[HN Gopher] Escaping the Dark Forest
___________________________________________________________________
Escaping the Dark Forest
Author : CyrusL
Score : 200 points
Date : 2020-09-24 17:09 UTC (5 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (samczsun.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (samczsun.com)
| gabereiser wrote:
| When's the movie script due? This was an amazing read mainly for
| the multiple perspectives and story. Great job!
| pavlov wrote:
| Nice work, but honestly I'm not sure why they bother.
|
| The article states that the purpose of these smart contracts is:
|
| "Stake your tokens with us and you could be the next
| cryptocurrency millionaire"
|
| That's an obvious scam. Anyone who gave real money to such a
| cause has already lost it. So why is the author giving away his
| time to help the scammers?
| SiempreViernes wrote:
| For the glory? Because even chumps deserve justice? Because
| _someone_ needs to defend the reputation of digicoins?
| snake_plissken wrote:
| I still don't understand what's happening at the core of this and
| the other dark forest post from a few weeks ago. How exactly are
| these bots front-running/stealing the ethereums?
|
| My understanding: -these bots scan the smart
| contracts that are waiting to be executed by the miners
| -the bots find vulnerabilities (another grey area in my mind) in
| the contract -the bots adjust the destination address of
| where the contract is supposed to send the the ethereums
| -then the bots continually execute the vulnerable smart contract
| code
| schoen wrote:
| My understanding of the front-running issue in these two cases
| is that a _human being_ found vulnerabilities in particular
| smart contracts, which would allow _anyone_ to claim the value
| protected by a particular contract. The human beings wanted to
| use these vulnerabilities to transfer the value somewhere, such
| as to an escrow account or to the original owners of that
| value. However, since the vulnerabilities allow _anyone_ to do
| this, the front-runners could take this value for themselves by
| noticing the humans ' attempt to execute the transactions, and
| then more quickly executing the exact same transaction with a
| different destination.
|
| You can't take advantage of a "normal" cryptocurrency
| transaction this way because the "normal" transaction is like a
| super-minimal smart contract that's designed to pay only one
| hard-coded recipient. Therefore, that transaction either
| happens or doesn't happen, but its recipient can't be altered.
| Nor can you take advantage of a non-vulnerable smart contract
| this way, because the non-vulnerable smart contract can't be
| triggered to perform an action that its creators would consider
| inappropriate. But for a vulnerable smart contract, there's a
| series of events that would cause it to send value to an
| _arbitrary_ address (and not in exchange for some other
| adequate compensatory value). It 's this case where the front-
| runners want to find a way to swap in their own addresses for
| these transactions, and that's also why obfuscation could deter
| that -- making it hard for the front-runners to notice that
| that was possible.
| AgentME wrote:
| I think it's an important detail to point out that legitimate
| transactions mostly aren't vulnerable to the "Dark Forest"
| issue. A lot of comments I'd seen on the original "Ethereum
| is a Dark Forest" blog post seemed to be under the impression
| that this was a general Ethereum issue affecting normal
| users.
| 3np wrote:
| Arbitrage trades and related activities like MakerDAO
| keepers would be legitimate transactions vulnerable to this
| (essentially someone else extracting the value from their
| discovery). Granted that is a very small subset of users.
| drchopchop wrote:
| Basically a human realizes that smart contract X is broken, and
| tries to enlist others to fix it. However, given the
| decentralized and generally shady nature of crypto, the process
| of disclosure also means a bad actor could get wind of the bug
| before it's addressed, and use the exploit to steal all of the
| money.
|
| Thus, you have white hats racing to siphon money out of a
| buggy, immutable contract which also happens to be worth
| millions of real dollars. It'd be funny if there wasn't so much
| real money involved.
| renewiltord wrote:
| You put your gold in a box and stuck it in the ground in a
| ranch in the middle of nowhere. No one knows there is gold in a
| box in the ground so it's safe. But people know that other
| people but gold in boxes and stick it in the ground.
|
| One day you go to get it so you load up your pickup with gold
| digging equipment and drive to the ranch. On the way are
| spotters. They see your truck has gold digging equipment. They
| see that the road you're going down leads to the ranch. It's
| obvious what you're going to do.
|
| They load up their faster Ford Ranger and blaze down the road.
| You can't catch up. They have a faster car. You get there. They
| have taken your gold.
|
| If you hadn't gone there, the gold was relatively safe. Maybe
| some day someone happens on it but realistically probably not.
|
| But you went. By looking for it you revealed you were looking
| and you revealed where you were looking.
| Sniffnoy wrote:
| It's much simpler than that. (Also, you appear to have a few
| concepts mixed up. For instance, one doesn't execute smart
| contracts, but rather transactions. Smart contracts just sit
| there until someone sends a transaction to one, at which point
| it executes that transaction.)
|
| What the bot does is that it checks each transaction that is
| waiting to be executed and simulates sending that transaction
| itself on a private blockchain forked from the real network. If
| the simulation results in a profit, it frontruns that
| transaction -- i.e., it sends the transaction itself for real,
| but bidding a higher price than the original sender did, so
| that its transaction will get executed rather than the the
| original transaction it's copying.
|
| It doesn't need to perform any sort of vulnerability scan; it
| just mimics _other_ people exploiting arbitrage or
| vulnerabilities and pays more to get there first.
|
| Similarly, it doesn't need to adjust any destination addresses.
| It's just looking for arbitrage opportunities or
| vulnerabilities that will direct ether _to the sender_. Smart
| contracts are entirely capable of getting the address of the
| message sender, and using that as a destination to send ether
| to. So the bot doesn 't need to adjust the transaction data at
| all, which would be substantially more complicated.
| danielvf wrote:
| Imagine that everyone agreed that just one slow computer would
| handle banking, contracts, and the stock markets for the entire
| world. This gets rid of any pesky concurrency issues. To move
| money from person to person, or to execute contracts or
| programs, you write up a sticky note with what you want to have
| done, sign it, and attach some money to it. Once every couple
| minutes, the computer administrators come out, collect a couple
| notes with the most money on them, and feed those into the
| computer.
|
| The Dark Forest attack is possible because everyone can see all
| the notes on the board waiting to be processed, and everyone
| can simulate exactly, precisely what the really slow computer
| will do with a given note.
|
| Suppose you found someone wanting to sell TSLA stock for $5 and
| someone wanting to buy it for $400. You would write up a note
| to buy it for $5 and sell it for $400, and stick it on the
| board. However, the moment you put the note on the board, the
| attackers and their automated telescopes have simulated that
| this note results in the holder having $395 more than they
| started with, and gave nothing away in return. The attacker
| then simulates an alternate future in which they post the note
| instead, and verify that they get the money. It works! So the
| attacker copies your note, signs it themselves, puts a much
| bigger wad of cash on it than you did, and slaps it up on the
| board.
|
| When the operators come out, they collect the attackers note
| first (more cash) and by the time your note is run, the
| opportunity is no longer there.
| SilasX wrote:
| Great analogy! The only thing I would add is that, if your
| arbitrage trade takes away too much money from an account
| belong the core devs (which would be like, the regulators
| responsible for the computer), they would retroactively undo
| that transaction in the computer's logic (force a hard fork).
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14819268
| 3np wrote:
| That's an unfair representation of what actually unfolded.
| dash2 wrote:
| It sounds like the whole system has a huge public goods
| problem. In the real world stock market, buying TSLA is a
| signal that you believe the price is good, and if you're a
| big enough investor, your buy might move prices up before you
| complete. In this world, other people can steal that signal
| and move the price before your transaction even starts. Isn't
| this a design flaw?
| AgentME wrote:
| There are ways to make marketplace contracts which allow
| buy and sell orders like this that aren't vulnerable to
| front-running. It's possible to have the buy and sell
| orders happen off-chain and then be settled on-chain later
| (Loopring works this way; there are other benefits to this
| system too such as speed of execution and lower fees), or
| for a marketplace contract to require orders to be preceded
| by a precommitment transaction, which includes a hash of
| the upcoming order, so the upcoming order can't be frontrun
| because the frontrunner would need to do their own
| precommitment transaction first.
|
| Note that a marketplace contract like this isn't the only
| kind of smart contract; it's not the case that all smart
| contracts have the potential for front-running
| vulnerabilities. For example, there are smart contracts
| that do things like manage community funds and require
| people to vote on how the funds are spent, which don't do
| anything that could be vulnerable to front-running.
| NKosmatos wrote:
| Nice read! That's why I respect whitehat hackers, to be tempted
| by ~10million and then proceed doing the right thing. I wonder if
| they got a reward/bounty for managing to save all this ETH.
| ve55 wrote:
| Very interesting story, it really does sound like a scifi
| thriller to me.
|
| It also makes me wonder what type of legal battle would ensue if
| a blackhat were to have taken all of these funds instead, I'm not
| sure I've seen any public high-profile cases like that yet.
| Analemma_ wrote:
| This is all very interesting to read about, but in the same way
| epic battles in Eve Online are interesting to read about but not
| participate in. I hope the author doesn't think this article is
| functioning as an enticement to use ETH myself, because it's only
| confirming for me that I never, ever want any of my money near
| that shambling wreck.
| kevinpet wrote:
| Makes me think of salvage operations, and then raises the
| question of how do people get paid? They're providing a valuable
| service. I think in shipping there are both conventions and an
| ability to quickly negotiate that allows contracting for a
| salvage ship to rush to the aid of a grounded or sinking
| container vessel.
| Animats wrote:
| Yes, there are. It's the Lloyds Open Form.[1] "No Cure - No
| Pay". This is the standard deal for salvage operations, and is
| well over a century old. It's very simple, since it's intended
| to be executed by someone on a sinking ship. It's sufficient
| for the captain of a ship in trouble to contact a "salvor" and
| say they accept the standard Lloyds Open Form. A message
| "ACCEPT SALVAGE SERVICES ON BASIS LLOYDS STANDARD FORM LOF 90
| NO CURE NO PAY ACKNOWLEDGE" is enough.
|
| _Contractors' basic obligation: The Contractors identified in
| Box 1 hereby agree to use their best endeavours to salve the
| property specified in Box 2 and to take the property to the
| places stated in Box 3 or to such other place as may hereafter
| be agreed. If no place is inserted in Box 3 and in the absence
| of any subsequent agreement as to the place where the property
| is to be taken the Contractors shall take the property to a
| place of safety._
|
| _The Contractors' remuneration and /or special compensation
| shall be determined by arbitration in London in the manner
| prescribed by Lloyd's Salvage Arbitration Clauses in force at
| the date of this agreement._
|
| That's the deal.
|
| You need some agreed way to resolve how much the job is worth
| for this to work. The Lloyds Open Form is an agreement to do
| the job and discuss later how much it's worth. That's generally
| settled by insurance adjusters. It's much like the aftermath of
| auto accidents.
|
| How much does the salvor get? 15% - 35% of the recovered value,
| reports Lloyds.[2] Of course, salvors work under tough
| conditions. They have to have equipment and people ready 24/7
| to go somewhere and do something. That's expensive. Some
| classic worldwide names exited in the past decade. Mammoet and
| Titan both dropped out.
|
| All this is against accidental losses, not against an
| adversary. Where there's an opponent, it's a much tougher
| problem. Marine salvage is vs. the ocean. Whether this model
| can be made to fit programmed contract problems or ransomware
| is a big question. One worth pursuing.
|
| [1] https://www.lloyds.com/market-resources/lloyds-
| agency/salvag...
|
| [2] https://www.tugadvise.com/wp-
| content/uploads/2015/10/lloyds-...
| MacsHeadroom wrote:
| The people helping here did it for compensation in the form of
| good will with key players and/or potential future customers of
| their respective crypto products.
|
| If you're going to use two similar looking services for
| something using ETH, do you go with the one by some no-name or
| the one created and championed by community heros?
| huac wrote:
| you will pay a higher fee to a trusted miner to process your
| transaction without sending to mempool.
| itronitron wrote:
| seems like a very interesting story however after the third voice
| change I lost interest and the specialized tech jargon just makes
| it sound goofy
| AgentME wrote:
| I was wondering why the article kept repeating details in re-
| worded ways as if they happened to other people. I didn't even
| realize that different parts were by different authors.
| iameli wrote:
| Love whitehat crypto postmortems like this. They always read like
| heist movies.
|
| Curious about the use of SparkPool to bypass the mempool and get
| the transactions minted directly into a block. It looks like
| anyone can sign up and contribute their hashrate to SparkPool. Is
| there a risk of malicious miners running workers in their
| competitors' pools and then frontrunning?
| bodski wrote:
| AFAIK only the pool operator can see the full set of
| transactions for the block being mined. Pool workers only get
| to see the block header for the new block. This header only
| contains the hashed root of the transaction tree, and so they
| are unable to front-run private transactions in this way.
| wins32767 wrote:
| One of my good friends has a saying, "Humans are really good at
| optimizing the hell out of the wrong thing." I can't help but
| think that when reading about any sort of heroics involving
| blockchain.
| currymj wrote:
| i tried writing some toy Ethereum smart contracts circa 2016. at
| that time it was immensely difficult to write them in a secure
| way -- even a simple "hello world" level Solidity contract could
| easily have exploitable bugs if you don't code in an extremely
| defensive style.
|
| i'm told things have improved since then -- can anyone who's used
| Solidity more recently comment on this? is it true?
|
| this, plus the fact that putting information from the real world
| onto the blockchain unavoidably requires some trust, seemed like
| the two big problems then, and it seems like they haven't really
| been fixed.
| vvpan wrote:
| Well, what are the fixes? Writing "smart contracts" is not
| meant to be for anybody but very seasoned developers. Also if
| you write a contract and do not get it audited by 3rd parties
| than nobody will (or should) take for anything other than a toy
| application. That's just the nature of writing immutable code
| that potentially transfers a value.
|
| About Solidity in particular - I think most people would say
| it's not the best. There are endeavors to develop better
| languages but Solidity has become quiet deeply entrenched in
| the Ethereum world. Everybody is busy with much more pressing
| issues - like scalability.
| finnh wrote:
| I've posted this before [0], but it's still apropos regarding
| the foolishness that is Ethereum.
|
| [Ethereum] only makes sense if all of the following obtain:
|
| (a) the code is 100% bug-free (b/c accidents cannot be
| rewound)
|
| (b) all code-writers are 100% honest (their code does what
| they say)
|
| (c) all contract participants are 100% perfect code readers
| (so as to not enter into fraudulent contracts)
|
| (Strictly speaking, only one of (b) and (c) needs to be
| true).
|
| None of these conditions will ever obtain.
|
| [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14471465
| vvpan wrote:
| And yet the marketcap of the funds locked in a subset of
| contracts on Ethereum is almost 10 billion today
| (https://defipulse.com/) and I have been using a popular
| contract wallet for a while to hold my funds and transact
| with friends. So clearly it cannot be nearly as
| catastrophic as you mention, no?
| sfkdjf9j3j wrote:
| Is it really meaningful to talk about market cap when
| there are no underlying assets? The value could be
| entirely (or almost entirely) speculation.
| vvpan wrote:
| Sure, but it is still redeemable value for an attacker,
| yet attacks are relatively scarce. Or scarce enough for
| people to keep putting money into it. That's the point I
| was trying to make.
|
| I know what you mean by "no underlying assets" but I'd
| say it's arguable. Does BTC (WBTC) have value? By this
| time it seems like it does. There are also billions of
| dollars of "stablecoins" on the network. Are they a valid
| underlying asset? So far it seems like they are... Things
| have no underlying value until they all of a sudden do, I
| think that's the story of Bitcoin. A story of value too.
| currymj wrote:
| what i recall was that there were many pitfalls even to do
| something simple, and this event suggests that even experts
| may find it difficult to avoid mistakes.
|
| part of the challenge was just the inherent weirdness of the
| ethereum execution environment, where the functions you write
| can be directly called by an adversary, and they can set up
| their own version of the stack however they want.
|
| it didn't seem like the language helped to mitigate the
| inherent difficulty however.
| ladberg wrote:
| I love that they're continuing the Dark Forest analogy! Makes me
| also realize I never want to dip my toe in crypto like that. It's
| like an amateur going up to an entirely unregulated wall street
| and expecting to earn some quick cash.
| nullc wrote:
| The word you want here is "ethereum" not "crypto". Crypto is
| cryptography, and even if you want to redefine it as
| 'cryptocurrency' the sheer reckless yolo incompetence and
| scammyness of ethereum is not especially representative.
| microtherion wrote:
| What IS a "representative" cryptocurrency, then, if the #2 by
| market cap is not representative?
|
| Would it be Bitcoin, used for such time-honored business as
| drug purchases and hiring contract killers? Would it be
| Tether, the fiat currency for people who think that central
| banks are excessively transparent?
|
| The one extra element that Ethereum brings to the table is
| computationally much more powerful contracts, which makes it
| technically intriguing, but also adds another level of
| scammyness and incompetence to the enterprise.
| ladberg wrote:
| I think "crypto" can mean cryptography or cryptocurrency
| depending on context. Every cryptocurrency I've seen has a
| Dark Forest, even if it's not as bad as Ethereum.
|
| For example, if you create a private key using something
| guessable [1], point a camera at a QR code [2], or make a
| wallet using software you didn't write yourself [3], you can
| expect your money to irreversibly disappear faster than you
| can react.
|
| [1] https://www.wired.com/story/blockchain-bandit-ethereum-
| weak-...
|
| [2] https://www.theverge.com/2013/12/23/5238764/news-anchor-
| rece...
|
| [3] https://cryptonews.com/news/popular-private-key-
| generator-co...
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| There are worse coins out there than etherium
| swensel wrote:
| In terms of ethereum, do you mean ethereum smart contracts?
| The ethereum platform, as defined by it's creators, is
| actually quite technical. Anyone who spends the time to learn
| the Solidity language and what it takes to deploy a smart
| contract is free to, so yes there can be legitimate,
| illegitimate, poorly designed or well designed smart
| contracts, just like other software programs.
| pron wrote:
| Amateur has nothing to do with that. Ethereum, and "smart
| contracts" in general, are built on such shaky foundations that
| unless shakiness is what you're looking for, you have nothing
| of interest to find there.
| vvpan wrote:
| Can you elaborate? Why do you find that "smart contracts" are
| built on a shaky foundation?
| drchopchop wrote:
| Because there is no real formal verification process for
| smart contracts, it's extremely easy to slip bugs into the
| contract code, the contract itself is generally immutable
| (can't fix bugs), and the effects of a breach are generally
| catastrophic and irreversible.
|
| Need more reasons?
| vvpan wrote:
| You are incorrect. Contracts are immutable but you can
| upgrade your application. There are different patterns,
| one where you make a shell contract that has pointers to
| contracts with actual business logic.
|
| Also, there are patterns where the user needs to confirm
| that yes they want to use the new version.
|
| There are also systems of insurance on contracts.
| BTCOG wrote:
| This as well. Immutable bugs.
| BTCOG wrote:
| Yes. Stay away from Ethereum altogether if for investment and
| simply put amounts you are willing to invest into Bitcoin.
|
| Ethereum DeFi currently ongoing is extremely risky and
| insecure in the longterm for various reasons. The open smart
| contracting is super dangerous, the Ethereum blockchain is
| way too bloated, the fees are shooting up, and it was
| designed to be a shared computer, an EVM for running things.
| Bitcoin is an investment and sound money. They do not compare
| and don't have the same end goals.
| sneak wrote:
| I offer that anyone who did the work that these researchers did
| would have also been "rightful owners" of that money.
|
| This is the consequence of programmable money; there's no getting
| around it, and, in my opinion, people shouldn't want to. Rescuing
| people and brands who don't put the effort into security from the
| consequences of their own mistakes isn't a net benefit.
|
| I'm all for anonymous teams, but look at the hoops this person
| had to jump through just to get in touch with them to report the
| bug.
|
| When you're anonymous, all you have is your brand, and theirs
| should have burned to the ground for this entirely preventable
| error.
| squeezingswirls wrote:
| Addendum https://zengo.com/generalized-front-running-ethereum-
| arbitra...
| superkuh wrote:
| I guess the take away here is that if you have the right
| connections then you can bypass the system.
| larzang wrote:
| Right? Forget bugs in the contract system, if you have pools
| writing whatever history they want in private that seems to
| defeat the entire point.
| formerly_proven wrote:
| This read like a piece by William Gibson in the Neuromancer
| universe. I finally understand now why people are attracted by
| cryptocurrencies.
| [deleted]
| BEEdwards wrote:
| You and I came to different conclusions from the same idea.
|
| I came out thinking why anyone would fuck with this gameable
| broken system, the more i learn about cypto the less I think of
| it.
| ordinaryradical wrote:
| Yes, if you're an enthusiast, it seems like good, technical
| fun.
|
| But I have no idea how an "investor" could read this and think
| they can price the risk correctly. This isn't even the wild
| west of finance--this is intergalactic space.
| jquery wrote:
| > But I have no idea how an "investor" could read this and
| think they can price the risk correctly. This isn't even the
| wild west of finance--this is intergalactic space.
|
| To be a successful investor, you don't necessarily have the
| price the risk correctly, you just have to price it better
| than others.
|
| I imagine someone successfully investing in crypto can read
| stuff like this fluently.
| pfisch wrote:
| Anyone "successfully" investing in crypto got in at least 4
| years ago or when we the last big run up was and just held
| in a reputable exchange or in their own wallet that they
| secured well.
|
| They don't need to understand anything really except how to
| deposit 5000+ in a reputable exchange. I think this makes
| up most successful crypto investors.
| bojo wrote:
| I am not an advovate for crypto by any means, but this is
| false. There are some Wall Street level investors out
| there.
|
| https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2020/08/0
| 6/v...
| golergka wrote:
| Many "investors" are working very far outside the law, are
| used to very high levels of risk and desperately need
| different ways to keep their assets out of view from
| authorities.
| nootropicat wrote:
| It's way safer and less complex than you would expect. Most
| staking contracts are a copy-paste of two basic staking
| contracts (from synthetix and sushiswap), so it's enough to
| do a text diff and see what was changed, which is trivial.
| For more complex contracts that do something more, funds at
| risk are the best bug bounty there is - in the current
| environment if something had >$10M for a month and wasn't
| hacked, it most likely can't be trivially hacked. Bzrx, the
| single most incompetent defi platform, was hacked just two
| weeks after a relaunch for $8M - most likely someone was
| waiting from the start for it to get enough funds to make the
| hack worthwhile. Almost no hacks happened during the entire
| yield farming craze.
|
| Key word trivially - some contracts are custodial, so if
| someone hacked the owners (or they turned out to be scammers)
| funds could be stolen, which arguably has a reverse Lindy
| effect in the beginning. Fortunately people are starting to
| demand at least timelocks and/or multisigs. Another risk is
| how well liquidations function during a price crash, for
| protocols that need them.
|
| The current risk premium was and still is absurdly
| overestimated, but that was a good thing (for me) as without
| it three or even four digit APYs wouldn't last a day, but
| thanks to the unwarranted risk premium they lasted about 2
| months. During the short peak three weeks ago it was possible
| to make even ~8% per day (on millions of dollars - good
| liquidity), completely risk free (trivial staking contracts).
| The great crypto bullrun of 2020 already happened and few
| outside of ethereum even noticed.
|
| You will see billions flow into defi on ethereum as others
| realize the real level of risk too (which guarantees those
| astronomical returns are never going to return - but even 10%
| apy on dollars is good in the current environment).
| hitekker wrote:
| As an investor who is not into crypto, I don't understand
| this comment, let alone use it to correctly price the risk
| of crypto.
| escapecharacter wrote:
| agreed; this reads like someone explaining their casino
| good luck charm strategy.
| AgentME wrote:
| Stay away from putting money into unique smart contracts
| that haven't been running for a long time with a lot of
| activity. Stay away from smart contracts that are
| custodial (where the creator is given privilege to all
| depositors' funds).
| dwaltrip wrote:
| Me think you are in a bit too deep and may be
| underestimating how things can go wrong.
|
| Another possibility is that you have a high risk tolerance
| as well as an uncommon knack for this sort of thing that
| most people don't have.
| psswrd12345 wrote:
| >Another possibility is that you have a high risk
| tolerance as well as an uncommon knack for this sort of
| thing that most people don't have.
|
| Ding ding. Which is why returns won't last as the
| information asymmetry curve is flattened.
| vvpan wrote:
| If anybody would like more intense blockchain story-telling check
| out this longish write-up about Justin Sun's takeover of Steem.it
| from a few weeks back. https://decrypt.co/38050/steem-steemit-
| tron-justin-sun-crypt...
| centimeter wrote:
| It seems to me that basically no cryptocurrency outside of
| Bitcoin has its shit together.
| huac wrote:
| interesting read - seems like the solution to the dark forest is
| equivalent to a dark pool in traditional finance?
|
| the logical conclusion is that within a few months we'll have
| dark pools run by miners who will process your transactions
| without broadcasting to mempool, in exchange for an increased gas
| fee. and, within a year, we'll find out that some dark pools sold
| order flow to those HFT's anyways, a la UBS
| https://sites.law.berkeley.edu/thenetwork/2015/01/29/ubs-dar...
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