[HN Gopher] Tracking One Year of Malicious Tor Exit Relay Activi... ___________________________________________________________________ Tracking One Year of Malicious Tor Exit Relay Activities (Part II) Author : hacka22 Score : 183 points Date : 2021-05-10 16:55 UTC (6 hours ago) (HTM) web link (nusenu.medium.com) (TXT) w3m dump (nusenu.medium.com) | grouphugs wrote: | this project fucked over freenode so bad, would still not | recommend joining that organization | 02020202 wrote: | wow, quarter of the entire tor network is | compromised....shiiiiet. at least it seems forcing https solves | the problem. | ajcp wrote: | The almost willful lack of tradecraft, scale of deployments, | small time-frames, and "loudness" of action the highlighted | entity displays, combined with the technical knowledge required | to take part in this narrow space, suggests that someone is | tolerance-checking the system rather than actually seeking to | inhabit it. | | Or they really are just shitty and impatient Russians, I could go | either way. | notriddle wrote: | You're suffering from the Toupee Fallacy. You assume that these | people must be intentionally making themselves noticeable, | because there's no way the average malicious Tor node operator | could be this dumb. | | But there's no rule saying that these are average malicious | exit node operators. They could just be particularly stupid | ones. We don't know about the competent ones. | bawolff wrote: | Why does tor even allow plain http by default. The internet has | changed, most sites support https now, seems like a better | default is in order. | Ajedi32 wrote: | As the article notes, Firefox has an HTTPs-only mode now and | Tor Browser is based on Firefox ESR, so there's a chance they | might add that feature in the next major version update: | | > When Tor Browser migrates to Firefox 91esr we will look at | enabling https-only mode for everyone, but there remains a | significant concern that there are many sites that do not | support HTTPS (especially more region specific sites) and the | question of what messaging Tor Browser should use in that case. | | Source: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor- | relays/2021-April... | f430 wrote: | Quick question: if you use Tor to send and receive crypto are you | at risk of MITM? | jandrese wrote: | If you aren't in the habit of answering yes to big browser | warnings about self-signed certs it seems like it shouldn't be | an issue. | | If the MITM operators have stolen a well known root cert then | we have a much bigger problem. | avidiax wrote: | SSL stripping allows attackers to avoid the big browser | warnings, yet view and tamper with your data. | | https://blog.cloudflare.com/performing-preventing-ssl- | stripp... | vbezhenar wrote: | HTTP is marked as " Not Secure". It's not big, but it's | noticeable if you're paying attention and you definitely | should pay attention for financial operations. | opheliate wrote: | In most cases, it should be okay, it's a specific scenario | where MITM is possible. The issue arises if you're using Tor to | access a website which gives you an address to send crypto to, | and you trust that address is correct. | | If it's a hidden service you're connecting to, it's fine, | there's no way for a malicious exit node to alter what's sent | to you. If it's a normal website (i.e: not .onion) that you're | getting the address from, then the exit node could perform SSL | stripping [0], an attack in which a website which would | normally be served over HTTPS is served to you via HTTP, and so | the malicious exit node could alter the content. In this case, | the attacker could change any cryptocurrency addresses present | in the website to convince you to send currency to the wrong | address. It would be visible in your browser that the website | is being served over HTTP, not HTTPS. | | It should be noted, this scenario is getting rarer with the | introduction of HSTS [1], especially in conjunction with HSTS | preloading, which prevents your browser from accessing the | website over plain HTTP. Tools like HTTPS Everywhere [2] can | help ensure that you never access websites over plain HTTP | also. | | Also, this isn't a vulnerability in Tor per se, the exact same | is possible without Tor, it's just that when you connect to a | website via Tor, you're deliberately introducing extra hops | between you and your destination, which wouldn't normally be | there. | | So, things that would need to come together for this attack to | work: First, you're not connecting to a hidden service. Second, | the website you're connecting to doesn't use HSTS, or you've | not connected to them before & they're not in the preload list. | Third, you aren't using a tool like HTTPS everywhere and you | don't notice the website is coming to you over HTTP. Fourth, | you don't verify that the address you've been given is correct | independent of the website before sending a payment. This seems | to me to be a fairly rare set of circumstances on the modern | internet. | | 0: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/41988/how- | does-... | | 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security | | 2: https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere | azalemeth wrote: | Out of curiosity, is there much of a (legal, sensible) community | on i2p nowadays? I think its crypto is stronger than tor's, but | unfortunately when I looked (many, many years ago) it was an | absolute cesspool of humanity, of the "oh god, I am uninstalling | this now" variety. | saurik wrote: | FWIW, the security researchers I talked to about I2P--such as | the authors of the paper I link after this paragraph, which is | an example that comes to mind readily--mostly had felt that | there was no reason to write papers about it anymore as there | had been so many attacks on it already and that none of them | had been taken seriously (unlike the Tor people, who care | deeply and fix things quickly) that it wasn't fun or pointful. | | https://sites.cs.ucsb.edu/~vigna/publications/2013_RAID_i2p.... | a2tech wrote: | As a believer in the Tor mission---how do I run a non-evil exit | node? | akadruid1 wrote: | Given the sizable investment of time and money required to run | and independent exit node, it might be worth considering | throwing your support behind one of the existing non-profits | providing exit nodes | | https://blog.torproject.org/support-tor-network-donate-exit-... | | https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq#RelayDonations | flatiron wrote: | running an exit node is a really bad idea. someone is going to | do something dumb on Tor and the local PD isn't going to know | anything about Tor and will come knock on your door. i used to | run a relay and even that became too much of a hassle. first my | bank blocked me (they block all tor traffic even from relays) | and then my companies IT did an audit and saw traffic "coming | from tor" to them and politely asked me to stop using Tor. that | was the last straw for me, and i took it down. | scrose wrote: | I've had a similar experience just connecting to my school's | Wifi network. Someone left a threatening message on the now | dead 'anonymous' chat app(YikYak) using the campus Wifi. | Campus PD checked the IP address, saw one of my devices now | had that IP, and gave me a call. I spent 5 mins trying to | understand what this app was that they were even talking | about, and another 10 mins explaining how IP addresses work | to them. | SubiculumCode wrote: | But why would you do that from you home IP and not rent a | server somewhere? | phoronixrly wrote: | AFAIK | | 1. Live in a country in which law enforcement follows the law | and the law does not prohibit running tor, as noted in a | response. | | 2. Hire a lawyer competent on cybercrime, intellectual property | and freedom of speech. | | 3. Set up a non-profit or other legal entity with the explicit | purpose of running tor exits/relays (stated in the articles of | incorporation or similar founding documents, depending on the | country and type of legal entity). Make sure its address is not | your home address. | | 4. Purchase or rent the necessary hardware through the legal | entity (don't ever do anything unrelated to the tor exits from | this entity). _Make sure you co-lo it in a datacenter, do not | run any exits in your office and especially not in your home_. | Avoid having any hardware you rely on not being seized in close | (physical -- same rack or logical -- e.g. same network) | proximity. Explain to your host that you 'll be running tor | exits. Clearly label your systems as tor exits in any possible | way you can manage, including physically on the cases/bezels. | Run a web server on their public IPs with a page explaining | that this is a tor exit node run by such and such legal entity, | set WHOIS data with the same info if possible. Set up reverse | DNS with hostnames that clearly state this is a tor exit node. | | 5. Be ready for trips to the PD in order to explain what tor is | and why what you're doing is legal and that it's not you that | sent that phishing e-mail, etc. It is a matter of _when_ an | illegal activity will be traced back to your the legal entity | 's exit and no amount of labelling will deter law enforcement | from summoning you as a representative of the entity. Reasons | being incompetence, desire/requirement to investigate | thoroughly, or plainly using inconvenience as a way to | discourage you from running the nodes (in the end, tor both | creates more work for law enforcement and is a big obstacle to | them so they'd rather not have to deal with it if possible). | | This is the gist of it. The details need to be discussed with a | lawyer. And again all of this relies on the law enforcement and | justice systems to follow the law and the law to not prohibit | tor. Don't do this in a country in which there's risk of you | being black-bagged or held legally responsible for running tor | or not keeping traffic logs. | | Source: my poor understanding my country's and EU's laws. | IANAL. | 8note wrote: | Addendum to 1. Tor also has to be legal in that country | INTPenis wrote: | I'm a long time exit node operator, I operate X currently and all | are in Asia where they're most needed imho. | | I would not be opposed to having some sort of operator validation | of exit nodes. Where you can actually validate who runs an | operator node, get a person behind them. And perhaps rate those | higher than others. | WORMS_EAT_WORMS wrote: | > I operate X currently and all are in Asia where they're most | needed imho. | | Interesting/Awesome. Just curious, what day/event specifically | motivated you to get started with this? | | To be honest, my impression -- which could be wrong -- is most | exit node operators do so for nefarious reasons, Pr0n (hence | your username INT-Penis), or are Fed. | | (to be clear, appreciate what you are doing regardless) | dmantis wrote: | I had ran exit node for several years because it, you know, a | good thing to do in life. Like donating to charity or publish | GPL code. Freedom sometime is underrated, but if you live in | authoritarian state you may understand. | | Helping people around make me feel better. | nacs wrote: | > Pr0n (hence your username INT-Penis), or are Fed. | | This part of your comment is completely unnecessary and | unwarranted. | | You already asked your question, just wait for an answer | instead of jumping to uncharitable conclusions. | maybelsyrup wrote: | > Pr0n (hence your username INT-Penis) | | Wait I can't tell if you're joking, do you really think their | username is a reliable indication that they run Tor nodes for | pornography, and not a stupid internet pun? Because if you're | joking I lol'd, but if you're not I ... I'm worried about | you, I guess? | a1vd wrote: | The username refers probably to INTP-enis, INTP is a | personality type (Myers-Briggs). | ConcernedCoder wrote: | For the uninitiated, this: | https://www.16personalities.com/intp-personality | NaturalPhallacy wrote: | As a username with a stupid pun/portmanteau with a dick | joke in it I appreciate this. | | I wanted to use the name NaturalsticPhallacy, because it's | a prevalent fallacy I see people fall for, and humans have | found dicks funny since recorded history but it's too long | for HN so I had to shorten it to this one. | | I do not build or operate any sort of porn or even porn | adjacent software or service and never have. Not that I | wouldn't if the right job came along, but I never have and | currently don't. | | But I digress. Usernames are generally best ignored. The | content of their writing is what matters. | WORMS_EAT_WORMS wrote: | Yes, I am wondering why the person with the username | containing the word "Penis" runs Tor exit nodes. It is | curious and agree could easily be totally unrelated. | Forbo wrote: | Considering that I see a large number of Tor nodes running | from the same addresses as many pool.ntp.org nodes, I think | your view is a bit uncharitable. Some people believe in | Internet freedom and privacy, and see Tor as a way to help | bring that vision to the world. In my opinion, it's just | people contributing another piece of infrastructure run as a | public service. | INTPenis wrote: | I just think anonymity should be a right. I don't even | remember when I was introduced to tor first, probably | sometime in the early 2000s. | | I'm not stupid, with anonymity comes abuse. But I don't think | that's a reason to get rid of the option to be anonymous. | | I'd say your impression is wrong about tor operators, I've | met a few of them at various events. (Not including the tor | operators who try to subvert anonymity of course, whoever | they are.) | | But the tor network is absolutely mostly used for illegal | activity. I can't be dishonest about this, that would mean | denying human nature. Give humans a way to be anonymous and | they will absolutely abuse that. | | But I've also met one reporter in person who thanked me for | the tor network, that's enough for me. | Analemma_ wrote: | To be honest I just take it for granted that all exit relays are | either run by Feds or at least compromised by Feds. If you use | Tor for anything you wouldn't want Five Eyes to know about, | you're an idiot. | xvector wrote: | Isn't Tor designed to ensure anonymity despite a snooping exit | relay? I thought that even if you compromise an exit you can't | do much without compromising the in-between relays. | Lammy wrote: | Designed by the US Navy to ensure anonymity of US agents | abroad from other countries via the DoD-birthed Internet, | sure. | bawolff wrote: | Its designed so that a snooping exit node can't identify you, | but it can see all traffic. | | Which is why you should generally only use https when using | tor. The last leg may be snooped on so you need to use | encryption during it. (http is fine with hidden services | though) | | Its important to keep in mind that anonoyminity and data | integrity are separate properties. You can have one without | the others. | golergka wrote: | What would you use instead? | 2OEH8eoCRo0 wrote: | Use a VPN and don't do anything that would get you on a | terrorist/cybercrime/pedo list in the first place? | | There is no safe when it comes to determined state actors. | yakubin wrote: | _> don 't do anything that would get you on a | terrorist/cybercrime/pedo list in the first place?_ | | This is going to be difficult: | <https://arstechnica.com/information- | technology/2014/07/the-n...> | large wrote: | >Use a VPN | | Pretty sure that gets you on a list? | 2OEH8eoCRo0 wrote: | You're pretty sure? It should be easy to find a source | for that claim then. | munk-a wrote: | Purchase some hardware with cash and distribute it around the | world to tunnel through. Then expose them as public proxy | servers (or even Tor nodes) so that a fair amount normie | traffic passes through them. | | If you seriously feel paranoid about being watched then | you'll want to own the hardware you're actually passing | through. And I assume that any large organizations that | demand this level of invisibility (cartels etc...) have | essentially done this - likely locating some of those servers | behind armed guards that will protect the physical device. | | That said, I think it's unlikely that Tor has been majority | compromised at this point, but as it fades from the minds of | folks and becomes more and more niche the probability will | escalate. | rsuelzer wrote: | Given the immense barriers to setting up an exit node, I | would find it rather surprising if the majority of exit | nodes are not already controlled by state actors, either | directly or by proxy. My personal opinion is that if | anonymity on Tor is to continue, it will be the result of | competition for control of the network between opposing | states and not altruistic non-profits. | itake wrote: | >Purchase some hardware with cash and distribute it around | the world to tunnel through. | | how do you keep the hardware physically secure? What | prevents a gov actor replacing it with their own mitm | proxy? | cyberpunk wrote: | I would have paid some homeless guys to get me bunch of SIM | cards, use em once, and proxy via some hacked webcams, | after cleaning the rest of the malware off em... | | I mean. That's what I uhh, would do if I was doing | something dodgy on the internet... | | Edit; with a second hand android bought from a pawn shop | running nethunter as an ap ofc... | v8dev123 wrote: | > what I uhh | | Send me your address and I uhhh | encryptluks2 wrote: | Use an open Wifi hotspot with a spoofed MAC. | itake wrote: | This didn't protect Ross Ulbricht. | encryptluks2 wrote: | Because he walked away from his computer and left it | unlocked. Wear a hidden bluetooth device or something to | lock your computer and use USBGuard if you're that | worried. | bawolff wrote: | I feel that, at the point where the fbi is trying to | distract you by making out so they could steal your | laptop, its already too late and you are very screwed. | | Maybe a bluetooth autolocking thing could have delayed | the inevitable, but it would just be a delay. | encryptluks2 wrote: | Not really. Wish proper encryption and a USB safe list, | once the computer is locked there isn't much they can do. | bawolff wrote: | They can watch you for the rest of your life, interrogate | you, etc. | | Presumably they acted the way they did because they had | reasonable belief that their plan would work. If Ross | behaved differently i assume they would have a different | plan of action | flatiron wrote: | IIRC he was still sitting at the computer. They just | distracted him to turn around and then they swiped it. | jandrese wrote: | They literally snuck up behind him and swiped it out of | his hands. He was seated with his back to the door, one | of his many opsec failures. | encryptluks2 wrote: | Regardless, USBGuard and a hidden bluetooth device to | automatically lock when it leaves a certain radius would | have likely prevented any issues. | brobinson wrote: | Neither did linking his dark web identity to his real | life identity via multiple forum posts or his other 1,000 | opsec failures. | xvector wrote: | I suspect those "opsec failures" are just parallel | construction. The FBI almost certainly used a zero day on | him and then waited to see how they could construct a | feasible explanation for having identified him from | there. | hnnnnnnng wrote: | I agree with this. They just wait to find a small | breadcrumb trail and then use that construct a case. The | identifying the suspect is done through hidden means. | maybelsyrup wrote: | > almost certainly used a zero day on him | | I "like" this explanation, but are you going with your | gut on that or do you have any concrete signs that point | in that direction? | xvector wrote: | Parallel construction is not new for US intelligence when | it comes to solving high-profile crime. We know US | intelligence both hoards and uses zero days, especially | on users of Tor. As such, we can be reasonably certain | that parallel construction is used to capture | cybercriminals in high-profile cases, since it immensely | simplifies solving the crime to a matter of using the | exploit and merely observing for gaps in opsec. | | Furthermore, using a zero-day on Ulbricht would be | optimal as he is no security researcher. You are unlikely | to "burn" a zero-day unless you are using it in a dragnet | sort of fashion while a vigilant security researcher is | watching. | | By definition, it's hard to find proof of parallel | construction. However, former intelligence officials have | confirmed its use as a "bedrock technique" for catching | criminals [1]. | | [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction | maybelsyrup wrote: | This is really interesting, and sad. Thanks. | | > simplifies solving the crime to a matter of using the | exploit and merely observing for gaps in opsec | | By this logic, could one get away with a "crime" | indefinitely given good enough (perfect?) opsec? | bawolff wrote: | Even if that's true, Ross certainly made it easy for them | na85 wrote: | Arguably it did protect him, but Ulbricht compromised | himself by making several major opsec blunders including | linking his personal Gmail address to his pseudonyms. | therein wrote: | Try public WiFi + spoofed MAC + directional antenna. | | What if you live 3 blocks away from a public library but | a few floors higher? With direct line of sight and some | wireless networking gear? | | Would they really try to triangulate the client packets? | It is a large leap past "oh he is in the library, let's | go find him". You aren't triangulating the AP, you need | to logically isolate the packets from the client, | calculate their dB and somehow triangulate on just that. | NaturalPhallacy wrote: | >Would they really try to triangulate the client packets? | It is a large leap past "oh he is in the library, let's | go find him". | | This is smart, and a good idea. But it really just adds a | step. Once they go to the library and don't find him, | they'll start looking for something 'smart'. And doing | 'smart' things like this really get the hackles of the | feds up because they start thinking exciting things like | 'state actor', and "I'll get a promotion out of this". | | The best place to hide something is right out in the | open. Preferably behind a SEP field. | | Not hating on your idea, just exploring it further. | Analemma_ wrote: | I don't really do anything worth hiding from state-level | attackers, but if I did I wouldn't do it over the internet at | all. | gruez wrote: | so you'll do it in meatspace where there are witnesses and | facial recognition/ALPR cameras everywhere? | vinay_ys wrote: | There's one kind of tech that's good enough to protect | your privacy from corporations that want to profile your | behavior or keep you safe from malicious hackers who want | to steal your data by luring you into digital spider | nets. | | Then there's another kind of tech (and tactics and | practices) that could hope to keep you safe when you are | targeted by state-level actors in both digital space and | meat space. | | Tor barely belongs in the former category. | motohagiography wrote: | Trying to figure out what makes MITM'd exit nodes valuable. | | Sure, as an attacker it's interesting, but cost vs. how | interesting isn't clear. The law enforcement case for specific | investigations makes some sense, general counter intelligence | value of keeping track of which web sites are attracting people | who take precautions, maybe there is a general list of suspected | dissident minds states maintain? | avidiax wrote: | Part 1 says that they use SSL-stripping attacks to replace | cryptocurrency addresses with their own address, allowing them | to capture e.g. transfers to a crypto mixer. | | https://nusenu.medium.com/how-malicious-tor-relays-are-explo... | jandrese wrote: | The thing that confuses me about that is if you have not | installed the malicious MITM's root cert in your browser | isn't that going to fail? | | Or are these MITM's somehow signing stuff with well known | root certs? That seems like it would be a much bigger story. | Or are TOR users really accepting self-signed certs when | passing around their bitcoin addresses? | | Maybe there are bitcoin clients that don't validate the chain | when doing TLS? Given the sorry security posture of so many | exchanges this is somewhat more plausible. | michaelmcmillan wrote: | Most sites redirect all http traffic to https to make sure | the traffic is encrypted. | | Here's an example with HN (notice the protocol in the | req/res): $ curl -v | http://news.ycombinator.com [...] < HTTP/1.1 | 301 Moved Permanently < Location: | https://news.ycombinator.com/ | | However, the first request is over http, before it gets | redirected and encrypted. This is where the malicious relay | node would intercept and change the response. | tialaramex wrote: | _This_ is actually what 's going on. It's what HSTS and | HSTS preloading protects you against, it's why Chrome is | moving to just assuming HTTPS when you type domain names | without specifying, and it's why Firefox now has "HTTPS | only mode" where it goes further and just rewrites all | HTTP as HTTPS (even in random links you follow) and gives | you an interstitial caution page to decide if you really | want to try HTTP when HTTPS fails. | | People have all these fancy high-tech Hollywood-style | theories about how they imagine things being attacked, | but the reality is _almost always_ far more boring. | [deleted] | bawolff wrote: | Ssl stripping usually means replacing https links with http | (when on http) and blocking TLS so users retry with http. | | Moral of the story, if you a are a site operator use HSTS. | And if you're on tor, you should maybe consider configuring | things so you only use tls. | jandrese wrote: | That makes sense. I know the MITMproxy they mentioned re- | signs the traffic, but it will not work unless you install | its self-generated cert so I thought it was weird that the | malicious exit nodes were using it. | | Also, if someone is running a bitcoin exchange that has | port 80 open for anything more than a redirect I would not | do business with them. | swiley wrote: | You can just tell people to install the cert. | | Verizon puts an MITM proxy from Mcaffe on people's | routers (with their consent) that does this. | michaelt wrote: | They MITM connections that aren't encrypted and prevent | them from becoming so. | | Many bitcoin mixers are not HSTS preloaded. And to avoid | creating a trail, TOR Browser doesn't save frequently | visited sites, history for autocomplete, cached redirects, | or cached HSTS headers between sessions. | | And as Tor users prize secrecy, many don't bookmark their | bitcoin mixer. Instead they key in the address manually - | and sometimes they're used to doing without the | https://www. prefix. And by convention, browsers use http | when you do that. | | The exit node then removes the http-to-https redirect, and | presents the bitcoin mixer over http, with the bitcoin | addresses replaced. | | The result looks like this: https://imgur.com/otaBerJ | | No MITM of encrypted connections needed. | | It's almost impossible for the Tor project to detect this, | as the attackers only target a small whitelist of sites - | so the Tor project can only detect attackers by guessing | the sites on the attack whitelist. | Lammy wrote: | > you have not installed the malicious MITM's root cert in | your browser | | PROTIP: Your browser already comes with all the malicious | root certs a Five-Eyes-aligned attacker would ever need. | The Tor Browser uses Mozilla's Root Store if you want to go | see what's in it. To pick a random example look at | VeriSign's root, the company that runs dot-com and dot-net, | and manages dot-gov. Do you think they might be Best Fwends | with the DoD/NSA/etc? | https://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/verisign-cooperative- | agreement | | I also think it's a pretty safe bet that many many other | roots are compromised many times over even if nobody ever | willingly cooperated with anything. | vbezhenar wrote: | There's certificate transparency, it's required for all | certificates, so if any root will issue fake certificate, | you can catch and report it. So I'm not sure if that's a | pretty safe bet. | tialaramex wrote: | Logging (for Certificate Transparency) isn't a policy | requirement. In fact last time I looked, there are | (special purpose, typically in industrial settings so | their clients aren't web browsers) Intermediates under | some roots that just aren't outfitted to be capable of | logging at all. Their existence is not a policy | violation. | | Clients (most particularly, popular browsers such as | Chrome) can and do require SCTs (effectively proof the | certificate was logged) to accept a certificate, but that | just means if you issue a certificate under a trusted | root without logging it, it just won't work in such | browsers until somebody logs it. | | You can even do this intentionally, if you're Google for | example you get yourself (unlogged) certificates for | shiny-new-product.google.example and shiny-new- | product.example on Monday, and you don't need to worry | that some eagle-eyed journalist spots that in the logs | before your official product launch on Thursday evening, | live in front of millions of people. You can log the | certificate yourself minutes before launch, then attach | the SCTs and it'll work. | | [Google even got this _wrong_ once, mistakenly using a | certificate they didn 't have enough SCTs for due to a | bug. Chrome rejected these certificates and so, for a | brief period until they fixed the problem, Google's own | sites didn't work in Chrome] | | Now, that last part is technically not trivial to do | correctly (chances are your existing web dev tooling | can't do SCT stapling, or at least you'd need to go read | a bunch of instructions that you aren't going to bother | with) and so when you get a Let's Encrypt cert, or you | buy something cheap from a reseller, it is already logged | for you, the SCTs are baked inside the certificate you | get -- but that's just because there isn't a big market | for unlogged certificates, not because such certificates | can't or mustn't exist. | tialaramex wrote: | This invokes a really stupid conspiracy theory, to | achieve a very marginal goal, in a space where it would | be easy to produce evidence if it was real and yet of | course no effort is made to even look for such | evidence... | | > To pick a random example look at VeriSign's root | | But why though? Verisign is not in fact operating a | trusted CA, so that makes as much sense for an example as | looking at some root you just minted on your laptop. | | Most likely, as so often with conspiracy theorists, you | didn't stop to see if the facts line up with your | beliefs, after all "VeriSign" is named right there in a | certificate Mozilla trusts, surely that's a smoking gun | right? | | Er, no. DigiCert owns the business behind that, | collecting rights to names for a whole bunch of long | obsolete CAs. The "smoking gun" CA that has the | "VeriSign" branding is only trusted by Mozilla to sign | S/MIME email certificates, something you likely couldn't | care less about and certainly won't be using in the Tor | Browser. | | This all reminds me of what ekr said about this years | ago, the most likely explanation for why we do not see | practical attacks on security protocols like TLS is that | it's almost _always_ easier to find a weaker link | elsewhere, see the parts of this thread explaining much | simpler tricks that we know work. | Lammy wrote: | I am not any sort of conspiracy theorist and am very | offended at your insult. Why do you go online if you | aren't going to be nice to others? Intent is obviously | unknowable, but here you are doing exactly that to me. | vorpalhex wrote: | The NSA is probably not stealing your bitcoin. | fpgaminer wrote: | The concern here isn't state actors; just lowly exit node | operators looking to skeeze a buck. Check the other | comments for how it's actually done. | | More importantly, I think your fear about state actors | abusing trusted root certificates is unfounded. As soon | as a malicious cert is found, the issuing root cert will | be nuked from orbit by all the major browser vendors. | It's not a viable option for state actors, especially | when they have much better options (like the NSA tapping | Google's internal networks, for example). | makomk wrote: | Hopefully the Tor operators have improved their process for | handling this since a few years ago when the e-mail address | for contacting them about malicious exit nodes went to | someone whose email provider bounced any emails containing | the names of some of the main targets for these attacks and | who didn't seem to be able to understand the attack once you | did somehow get through to them... | geek_at wrote: | These days I mainly use tor for hidden services. It's hard to use | it for normal surfing anyways | arthurcolle wrote: | yeah captcha's are so user hostile | belorn wrote: | I use it for so many different purpose: | | 1) When I want to make sure a site doesn't get saved to my | network/client profile on search engines and content sites. | | 2) When I need to verify that something is up/down compared to | what I or a customer is seeing. | | 3) When I need to force IPv4 (tor is ipv4 only) | | 4) Hidden services. | | 5) Hotel/Airport wifi. | wolverine876 wrote: | > 5) Hotel/Airport wifi. | | Remember that Tor only routes TCP. It's not a substitute for | a VPN in many circumstances. | dotBen wrote: | Why don't you just use a VPN for this (self hosted or 3rd | party like NordVPN)? Especially given the additional risk of | tor users being attacked, which the author refers to in the | opening paragraphs of the post. | AlexAndScripts wrote: | Nord VPN is incredibly bad for a multitude of reasons. Look | for a reputable VPN, and ignore the shills. | dotBen wrote: | Just to say, I'm not a shill for NordVPN - no affiliation | with them. I was wanting to reiterate a hosted option vs | self-install and it was the first one that came to mind. | Noted they are not good! | idiotsecant wrote: | Why are they bad? | tuco86 wrote: | Sleazy marketing promises makes me dismiss them outright. | zelon88 wrote: | Stop and break that down... "Why don't you just send your | browsing history to NordVPN instead of risking using a | compromised exit node....." | vbezhenar wrote: | Exit node does not know your source IP and will only see | your connections for 10 minutes. NordVPN knows your | source IP and will see your entire connection history. | belorn wrote: | For the first usecase, the #1 problem in privacy security | is that databases get leaked at some point in the future. | Some VPN's has been caught logging way to much, and then | either having to disclose it or have it leaked. Three hops | with with no logs with my name and banking information, and | only a gate node that has an ip address is fine enough for | privacy sensitive visits to regular (legal) websites. | | For 2), Tor browser is a single executable that I can just | start and run on any computer, even through a remote | control if I want to very the network through a customers | own computer. No credentials, no payments, no waiting. | | Don't know enough about nordvpn for 3). | | 4) Hidden services is tor only. | | 5) Nordvpn would work fine for that. | | Different security threat need different security measures. | The biggest risk to my own security is not that someone | mitm my tor connection because I do not use tor for | services which I have an account with, and would never do | banking on a tor connection. My bank can more or less find | what my network is anyway by looking at my transaction and | which of those is an ISP. Leaks from companies however | seems so common that one get posted here on HN every month, | and haveibeenpawned feel more relevant today than | antivirus. ___________________________________________________________________ (page generated 2021-05-10 23:00 UTC)