[HN Gopher] First Node.js-Based Ransomware: Nodera
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       First Node.js-Based Ransomware: Nodera
        
       Author : el_duderino
       Score  : 43 points
       Date   : 2020-01-22 17:27 UTC (5 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (blogs.quickheal.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (blogs.quickheal.com)
        
       | asdfasgasdgasdg wrote:
       | One of these modules' owners should update their modules to check
       | if they are running as part of the ransomware, and kill the
       | program if so. That would certainly be an interesting turn of
       | events.
        
       | jlv2 wrote:
       | "The sample received in our lab was vbs script which has multiple
       | embedded js scripts. On execution, it creates a directory
       | "GFp0JAk" at location "%userprofile%\AppData\Local\"."
       | 
       | Why is this even possible?
        
         | carlmr wrote:
         | Can't everybody write to their own user's AppData folder?
        
         | penagwin wrote:
         | If applications can't write to the Application Data folder then
         | what's the point of an application data folder?
         | 
         | > Why is this even possible?
         | 
         | Well they said "on execution" so that's what made it possible.
         | Now if it could install to that location without being
         | explicitly executed (say on download or via a browser bug) then
         | THAT would be a much bigger deal.
        
       | duxup wrote:
       | So as I read it this is ransomware that was built using nodejs...
       | not a compromised npm package or anything like that. Is that
       | right?
        
         | grammarxcore wrote:
         | That's what I took away from the article as well. It's
         | installed via a VBScript file.
         | 
         | Edit: I'm also not able to find any other record of it (yet).
         | Everything links to the OP link or analysis on the OP link.
        
       | fludlight wrote:
       | Most languages, distros, large applications, etc have their own
       | packaging system. Some are more laissez-faire than others.
       | 
       | Does someone know a good article from the POV of the maintainer
       | of a packaging system ecosystem that describes the tradeoffs made
       | by different approaches over the past ~30 years?
        
         | asdfasgasdgasdg wrote:
         | To be clear, as far as I can tell, the ransomware is built
         | _using_ nodejs. It is not a ransomware that 's installed via a
         | compromised package. Although if you happen to be a bad guy, it
         | seems like building a quality bitcoin-related package, waiting
         | until you have a big installed base, and then owning all your
         | users, might be an effective way to set yourself up for life.
        
           | carlmr wrote:
           | I thought Bitcoin can't effectively be mined on CPUs anymore,
           | only some AltCoins that are too difficult to compute with
           | ASICs
        
             | asdfasgasdgasdg wrote:
             | I'm not talking about a miner. I'm talking about a wallet
             | or some utility module. You'd wait until you have a big
             | installed base then change your module to silently steal
             | coinbase credentials. Wait a few weeks until you have
             | enough of them and then own all the accounts at once.
             | Something like that. The Bitcoin aspect of the module is
             | just to target effectively.
        
             | Wowfunhappy wrote:
             | Well, yes, but "effective" is context-dependent.
             | 
             | If you have a million computers mining for you, and you're
             | not paying their electricity, it doesn't really matter how
             | individually efficient they are.
        
         | hiccuphippo wrote:
         | There was a few articles about go's search for a new package
         | system from 2018.
         | 
         | Edit: See https://blog.golang.org/versioning-proposal and
         | related articles at the bottom.
        
       | robertkrahn01 wrote:
       | Site is currently down;
       | https://web.archive.org/web/20200122181519/https://blogs.qui...
       | 
       | The article mentions the ransom message with the date March 1
       | 2018. This probably means this malware is two years old?
        
         | grammarxcore wrote:
         | > This ransomware seems to be in development phase and has some
         | flaws as mentioned below:
         | 
         | > ...
         | 
         | > Hard code destruction time of Private Key "March 1 2018".
         | 
         | Quite possibly. I'm not sure what that language means and they
         | don't provide more analysis of the HTML page that comes from.
         | If it's in development maybe some dude has been sitting on this
         | idea for a few years and their virus scanner just picked it up
         | recently.
        
         | ecmascript wrote:
         | Ironically, the archive link you provided also doesn't load for
         | me.
        
           | msla wrote:
           | If it's just a blank screen, it's a longstanding issue nobody
           | seems to acknowledge:
           | 
           | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21765389
           | 
           | > There's a problem with the Wayback Machine in specific
           | which can kill your ability to access it quite silently,
           | unless you know how to use the browser's development tools
           | and interpret headers.
           | 
           | > It has to do with cookies: Somehow, the Wayback Machine
           | sets cookies... and sets cookies... and keeps setting
           | cookies, until it overflows its own ability to _accept_
           | cookies. At that point, your browser tries to access a
           | Wayback Machine page, handing the server all of the cookies
           | it currently has, and the server refuses to deal. It
           | absolutely denies everything, sending an error header and a
           | blank page. You have to clear all web.archive.org cookies to
           | get anything at all, at which point it works perfectly.
           | 
           | > I've completely solved this problem by blacklisting
           | web.archive.org in browser cookie blacklists. I haven't had
           | it happen since then. As far as I'm concerned, the problem is
           | diagnosed and just needs to be solved. At _their_ end.
        
           | [deleted]
        
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       (page generated 2020-01-22 23:01 UTC)