anything
different is going to cost tens of billions of dollars. And within
that, there's very little the United States can do—no amount of money
will be sufficient compared to what Brazil needs. So I would bet that
the future of the U.S.-Brazil relationship should center around that,
but there's an opportunity now.
Brazil is about to unveil its own Inflation Reduction Act. It's
basically subsidies and industrial policy to facilitate a transition
to a lower carbon economy. The task to get that to work without major
corruption scandals or major inefficiencies is going to be enormous.
There is a real opportunity for collaboration between the two
countries—in particular, the private sectors.
The other area where there's room for collaboration—but a lot of
danger—is on the issue of climate-related organized crime. One of the
problems Brazil faces in the Amazon in particular is that organized
crime is behind cattle laundering, illegal logging, and illegal
mining. When the Lula administration took office, the minister of the
environment found out the Amazon region had [at least 1,200] illegal
airstrips. And the problem with illegal airstrips in a landmass the
size of Europe is that if you bomb them from the air with support from
the federal police, they get rebuilt within three or four days.
Now, no talk of America cooperating militarily or even police
cooperation in Brazil will fly. Brazilian elites are terrified of an
American military presence in South America. But what can fly is
cooperation to help Brazil deal with the end of the illegal trade
cycle, which is trade through the Atlantic going into Africa and then
to Europe, where the consumer markets are for drugs, illegal logging,
illegal mining, and so on. Intelligence cooperation, military-to-
military cooperation outside the Amazon—I think that would be an
opportunity. But as Margaret said, America's ability to support Brazil
in this is going to be limited.
**Chris Chivvis:** How do you see the similarities and differences
between Brazilian strategic thinking and the other emerging powers in
the BRICS?
**Matias Spektor:** Let me take two: India and Indonesia. These
countries are in many respects parallel to Brazil, and Brazil has had
increasingly positive and closer ties with these countries. They see
themselves as coming from a postcolonial experience and are moving up
the ranks in the world.
So what can we say about the comparisons? This is really tricky. India
is in an enviable position from Brazil's standpoint because India can
trade support with the United States in ways that Brazil cannot. India
matters geopolitically in the context of counterbalancing China. And
India is making a buck out of this, mostly through military
cooperation and purchases, [as well as] a phenomenal diaspora that is
highly educated and well-employed in the United States. Brazil doesn't
have any of this, so we cannot really compare what's happening in the
ties between Washington and New Delhi to Washington and Brasília.
Brazil is much weaker.
Then take Indonesia. Indonesia too is a country whose foreign policy
resembles Brazil's a lot. When you listen to diplomats from Indonesia
talk, it sounds like a Brazilian is talking. Joko Widodo, the
president, is the only man I believe in the last few months to have
met the presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. This is
a man who sees himself as trying to hedge his bets and not take sides
and benefit from the existing competition. But Indonesia is in a part
of the world that China claims as its own regional hegemony. So the
differences are enormous.
Stewart Patrick from Carnegie had a [recent] piece arguing that we
shouldn't really call the Global South "the Global South." This is a
very diverse set of countries, but there is something that unites
them. And what unites them is a common experience of being at the
bottom end of a global hierarchy. These are countries that have an
experience with colonialism, economic injustice, and racial injustice,
and these provide a common ground.
Does this mean they produce a common platform and they are united in
multilateral fora? No. But they're united in the belief that
unipolarity is not good for them. So defending the global liberal
international order is not going to fly with them because they see
advantage in having not only a strong China but also a strong Russia.
**Chris Chivvis:** How might the United States counter Chinese
influence in Brazil in a way that is smart and sophisticated?
**Margaret Myers:** I think there are a few things that can be done.
First of all, I'm a big proponent of greater economic engagement with
the region generally, given long-standing feelings among Latin
American leaders that the region has been abandoned by the United
States.
**Chris Chivvis:** What are you thinking about in particular?
**Margaret Myers:** We're at a bit of an impasse with [trade], but
certainly economic assistance in various forms, and also investment,
especially in the case of Brazil.
As the United States looks to secure supply chains, which have been a
big part of an effort to reduce reliance on China and to reorient
production toward the region, it's my view that Brazil can and should
play a role in this process, especially in the production of higher
value-added products. The United States right now is a major
contributor to value-added production across the region. This is not
something that we talk about enough, and we should engage with Brazil
on these terms.
The problem is this idea of "friendshoring," right? Creating
opportunities for countries with demonstrated commitments to U.S.
interests. But Brazil has a mixed record there. Friendshoring is
necessarily exclusive by nature, so maybe we ought to think about this
as "making friends-shoring" or something of that nature. It strikes me
that the administration would seem to be taking this to heart—at least
to some degree, having just talked about a jobs initiative with
Brazil, which could be great depending on its scale.
I think also another thing that needs to be done—and is being done to
a certain degree—is bringing Brazil into the fold. As in this recent
G7 meeting, acknowledging its prominence on the global stage and in
global agenda-setting. This is a critical component to maintaining
fruitful bilateral ties and to ensuring at least some alignment on
issues of global interest, even though there is this profound
commitment to avoiding an overreliance on one single partner or on the
United States in general.
[A third step] is maintaining and strengthening the many existing
mechanisms for bilateral cooperation. In some of these, ideally, there
may be a degree of policy coordination that can be achieved that would
be beneficial, as the United States looks to compete in broader terms
with China, not just in Brazil but globally.
_View the_ _whole event_ _in the player below, or_ _watch it on
YouTube_ _._
VIDEO
_Previously in Pivotal States:_
______________________________________________________________________
Served by Flask-Gopher/2.2.1