[HN Gopher] Over 20k servers have their iLO interfaces exposed t...
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       Over 20k servers have their iLO interfaces exposed to the internet
        
       Author : caaqil
       Score  : 85 points
       Date   : 2022-01-28 18:28 UTC (4 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (isc.sans.edu)
 (TXT) w3m dump (isc.sans.edu)
        
       | johnklos wrote:
       | I reported a security issue in Supermicro's IPMI implementation
       | to them. They dismissed the issue and never fixed it.
       | 
       | These companies don't care if there's no way to stop a remote
       | control service (iLo, iDRAC, IPMI) from binding to a motherboard
       | ethernet port. In the case of Supermicro, you can't configure via
       | the built-in BIOS, there are no jumpers you can use, and you must
       | have a full network setup and installed tools to configure a new
       | machine. This makes deploying in the field much, much more
       | problematic.
       | 
       | If the BIOS battery dies and settings set are lost, the
       | motherboard defaults to joining whichever ethernet is active,
       | with default credentials. It's incredibly stupid and insecure.
       | 
       | I will never buy Supermicro again, but for the hardware that was
       | already bought, I mandated loopback plugs for all IPMI ports so
       | the IPMI wouldn't switch to the system ethernet.
        
         | zamadatix wrote:
         | Supermicro switched to unique default passwords (same as
         | Dell/HPE) a few years back. Silly to not have day one but
         | really when you look at any of these they are all a security
         | nightmare.
        
         | stingraycharles wrote:
         | Honest question: do people actually connect their ipmi / bmc to
         | the public internet? Or is it something different that's being
         | exposed here?
        
       | mirceal wrote:
       | if you want to be really scared read:
       | 
       | http://fish2.com/ipmi/itrain.pdf
       | 
       | all servers in a datacenter have this management interface (iLO
       | is just one type).
       | 
       | if the management network these sit on is poorly secured (like
       | here) your servers are literally powned.
        
       | danpalmer wrote:
       | BMCs are slightly different I think (more powerful!) but at my
       | previous workplace we once had a server provided to us by our
       | hosting provider that had its BMC exposed on the internet with
       | default credentials. They never told us the machine even had one
       | (most of our servers from them didn't). We only figured it out
       | once we found a Monero miner on the machine.
       | 
       | People on here love promoting dedicated servers over cloud VMs,
       | but it's so much easier for this sort of thing to go wrong with
       | dedicated hosting.
        
         | vel0city wrote:
         | Integrated Lights-Out (iLO) is the HP flavor of baseboard
         | management controller (BMC) platform. Dell calls theirs Dell
         | Remote Access Controller (DRAC), other vendors have their own
         | branding. They all do more or less the same thing.
        
         | mirceal wrote:
         | BMC is the hardware, iLO is the interface. you can also have
         | other types of interfaces but in the end it's still a BMC.
         | 
         | a chip that sits on the southbridge of the server and has
         | management capabilities (power operations and access to the
         | underlying os being the 2 big ones).
        
         | throwawayboise wrote:
         | The latest generations of servers ship with randomized BMC
         | passwords. This was indeed a problem in the past when they
         | shipped with credientials such as ADMIN / ADMIN or no password
         | at all.
        
           | dnautics wrote:
           | "Latest generation" = last 2 years. Three years ago I was
           | buying SMC servers which were the first round configured with
           | randomized passwords to comply with CA law (some batches had
           | ADMIN/ADMIN) and gigabyte servers still were out of
           | compliance.
        
             | dijit wrote:
             | I bought my last batch of Dell machines in 2017 (so, 5
             | years? wow), and they had randomised passwords.
             | 
             | But yes, some providers put the BMC on the internet because
             | it's easier, a provider I used once did this and I was
             | quite displeased as iDRAC's are quite weak and suffer under
             | the weight of bot-spam. -- even if there were no security
             | issues.
        
       | GekkePrutser wrote:
       | This is actually really much lower than I expected..
       | 
       | Though what helps is that most servers have a dedicated iLO
       | interface and you really have to choose to configure it on the
       | regular ones along with normal traffic. So out of band is
       | default.
       | 
       | So in this case it's only people who have deliberately configured
       | this. I think this is why it's not hundreds of thousands.
        
         | madjam002 wrote:
         | I've only dabbled with iLO but even when operating on the same
         | interface I'm not sure how this gets onto the internet? From
         | what I remember you configure it with a static IP, so these
         | people surely are configuring their iLO to listen on a publicly
         | routable IP?
        
           | GekkePrutser wrote:
           | Yeah if your server is DMZ they could have configured it with
           | another ip in the same range.. I guess it's something like
           | that.
           | 
           | Some of them could also be intentional, in order to provide
           | management capabilities.
           | 
           | At least iLO has no default password (each server comes with
           | a label with the password)
        
         | wongarsu wrote:
         | We once (~2 years ago) had an Asus server with their BMC, which
         | is much easier to expose: while it has a dedicated physical
         | interface by default it is also exposed on the first LAN port
         | and configured to use DHCP. I can easily see how those boards
         | leave you accidentally exposed in a colocation setup. But I'm
         | still struggling to come up with a way to accidentally expose
         | that on the internet. Public IPv4 isn't usually handed out via
         | DHCP.
         | 
         | My best guess is that the vast majority of these 20k servers
         | have their management interface deliberately exposed. Only
         | takes 2000 people with 10 servers each to think this is a good
         | idea.
        
         | assttoasstmgr wrote:
         | Not sure I agree with you 100% on your police work there, Lou.
         | 
         | I worked with a good number of SuperMicro servers that - to my
         | surprise - the IPMI interface was by default set to "fail over
         | to bridge to primary interface". That is to say if the IPMI
         | port was disconnected, it would bridge onto your primary NIC
         | with a second MAC address. The way to disable it was to
         | download an obscure utility from SuperMicro's website, which
         | only ran under Windows, and to pass an equally obscure
         | hexadecimal command line flag.
         | 
         | Fortunately in my case, these ran on a network with no DHCP
         | server, but I can't assume that's true in every case.
        
           | throwawayboise wrote:
           | Yes SuperMicro machines are configured that way. Some don't
           | even have a dedicated separate IPMI interface.
        
             | dnautics wrote:
             | Yeah those supermicros scared the bejeezus out of me when I
             | saw them in the catalog. I mean, yeah, you _can_ configure
             | the switch to listen onto different vlan ids, but what if
             | something weird happens and that stateful information is
             | lost or corrupted?
        
           | GekkePrutser wrote:
           | iLO as the remote management tech from HP doesn't do that
           | though, at least not on any of the servers I've seen.
           | 
           | IPMI is a very different thing.
        
         | trebligdivad wrote:
         | Note that the search was only for HP iLO's; not everyone elses
         | model.
        
           | GekkePrutser wrote:
           | Yeah I got that. Other brands don't actually have iLO as it's
           | an HP trademark.
        
       | ggm wrote:
       | I love how iDrac shipped with a password everyone knows. I would
       | have thought it was trivial to make it a 1-time passthrough to
       | change it, to stop this being the cartoon character we know and
       | love.
        
       | gengelbro wrote:
       | I've had the bad fortune of dealing with iLO in the past. There's
       | absolutely nothing surprising to me that it would be remotely
       | exploitable, as well as default remote accessible.
        
       | cma wrote:
       | Some could be honeypots
        
         | dlsa wrote:
         | Likely a lot more aren't. Having tripwires is still a good idea
         | though.
        
       | serverCurios wrote:
       | That was a great deep dive in to iLO. I wonder how much of that
       | would apply to Dell's iDRAC?
        
       | cesaref wrote:
       | The older iLO2 and 3 were from the Gen7/8 HP rack mount servers,
       | which were released around 2013 or something like that. I'd have
       | thought that the majority of commercial uses have long passed, so
       | I was wondering if these generation of machines are really being
       | used for home labs, that sort of thing, as they are passed their
       | use by date (I think the gen7 machines were EOSL'd in 2018 so
       | they'll have been chucked out of datacentres).
       | 
       | Actually, I can imagine a fair few are still in use as small
       | enterprise servers, with iLO being visible for remote admin,
       | which is a shame, as that suggests they are not behind a tunnel,
       | so those addresses probably indicate larger problems than a
       | visible iLO.
        
         | jabart wrote:
         | iLO2 is G6 iLO3 is G7 iLO4 is G8
         | 
         | Walking around a DC, no they have not been "chucked out of
         | datacenters"
        
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       (page generated 2022-01-28 23:00 UTC)