[HN Gopher] Is "KAX17" performing de-anonymization Attacks again...
       ___________________________________________________________________
        
       Is "KAX17" performing de-anonymization Attacks against Tor Users?
        
       Author : Tomte
       Score  : 168 points
       Date   : 2021-12-06 18:30 UTC (4 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (nusenu.medium.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (nusenu.medium.com)
        
       | amatecha wrote:
       | Lightweight frontend alternative: https://scribe.rip/is-
       | kax17-performing-de-anonymization-atta...
        
         | nabakin wrote:
         | Front ends are getting more common around here. I like this
         | change. If they reach mainstream, maybe websites will finally
         | become more responsive
        
       | jerheinze wrote:
       | Instead of messing with your path selection a better strategy
       | would be just run your own guard nodes that you trust (a guard
       | node is the first node that you connect to in a Tor circuit) and
       | to stick with them. Remember, de-anonymization attacks require
       | the attacker to control both the guard node and the exit node at
       | the same time.
        
         | pstrateman wrote:
         | That only works if the attacker doesn't know the guard node is
         | you.
         | 
         | If they do all you've done is made the middle mode the guard.
        
           | jerheinze wrote:
           | > That only works if the attacker doesn't know the guard node
           | is you.
           | 
           | That's not how Tor nodes work. Once you setup a guard node
           | (and it got enough reputation) you won't be the only person
           | using the guard node. Also de-anonymization attacks require
           | you to know the traffic coming to the guard node (and if you
           | run a trustworthy one yourself and you're not dealing with a
           | global passive adversary then there's no way the attacker
           | will be able to see the incoming traffic to the guard node).
        
         | VWWHFSfQ wrote:
         | Running your own node and "sticking with it" is not a great
         | idea especially if you're the only one using it. You will be
         | spotted and identified pretty much instantly
        
           | jerheinze wrote:
           | > especially if you're the only one using it
           | 
           | That's not how Tor nodes work. Once you setup a guard node
           | (and it got enough reputation) you will NOT be the only
           | person using it.
        
             | yardstick wrote:
             | > > just run your own guard node that you trust
             | 
             | I guess this approach works fine for an individual, but if
             | everyone has to run their own guard node to be safe, why
             | would anyone connect to your guard node (given it would be
             | risky from their perspective since they aren't running it
             | themselves).
             | 
             | In other words, if you accept you can't trust anyone else,
             | why would anyone else trust your node too?
             | 
             | (Edit: Sorry I'm wording it poorly but I hope you get the
             | idea)
        
               | jerheinze wrote:
               | The overwhelming majority of people don't customize their
               | path selection in Tor, so you will always get traffic to
               | your new guard node.
        
               | p_j_w wrote:
               | I think what GP was getting at is that your solution is
               | not a global one. Not everyone can employ it.
        
         | int0x2e wrote:
         | If you want your guard node to be helpful in anonymizing your
         | traffic, you should really make sure it's public and used by
         | some % of the global user base (so that your traffic blends in
         | the noise). Once you do that though, you will always have to
         | trust that node a little less than you could if it was walled-
         | off so it would only serve you, just because it is another
         | machine serving connections on the internet that will likely be
         | targeted by adversaries who would benefit from turning many of
         | the guard nodes into part of their Tor de-anonymization
         | service.
         | 
         | If I had endless resources and was truly paranoid, what I'd do
         | is build my set of public guard nodes, make sure they're
         | serving Tor traffic, etc. But then, I'd "borrow" those IPs
         | occasionally for trusted nodes which will only accept
         | connections from me (ideally both sets of machines will be live
         | and routing traffic simultaneously).
         | 
         | In theory, you could apply the same tricks with similar success
         | to exit nodes of course (though as usual, running an exit node
         | is generally a slightly riskier / harder thing to do)
        
       | kingcharles wrote:
       | What was the email address they were using?
        
       | fdhfdjkfhdkj wrote:
       | This author going to either get recruited by or murdered by this
       | malicious actor
        
       | hereforphone wrote:
       | Question from someone outside the Tor loop: how do they know that
       | these various nodes are correlated with one another / belong to
       | the same entity?
        
         | mmastrac wrote:
         | It's not specified, but related to the software they are
         | running:
         | 
         | "In autumn 2019 I stumbled on something odd: Tor relays doing
         | something that the official tor software is unable to do." [1]
         | 
         | [1] https://nusenu.medium.com/the-growing-problem-of-
         | malicious-r...
        
         | rsync wrote:
         | "... how do they know that these various nodes are correlated
         | with one another ..."
         | 
         | The OP alludes to this:
         | 
         | "... and the fact that someone runs such a large network
         | fraction of relays "doing things" that ordinary relays can not
         | do (intentionally vague), is enough to ring all kinds of alarm
         | bells."
         | 
         | ... and the OP is "intentionally vague".
         | 
         | I, also, am very interested to know how they correlated them
         | and what the interesting behavior was that they exhibited ...
        
         | password4321 wrote:
         | In very small part:
         | 
         | > _Some of KAX17 's relays initially had used that email
         | address in their ContactInfo but soon after these relays were
         | setup the email address got removed from their configuration._
        
         | qeternity wrote:
         | Nice try, KAX17
        
       | tn890 wrote:
       | Surprised to see a quality post on Medium. I'd be interested to
       | know why the author chose Medium?
        
         | drugones wrote:
         | Medium was good when it started, then got overhauled by low
         | quality; you can still find good content here and there.
        
       | tantalor wrote:
       | Weird how this article has a "hashtag" but its not a link, so its
       | not actually a hashtag.
       | 
       | Medium actually has a "tag" feature, but this ain't it:
       | https://medium.com/tag/KAX17 (404 Page Not Found)
        
         | sp332 wrote:
         | Twitter users started using hashtags well before the Twitter
         | platform automatically turned them into links. The important
         | part of a hashtag is the syntactic # and not the HTML <a> tag.
        
           | wlesieutre wrote:
           | That's useful if you can do exact text searches, which are
           | increasingly not supported
        
         | russh wrote:
         | Of course, it's Medium.com policy never to imply ownership in
         | the event of a hashtag. We have to use the indefinite article,
         | "a hashtag," never ... your hashtag.
        
           | analognoise wrote:
           | https://youtu.be/GfqEBVFHnTg
        
           | [deleted]
        
       | saurik wrote:
       | FWIW, as much as people love to rag on cryptocurrencies, I feel
       | like this is where they shine. ( _Of course_ --as someone like me
       | always shows up--I work on Orchid, a cryptocurrency market for
       | bandwidth that is intended to support various use cases including
       | those similar to Tor.)
       | 
       | The issue is that no one entity should be able to just sit around
       | and dominate the directory of nodes by claiming "I'm a million
       | nodes, wheee!!!", and so that needs to be "expensive". However,
       | for it to be expensive, they also need a way to make money
       | running the nodes.
       | 
       | In our case, people have to lock some money up in a shared pile
       | in order to gain control over percentages of the directory, and
       | what you get in return is that you randomly will get people using
       | you to relay their traffic, for which they will pay you fees
       | (likely close to cost).
       | 
       | (Essentially, instead of Tor's mechanism where, when you want to
       | find a relay node, you randomly select between all entries with
       | equal weight, you would select between market participants
       | linearly weighted by the amount of money they have locked up in
       | the directory.)
       | 
       | And that's really what most of these cryptocurrencies are doing
       | in this generation of new decentralized protocols (which I've
       | seen people hate on): dealing with the reality that there are bad
       | actors and not everyone is going to run the software without evil
       | changes.
       | 
       | This is also the core of Ethereum: you want a decentralized
       | database capable of transactions? OK, well, the order of
       | operations matters (as transactions can preclude the ability for
       | later incompatible ones) and so we need to limit the influence
       | that any one operator has...
       | 
       | ...so you build a system where nodes have to spend something--
       | either doing some silly math constantly (proof of work) or
       | locking some money up in a pile (proof of stake)--to gain control
       | over percentages of the directory, and in return they get to
       | charge fees to commit transactions.
       | 
       | (There is additionally often an inflation-based block-rewards
       | component, in the case where no one is paying fees. I'm honestly
       | not for these and have a way-too-complex-for-here argument for
       | why they might even be "evil" in most cases, but that's kind of
       | irrelevant anyway.)
       | 
       | The reality is that, if you want to build a decentralized system,
       | and you want to figure out how to make it hard for bad people to
       | do bad things, you have to raise the cost of doing said bad
       | things; but, to do that will require programmable money...
       | leading you to crypto.
        
         | NikolaNovak wrote:
         | >>"The issue is that no one entity should be able to just sit
         | around and dominate the directory of nodes by claiming "I'm a
         | million nodes, wheee!!!", and so that needs to be "expensive".
         | However, for it to be expensive, they also need a way to make
         | money running the nodes. "
         | 
         | I always feel either I'm stupid or I'm missing something when
         | it comes to crypto, Because I understand words and I feel I
         | understand concepts but I don't understand linkages others take
         | for granted, as it pertains to problem at hand of anonymous
         | communication.
         | 
         | If nodes are expensive, doesn't nsa have more money than any
         | given privacy focused individual or organizing?
         | 
         | If they make money how is it expensive in a useful way
         | 
         | I genuinely don't understand how that solution solves a
         | problem, unless they problem is "we need another way to
         | transfer money (ideally to ourselves and early adopters from
         | late adopters)."
        
           | saurik wrote:
           | > If nodes are expensive, doesn't nsa have more money than
           | any given privacy focused individual or organizing?
           | 
           | So, two things are going on here.
           | 
           | The first is that I doubt KAX17 is the NSA... they might not
           | even be a government! Most systems people build that rely on
           | altruism are so easily attacked that a grad student can take
           | control of them using resources at a University. I appreciate
           | that the bar to prevent the NSA (or the CCP, or whatever
           | other government surveillance network you are most concerned
           | about) taking over your network is high, but the bar right
           | now is just _so low_ for most of these protocols that it
           | should be embarrassing. If the NSA were really the only
           | problem for Tor, I 'd call that "a wild success".
           | 
           | The second, though, is that the goal should be to get big
           | enough that the NSA would actually have a hard time
           | dominating the resources of the pool. This requires being
           | pretty large, but isn't insanely impossible. Let's look at
           | Bitcoin for a moment: I am one of the first people to agree
           | that "proof of work is probably an immoral way to solve this
           | problem" (due to the externalized environmental effects of
           | electricity usage and the such), but damn if it isn't
           | effective, right? Bitcoin uses 0.5% of the world's
           | electricity. That means to take control of half the Bitcoin
           | network the NSA would have to build out the infrastructure
           | for buying an equivalent amount of the world's electricity
           | usage... I bet that's hard, even for them.
        
         | AlexanderTheGr8 wrote:
         | > The reality is that, if you want to build a decentralized
         | system, and you want to figure out how to make it hard for bad
         | people to do bad things, you have to raise the cost of doing
         | said bad things; but, to do that will require programmable
         | money... leading you to crypto.
         | 
         | So to create a decentralized system like crypto, you need
         | crypto (as programmable money)?
         | 
         | Also, can you elaborate on locking money in a pile? Do people
         | lock money as the currency? How does it demotivate people
         | (whose money is locked) to do bad things?
        
         | hnarn wrote:
         | The adversaries mentioned in the article are highly
         | sophisticated and seem to have access to a great amount of
         | resources. They may be, and some would probably say they likely
         | are, working for nation states.
         | 
         | Given a situation where your adversary is a nation state, how
         | does crypto fix anything? How is crypto not in the end just
         | "proof-of-resources"? Nation state wins.
         | 
         | The article touches on trust models and personally I think it
         | would be a better solution to introduce some kind of manual
         | trust into the routing. If there's one thing Tor does not need,
         | it's crypto-"currencies".
        
           | saurik wrote:
           | I just-about-concurrently to you asking this question
           | answered a similar question someone else had posed already
           | (using the NSA as their specific example) here:
           | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29466855 .
        
       ___________________________________________________________________
       (page generated 2021-12-06 23:00 UTC)