[HN Gopher] Minimum Viable Secure Product
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       Minimum Viable Secure Product
        
       Author : arraypad
       Score  : 36 points
       Date   : 2021-11-03 21:18 UTC (1 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (mvsp.dev)
 (TXT) w3m dump (mvsp.dev)
        
       | ChrisMarshallNY wrote:
       | That's a great idea!
       | 
       | I hope that the idea takes hold.
        
       | lmeyerov wrote:
       | I dislike any compliance document that requires paid & external
       | vendors, so would love to see that factored out
       | 
       | SOC I vs SOC II helps get at these kinds of distinctions in
       | practice. I've seen a lot of conversations enabled by that. "We
       | did the SOC I software checklist. At some point, we'll pay
       | vendors $50K-250K for SOC II, feel free to fast track that now as
       | part of our contract."
       | 
       | I get why it's there, but this kind of thing is also why, despite
       | being designed to address a real need, initiatives like FedRAMP
       | have been slow & expensive disasters in practice. We should be
       | pushing to self-serve & automated accreditation, and all the way
       | to 1 person projects. Anything that puts third parties, people,
       | and $$$ in the critical path needs to be split out.
        
         | wly_cdgr wrote:
         | I get why it's there, but then I also get why the guy who runs
         | my corner store gives Jimmy a $200 interest-free loan every
         | Thursday
        
         | Kalium wrote:
         | If you have a way to automatically handle all the auditing that
         | goes into evaluating all the not-strictly-technical controls
         | that are part of SOC and PCI-DSS and similar, a _lot_ of people
         | will be very interested.
         | 
         | Based on this list, how would you automatically validate that
         | vulnerability reports are handled in a reasonable timeframe?
         | How would you do self-serve validation for incident handling
         | timelines? How do you quickly and easily automate assessments
         | of subprocessor data handling?
         | 
         | Quick, easy, strong, self-service, automated accreditation is a
         | wonderful goal! It's critically important to make this stuff as
         | easy as possible because there are features to ship and
         | customer needs to meet. Security must be a baseline for
         | _everyone_ , and achievable by everyone, or else it's just a
         | way for big companies to squeeze out small ones It just might
         | be worth considering carefully that there may be systems at
         | hand that blend humans and computers. It may perhaps be
         | possible that information security could be more than just an
         | engineering problem.
         | 
         | If I may propose a different framing? Information security is
         | primarily a human endeavor. It is mostly about how humans and
         | systems made of humans behave. Information security is about
         | _process_. Some parts of it can be partially handled by
         | computers, but most of it is deeply not susceptible to
         | automation.
        
       | aetherspawn wrote:
       | Your page ( https://mvsp.dev/mvsp.en/index.html ) is broken on
       | small screens ie 13-inch laptops. This is because of the use of
       | padding and width: 100% at the same time. You need to remove
       | .w-full from the styles in your content.
       | 
       | Edit: I have opened a quick PR.
        
       | killerpopiller wrote:
       | how would the list differ for B2C users?
        
       | Zababa wrote:
       | Maybe a way to help that would be to see if a library/framework
       | is compliant. For example, Dream in OCaml automatically adds CSRF
       | tokens to your forms https://aantron.github.io/dream/#forms (I
       | took that example since OWASP compliance is one of the big points
       | and it's not well known, I don't want to start a framework war
       | here. Since there are constantly new developers, I think it would
       | help to talk more and show more security best practices.
        
         | Kalium wrote:
         | I think one of the key lessons here is that a framework
         | fundamentally _cannot_ be compliant. Too much of what is
         | required is simply beyond what any framework can deliver and a
         | matter of human-based process.
        
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       (page generated 2021-11-03 23:00 UTC)