[HN Gopher] The Dark Side of Expertise
       ___________________________________________________________________
        
       The Dark Side of Expertise
        
       Author : signa11
       Score  : 120 points
       Date   : 2020-01-24 08:30 UTC (14 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (lwn.net)
 (TXT) w3m dump (lwn.net)
        
       | davidw wrote:
       | Somewhat of a counterpoint - I didn't make it all the way through
       | this book, but I think it has an interesting thesis:
       | 
       | The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against Established
       | Knowledge and Why it Matters: https://amzn.to/3aHdIBB
        
       | cbanek wrote:
       | Just another study about expertise and how it can maybe not be
       | beneficial:
       | 
       | https://www.bmj.com/content/357/bmj.j1797
       | 
       | From "Physician age and outcomes in elderly patients in hospital
       | in the US: observational study":
       | 
       | > Physicians' skills, however, can also become outdated as
       | scientific knowledge, technology, and clinical guidelines change.
       | Incorporating these changes into clinical practice is time
       | consuming and can at times be overwhelming. Interest in how
       | quality of care evolves over a physician's career has revived in
       | recent years, with debates over how best to structure programs
       | for continuing medical education, including recent controversy in
       | the US regarding maintenance of certification programs.
       | 
       | > Within the same hospital, patients treated by older physicians
       | had higher mortality than patients cared for by younger
       | physicians, except those physicians treating high volumes of
       | patients.
       | 
       | Basically, expertise can change, and if you don't keep up, you
       | may be following outdated advice (which might not useful or even
       | possibly harmful). I feel like the "dropping your equipment" is a
       | part of this. You need to know the right tool for the right job,
       | and sometimes doing the same thing for years might lead you down
       | the wrong path.
        
         | grawprog wrote:
         | >I feel like the "dropping your equipment" is a part of this.
         | You need to know the right tool for the right job, and
         | sometimes doing the same thing for years might lead you down
         | the wrong path.
         | 
         | This happened at my last job. The company I worked for hadn't
         | really changed their methods for about 7 years. Jobs went slow,
         | we worked ridiculous amounts of overtime and mistakes were a
         | regular part of the job. Over the years I worked there, I went
         | through everything, replaced a few processes, convinced the
         | owner to get newer more efficent tools and in the end, cut down
         | the amount of overtime we worked to almost nothing, reduced
         | actual human operater times on our machines from about 2-3
         | hours per run to 20 minutes, and reduced mistakes and error
         | from once a week or so to once in a blue moon.
         | 
         | The thing is, I didn't do anything amazing or groundbreaking,
         | they could have been operating that way for longer, they'd just
         | found something that had worked and never bothered to try and
         | improve their system. I was left alone for a few years and
         | given free reign to do pretty much whatever I wanted, I got
         | sick of being overworked, so I started figuring out and
         | changing whatever I could to make things quicker, easier and
         | better and it really didn't take much in the end to make a
         | drastic improvement.
        
       | jkingsbery wrote:
       | > They then told the students to go up the hallway to a different
       | room where there would be another test. What the students didn't
       | know was that the test was actually in the hallway; the time it
       | took each participant to walk down the hall was measured. It
       | turned out that the students who had been exposed to the "elderly
       | words" walked more slowly down the hall. Attendees might be
       | inclined to call that "absolute crap", Brady suggested, but it is
       | not, it is repeatable and even has a name, "the Florida effect",
       | because Florida was used as one of the words associated with the
       | elderly.
       | 
       | I haven't ready widely on this, but from what little I have, most
       | attempts at reproducing this and other priming experiments have
       | failed.
       | 
       | (see, e.g.,
       | https://replicationindex.com/2017/02/02/reconstruction-of-a-...,
       | https://replicationindex.com/category/priming/ and
       | https://www.discovermagazine.com/mind/reproducibility-crisis...)
        
       | lonelappde wrote:
       | This is a write-up of a pseudoscience gobbledygook just-so
       | stories that don't do justice to the complexities of the
       | catastrophes they draw trite morals from.
       | 
       | Here's a more thoughtful write up of the Civic center collapse,
       | attributed largely to a large project with diffusion of
       | responsibility and no one empowered the fix the problems they
       | were held responsible for. https://eng-
       | resources.uncc.edu/failurecasestudies/building-f...
        
       | 0xff00ffee wrote:
       | Wow: I lived in CT in 1978 and it was a wicked snowstorm: 10 foot
       | snow drifts shut the coast down. I remember reading about the
       | collapse in the New Haven Register.
        
       | aaron695 wrote:
       | This illogical talk is because of "Thinking, Fast and Slow",
       | Chapter 4, which Daniel Kahneman has since questioned.
       | 
       | http://www.decisionsciencenews.com/2012/10/05/kahneman-on-th...
       | 
       | USCSB has great work place accident round ups (CGI, no gore). Of
       | course Expertise is what makes the workplace safer, it has no
       | dark side.
       | 
       | Here's Murphy's law (If it's possible for it to happen, given
       | enough time it will, so don't allow it to physically happen
       | wherever possible over processes)
       | 
       | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tflm9mttAAI
        
       | WhompingWindows wrote:
       | I don't buy this headline at all, the author does not prove there
       | are actual experts behind this story at all...
       | 
       | The primary story used here is that a sagging arena roof was
       | consistently deemed safe by "engineers" (no proof of expertise
       | provided) based upon their calculations...and this is somehow a
       | "dark side" of expertise? It reads much more like ineptitude;
       | that'd be like any coder here constantly ignoring terrible
       | performance and numerous bugs and claiming their architecture is
       | just fine.
        
         | mjw1007 wrote:
         | There's also an unexplained leap from "the calculations are
         | correct" to "we should proceed as planned even though it's
         | sagging when it shouldn't".
         | 
         | Even if the engineers were infinitely arrogant and assumed
         | nothing could possibly be wrong with the design, you'd expect
         | them to react by saying "you must be building it wrong or using
         | substandard materials", or something.
        
           | kerkeslager wrote:
           | This is the same annoying problem I found with Malcolm
           | Gladwell's _Blink_. He draws this conclusion that we can
           | trust our first impressions, but it 's really unclear how he
           | comes to that conclusion: some of his evidence comes to no
           | conclusion, and some of it directly contradicts that
           | conclusion.
        
             | [deleted]
        
               | [deleted]
        
           | bryanrasmussen wrote:
           | I'm starting to think someone was misled by their expertise
           | into thinking this article was any good.
        
       | dsego wrote:
       | A eerily similar case of an eruptive fire killing firefighters
       | happened not so long ago (in 2007) in Croatia.[1]
       | 
       | In this case it was most likely that the group of fire fighters
       | did not have time to reach a safety zone and escape. [2]
       | 
       | [1]
       | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Croatian_coast_fires#Korn...
       | 
       | [2]
       | https://www.witpress.com/Secure/elibrary/papers/FIVA08/FIVA0...
        
       | gapo wrote:
       | I am super surprised to see this on LWN. But it was a fascinating
       | read.
        
       | JackFr wrote:
       | Priming with respect to the Florida effect is a famously not
       | replicable result. It's not a real effect. I'm more sympathetic
       | to the word game example, yet it's not obvious how that
       | translates to anything beyond.
       | 
       | With respect to the Hartford Civic Center, as always, it's a
       | little more complicated than that. Yes the architects stood by
       | their calculations, but this was more of a process issue than
       | hubris. Despite the new techniques used, the plans were subject
       | to peer review. Additionally the construction was not fully
       | according to plan. Weaker struts were actually used than called
       | for in the design, and that's on the construction manager rather
       | than the architect.
        
       | The_mboga_real wrote:
       | No mention of 10,000 hours of research and practice. Now that's
       | the real dark side!
        
       | kerkeslager wrote:
       | This was pretty ramble-y and pulled in some pretty unrelated
       | examples.
       | 
       | * We never get a clear answer for why the Civic Center Engineers
       | got the inputs wrong, so we can't conclude that it was because of
       | their expertise.
       | 
       | * With the firefighters, there's a pretty easy proximal
       | explanation, which again is not their expertise misleading them:
       | panic. If anything, the solution to the problem shows that
       | expertise was the solution to the problem, not the cause of it:
       | by adding running without packs to their expertise in a concrete
       | way, they were able to override panic.
       | 
       | * With the priming examples, I can see how this might be related,
       | but the only example which actually involves expertise leading
       | them astray is the baseball example. But this priming research,
       | contrary to what's claimed in the article, _isn 't_ reproduce-
       | able. And even if it were, these sorts of lateral thinking
       | exercises have pretty limited applicability: detectives or
       | theoretical physicists use a high degree of lateral thinking, but
       | many careers don't, and I didn't get those examples from the
       | article, I had to come up with them myself: that hardly speaks to
       | this being an insightful article. And ultimately, it's unclear
       | whether expertise leads detectives or theoretical physicists
       | astray: surely part of gaining expertise in a field that requires
       | a lot of lateral thinking involves building the skill of putting
       | aside preconceptions. Again, I don't think we can conclude that
       | expertise is the problem: it may be the solution.
       | 
       | Overall, this topic could be interesting, but this isn't an
       | insightful article on it.
        
         | svnpenn wrote:
         | > With the firefighters, there's a pretty easy proximal
         | explanation, which again is not their expertise misleading
         | them: panic.
         | 
         | Exactly, plus while his idea was fascinating, its
         | understandable that the others didnt follow suit; he
         | essentially invented the idea:
         | 
         | > Similar types of escape fires had been used by the plains
         | Indians to escape the fast-moving, brief duration grass fires
         | of the plains, and the method had been written about by James
         | Fenimore Cooper (1827) in The Prairie, but in this case Foreman
         | Dodge appears to have invented it on the spot, as the only
         | means available to him to save his crew.
         | 
         | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mann_Gulch_fire
        
         | quindecagon wrote:
         | Re point 1:
         | 
         | > This was the early 1970s, he said, why were these engineers
         | so confident in their calculations? As guessed by many in the
         | audience, the reason for that was "computers". In fact, when
         | they won the bid, they told the city of Hartford that they
         | could save half a million dollars in construction costs "if you
         | buy us this new, whiz-bang thing called a computer". It turned
         | out that the computer worked fine, but it was given the wrong
         | inputs. There was an emotional investment that the engineers
         | had made in the new technology, so it was inconceivable to them
         | that it could be giving them the wrong answers.
        
           | kerkeslager wrote:
           | Yes but we don't ever find out why they got the inputs wrong.
           | 
           | Does this sound like expertise to you?
        
             | phkahler wrote:
             | They ignored the actual fact that it was sagging more than
             | predicted and insisted the calculations were right. That
             | might be ok, but someone allowed the project to proceed
             | without explaining the contradiction. Real observations
             | were dismissed in favor of believing in the expertise.
        
               | spaced-out wrote:
               | >They ignored the actual fact that it was sagging more
               | than predicted and insisted the calculations were right.
               | 
               | Seems like they lack the expertise needed to properly
               | evaluate their model.
        
               | geggam wrote:
               | or experience can create a bias where you know you are
               | right even when the evidence says otherwise.
               | 
               | Age usually humbles people by them experiencing this
               | often enough they tend to check things... if they mature
               | properly
        
               | kerkeslager wrote:
               | Hm. You're saying that inexpert decision-makers were
               | misled by experts?
               | 
               | That is true, but I'd argue that the article is making a
               | different claim: the article is claiming that experts are
               | misled by their own expertise.
        
               | akamoonknight wrote:
               | It seems like one difficulty is in knowing what expertise
               | is important? Assumedly the contractors thought they had
               | expertise, but were lacking. The firefighters assumedly
               | thought they had expertise, but we're lacking. What
               | expertise do I think I have, but am actually lacking?
        
               | kerkeslager wrote:
               | Yeah, that's difficult. The only answer I've found is
               | experience. Gaining experience for yourself is painful
               | because it's slow, and part of the experience is
               | consequences of your mistakes: in fields like fire-
               | fighting (or rock climbing, which I love) your mistakes
               | can literally kill you. So hopefully you learn form other
               | people's experience and mistakes as much as possible.
        
             | mjw1007 wrote:
             | I think "wrong inputs" here is an odd way of saying that
             | the model was bad (presumably to distinguish that problem
             | from outright bugs in the design software or computer
             | hardware failure).
             | 
             | https://eng-
             | resources.uncc.edu/failurecasestudies/building-f...
             | 
             | says
             | 
             | << The roof design was extremely susceptible to buckling
             | which was a mode of failure not considered by in that
             | particular computer analysis and, therefore, left
             | undiscovered. >>
        
               | kerkeslager wrote:
               | Okay but again: was this failure because their expertise
               | misled them?
        
               | mjw1007 wrote:
               | Not as far as I can see, no.
               | 
               | That article contains the following claim: << Computers,
               | however, are only as good as their programmer and tend to
               | offer engineers a false sense of security. >>
               | 
               | which matches the "dark side of expertise" talk's bit
               | about << There was an emotional investment that the
               | engineers had made in the new technology, so it was
               | inconceivable to them that it could be giving them the
               | wrong answers. >>
               | 
               | That seems to me to be a different issue to being misled
               | by one's own expertise, and in any case neither source
               | bothers to give any evidence that it's true (that is,
               | that the computer's involvement was the cause for the
               | unreasonable trust in the model's results).
        
               | bryanrasmussen wrote:
               | No. In fact if they were misled by computers and they
               | were not software engineers, which I had assumed they
               | were not from them being called "Design Engineers" in the
               | anecdote, it follows that they were not misled by their
               | expertise but their assumptions of expertise from this
               | unknown mysterious powerful new thing that a lot of money
               | had been poured into.
        
       | rossdavidh wrote:
       | I was glad to see that the comments on the webpage provided a
       | link (https://replicationindex.com/2017/02/02/reconstruction-
       | of-a-...) to a summary of how priming research has been cast into
       | doubt in recent years. Any talk, article, or premise that uses
       | priming experiments to explain something, is a red flag for me.
       | I'm not saying none of it really works, but I am saying that it
       | is clear that something more complex is going on than we think,
       | and many of the priming experiments, at a minimum, have been
       | misinterpreted (and in some cases are just totally unreplicable).
        
       | nemo wrote:
       | TBH, if you gave me the list "dark," "shot," and "sun" I'm not
       | sure I'd ever think of "glasses" as a word that went with all
       | three, since I still don't really know what dark glasses are. I
       | guess like dark sunglasses? Or maybe they mean "through a glass
       | darkly"? Priming is a real effect, but that example of priming
       | seems like it was poorly selected.
        
         | kerkeslager wrote:
         | > Priming is a real effect, but that example of priming seems
         | like it was poorly selected.
         | 
         | Except maybe it's not even a real effect:
         | https://replicationindex.com/2017/02/02/reconstruction-of-a-...
        
           | nemo wrote:
           | Interesting! Thanks.
        
         | pm215 wrote:
         | Well, it depends whether you happen to have that idiom in your
         | personal dialect or not. The most high-profile use of it I
         | happen to know of is from the 80s hit "The Future's So Bright,
         | I Gotta Wear Shades", which starts out "I study nuclear science
         | / I love my classes / I got a crazy teacher, he wears dark
         | glasses"...
        
       ___________________________________________________________________
       (page generated 2020-01-24 23:00 UTC)