[HN Gopher] Metcalf Sniper Attack
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       Metcalf Sniper Attack
        
       Author : rococode
       Score  : 85 points
       Date   : 2020-08-29 18:25 UTC (4 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (en.wikipedia.org)
 (TXT) w3m dump (en.wikipedia.org)
        
       | urda wrote:
       | I remember this, still wild re-reading the entire record of
       | events.
        
       | areoform wrote:
       | The reason why the Intelligence Community freaked out is because
       | this is exactly the kind of small-scale test they'd do to test a
       | possible attack pattern.
       | https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/27/military-style-raid-on-...
       | 
       | The people spooked here _are_ spooks. And that should be telling
       | for those of us on the outside. It 's an attack scenario no one
       | had planned for.
       | 
       | I would highly recommend this article by Michael Lewis (and his
       | book) that explores related systemic risk,
       | https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/07/department-of-energy...
       | 
       | > The safety of the electrical grid sat at or near the top of the
       | list of concerns of everyone I spoke with inside the D.O.E. Life
       | in America has become, increasingly, reliant on it. "Food and
       | water has become food and water and electricity," as one D.O.E.
       | career staffer put it. Back in 2013 there had been an incident in
       | California that got everyone's attention. Late one night, just
       | southeast of San Jose, at Pacific Gas and Electric's Metcalf
       | substation, a well-informed sniper, using a .30-caliber rifle,
       | had taken out 17 transformers. Someone had also cut the cables
       | that enabled communication to and from the substation. _"They
       | knew exactly what lines to cut," said Tarak Shah, who studied the
       | incident for the D.O.E. "They knew exactly where to shoot. They
       | knew exactly which manhole covers were relevant--where the
       | communication lines were. These were feeder stations to Apple and
       | Google."_ There had been enough backup power in the area that no
       | one noticed the outage, and the incident came and went quickly
       | from the news. But, Shah said, "for us it was a wake-up call." In
       | 2016 the D.O.E. counted half a million cyber-intrusions into
       | various parts of the U.S. electrical grid. "It's one thing to put
       | your head in the sand for climate change--it's like manana," says
       | Ali Zaidi, who served in the White House as Obama's senior
       | adviser on energy policy. _"This is here and now. We actually
       | don't have a transformer reserve. They're like these million-
       | dollar things. Seventeen transformers getting shot up in
       | California is not like, Oh, we'll just fix the problem. Our
       | electric-grid assets are growingly vulnerable."_
       | 
       | > In his briefings on the electrical grid MacWilliams made a
       | specific point and a more general one. The specific point was
       | that we don't actually have a national grid. Our electricity is
       | supplied by a patchwork of not terribly innovative or
       | imaginatively managed regional utilities. The federal government
       | offers the only hope of a coordinated, intelligent response to
       | threats to the system: there is no private-sector mechanism. To
       | that end the D.O.E. had begun to gather the executives of the
       | utility companies, to educate them about the threats they face.
       | "They all sort of said, 'But is this really real?' " said
       | MacWilliams. "You get them security clearance for a day and tell
       | them about the attacks and all of a sudden you see their eyes go
       | really wide."
       | 
       |  _Edit_
       | 
       |  _Personal Interpretation:_ Someone hired highly trained
       | mercenaries (?) to operate on US soil to test destroying critical
       | infrastructure that led directly to Apple + Google. Large,
       | stationary, expensive infrastructure that is lacking in
       | redundancy.
       | 
       | They knew exactly what targets to hit. It follows that they knew
       | that there was backup capacity in the system. This was a test
       | run. And bullets are cheap.
       | 
       | What if instead of one team for one location, it had been three
       | teams for three locations? Or, four? Five? Six? Could they have
       | successfully crippled the nation? And plunged the stock market?
        
         | bonchicbongenre wrote:
         | The answer: yes, they could've. I had a professor who
         | previously had been part of a US gov group that had been tasked
         | with preparing for an attack on the electrical grid, all the
         | way back in the tail end of the cold war. His impression of the
         | security of the US grid was that it was completely unsecured.
         | He told me that they had no chance of solving the problem then,
         | and that he expects the same is still the case. His worst fear
         | is a large EMP attack, not locally cutting powerlines, but the
         | danger still stands
        
         | thinkling wrote:
         | > They knew exactly what targets to hit. It follows that they
         | knew that there was backup capacity in the system. This was a
         | test run. And bullets are cheap.
         | 
         | Sounds like perhaps this was a white hat actor intending to
         | push others to get serious about these risks?
        
           | baybal2 wrote:
           | Kind of useless act it was then.
           | 
           | Fences, and cameras would not stop a well armed sabotage
           | team.
        
         | nullc wrote:
         | Sounds like a great promotion for someone selling substation
         | security.
        
       | jonathankoren wrote:
       | That's not the only weird sabotage that has happened in San Jose.
       | Back in 2009, someone intentionally cut some fiber optic cables.
       | They've never been found.
       | 
       | https://www.mercurynews.com/2009/04/09/san-jose-police-sabot...
        
         | tyingq wrote:
         | Probably someone hoping for copper to scrap.
        
       | Beldin wrote:
       | I don't understand why this is called a terror attack. From the
       | article it seems managers got spooked, sure. But it doesn't read
       | as if the general population was.
       | 
       | Granted, it's possible the attack failed to achieve its goal and
       | that's why the population is not terrorised. But even then: an
       | actual terrorist could've easily kept track of news on damages
       | caused and how close to great effect they had come. That would
       | surely incentive them to try again. But I'm not aware of that
       | happening.
       | 
       | So what is the terror angle here?
        
         | save_ferris wrote:
         | The terror angle is that someone tried to disrupt a major
         | component of the electrical grid. It's hard to imagine a motive
         | for such an attack that doesn't involve trying to cause major
         | panic to a community. That's definitely qualifiable as
         | terrorism.
         | 
         | Just because they didn't attempt again (that we know of)
         | doesn't mean that they weren't terrorists to begin with. Also
         | noted in the article, investigators later believed it to be an
         | inside job. This goes into wild speculation, but if the
         | attackers worked at DHS, they may have known how close an
         | investigation came to revealing them and opted not to try
         | again. We'll probably never know why though.
        
       | digi59404 wrote:
       | I was on duty as security for a.. semi secret substation
       | designated as critical infrastructure that night. In the Bay
       | Area, we just had to divert power a little bit. It basically
       | didn't affect the grid at all.
       | 
       | Everyone was all a little more worried as to if this was
       | isolated, if we were next, etc etc.
       | 
       | Transformers that are small are often on hand and easy to swap
       | out. But some of the bigger ones have months long lead times. The
       | facility we were at had transformers that had a 6 month lead time
       | from Germany to replace them and they had to be sent via boat as
       | they wouldn't fit in planes.
       | 
       | The average person isn't going to know that about transformers.
       | Which leads more credence to the fact it's an inside job.
        
         | crehn wrote:
         | Out of curiosity, how does one "divert power"?
        
           | MadVikingGod wrote:
           | What that practically means is power that would have normally
           | come through those substation would be delivered by some
           | other source, and thus go through a different set of
           | substations.
           | 
           | What most people don't understand is that it's important that
           | the demand + the transmission losses = the production, not
           | just as a whole, but also for each link. To help with that
           | most places don't produce 100%, and a lot of higher power
           | links are redundant. But that can only cover so much. If it's
           | not a high demand day you can probably source power from
           | other providers, but sometimes that's not enough.
        
         | greedo wrote:
         | "The average person isn't going to know that about
         | transformers. Which leads more credence to the fact it's an
         | inside job."
         | 
         | Or that the perpetrators were well informed about
         | infrastructure vulnerabilities.
        
       | natcombs wrote:
       | That video does not appear to show anything for four minutes. Did
       | I miss something?
       | 
       | Edit: Now I have a feeling that I got trolled and that's the
       | point of the video
        
         | unkeptbarista wrote:
         | The action is easy to miss after nearly two minutes of nothing
         | happening. If you fast forward you might not see it at all.
         | 
         | 1:54 What I believe is the signal flash near the fencing. Lower
         | left of the video.
         | 
         | 2:06 You will see sparks from a bullet striking the fencing. A
         | bit higher up than the signal flash, and on the extreme left of
         | the video.
         | 
         | 3:01 Toward the middle right of the video, a bullet striking
         | the fencing.
         | 
         | Update: NPR article with timing of events seen in video. They
         | say first flash is also bullet related and not the signal flash
         | I thought it might be.
         | 
         | https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/05/272015606...
        
           | urda wrote:
           | Thanks so much for this.
        
         | daneel_w wrote:
         | There are a few smaller and larger sparks now and then. The
         | resolution, quality and low frame rate renders the entire video
         | more or less useless.
        
         | guerrilla wrote:
         | Starting at 1:50 you can see a flash at the bottom, after 2:00
         | you can see sparks occasionally on the left fence and the fence
         | to the top-right. There's more sparks before 3:00. The video
         | could certainly be shortened.
        
       | valuearb wrote:
       | 2015: "While we have not yet identified the shooter, there's some
       | indication it was an insider," said Caitlin Durkovich, assistant
       | secretary for infrastructure protection at the Department of
       | Homeland Security.
        
         | csilverman wrote:
         | I always wondered about this. First thing that crossed my mind
         | at the time was that it was (1) idiots who thought it would be
         | fun to cause high-profile trouble, or (2) terrorists, but it
         | sounded a bit sophisticated for #1 and as far as I know, no one
         | ever claimed credit for it.
         | 
         | After reading one of the references
         | (https://money.cnn.com/2015/10/16/technology/sniper-power-
         | gri...), and learning that they think it might have been an
         | insider, a third possibility occurs to me: what if it was
         | someone--maybe a PG&E employee--who knew first-hand how
         | unprotected this infrastructure was, and wasn't being taken
         | seriously? Especially given the Homeland Security report a year
         | earlier about how easy this kind of attack would be.
         | 
         | Conspiracy-theory stuff, maybe, but:
         | 
         | > _The assault...became a harsh wake-up call for energy
         | providers, who have since become obsessed with the physical
         | security of their remote power stations._
         | 
         | > _PG &E alone has pledged to spend $100 million to improve
         | security at its facilities...Transformers are often custom
         | designed, sometimes costing $3 million each--and replacements
         | are slow. Plus, physical attacks on energy distribution
         | machines are much more effective at taking out the power grid
         | than a computer hack. And it's incredibly easy to pull off,
         | several energy utility firms told CNNMoney._
         | 
         | > _Experts attending GridSecCon, held by the North American
         | Electric Reliability Corporation this week, are now discussing
         | the need to enclose electronics in 1 /2-inch thick armor
         | plating that can stop high-powered rifle rounds. Power
         | utilities have started loading remote substations with infrared
         | cameras, gunshot audio sensors and even seismic recorders that
         | catch vibrations._
        
           | [deleted]
        
           | bargle0 wrote:
           | There's a fourth option: intentional vandalism that isn't
           | terrorism, like the fire on the USS Miami.
        
             | [deleted]
        
             | csilverman wrote:
             | Yeah, arbitrary vandalism was the first option I
             | considered. Can't rule it out, although whoever did this
             | seems to have shown more caution/coordination than you'd
             | expect from a couple of drunk idiots taking potshots at
             | street signs.
        
           | skylanh wrote:
           | Well, if we're doing actionable conspiracy theories then:
           | 
           | - it caused $15 million in damage, and $100 million in
           | updated security -> contractor needing work
           | 
           | - it was a "domestic terrorism" event -> what legislation or
           | policies were on the table at this time?
           | 
           | Those would be my starting points.
        
             | csilverman wrote:
             | Someone else mentioned job security/contracts as a possible
             | motivation. It makes sense.
             | 
             | I'm less sure about the terrorist angle. The point of a
             | terrorist act is to advance or discourage a specific
             | political agenda; that only works if you're clear about who
             | you are and why you did it, though. These guys never did
             | that (although maybe scaring PG&E into securing their
             | facilities roughly fits the definition of goal-oriented
             | violence, even if it wasn't motivated by politics).
        
           | luma wrote:
           | Maybe somebody trying to sell physical infrastructure
           | security solutions to PG&E?
        
             | csilverman wrote:
             | I actually hadn't considered the idea that they might have
             | a financial interest in grid security. It makes a certain
             | kind of sense.
        
       | natch wrote:
       | The only significant facility I can think of in this area is the
       | IBM Almaden Research Lab. It and another IBM office are very
       | specifically in that area, which is an odd connection. Can't say
       | whether their electrical service is provided by that substation,
       | but they are geographically very close.
       | 
       | https://goo.gl/maps/i7NWjxfomyXvZCBY9
        
       | arnaudsm wrote:
       | On a similar register, multiple French power plants were scouted
       | by unidentified drones in the past 5 years. Transformers are an
       | fragile point of failure of an entire country infrastructure. I
       | hope security has improved since then.
        
       | 2OEH8eoCRo0 wrote:
       | Why is it called an act of domestic terrorism? Was it
       | ideologically motivated?
        
         | tyingq wrote:
         | Good question since they didn't catch anyone. It looks pretty
         | remote, so perhaps not surprising the culprit wasn't seen.
        
           | ojbyrne wrote:
           | It's in a suburb of San Jose. I don't think it can be
           | classified as "remote."
        
             | tyingq wrote:
             | Well, it doesn't look urban or suburban to me. But, hey,
             | you're the expert.
             | 
             | https://www.google.com/local/place/fid/0x808e2f6cead39bb3:0
             | x...
        
               | [deleted]
        
               | mlyle wrote:
               | It's right along the freeway. A couple hundred thousand
               | commuters from south SJ suburbs pass it every day. It's
               | in a little band of open space between South San Jose and
               | those suburbs.
               | 
               | https://goo.gl/maps/2TfHJKYXBExg4SqH7
        
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       (page generated 2020-08-29 23:00 UTC)