[HN Gopher] Neural nets are not "slightly conscious," and AI PR ...
___________________________________________________________________
Neural nets are not "slightly conscious," and AI PR can do with
less hype
Author : andreyk
Score : 96 points
Date : 2022-02-20 20:16 UTC (2 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (lastweekin.ai)
(TXT) w3m dump (lastweekin.ai)
| andygroundwater wrote:
| It's stretching credulity beyond the usual exaggerated hype
| associated with AI. What we have now is semi-OK forecasting at
| scale, nothing more. We (as in the researches, platform and
| technology) can get a system to select what looks to be a valid
| response to a host of stimuli, e.g., chess moves, patient
| diagnostics, vehicle driving etc.
|
| None of this "thinks for itself", nor is it remotely near to such
| levels of conscious self-awareness. I'm sick of this hype, it's
| been going on since the 1905's with hucksters promising robot
| household domestics, and all sorts of kooky weirdness that was
| swallowed up by the popular media.
| csee wrote:
| The people who say it might be slightly conscious are just
| appealing to a functional, substrate-independent requirement
| for consciousness. I happen to agree with them that it's
| feasible and plausible.
|
| Let me ask you. If we invented an AGI that was as smart as us
| based on much larger nets (perhaps with one or two algorithmic
| tweaks on current approaches) trained on much more data,
| running on commodity hardware, would it be conscious? If yes,
| why can't our current nets be slightly conscious?
| new_guy wrote:
| 'slightly conscious' is just word salad, it doesn't actually
| mean _anything_.
| csee wrote:
| I am slightly conscious when I am extremely drunk and can
| barely think and feel, but yet still have some modicum of
| conscious experience. That's what it means.
|
| If you don't agree that consciousness exists on a spectrum,
| and instead think that something is either conscious or
| not, then simply replace the words 'slightly conscious'
| with 'conscious'.
| tedunangst wrote:
| But why would I want to put an extremely drunk computer
| in charge of making decisions?
| csee wrote:
| I was attempting to give an example of what a 'slightly
| conscious' state is to show that it isn't completely
| incoherent. Admittedly it was far from rigorous.
| bondarchuk wrote:
| You could say the same about "conscious" in general.
| There's not a single coherent definition of the word, not
| even in academic debates.
| Animats wrote:
| Maybe we should just say "Shut up and program", similar
| to how some physicists say, "Shut up and calculate", when
| the philosophical wrangling gets out of hand. Copenhagen
| interpretation vs. many-worlds? Does it matter? Is there
| any way to find out? If not, back to work.
|
| My comment on this for several decades has been that we
| don't know enough to address consciousness. We need to
| get common sense right first. Common sense, in this
| context, is getting through the next 30 seconds without
| screwing up. Automatic driving is the most active area
| there. Robot manipulation in unstructured environments is
| a closely related problem. Neither works well yet. Large
| neural nets are not particularly good at either of these
| problems.
|
| We're missing something important. Something that all the
| mammals have. People have been arguing whether animals
| have consciousness for a long time, at least back to
| Aristotle. Few people claim that animals don't have some
| degree of common sense. It's essential to survival. Yet
| AI is terrible at implementing common sense. This is a
| big problem.
| YeGoblynQueenne wrote:
| Indeed, common sense is one of the foundational problems
| of the field. This is John McCarthy, in 1959, fresh out
| of the Dartmouth workshop:
|
| _Programs with common sense_
|
| _Interesting work is being done in programming computers
| to solve problems which require a high degree of
| intelligence in humans. However, certain elementary
| verbal reasoning processes so simple that they can be
| carried out by any non-feeble minded human have yet to be
| simulated by machine programs._
|
| http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/mcc59/mcc59.pdf
|
| Again, that's 1959. Ouch.
|
| I wonder, who started talking about consciousness in
| machines? Turing talked of "thinking", McCarthy of common
| sense, lots of people of "intelligence", Drew McDermot of
| stupidity, even, but who was the first to broach the
| subject of "consciousness" in machines?
| csee wrote:
| There isn't, but the response to this lack of definition
| shouldn't be to simply terminate the discussion.
|
| We know it's probably a real thing because we experience
| it, and it's an extremely important open question whether
| an AGI on hardware will have "it" too.
|
| The answer to the question will have large ethical
| implications a few decades into the future. If they can
| suffer just like animals can, we really need to know that
| so we don't accidentally create a large amount of
| suffering. If they can't suffer, just like rocks probably
| can't, this doesn't have to be a concern of ours.
| grumbel wrote:
| The response to the lack of definition should be
| investigation into how that definition could look like,
| not arguing if we or something else has it or not.
| Without a definition and criteria to test you're never
| going to make progress.
| csee wrote:
| Philosophers have been trying for decades to define it
| rigorously and have failed decisively. It really looks
| intractable at the moment. Given we are in this quagmire,
| I think it is ok to explore/discuss a bit further despite
| the shaky foundations of only having fuzzy definitions of
| "qualia" or "consciousness" to rely on.
| mannykannot wrote:
| Quite a lot of the philosophical debate has been tied up
| in the effort to show that minds cannot be the result of
| purely physical processes or will never be explained as
| such, which does not tell us anything about what they
| are.
|
| We are not going to be able to say with any great
| precision what we are trying to say with the word
| 'consciousness' until we have more information. In lieu
| of that, what we can do is say what phenomena seem to be
| in need of explanations before we can compile a
| definition.
|
| At this point, opinions that human-level consciousness is
| either just more of what has been done so far, or cannot
| possibly be just that, are just opinions.
| sesm wrote:
| Which probably means that someone with "chief scientist"
| title shouldn't be using it when making public claims. Of
| course, he can do it for his own profit, but he is
| ruining the credibility of his research field, that's why
| people working in this field object to it.
| oneoff786 wrote:
| There's no evidence that neural nets can form an AGI so it's
| a moot point. The AGI is an I'll defined inflection point.
| Galaxeblaffer wrote:
| I'd consider brains and other biological neutral systems as
| neutral nets. So to me there's pretty convincing evidence
| that neutral nets can form an AGI
| oneoff786 wrote:
| Well you shouldn't. They are not the same. Brains are not
| (ML) neural networks. Neural networks are just a
| mathematical approximation of one part of how the mind
| works
| defenestration wrote:
| You can argue that consciousness has an important role in
| evolution. That creatures which are aware of their own existence
| have a greater chance of reproduction and survival. What if we
| create an AI and give it the goal of maximum reproduction, would
| it be more effective if it can 'think' about itself?
| Veedrac wrote:
| So this article does not actually defend its claim, it just gets
| mad that some AI researcher expressed their opinion, makes an
| unsourced (albeit probably correct) claim that the criticized
| opinion is a minority position, and wishes really strongly that
| people would be less excited about this thing that they are not
| as excited about.
|
| Meanwhile in academic philosophy, it's totally OK to conjecture
| that, say, subatomic particles are 'slightly conscious' and
| nobody tries to tell them that they are not allowed to have an
| opinion.
|
| Here's a hint, if you want to refute an idea, refute the actual
| idea, don't just tell the person in so many words that they don't
| have the social status to say it. Yes this post wound me up a
| bit, how could you tell?
| abeppu wrote:
| You're asking for a refutation, and ordinarily that's a good
| thing to aim for, but in this case was the original claim clear
| enough to be refuted? I think we don't even have a good
| definition for consciousness and we certainly don't have
| agreement over what would constitute evidence for it from the
| view of an outside observer, and the original claim doesn't
| attempt to provide any evidence, and so doesn't even imply an
| epistemic position. How can one refute something which is so
| vague?
| jstx1 wrote:
| > Here's a hint, if you want to refute an idea, refute the
| actual idea,
|
| Science doesn't work that way -
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability
| melony wrote:
| The difference is that claiming consciousness may kill the
| entire field of ML research when non-experts decide to wade in
| and start lobbying for regulation. You don't want misguided
| groups like PETA meddling with regulating neural network
| research. FAANG won't be affected much either way but your
| average university will.
| andreyk wrote:
| hmm, I am not sure this is a fair assessment, the portion on
| "Experts largely agree that current forms of AI are not
| conscious, in any sense of the word. " provides sources and a
| brief argument. Sure it's not a super long defense of the
| stance, but then again this is mostly an overview of what
| happened with all this twitter drama and not a full argument
| about this topic.
|
| Also, it outright states "Granted, the claim could also be
| reasonable, if a particular definition of consciousness was
| specified as well."
| andai wrote:
| Do we even have a consensus on which animals are conscious?
| burrows wrote:
| Do you believe it makes sense to even claim that other
| humans are conscious?
|
| If conscious is defined as "to have subjective
| experiences", then I don't believe "other people are
| conscious" is coherent.
|
| The argument I hear usually is that other bodies are
| constructed like my body and I'm conscious therefore they
| are probably conscious too.
|
| But I think this completely misses the point. The issue is
| the proposition itself. How can that proposition be
| translated into empirical claims? If the answer is just
| that other bodies are like my body, then conscious is just
| a fancy synonym of "is a human being".
| danaris wrote:
| It is possible to define an upper boundary for "this is not
| conscious" and a lower boundary for "this _is_ conscious "
| with grey area in between them.
|
| Thus, even if we cannot clearly state for any given animal
| whether it is or is not conscious, we can still clearly
| state that, say, a coffee maker is not conscious, even if
| it has rudimentary processing capability, or that a person
| _is_.
|
| As I implied in another comment[0], I believe it would be
| both possible and valuable to construct a set of conditions
| that we collectively feel are _necessary_ , if not
| _sufficient_ , to define consciousness. That way, we could
| at least rule it out as long as no AI meets those minimum
| standards.
|
| [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30409569
| jeffparsons wrote:
| > "Experts largely agree that current forms of AI are not
| conscious, in any sense of the word."
|
| Experts in what? There _are_ no experts in consciousness, at
| least in the lay sense.
| mcherm wrote:
| Experts in AI.
|
| The statement "Experts largely agree that current forms of
| AI are not conscious" connects to two pieces of expertise:
| expertise in consciousness and expertise in AI. It is
| plausible an expert in AI might have the background to
| state with confidence that AI is not "conscious" in any
| meaningful sense of the word.
| OneLeggedCat wrote:
| Looks like you are getting downvoted, but it's true.
| Defining exactly what it is to be "conscious" is a nearly
| impossible problem to solve, even having spent your life
| studying it. I'm not personally even convinced that
| "cogito, ergo sum" is even correct.
| OJFord wrote:
| 'cogito' is a stumbling block in itself really.
| Traster wrote:
| It's true that "conscious" may be difficult to define,
| but it's almost impossible to come up with a definition
| for which there aren't exisitng experts.
| joshuamorton wrote:
| Perhaps this is the point. If you don't have an agreed upon
| definition of the word, it is not a useful tool. A claim o
| consciousness, if that claim is meaningless, isn't useful.
|
| But aside from that, there is a lot of philosophy on what
| consciousness is
| (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness has some of
| it). And those people, especially philosophers in the
| crossover of computer systems/intelligence and general
| philosophy are "experts".
| nope_42 wrote:
| The burden of proof is on the person claiming something is
| true.
| darawk wrote:
| So if I claim it is true that neural nets are not conscious,
| the burden of proof is now on that claim?
|
| The burden of proof is on the person making an assertion. The
| original claim was not an assertion, it was that they "may be
| slightly conscious". The article linked here is the only one
| that made an actual assertion, which is that the original
| claim was categorically false.
|
| In short, I agree with you. The burden of proof is on this
| article to demonstrate that neural nets are not conscious.
| nope_42 wrote:
| The null hypothesis is that things aren't concious until
| there is evidence that they are.
| darawk wrote:
| And what evidence is that, specifically?
| chasing wrote:
| There are actual living things we have difficulty proving are
| "conscious" and you get into really tricky territory trying to
| establish what might be "conscious" (or even "alive") in the
| world even without bringing AI into the mix. Even the people
| around us we can't _prove_ to be conscious except in that we are
| also human and assume they have a similar first-person
| (subjective) view of the world and aren 't just a biological
| robot running equations. Yes, you could literally be the only
| conscious being in the universe and the universe would
| indistinguishable from one with many consciousnesses.
| freemint wrote:
| If something only can "think" if it feed data it can not
| reflect about itself out of it's own volition.
| OJFord wrote:
| (in an ironic demonstration of what I mean) I'm not sure I
| understand what you're saying - but is it that you can only
| call a process 'thinking' if it's producing some output
| that's not derivable from its input, nor hard-coded in the
| definition of the function, as it were?
|
| Perhaps that's way off, I was just starting to think along
| those lines as I came to your comment, and it seemed it might
| fit, that we might be thinking along the same lines.
| joe_the_user wrote:
| This especially,
|
| I'd be very skeptical of claims that, say, some complex
| ongoing control system, like a self-driving car, could be
| "conscious". But there's an argument someone could make.
|
| But an artifact that has no data storage seems to fail any
| reasonable definition immediately. Maybe it could be part of
| something else that you can claim is conscious if you add
| storage, output controls, aims or whatever. But by itself the
| claim just seems preposterous.
| visarga wrote:
| > Yes, you could literally be the only conscious being in the
| universe and the universe would indistinguishable from one with
| many consciousnesses.
|
| No, you think that's possible but it's naive. Your existence
| depends on environment and self replication of information.
| Your structure depends on it, your cognition. Are you saying
| you can be separate from the tree, and everything just a fake
| around you?
| igorkraw wrote:
| Edit:Shoot, I meant to reply to another comment. Leaving this
| here and linking it
|
| ---
|
| IIT is the most coherent definition of consciousness I'm aware
| of
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theor...
|
| People dismiss it often, and it has valid academic criticisms,
| but most "lay" critiques I've seen seem to dismiss it because
| it gives things they don't consider to be "conscious like them"
| consciousness.
|
| I think in general, we overexagerate qualities that humans have
| as uniquely special and important (intelligence, sentience,
| consciousness), even if the definition of them is fuzzy and any
| non-fuzzy definition is "too inclusive". I wonder if this is
| because we are collectively Identity building and creating an
| "other" out of nature, because otherwise we'd
|
| 1. Be much less special as we want to fee
|
| 2. Would have to consider a lot of inconvenient externalities
| for our reasoning (moral and otherwise) to be consistent
|
| And both are slowdowns when you are bootstrapping a post
| scarcity society out of scarcity, so it'd culturally valuable
| to reify special qualities that we just determine "we" possess
| and "they" don't - because it's easier to unify on and allows
| more actions than making sure everyone can deal with the
| unfiltered reality of human... unremarkableness in an uncaring
| world, another social species like so many other with a
| temporary oligarchy on the planet (without wanting to drone to
| philosophically, I do think this aspect of Weltschmerz is
| underappreciated, especially seeing the anxiety amongst my peer
| group when the topic comes up)
| mannykannot wrote:
| You have acknowledged that there are valid academic
| criticisms of IIT, and for those wanting to get an idea of
| what those might be, a good place to start is with Scott
| Aaronson's responses in his blog:
| https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799
|
| Note that the issue that you are concerned with here and the
| usefulness of IIT are separate concerns, and critics like
| Aaronson are not taking that position on the basis of the
| attitudes you claim are behind many 'lay' critiques.
| dificilis wrote:
| "Conscious" is a word that has no objective scientific
| definition.
|
| It follows that "slightly conscious" is not well defined.
|
| In practice "conscious" just means "anything that thinks and
| makes decisions like I do".
|
| Also, nobody actually understands how their own brain works when
| they are thinking and deciding, which makes it very difficult for
| anyone to determine if some particular AI software thinks and
| decides the same way that their brain does those things.
| bondarchuk wrote:
| I don't think "conscious" as a binary or scalar variable will
| ever be a coherent concept. "Raw" consciousness without content
| has never been demonstrated or even sensibly theorized. At the
| very least, we should add another term, that which the entity is
| conscious of. Then, I don't see why you would so vehemently deny
| that an image recognition net is conscious of the images it
| recognizes.
|
| Last I heard lobsters are supposed to be conscious and they only
| have about 100k neurons.
| skilled wrote:
| I mean, whatever the comments say here, it doesn't change the
| fact that news outlets pick up these kind of tweets and proclaim
| them as gospel.
| jowday wrote:
| Discussions of "Consciousness" in the context of ML or AI
| research always seem to devolve into navel-gazing futurist
| pseudointellectualism. I don't think it's possible to have a
| meaningful conversation about something as ill defined as
| consciousness. This isn't to malign the OpenAI researcher behind
| the original tweet - I just feel that AI researchers bringing up
| consciousnesses is a good signal to tune the conversation out.
|
| Bonus points if psychedelics are somehow brought up.
| danaris wrote:
| To be "conscious" in the sense that we generally understand it,
| any AI would need, at minimum, two things that are not commonly
| part of it.
|
| First, it needs to be _continuously active and taking data
| input_.
|
| Second, and closely related, it needs to be _continuously
| learning_.
|
| The neural nets we use today, in the main, are trained in one big
| lump, then fed discrete chunks of data to process. The neural
| nets themselves exist simply as static data on a disk somewhere.
| Some, I believe, have multiple training stages, but that's not at
| all the same thing as true _continuity_.
|
| I'm sure there are other aspects to being conscious, but I
| suspect that some of them, at least, are emergent behaviours, and
| I further suspect that they are mostly or all dependent upon
| these two.
| user3939382 wrote:
| It's not just PR it's entire companies. I had a job interview
| with a guy who wanted me to do sales for his ML company and was
| bragging he had "AI" to predict who was going to win the Academy
| Awards. He had con-vinced someone with deep pockets that was
| going to work. If you go look at tech jobs on LinkedIn you see
| countless new companies with similar mud foundations that are
| somehow raising capital.
| bonoboTP wrote:
| I believe the good experts are already distancing themselves
| from the AI term. It will backfire and will go out of fashion
| once again. There are important tools and skills in this space,
| but "AI" has been used more for deception than for clarity.
| belval wrote:
| This is part of Microsoft and OpenAI marketing/branding strategy.
| Similar wording was used during the acquisition when OpenAI used
| "pre-AGI" in their press release:
|
| > Instead, we intend to license some of our pre-AGI technologies,
| with Microsoft becoming our preferred partner for commercializing
| them.*
|
| It's mostly arguing about semantics and it's fine and common in
| research circles. Sam Altman is pretty out of line with his
| comment saying LeCun lacks vision because he doesn't adhere to
| their hype (my opinion) based wording. Aside from that it's just
| business as usual, no need to stop every time academics argue.
|
| https://openai.com/blog/microsoft/?utm_source=angellist
| xiphias2 wrote:
| AI researchers with huge salaries at huge companies are
| incentivized to hype what tasks machine learning can do while
| underestimating how centralized power it gives to the companies
| that have the infrastructure to train huge NNs.
|
| It doesn't matter whether AI is conscious or not, only whether
| it's centralizing or decentralizing power as it gets more
| powerful than human thinking (even if it's not conscious).
| bonoboTP wrote:
| The whole discussion is pure fluff and a Twitter box match.
| You'll do yourself a favor by keeping all this noise out and
| concentrate on actually valuable books and writings.
|
| Any doofus and their cat can have an opinion on whether machines
| are conscious. We've been having this debate since Turing and
| even earlier.
|
| Also any time a Twitter storm comes up around AI, you will
| predictably have certain blocks building and flinging excrement
| at each other for various latent political disagreements.
|
| For Sutskever, it's a way to get into the news cycle, to get lots
| of engagement. Do you want to reward these? It's like Musk
| tweets. You can probably have more "impact" with a well optimized
| two-line off-hand tweet than with an actual book where you
| explain some novel idea.
| visarga wrote:
| > Any doofus and their cat can have an opinion on whether
| machines are conscious.
|
| Please try a little bit to read the source before commenting.
| The originator of this opinion is Ilya Sutskever, co-founder at
| OpenAI and cited 269k times. He's one of the top people in the
| field. https://twitter.com/ilyasut/status/1491554478243258368
|
| I take Ilya's tweet more like a musing, an invitation to think
| what if, rattling the box to get interesting reactions.
|
| In my opinion he's not necessarily right or wrong. Today's
| large neural networks might be conscious if they didn't lack
| some special equipment - a body, senses and action organs, and
| a goal. They need to be able to do causal interventions in the
| environment, not just reply to simple text inputs. I think
| embodiment is not out of reach.
|
| Look at Yann LeCun's strong reply:
|
| > Nope. Not even for true for small values of "slightly
| conscious" and large values of "large neural nets". I think you
| would need a particular kind of macro-architecture that none of
| the current networks possess.
|
| https://twitter.com/ylecun/status/1492604977260412928
|
| The neural nets need the 4Es of cognition: embodied, embedded,
| enacted and extended.
|
| > The four E's of 4E cognition initialize its central claim:
| cognition does not occur exclusively inside the head, but is
| variously embodied , embedded, enacted, or extended by way of
| extra cranial processes and structures... they constitute a
| form of dynamic coupling, where the brain body world
| interaction links the three parts into an autonomous, self
| regulating system.
|
| (MJ Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind
| to Embodied Phenomenology)
| [deleted]
| burtonator wrote:
| theferalrobot wrote:
| I feel like everyone taking a hardline stance on this is being
| disingenuous - consciousness as it is used in pop culture is a
| largely non-scientific (and in my opinion a useless) term.
|
| If you claim 'consciousness' is just an emergent phenomena of
| complexity (something I happen to agree with) then sure neural
| nets are potentially slightly conscious, but that isn't how most
| people view consciousness unfortunately.
|
| Most people view 'consciousness' as some 'pie in the sky'
| component of biological life that has yet to be discovered by
| science, but this line of inquiry is completely outside the realm
| of useful dialog, so it seems pointless to debate such things.
|
| These are the two general views of consciousness, the first at
| least provides a useful framework for discussion, but the two
| camps will vehemently always disagree with each other.
|
| > "The question of whether a computer can think is no more
| interesting than the question of whether a submarine can swim." -
| Edsger Dijkstra
| fsckboy wrote:
| "I think consciousness is just emergent from complexity, so
| what I have to say is valid, but people who suspect that's not
| the full story, well that's pointless to debate, they should
| use my framework for discussion"
|
| sheesh. weak.
| jjcon wrote:
| It is pointless to debate with someone that invokes ideas
| outside the realm of scientific inquiry... that is
| definitionally true isn't it?
| vba616 wrote:
| If I claim "no advanced automobile will ever develop the
| ability to run like a horse as an emergent phenomenon"
|
| Does that mean that I regard running as outside the realm
| of scientific inquiry?
| theferalrobot wrote:
| >but people who suspect that's not the full story, well
| that's pointless to debate, they should use my framework for
| discussion
|
| You can believe whatever you want, use whatever framework you
| want (religion, spirituality, science etc). I'm just pointing
| out that it is pointless to debate between the two because
| they fundamentally disagree about how to inquire about the
| world and answer questions like this. Everyone in this debate
| is talking past each other without acknowledging that they
| are starting from two very different positions and sets of
| definitions.
| fsckboy wrote:
| it sounds like you put yourself in a class of people who
| are perfectly rational, and therefore anything that you
| can't think of doesn't exist, and anybody who thinks about
| those things is a mystic.
|
| you are making a mistake like physicists who believed "God
| does not play dice with the world" at the dawn of quantum
| mechanics or "time is a constant, not the speed of light"
| at the dawn of relativity.
|
| You have no idea where consciousness comes from, stop
| assuming you do, it's poor science.
|
| (For the record, I'm sure the integral of my history of
| atheism is strictly greater than yours, mentioning since
| that seems to be the subtext of your argument.)
| igorkraw wrote:
| I meant to reply to this comment since IIT is the main coherent
| treatment I've seen+my thoughts about why people habe this pie
| in the sky tendency
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30409369
| vba616 wrote:
| I don't get the (perennial) dichotomy.
|
| It seems to me the question of whether a submarine can swim is
| well-formed and relevant.
|
| I feel confident that no advanced propeller driven craft will
| ever develop flippers and fish-like swimming as an emergent
| phenomenon.
|
| I also feel confident that an artificial device that _does_
| swim like a fish is entirely within the realm of engineering,
| let alone science.
|
| It has never made any sense to me that, by analogy, there is a
| conflict between those two beliefs.
|
| Economic forces may preclude fish-machines, but it might just
| mean they will be delayed for a long time because they are
| difficult.
| [deleted]
| DantesKite wrote:
| The original tweet was very innocuous and seemed more like a
| thought experiment than a proclamation.
|
| Furthermore, nobody has come up with any conclusive evidence that
| the statement is incorrect.
|
| It's possible neural networks are slightly conscious, because we
| fundamentally do not understand what consciousness entails.
|
| If anybody can prove that statement is wrong, Nobel Prize to
| them.
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(page generated 2022-02-20 23:00 UTC)