[HN Gopher] Microtargeting as Information Warfare [pdf]
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       Microtargeting as Information Warfare [pdf]
        
       Author : donohoe
       Score  : 48 points
       Date   : 2022-01-11 20:00 UTC (3 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (cyberdefensereview.army.mil)
 (TXT) w3m dump (cyberdefensereview.army.mil)
        
       | amriksohata wrote:
       | I found I was being targetted with a lot of pro Pakistani
       | propoganda on tiktok. I am Indian and the Pakistan is friendly
       | with a big neighbour.
        
       | the_optimist wrote:
       | Turns out the military is solidly 20-25 years behind the
       | cypherpunks and the EFF, and the failure to set the stage at a
       | higher level has lead to ready exploits.
        
       | kraemate wrote:
       | So, are people who work for microtargeting platforms (FB etc) war
       | criminals?
        
         | [deleted]
        
         | philprx wrote:
         | I think the intelligence work referred here is not within the
         | scope of war as defined in war criminal.
         | 
         | But it could be collaborator to foreign intelligence, or agent
         | for foreign intelligence, which already is punishable. Now the
         | knowingly or unknowingly factor is important usually is
         | qualifying these crimes.
        
       | troelsSteegin wrote:
       | "The Department of Defense must place greater emphasis on
       | defending servicemembers' digital privacy as a national security
       | risk."
       | 
       | What stood out for me was: "The objective of surveillance
       | capitalism-enabled advertising and information warfare is the
       | same: to influence an individual's behavior change in support of
       | someone else's goals."
        
         | JacobThreeThree wrote:
        
       | uniqueuid wrote:
       | Sure, microtargeting could be potent.
       | 
       | But its effectiveness depends so much on the message, we could be
       | calling anything information warfare.
       | 
       | I feel that the automated, microtargeting part is often over-
       | estimated. We are routinely exposed to a huge range of content
       | and are pretty resilient, the delivery doesn't radically change
       | that [1].
       | 
       | [1] An exception are new media such as radio and TV in their
       | infancy and perhaps Facebook for elderly people today - see the
       | paper from Andy Guess, Josh Tucker etc.:
       | https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aau4586
        
         | wolverine876 wrote:
         | > We are routinely exposed to a huge range of content and are
         | pretty resilient, the delivery doesn't radically change that
         | 
         | Microtargenting has never happened before; that's an enormous
         | change. Regarding our resiliancy, the results in our society
         | seem opposite your optimistic prediction.
        
         | didericis wrote:
         | Agreed. And the dangers of over regulating information exposure
         | are pretty severe. The whole point of free and open society is
         | to avoid over reliance on a central authority and allow for
         | emergent authority. Having a DoD regulatory program determining
         | what is and isn't information warfare seems infinitely worse
         | than targeted advertising.
         | 
         | One little talked about counter strategy is just giving those
         | same people targeted ads with better information. If you need
         | to prevent certain messages from reaching certain people
         | entirely and can't counter them maybe that means they have some
         | validity that needs to be addressed to make counter messaging
         | viable. Jumping straight to regulation rather than a change in
         | counter messaging is a huge red flag that reflects poorly on
         | the level of humility and need for introspection I think is
         | needed to prevent these kinds of problems without making things
         | worse.
        
         | jchrisa wrote:
         | I ran this game on the local political establishment in 2015,
         | and it was scary effective. I assume they are more resilient
         | today, but at the time entry-level social media advertising
         | techniques were able to have a massive influence on
         | politician's perceptions of their constituents's concerns. I
         | wasn't surprised at all by the impact social advertising ended
         | up having in the 2016 election.
        
         | pohl wrote:
         | _But its effectiveness depends so much on the message_
         | 
         | I think it's best to think of this as _messages_ (plural) when
         | talking about microtargeting. Everybody could get a different
         | message but, in aggregate, the set of (Target, Message) tuples
         | could add up to moving the needle towards some desired outcome
         | (for elections, in particular: activating some voters,
         | discouraging others).
         | 
         | For example, we might look at the infamous pre-election 2016
         | meme that cited the fake "Crime Statistics Bureau - San
         | Francisco" and think it's not an effective message because it's
         | so easily disproven. But the real question is whether or not
         | it's an effective message for the subset at which it was aimed.
         | 
         | A better phrasing might be "its effectiveness depends so much
         | on the messages in aggregate," maybe.
        
         | eurasiantiger wrote:
         | If it is as you say, how come Trump became president?
        
       | harrybr wrote:
       | Also see Christopher Wylie's book "Mindfuck".
       | 
       | 2018 interview with the author here:
       | https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistl...
        
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