[HN Gopher] Ethereum Has Issues ___________________________________________________________________ Ethereum Has Issues Author : danso Score : 200 points Date : 2022-04-14 16:46 UTC (6 hours ago) (HTM) web link (blog.dshr.org) (TXT) w3m dump (blog.dshr.org) | bulbosaur123 wrote: | Let me guess. "It's still early". No it's not. "Still early" is | the laggard's cope. We are in late stage of adoption, entire | countries (El Salvador) have adopted Bitcoin, to what effect is | up for discussion. One thing is clear, it's no longer "early". | maupin wrote: | Maybe not early, but saying that we are in the "late stages of | adoption" is laughable. | whymauri wrote: | This might get me crucified on HN, since many here are from | developed countries, but I would argue we're just cresting | the hill of late stage adoption for the Internet. Like, 40% | of the world still does not have Internet! | hitovst wrote: | Ethereum is an anti-CC bribe. I get how traders might not have | realized this, but the principled people who were drawn to | Bitcoin should have realized this a long time ago. | carlosdp wrote: | > The long-term effort to implement "sharding" in Ethereum 2.0, | which in effect parallelizes the operation of the blockchain. | | This effort is effectively dead, for what it's worth. We've moved | beyond this, it was going to over-complicate things and Layer 2 | is a much better scaling solution that is already starting to | work in production. | drcode wrote: | It's not dead, data sharding (not execution sharding) is very | much part of the plan | https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/proto_danksharding_faq | | Execution sharding is also still planned, though right now it | is in the hazy distant future | Geee wrote: | Ethereum is a dead man walking at this point. I hope it dies as | soon as possible. Ethereum is the worst thing that happened to | cryptocurrency. It diverted attention from what's actually | important, brought all the scamming in the space, and hasn't | provided anything of value. | px43 wrote: | Ha, Flash Boys 2.0 was from 2019. This blog post is literally "I | read a thing from three years ago and have lost faith in | something that I never believed in in the first place". | | As someone who knows and has worked with all the people involved | with the write-ups referenced in this blog post, I can pretty | confidently say that the author is way way behind here. There | have been some insane advancements in recent years that would | blow his mind. | | MEV harvesting is actually an insanely fascinating field of | study, and it comes down to consensus in a world where | information can only move as fast as the speed of light. | | Front-running is a general problem where, if you can find out | that someone wants to buy something, and can buy it first and | sell it to the person who actually want it at a premium. This | gets really interesting in the blockchain space, because Miners | (Validators) decide the order of transactions, and in some cases | validators can be incentivized/coerced to move around | transactions in a way that might be beneficial for certain users. | This is what is referred to as _" Miner Extractable Value"_. | | Yes it's a problem, yes there are mitigations, yes there are fun | and weird ways around those mitigations, etc. | | This is what happens when people are incentivized to take a | really good hard look at what global consensus really means. At a | high level, most users don't really need to know or care about | any of it, but it exists as a parasitic force constantly | extracting value from the network. Still, IMO the parasites that | feed off MEV are at a significant disadvantage compared with | those who feed of legacy financial networks (for more on that, | you can read the actual Flash Boys book | https://www.amazon.com/Flash-Boys-Wall-Street-Revolt/dp/0393...). | Geee wrote: | The referenced paper is dated 29 March 2022. | https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.15930 | otterley wrote: | Can you elaborate on some of these "insane advancements"? | crazypython wrote: | It means they worked on it and acknowledge it now. The | fundamental problem is still very much there. | repomies69 wrote: | That sounds insance | toolz wrote: | Do we have to accept that MEV is a problem? Just because it's | been a tactic used in the shadows with traditional finance | doesn't mean it's a problem in an open ecosystem where anyone | willing to pay can play. There isn't some shadow elite funding | a central government here lobbying for restrictive legislation | to keep competition at arms length. In my opinion the crypto | ecosystem in general is much more understanding and capable of | finding ways to distribute information and trust, which | prevents this from becoming a bad thing like we see in | traditional finance. | lukeramsden wrote: | > Do we have to accept that MEV is a problem? | | Yes and no. On the one hand, one does have to accept that | "MEV" in the "_Maximum_ extractable value" is always going to | be potentially present on a public blockchain - but often | times, this is a good thing. Liquidity pool arbitrage is also | "MEV", but is MEV that is absolutely vital to efficient | markets, and the more advanced the players in that game get, | the more everybody gets to enjoy liquid and efficient | markets. On the other hand, more and more DeFi projects take | in to consideration possible MEV extraction vectors when | designing applications, and some even use "MEV protection" as | a USP (such as CoWswap) | jkhdigital wrote: | The real problem with MEV is that it distorts the consensus | mechanism in weird and unpredictable ways. MEV is essentially | free money that could be considered part of the block reward, | but it exists at the application layer so it really can't be | accounted for in the consensus protocol incentive design. | Application layer logic ("smart contracts") can move | arbitrary value in arbitrary ways, which can create wild | volatility from block to block. | | A similar problem appears to emerge when Bitcoin's block | reward disappears, as high volatility in block rewards would | cause rational miners to behave in suboptimal ways. | w_TF wrote: | Something that rarely gets addressed in these discussions is | why Ethereum even has fee market to begin with instead of a | cheap FIFO model which ideally would be more fair. | | To answer that I would invite anyone to try using a | blockchain under heavy load without any way for users to | prioritize transactions. What you will find is the network | becomes vulnerable to transaction spamming; possibly to point | of breaking consensus making it so nobody can transact at | all. | | MEV is a consequence of a design decision to address this. | And that's not to say Ethereum has everything figured out and | a better FIFO model can't solve this, but afaik this is the | current state of things. | 99112000 wrote: | FIFO? First in first out? The blockchain is essentially the | timestamping machine. The timestamp of a transaction are | untrusted until mined into blocks, even then a fork can rid | them. | | The blockchain is essentially solving the ordering problem, | one big timestamp machine. The solution you propose would | require a timestamp machine in the first place lol. | sl3232323 wrote: | _Nat_ wrote: | > As someone who knows and has worked with all the people | involved with the write-ups referenced in this blog post, I can | pretty confidently say that the author is way way behind here. | There have been some insane advancements in recent years that | would blow his mind. | | Looks like they link a lot of stuff from the past month. | | Examples of links in the article from within the last month: | | 1. https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.15930 | | 2. https://davidgerard.co.uk/blockchain/2022/04/04/if-you- | want-... | | 3. https://datafinnovation.medium.com/the-consequences-of- | scala... | | 4. https://web3isgoinggreat.com/?id=2022-04-05-0 | | 5. https://ethresear.ch/t/np-completeness-of-a-strong-form- | of-s... | throwaway82652 wrote: | >it comes down to consensus in a world where information can | only move as fast as the speed of light. | | Yes and now you're circling back around to the usual problems | with algorithmic high-frequency trading talked about in Flash | Boys, which has nothing to do with blockchains or | cryptocurrency. Unless you can cite some "insane advancement" | in consensus algorithms that solves these problems everywhere | then I doubt there is much more that can be said here. Because | AFAICT everything you're talking about is just piling more | mitigations and edge cases on top of an existing consensus | algorithm. That work is important and it needs to happen on any | distributed system. It's not some kind of world-changing thing, | it's just necessary maintenance (and cost) to keep the system | going. | | >This is what happens when people are incentivized to take a | really good hard look at what global consensus really means. | | They were already incentivized to do that without blockchains. | This sentence could be more accurately stated: This is what | happens when people deploy an experimental solution that claims | to solve global consensus, but as we find out from experience | that it actually doesn't, in some ways it actually makes it | worse, and generally speaking those problems are still just as | hard as ever. | tornato7 wrote: | There are actually some insane advancements coming out in the | form of zero-knowledge order books, Dusk Network being the | most well known. It essentially removes frontrunning as a | possibility because buyers and sellers are matched using ZK | proofs, but are not able to see any orders before they are | matched. | throwaway82652 wrote: | That sounds good for any kind of HFT platform matching | buyers and sellers. I don't see how that is an "insane | advancement" or has anything to do with blockchains. | pazimzadeh wrote: | Because the miner wouldn't be able to see the order | book?.. | throwaway82652 wrote: | Sure, if you care about HFT you probably want the same | guarantee to apply to any market maker, not just ones who | operate on blockchains. Unless I missed something here. | jkhdigital wrote: | The real question here is not whether one can design a | market that prevents bad behavior, but whether any of the | major players will ever bother using it. If the "little | guy" is always on the losing end of market shenanigans, | then market makers will never have an incentive to move | their liquidity to the "fair" market. | pcthrowaway wrote: | The "little guy" is always at a disadvantage in | capitalism (or small business, or mom & pop shop) | | I suspect there's a disconnect between people talking | about democratization of access, and people pointing out | crypto _doesn 't_ actually make things fair. | | Crypto _doesn 't_ make things fair for the little guy. | | It _does_ add additional transparency to financial | markets though, as well as things like open, verifiable, | non-custodial, programmable financial contracts (as long | as all the inputs can be verified reliably on-chain) | | This gives people equal access (with some limitations on | what that means) | throwaway82652 wrote: | >It does add additional transparency to financial markets | though | | No, not really. This whole comment is more crypto myth- | building. There's nothing technical about blockchains | that adds transparency. Any company that wants to publish | all its financial statements publicly can technically | already do so and could always do so. They don't for many | reasons, the most important ones being that customers | overwhelmingly want financial privacy, and financial | companies are required by law to provide a certain level | of privacy for customers. | | >open, verifiable, non-custodial, programmable financial | contracts | | No, smart contracts are technically not "contracts" in | the legal sense and are also not "non-custodial" because | they require middlemen to run the blockchain. There is | also nothing more open or verifiable about smart | contracts compared to any other program. They're just | programs. | | >as long as all the inputs can be verified reliably on- | chain | | This will never happen because the only reason they're | useful is because they take inputs from off the chain. | The marketing is that users will be able to actually use | these things to perform services. Of course that is self- | contradictory because of the previous reason. | | >This gives people equal access | | No it doesn't, because only a small fraction of people | are going to become smart contract programmers or are | going to become skilled in auditing smart contracts. You | might as well say all finance gives people equal access | because anyone can become a CPA. | rufusroflpunch wrote: | This is not directly related to the content of the post but is | about Ethereum. I have been putting this hypothesis out there on | twitter for a while now, looking for someone to refute me, but no | one has yet. This seems like a place where I might be able to | find someone who understand Ethereum enough tell my grasp of the | protocol is wrong (or right): | | Ethereum is going deflationary. Not disinflationary like Bitcoin, | but actually deflationary, with token burn. Whether you think | deflationary money is bad or good is not germane to the problem | I'm about to explain, as I see it. | | Ethereum makes a claim at decentralization. However, by moving to | a Proof of Stake system, they have set a fixed amount to be | staked (32 ETH in this case, though the number itself does not | matter). With the token going deflationary, that means that the | opportunity cost to stake will always be increasing, | mathematically, in ETH terms. The staking requirement does not | adjust to changing token supply. | | For argument's sake, if there are 100 ETH on the network, and you | stake 1 ETH, you effectively need to lock away 1/100 of all | wealth on the network. However, if 10 tokens get burned, now you | lock away 1/90 wealth on the network. Staking that 1 ETH just got | 10% more expensive because the opportunity cost of staking that | ETH increased relative to spending it. | | Economically, this means that the system is going to drive out | marginal stakers, by design. The only response I have gotten from | ETH holders is about staking pools, but staking pools don't fix | the underlying economic incentive brought about by deflation: | increasingly holders will find it less worthwhile to stake their | ETH. | | It seems to me that ETH is headed right for some kind of | centralization death spiral, as only increasingly wealthier | holders will be able to justify staking. | cdiddy2 wrote: | the premise that it will be deflationary forever isn't right. | It can't be and it will find an equilibrium or even become | inflationary again as dynamics around the burn and staking play | out. | dudus wrote: | What you seem to be afraid of is something that might or not | happen in a distant future. At that point they just change the | rules again. Ethereum has done it several times. If they don't | like the direction things are going they just change it. Some | people get mad about it but it just keeps chugging along and | these people go out and possibly create a fork that goes | nowhere. | | I still think crypto is high priced poop people currently view | as valuable. But I don't see how your point goes anywhere to | prove it. | pshc wrote: | Staking pays all stakers out proportional to their stake, which | is as fair as is possible, and more fair than PoW. Distributed | staking pools lower the barrier to entry to 0.01 ETH. | | Ethereum will still be printing ETH in perpetuity; it only | becomes deflationary whenever more is burned than printed. | rufusroflpunch wrote: | > Staking pays all stakers out proportional to their stake, | which is as fair as is possible, and more fair than PoW. | Distributed staking pools lower the barrier to entry to 0.01 | ETH. | | This doesn't change the economics of what I said, which are | about opportunity cost of staking vs. spending. | | > Ethereum will still be printing ETH in perpetuity; it only | becomes deflationary whenever more is burned than printed. | | I understand this. But what I've been hearing from ETH | holders forever now, is that ETH _will be_ going | deflationary. As in, burning more ETH than printing is | something will definitely be happening. It 's the bedrock of | the flipping narrative. | pshc wrote: | _> Staking that 1 ETH just got 10% more expensive because | the opportunity cost of staking that ETH increased relative | to spending it. Economically, this means that the system is | going to drive out marginal stakers, by design._ | | I don't really get it. It's more expensive because you're | making more money? Why wouldn't everyone just stake until | they feel like spending? How does this drive out marginal | stakers? | | _> But what I 've been hearing from ETH holders forever_ | | These are just people pumping their bags. No one actually | knows how it's going down. Anyone who holds such alpha | isn't posting it on Twitter. | svachalek wrote: | Based on current and projected usage vs staking rewards, it | looks inevitable. However the rules that Ethereum operates | by are not immutable. They have changed, and they will | change again. So just because it looks like it will be | deflationary this year, doesn't mean it will always be | deflationary. | coderintherye wrote: | You assume everyone always chooses the option of highest | return, however not everything in life is about opportunity | cost. | | I personally know two people running test stake nodes. They've | spent the time setting them up, documenting, and really getting | to know all the ins and outs of it because they find it | interesting. They will run production nodes. You only need some | X amount of people to do the same to avoid overt | centralization. Then it just comes down to an argument of what | is the minimum number for X where things feel properly | decentralized. | mxwsn wrote: | Eth will hit a stable point of total supply, with both | inflationary and deflationary mechanisms mentioned in other | comments finding an equilibrium according to market forces. It | won't deflate forever, so there won't be a centralization death | spiral according to your logic. | uncletammy wrote: | There is no magic in the mechanism behind ETH's | inflation/deflation. If an equilibrium is found, it will be | because the appropriate levers are pulled until the desired | ratio is reached. | | It's also worth keeping in mind that the levers needed may | not exist within the system. ETH is still a massively | ambitious and risky experiment. Anyone who says otherwise is | naive or trying to sell you something. That being said, ETH | is absolutely the most interesting thing happening in both | tech and finance. I hope it works out. | Animats wrote: | The system is functioning as designed. The suckers are being | fleeced. | | _It is in the nature of markets to move money from the many to | the few_. | chrisco255 wrote: | What kind of quote is that? Markets are clearly many-to-many by | definition. Money doesn't even have a meaning or value without | markets. It's just paper without markets. | 1991g wrote: | grafs50 wrote: | I think the idea is that "more capable" participants tend to | make money off of "less capable" participants. And there are | a lot more of the "less capable" ones. | chrisco255 wrote: | Markets are like ecosystems, they are an emergent property | of the aggregated activity of many participants. Yes, some | of those participants will end up at the top of the food | chain. But that's going to happen regardless of what you | do. | capableweb wrote: | Not sure if you're arguing against Ethereum, cryptocurrencies | as a whole, or capitalism as a whole? Your point would be | better understood if you explained what you mean a bit more. | jamwt wrote: | Unregulated capitalism. Regulation limits how much | information/expertise disparity can tip the scales. It | doesn't prevent it altogether (nor is that a constructive | objective), but limits it so the distribution between the | winners and losers ensures still reasonable outcomes for the | loser. | | All that's happening in crypto is the same exploitative | games/vehicles that happened in other markets before | regulation protected the least informed and least | Machiavellian players from the worst outcomes. There's no | real innovation in that respect. | mgamache wrote: | It is the nature of nature to move resources from the many to | the few. | [deleted] | nathias wrote: | These posts are like horse sheppards talking how cars suck | without ever seeing one. | jmyeet wrote: | So Crypto Andys like to hand-wave about the risk of a 51% attack | but consider this: | | > This is in addition to the long-standing concentration of | Ethereum mining power, with normally three and sometimes only two | mining pools controlling over 50% of the mining power. | | There is further hand-waving about how Proof-of-Stake (over | Proof-of-Waste) will magically fix these problems. But it's | actually this PoW computing power that makes the network more | resilient to hostile takeover. | | I've heard it described that the attraction of Crypto is the | essence of the American Dream: by getting rich by doing nothing | while lauding how smart you are over other people. So much of | Crytpo can be explained by Bitcoin FOMO. Everyone just jumps on | the latest shitcoin or NFT because "I'm not missing out this | time". | | Ultimately something has to create value or it will come crashing | down. The only use case we really have is illegal activity. Some | of that is justified on ethics grounds (eg bypassing capital | controls in Venezuela). A lot of it is just shady. | | There's a ton of talk about the "potential". So far the offshots | (eg NFTs, Web3) are just ludicrous boondoggles in finding | problems for a solution. I have doubts this will ever create | value for the masses. | bobkazamakis wrote: | correct. the eternal september of crypto andys who don't | understand anything about the design of the systems they wax on | about has nuked the fridge. | jerry1979 wrote: | What is a Crypto Andy? | jmyeet wrote: | It comes from Twitch [1]. While it often refers to streamers, | it has transcended that. An andy is someone who is identified | by whatever adjective is applied. So a Crypto Andy is someone | who is all and only about crypto, basically. | | Put another way: Andys are indistinguishable from each other | apart from one defining characteristic. And those Andys with | that characteristic are likewise indistinguishable and | interchangeable. | | [1]: https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/andy-slang | layer8 wrote: | I had to laugh at the article's example of "React Andy", | which I first gave a different interpretation. | Raidion wrote: | Andy is a fairly new and derogatory/tongue in cheek term | (from twitch, long story) that basically means people that | get attention from jumping on someone else's creative | bandwagon. | | Basically someone else does the creation, and you become an | Andy by trying to get involved without really adding much | value. | [deleted] | usrusr wrote: | > The only use case we really have is illegal activity. | | But isn't that enough? If we refuse to get rich from investing | in ransom futures we have no-one to blame than ourselves. | | At least that's how I read those typical victory lap posts by | crypto winners. Or by proclaimed crypto winners desperately | trying to extend the pyramid. Yes, I'll happily skip out on | ransom future wealth. | fleddr wrote: | No, the only use case is not illegal activity. | | NFTs, smart contracts in general, gaming, defi/lending/staking, | DEX, DAO, Filecoin/IPFS, and a few more in itself are not | illegal. You may consider them to be useless, but that's not | the same thing as illegal. | | Even if you scrap all that, there's the remaining core use case | of speculation. Which in itself is also not illegal and an | incredibly important use case, if not THE use case. | | You may be frown upon speculation, look down on it, judge it | anyway you please, but it does not change the fact that 100M+ | people with an exponential growth rate are into it. I guess | growing your money is popular, who would figure that. | | The point I would like to get across is that instead of | judging, you should have a deeper look at the WHY. Many people | think that these risk takers are plain dumb, selfish, | irresponsible. If only regulation would protect them against | themselves. | | That's not the situation at all. They're fully self-aware. They | are young people born into an economy that is plain broken to | them. Burdened by student debt, stagnant/unlivable wages, | unaffordable housing, zero or negative interest rates, high | inflation, no job security, unaffordable healthcare. | | They barely get by and have no outlook of ever getting ahead, | owning any asset or wealth, and the very simple goal of a basic | middle class life has become unattainable. | | In a backdrop that cruel, why not throw the little money you | have into a shitcoin? It might do a 10x. It might also go to | zero. Who cares? You didn't have any meaningful wealth to begin | with. | | And that is the appeal of crypto. It's not fueled by greed for | the sake of greed, it's fueled by desperation. Nothing to lose, | everything to win. Crypto is an asymmetrical bet, and the only | one available to everyone. | thebean11 wrote: | I think there's at least _some_ value that can potentially be | created. The fact that you can take out a loan or buy insurance | and your counterparty is a smart contract is pretty | interesting. It could seriously bring down insurance margins if | you no longer have drones of people administering policies. | Obviously remains to be seen how practical it is. | cuteboy19 wrote: | In DeFi to take out a loan of $100 you need to have | collateral worth $200 or more. If the value of the collateral | ever goes below $200 then it is immediately autosold. | Moreover the collateral has to be on the blockchain as well, | so concrete assets like houses cannot be used for this | purpose. | | The main issue with insurance is actually assessment. All | smart contracts do is replace execution, which was never a | hassle to begin with. | thebean11 wrote: | For sure, DeFi loans aren't practical at the moment (for | anything but speculation), and may never be practical for | something like a mortgage or even a credit card. I still | find it pretty mind blowing that an algorithm can loan me | money. | | For insurance I don't agree. Something basic like weather | insurance (widely used in agriculture) is already possible. | The hardest part is getting the weather information onchain | in a way that's trusted by the buyers and sellers of the | insurance. Weather oracles do exist though. | anyfoo wrote: | > I still find it pretty mind blowing that an algorithm | can loan me money. | | I still find it pretty mind blowing that you can make a | Turing complete language with nothing but S and K | combinators. Good luck finding a real world application | for that, though. | | Sometimes the crypto space (the part that isn't just FOMO | coin buyers at least) strikes me as folks who have been | looking at something technically interesting for the | first time in their lives, under the initial lure of | money, and haven't figured out yet that "technically | interesting" does not necessarily translate into real | world applicability. | thebean11 wrote: | Why don't you respond to the insurance part of my | argument? Like I said, I think that's more immediately | useful. | WJW wrote: | > I still find it pretty mind blowing that an algorithm | can loan me money. | | Algorithmic lending has been a thing for decades though. | What do you think a credit score is for if not a tool to | let computers decide whether to give you credit or not? | thebean11 wrote: | An algorithm might help decide who to lend to, but the | algorithm isn't actually lending the money. You aren't | paying the algorithm back. Pretty big difference there. | RustyConsul wrote: | Credit is loaning you money and providing an interest | rate. Usually something insane like 15%. | | DeFi is unlocking the value of an asset, making it liquid | and allowing me to participate in other investment | opportunities without an APR. | | One example is on Kaurura. I have KSM, Stake that KSM for | a 19% APR Rate. Throw that LKSM into a vault and mint | AUSD as long as i have 160% collatoral ratio. I can then | use that aUSD i printed, buy other assets and participate | in liquidity pools, which are giving anywhere from 50% to | 300% APR. | | It's a new era of finance. Play around in the space | before you say it's worthless. | milkshakes wrote: | this is a margin loan it's not a new concept | ineedasername wrote: | It's a fascinating throwback to the dotcom boom where | everything was "It's $X, but on the internet!" | | Now it's "$X but with crypto!". Only with crypto there's | a constantly evolving set of jargon that obfuscates the | fact that _yeah, traditional finance does it already_ To | be fair, the dotcom era had it 's fair share of | obfuscating jargon too. Maybe crypto just seems worse | because the dotcom boom was so far back in my memory. | | I think there might be some actual valuable use cases for | crypto. I just wish all the people reinventing the wheel | and thinking it's new would get out of the way. Then at | least we can find out if crypto actually has something | interesting it can do. | iboisvert wrote: | > It's a new era of finance | | I have no experience with crypto, but this I don't | understand. | | > DeFi is unlocking the value of an asset, making it | liquid... | | Like a mortgage or a bond issuance (bonds are secured | against assets of the corporation)? | | > Credit is loaning you money and providing an interest | rate. Usually something insane like 15%. | | Average rate for a 30-year fixed mortgage in the US is | about 4%[1]. Average Aaa corporate bond yield is | 3.43%[2]. I guess that you are talking about interest | rate on credit cards? I think that credit card debt is | pretty small compared to the size of the mortgage or bond | markets. | | > One example is on Kaurura... | | I'm not sure I follow you here, but it sounds like you | get a loan at 19% APR against some collateral. Then you | use the loan as capital for some other investment at a | higher rate of return. | | My question: how is this any different, for example, from | a company issuing bonds at 4% coupon rate and using the | proceeds to fund operations when the company's profit | margin is, say, 50%? | | Let's say it's a matter of scale; I, as a person, can't | issue bonds to trade on a public market. But I can get a | mortgage and invest in other stuff hopefully at a return | higher than the rate on the loan. | | As I said, I don't understand how this is a "new era of | finance". | | [1] https://www.valuepenguin.com/mortgages/average- | mortgage-rate.... | | [2] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA | dabeeeenster wrote: | "One example is on Kaurura. I have KSM, Stake that KSM | for a 19% APR Rate. Throw that LKSM into a vault and mint | AUSD as long as i have 160% collatoral ratio. I can then | use that aUSD i printed, buy other assets and participate | in liquidity pools, which are giving anywhere from 50% to | 300% APR." | | I'm sorry, but this sounds ridiculous. | quickthrower2 wrote: | It sounds like someone at a horse track who has brought | along his loan shark. | thrwy_ywrht wrote: | This comment is indistinguishable from satire. | quickthrower2 wrote: | I miss Ponzi, he really just took my money and dealt with | the details for me. Now you say I have to do all this | work? | danans wrote: | > The hardest part is getting the weather information | onchain in a way that's trusted by the buyers and sellers | of the insurance. | | So the hardest part is trust, the very thing that | blockchains supposedly make unnecessary? | thebean11 wrote: | People get touchy about the word "trust" in blockchain | threads. Would it help if I said that the hardest part is | creating a way to get the weather data on chain that the | buyer and seller can agree on ahead of time? | | Anyway, I'm obviously not claiming this can work without | input from humans off chain. My point is that the | infrastructure needed to get clean and honest weather | data on to the chain (which requires human inputs) is | much smaller than the entire infrastructure needed to | administer weather insurance (which other than the | previous part, can be done autonomously). | MrMan wrote: | Oracles open up a whole giant industry of data middlemen, | sounds great | danans wrote: | > Would it help if I said that the _hardest part_ is | creating a way to get the weather data on chain that the | buyer and seller can agree on ahead of time? | | > My point is that the infrastructure needed to get clean | and honest weather data on to the chain (which requires | human inputs) is _much smaller_ than the entire | infrastructure needed to administer weather insurance | | Is "much smaller" infrastructure on a different dimension | than the "hardest part" of the problem? If so, what | dimensions are those? | | If not, how can the trust/agreement part be both "much | smaller" and also the "hardest", especially given that it | requires human inputs, especially human driven systems | for routinely validating the process (AKA audits), and | adjudicating inevitable claims of breaches of the | agreement (AKA the courts). | thebean11 wrote: | It's the hardest part compared to the rest of the | blockchain solution. The "easy" onchain-only part | replaces a vast amount of infrastructure that would exist | in an insurance company. | throwaway82652 wrote: | >Would it help if I said that the hardest part is | creating a way to get the weather data on chain that the | buyer and seller can agree on ahead of time? | | No, because it's still impossible to do that at scale | without solving the oracle problem. Putting some | arbitrary data on a chain doesn't mean the data is | reliable. | thebean11 wrote: | You don't need to solve the oracle problem. Just agree on | an oracle. Weather.com writing weather on chain could be | your agreed upon solution, for example. | Karrot_Kream wrote: | I don't know if there's any way out of the oracle problem | honestly. There's nothing wrong with shopping around | between different human-administered oracles though, or | having some code which polls multiple oracles and takes | action based on some statistic applied to the oracles | (mean, etc.) But yeah I'm not convinced the oracle | problem can be solved. | throwaway82652 wrote: | Having multiple oracles doesn't really change the | problem, then you're implicitly trusting a group of | oracles instead of just one. | Karrot_Kream wrote: | With multiple oracles and a statistic, you're trusting | their results to be distributed along some distribution. | But I'm being pedantic. Ultimately, yes, you are still | trusting the oracles even if you aren't trusting them | each in totality. Like I said I don't think there's a way | out. Even if you hook up a weather sensor machine and | push updates to the chain, even outside of malicious | tampering, sensors themselves can be inaccurate or fail. | Perhaps there's a case to be made for an autonomous | weather sensor machine that is physically tamper-proof, | but ultimately there's a certain amount of trust when | dealing with off-chain data. I don't think that's able to | be overcome. | ineedasername wrote: | _I still find it pretty mind blowing that an algorithm | can loan me money._ | | Go to Amazon, put some items in your cart, and click the | (almost always present) banner about opening an Amazon | credit card. Enter your relevant information, wait about | 3 seconds, and BOOM! An algorithm just loaned you money. | 1penny42cents wrote: | The problem is that the loudest backers overshoot and | oversell the true potential. | | The truly innovative people are those who add the proper | constraints and work within them to solve the problems where | blockchains actually fit best. | throwaway82652 wrote: | >The fact that you can take out a loan or buy insurance and | your counterparty is a smart contract is pretty interesting. | | No it isn't. I've been hearing this for years and I still | haven't seen any reason anyone would actually want this, | beyond the novelty factor. It's strictly worse than any other | equivalent insurance or loan for a number of reasons, the | worst one being that there's no human you can talk to when | something goes wrong. If you think it's bad enough now when | your bank has terrible customer service or your insurance | company is fighting your claims, blockchains are like taking | that a step further by making it technically impossible to | provide any kind of customer service. | | >It could seriously bring down insurance margins if you no | longer have drones of people administering policies. | | This sentence also makes zero sense. You don't need | blockchains to replace insurance actuaries with an algorithm, | insurance companies could already do that. Over the long-term | they can't rely on this because the whole point of insurance | is you constantly readjust your models based on risk which | cannot be predicted. Once again I'm reading a cryptocurrency | thread where everything is wrong and nothing makes any sense. | Ruphin wrote: | A number years ago I was unemployed for an extended period | of time while working on open source projects, and I ran | out of money, so I took out a loan to cover my expenses. I | lived off this money for several months until I found a | suitable job, and after some time I repaid this loan. This | type of personal credit financing would cost a fortune in | regular finance (try going to a bank and taking out a loan | because you're broke and unemployed), but because I had | digital assets to pawn I had access to a line of credit at | a reasonable rate. | | Without this option, I would have to either finance myself | at a criminal rate, or accept a job I wasn't ready for. I | feel I'm much better off personally from having this option | available. | | Outside the personal anecdote, I don't understand how it's | difficult to see the utility in having digital goods of | value. It allows all sorts of use cases, and using them as | collateral for loans is just one. I have a harder time | accepting that goods of value simply cannot be digital. If | I look at the past 30 years of history, literally | everything is turning digital; our consumption of | entertainment, our work, our communication, social | connections. What is the argument for having all things of | value be either be a physical thing, or something | controlled by some central authority? It seems like a | "because that's how things have always been" sort of | position. | pattrn wrote: | > No it isn't. I've been hearing this for years and I still | haven't seen any reason anyone would actually want this, | beyond the novelty factor. It's strictly worse than any | other equivalent insurance or loan for a number of reasons, | the worst one being that there's no human you can talk to | when something goes wrong. If you think it's bad enough now | when your bank has terrible customer service or your | insurance company is fighting your claims, blockchains are | like taking that a step further by making it technically | impossible to provide any kind of customer service. | | One could make the same argument for a dictatorship being | superior to the rule of law. After all, you can always talk | to a human to resolve your problem. | | I'm not big into crypto, but this sentiment makes sense to | me. Removing human decision making from a process makes it | a game where everyone plays by the same rules. If you get | burned, it was your fault for making a bad move, and you | have no safety net to catch you. If you make a good move, | you reap the rewards. | | The person you responded to used an insurance company as an | example of where crypto might reduce administrative | expenses, thereby allowing customers to pay lower prices. | You ignored his point and focused entirely on the portion | of insurance premiums that he specifically didn't address. | Then you claimed that "once again everything was is wrong | and nothing makes sense." If you keep making up your own | bad arguments and then shooting them down, it makes sense | that you frequently feel this way. | SparkyMcUnicorn wrote: | > I still haven't seen any reason anyone would actually | want this, beyond the novelty factor. It's strictly worse | than any other equivalent insurance or loan for a number of | reasons, the worst one being that there's no human you can | talk to when something goes wrong. | | But people are using it, and (in the protocols I've seen) | claims are handled jointly between an advisory board and | community assessors, with a framework for appeals and | community voting. | | I think that's pretty interesting. | throwaway82652 wrote: | >claims are handled jointly between an advisory board and | community assessors, with a framework for appeals and | community voting. | | So you mean like a company with a board of directors, | shareholders and voting shares. I'm sorry I just I don't | think that's very interesting, because companies already | existed without blockchains and DAOs and smart contracts. | ineedasername wrote: | So it's still people doing the work, only the contract | exists in a different type of database. I'm really | missing something if that is supposed to be substantially | different than the current relationship I have with my | insurance company. | | Although with my insurance company I at least know the | assessor is qualified enough to look at pictures from a | car accident and determine the sequence of events and who | was probably at fault. | endisneigh wrote: | So basically, unpaid volunteers. | thrwy_ywrht wrote: | >The fact that you can take out a loan | | You can take out a loan in crypto that's fully secured | against some other crypto. It's turtles all the way down, and | has zero relevance to what most people think about when they | talk about taking out a loan. | jmyeet wrote: | There are a lot of these theoretical cases but none seem | likely to come to fruition anytime soon and pretty much all | of them ignore this basic problem: the transactional nature | of blockchains falls apart as soon as you interact with the | real world. | | Let me explain: you can have a smart contract where you get | 5-20% of the value whenevder it's sold and that'll work and | be guaranteed (assuming the network isn't compromised eg 51% | attack). That is wholly continaed with the blockchain. | | But what if someone wants to sell that for cash? Now you've | introduced the exact same trust issues that exist in every | transaction in the traditional finance system: trust in the | institutions involved and the potential needs for courts to | enforce contracts. | | So what exactly have you gained? Nothing. Literally nothing. | thebean11 wrote: | Why can't you sell it for some crypto asset and exchange | that for cash (obviously this second exchange requires a | trusted third party)? Maybe I don't understand your | example. | | That seems like an issue with cash (no way to enforce you | giving me the thing I paid for, and no way for you to | enforce me giving you the cash for the item you gave me). | | Yes using cash gets rid of the guarantee that the transfer | of goods is fully atomic that crypto generally offers. | Buying tomatoes at the store has the exact same problem. | itsoktocry wrote: | > _It could seriously bring down insurance margins if you no | longer have drones of people administering policies._ | | Instead you might a bunch of people with zero actuarial | experience gambling on policies. I agree, the concept is | interesting, no regulation makes everything a crapshoot. | thebean11 wrote: | Maybe. Or you enable people who need these services but | have no access currently to get them. Most likely both. | WJW wrote: | That seems like an insanely good opportunity for people | with actual actuarial expertise to profit off any retail | investors/gamblers in the market btw. That seems like a | market that would professionalize extremely fast. | quickthrower2 wrote: | I wonder if anyone talking here has every made any kind | of insurance claim? | | Doing it with a smart contract is as feasible as dating a | smart contract. | | You can only really "insure" against globally agreed on | data, for example the price of wheat. That is an | options/futures market not insurance though. | xur17 wrote: | Nexus Mutual offers insurance against smart contract | hacks, coin depegs, custodial provider withdrawal issues, | etc, and they've been operating fine for several years. | The one advantage I really appreciate is the transparency | it enables over the decision making process. | | There's no reason this couldn't be expanded for other use | cases, including home, car, etc. It really isn't limited | to just smart contract data as you suggested. | attilaperez wrote: | >That seems like an insanely good opportunity for people | with actual ~actuarial~ expertise to profit off any | retail investors/gamblers in the market btw. | | https://protos.com/tether-papers-crypto-stablecoin-usdt- | inve... | | If only you knew... | spookthesunset wrote: | > The fact that you can take out a loan | | Why would any rational actor provide a loan denominated upon | an insanely volatile "currency" like bitcoin or ethereum? The | lender could loan 100 ethereum bux only to lose big time | because the price of ethereum went up 10x in a week making | the amount repaid worthless. Or it could go down, in which | case the borrower would wind up defaulting because who would | want to pay back 10x more than they were lent? | | Lending requires a pretty stable currency... | lowdest wrote: | Have you looked into any of the lending platforms? These | are pretty well controlled for. Crypto loans are typically | collateralized, so that below a certain loan-to-value | ratio, the collateral belongs to the loan provider and the | borrower can keep what was borrowed. The exact rules vary | place to place. It's a calculated risk that is competitive | with other investments. | | People borrow to avoid triggering capital gains, or to gain | leverage or to short. | bpodgursky wrote: | > by getting rich by doing nothing while lauding how smart you | are over other people | | This is exactly how I envision the dream of old world wealth | you see on Downton Abbey or similar. | | Get born into a minor lordship somewhere in England and spend | your days educating yourself (maybe leisurely publishing a book | or two) and raking in tax revenue from the commoners. | rsync wrote: | "This is exactly how I envision the dream of old world wealth | you see on Downton Abbey or similar." | | Then you misunderstand ... | | That world you're envisioning is what happens _after_ the | "getting rich". | | In the case of feudalism - and its remnants - the "getting | rich" involved murderous expropriation of the lands and | property of anyone that got in the way by sociopaths who | hoarded and coveted everything that entered their awareness. | | I think it was pretty hard work, actually ... | bpodgursky wrote: | Yeah but that all happened in like 1071. | | The _dream_ is to inherit that wealth and be born into the | upper-crust. Nobody wants get their hands dirty with the | murdering and exploiting! | asasidh wrote: | "So much of Crytpo can be explained by Bitcoin FOMO. Everyone | just jumps on the latest shitcoin or NFT because "I'm not | missing out this time". | | This 200% | null0pointer wrote: | I think this is true. I also think the flipside of the coin | is true. So much of the crypto hate can be explained by | jealousy and anger at missing out. | asasidh wrote: | True. Bitcoin was once in a multi generation innovation. | necovek wrote: | Something like: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues? | | (Sorry, couldn't resist) | [deleted] | MichaelRazum wrote: | Have to agree. Just curios what happens to the whole thing if | Ethereum switches to POS. | undersuit wrote: | I don't think Ethereum will ever switch. The miners control the | chain now, POS will disrupt that. The miners can't make an | orderly exit of resources or to a new coin so they will persist | on the dominant PoW-Eth while PoS-Eth loses all chain | resources. | pazimzadeh wrote: | "If all miners do not make the switch to Proof of Stake, then | there is the danger that ethereum's blockchain might fork. A | similar situation occurred in 2017, when bitcoin miners | forced a fork in its blockchain by throwing their weight | behind bitcoin cash. Ethereum's founders, however, foresaw | such an eventuality and programmed its blockchain to | incorporate increases in difficulty levels for its mining | algorithm" | | https://www.investopedia.com/news/what-ethereums- | difficulty-... | delaaxe wrote: | If the POW miners continue mining, that'll create a fork | which will quickly become unprofitable because of the | difficulty bomb, and all of the stable coins on the fork will | become valueless rendering the fork useless. | cinntaile wrote: | It's just code, what is stopping them from removing the | difficulty bomb? | delaaxe wrote: | Nothing, but that'll just create yet another fork, just | like Ethereum Classic, which is completely worthless | latchkey wrote: | > The miners control the chain now | | "difficulty bomb" | thebean11 wrote: | > while PoS-Eth loses all chain resources | | What do you mean by this? Miners are not needed on the PoS | chain, and the PoS chain cannot be attacked with PoW | resources. | | The end users (people transacting in ETH and launching smart | contracts) will decide which chain is valuable and which | isn't. | Blackthorn wrote: | The problem is the "if" in that sentence is doing a lot of | work. POS has been six months away for several years. | nootropicat wrote: | >To some extent, the Ethereum project has just given up on | scaling the main blockchain. "For Ethereum to scale and keep up | with demand, it has required rollups" -- do the work somewhere | else and send back the result. The blockchain is only usable if | you work around actually using it. | | Zk-rollups are fundamentally superior to direct scaling because | they move execution and proof generation cost to only one node | (entity, could be a server farm) that only has to do it once, | while ensuring correctness is verifiable by anyone cheaply | forever. No more scalable solution exists from a purely | theoretical level. This in theory allows even running complicated | multiplayer games on a blockchain (turn based directly, realtime | by dropping state snapshots). | | In principle, this should be implemented directly - but it's so | early that a solution that can last for decades simply doesn't | exist. In addition, decentralizing zkrollup implementations to | third party teams allows for much faster innovation. | | Optimistic rollups are more questionable. | jrsj wrote: | There's really no need to post yet another "crypto is a scam" | comment on every single one of these posts. I mostly agree but it | adds nothing to discussion and we've all heard it a million times | already. | vmception wrote: | > We found two blocks in our 12 day span, 14,217,123 and | 14,241,282, for which miner profits from MEV exceeded four times | the block reward. | | I hope this becomes more common knowledge! All mining calculators | are wrong as they predict earnings that are upwards of 80% lower | than reality, for some people. There have been extended periods | of time (weeks, months) where this has been true. | | This is also one of the promises of the blockchain concept, in | the Satoshi paper for Bitcoin, the idea is for transaction fees | to exceed the block reward subsidy, in Bitcoin the hope is that | it occurs before the year 2140, in Ethereum it has been occurring | for several years, which is a great big deal. But it doesnt mean | the outcome is good, we just dont have to wait to see how it | plays out. | delaaxe wrote: | Rocket Pool, a decentralized Ethereum staking protocol, | distributes MEV profits to stakers | eachro wrote: | I've always found it odd that basic arbitrage (ex: buy asset A on | some exchange and sell it immediately on a different exchange and | earn the delta as profit) and sandwich attacks (place a buy order | before a whale places a big order and place a sell order | immediately afterwards) were under the umbrella of MEV. These are | trades that are possible in tradfi too. I suppose it's possible | that arb trades and sandwich attacks are more of a concern here | where miners can insert their own transactions into the mempool | but I don't know if we actually see miners engaging in this | behavior. | flatearth22 wrote: | bulbosaur123 wrote: | What useful has Ethereum created apart from providing an ever- | bloating platform for generation of infinite digital-only tokens? | As of 2022 the oracle problem still hasn't been solved, so actual | decentralized, objective real life object-to-blockchain | interaction is impossible. Monero added fully anonymous crypto | that is used by most of the dark web. USDT, USDC provided | stablecoins that can circumvent what fiat can't. Bitcoin is first | mover, largest liquidity, organic distribution, most | decentralised and most tested (least chance of bugs compared to | other projects). | | What legitimate use apart from creation of infinite, meaningless | tokens has Ethereum provided? | cetxcz wrote: | USDT uses Ethereum. | thinkmassive wrote: | It didn't launch on ethereum, and the largest issuance hasn't | been on ethereum for a long time | | https://tether.to/en/transparency | treyhuffine wrote: | You don't give Ethereum credit for USDT and USDC? | | Ethereum introduced the concept of decentralized compute | resources, in which it was also a first mover. Judging Ethereum | in its current state feels like judging the internet in the | 1980's and saying it's not a value provider. | thinkmassive wrote: | USDT was originally launched on Bitcoin via OMNI | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tether_(cryptocurrency)#Histor. | .. | delaaxe wrote: | > As of 2022 the oracle problem still hasn't been solved | | What do you mean by that? I thought ChainLink solved that | pretty well | tick_tock_tick wrote: | ChainLink just distributes the trust around making it harder | too corrupt but in no way solves the issue. | delaaxe wrote: | Trying to understand by going through this: | https://blog.chain.link/what-is-the-blockchain-oracle- | proble... | | Aren't they precisely solving the issue? | hamilyon2 wrote: | Read their white paper. Looks like secure computation with | extra steps. | tootie wrote: | Reading this blog post kinda flies in the face of crypto being | more transparent than fiat. The raw data may be transparent, | but the misuse/abuse are incredibly cryptic. And can only be | rectified the goodwill of open source code contributors. | joshu wrote: | a) i think that continuous auctions have a bunch of | vulnerabilities and that for exchanges, a periodic crossing might | be a better mechanism. this works better for high volume | instruments. it does come at the expense of immediate trading | | b) is it possible to make all the transactions in a block go "at | once"? ie if any tx have some sequential interdependence, kick | one and make it wait for the next block? | throwaway98797 wrote: | sure does, but has value too | | a public registry of txns is sweet | delaaxe wrote: | Isn't this solved by PBS (Proposer-Builder Separation)? | Barrera wrote: | This article goes off the rails for me with this statement: | | > Their starting point was the observation that Ethereum "smart | contract" execution is order-dependent within a block, unlike | transaction execution in Bitcoin and similar systems: ... | | First, Bitcoin runs smart contracts [1]. The lie to the contrary | has seeped into almost every discussion of Bitcoin vs. Ethereum, | and this author appears to have taken the bait. | | Second, Bitcoin transactions _are_ order-dependent within a | block. The entire point of the Bitcoin network is to impose a | global, unique order on all transactions and the only way to do | that is if order within blocks matters. | | I'm not sure about the rest of this article, but the failure on | these two points does not inspire confidence to continue. | | [1] | https://wiki.bitcoinsv.io/index.php/Opcodes_used_in_Bitcoin_... | rvz wrote: | Well guess what? | | They both have ridiculous issues that have made them both | unsuitable for any form of serious application when scaled up | to the tens of millions or even hundreds of millions. Even the | very least of all use-cases: Extremely cheap, fast and scalable | on-chain payment systems using a blockchain for regular users | to use. | | > The entire point of the Bitcoin network is to impose a | global, unique order on all transactions and the only way to do | that is if order within blocks matters. | | Yes. The whole point of Bitcoin is to be a peer-to-peer | electronic cash system using a transparent ledger where | everyone can see the transactions on-chain. Not a _' store of | value'_ or _' digital gold'_. | | Everyone knows on-chain payments with Bitcoin are too slow for | realistically accepting payments in the real world and places | like supermarkets, restaurants, etc unless you want to wait | hours in the queue for it to settle or fail. Given it's even | slower than VisaNet, you might as well go to the ATM and | withdraw cash using card to pay; even that is quicker. | | By that time, Bitcoin's volatility would already have caused | the recipient to have a fluctuating price on the paid-for | product, causing the sender to at worst under-pay for the value | of their goods regardless. Using the Lightning Network also | defeats the purpose of what Bitcoin was supposed to be as that | is centralized by design and the transactions are off-chain | without a trace anywhere to find it [0]. | | The whole point of Ethereum is to be the _' world's computer'_ | and a smart contract platform with utility. Instead, it has | turned into a digital slot machine with its problematic high | fees when usage skyrockets and regular users that aren't | millionaires can't use it at all, unless they'd like to spend | $1000 to send $10. The network also can't even scale either so | admittedly, users have to use duck-taped layer 2 systems that | confuse them to even bother using them to save on fees. | | Waiting years for ETH on PoS (ETH2) to launch isn't an option, | as that was promised in 2016 to release by then, yet here we | are 6 years later it's delayed once again. [1] No-one would | tell users or even merchants to wait half a decade for a single | product with years of known issues to get better in order to | just use it. They will just look elsewhere instead. | | The reality is, both of them have failed and deviated from | their intended purpose and are not designed to scale for on- | chain activities and both of them require _' layer 2'_ | contraptions which at most are centralized themselves and | highly complicate the usage for many users to even bother using | it. | | What a shame and a total proof of waste. | | [0] https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1367-2630/aba062 | | [1] https://twitter.com/TimBeiko/status/1514010098145759232 | carlosdp wrote: | Yea but let's be real, when most people think "smart contracts" | what they really mean is "turing complete smart contracts." | capableweb wrote: | Not sure how many people share that "common definition". Most | people I speak with day-to-day (who understands blockchain in | the first place), would consider "programs stored on | blockchain to run when conditions are met" as the most | defining feature, and doesn't have to be turing complete for | doing so. | bsamuels wrote: | If you ask any engineer outside the BTC cult if bitcoin | script and the EVM is comparable, they would say no. | capableweb wrote: | Absolutely, Bitcoin smart contracts are different than | Ethereum smart contracts. What's your point? Doesn't mean | one has smart contracts and the other one doesn't. | bsamuels wrote: | Are you seriously going to grandstand whether the word | "smart contract" can include non-turing-complete | runtimes? | | No, Bitcoin does not have smart contracts. It has a | limited scripting environment that you can't do much with | other than colored coins, and we've all seen how that's | played out. | Animats wrote: | Yes. I would have designed contracts as decision tables.[1] | Those are not Turing-complete. They look more like | spreadsheets. They have a finite number of cases and can be | exhaustively tested. | | [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_table | [deleted] | polyomino wrote: | You're citing bitcoin sv? Is this a joke? | naoqj wrote: | idk anything about crypto. why is "bitcoin sv" bad? | px43 wrote: | It's a low value Bitcoin fork from Craig Wright, a | delusional dude who claims to be Satoshi, so he made a fork | where he could control all the Satoshi coins. "SV" means | "Satoshi's Vision". | naoqj wrote: | That's crazy. If he is satoshi what's his excuse for not | having the private keys to those coins in the main | bitcoin network? | svachalek wrote: | It would be incredibly stressful for him to prove it, nay | as much as he would like to be vindicated, the risk of | the fame and the pressure blah blah blah. | | Sorry I can't be bothered to look up the actual quotes | but they're similarly incoherent. He pretends to have | them but not to want to use them, even to prove his | claims. | rvz wrote: | To summarize: | | In conclusion, if he is unable to prove he is Satoshi, he | therefore cannot claim to say he is Satoshi, unless he | can prove otherwise; but so far he has not. | | So hence the above unless proven, he is not Satoshi. | | QED. | [deleted] | Barrera wrote: | No, it's a mistake by me and should be changed [1]. The link | I got was, strangely, the first for the search I ran. I was | in a hurry and didn't double-check. BSV is a scam. It appears | I can no longer edit the post. Oh well. | | [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Script | Arnavion wrote: | Bitcoin had script opcodes before any forks, so it doesn't | matter which fork they cite. | Stevvo wrote: | Citing a scam from the most famous con artist in the | industry is never a good form. | mateuszf wrote: | Seems like an unintentional mistake though. | stale2002 wrote: | The source is suspect for sure, but the information is true | on this specific point. | | Bitcoin does have smart contracts, and op codes. Thats | correct, regardless of your disagreements with the source. | polyomino wrote: | opcodes that are almost all disabled in the real bitcoin | lostmsu wrote: | How is that implemented? | kova12 wrote: | that wasn't the point | sandwichinvest wrote: | So the point is to be technically correct but practically | irrelevant? | [deleted] | Kranar wrote: | Fair point, perhaps this would be a more reliable source but | the information is the same: | | https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Script | mmastrac wrote: | This is an honest question as I _really_ don't know the answer, | but aren't bitcoin contracts technically white-listed? The | opcodes exist, yes, but you can't just create a random contract | and have it work? | nullc wrote: | That hasn't been correct since Feb 2015: | https://bitcoin.org/en/release/v0.10.0#standard-script- | rules... | | (The 'almost completely' there refers to operations that do | literally nothing and are reserved for future extensions). | mmastrac wrote: | Thanks for reference, I didn't realize this was opened up | like that. | therein wrote: | You can and it would. You have opcodes, you order them in any | way you want with the arguments. It is just not Turing | complete on purpose. | nullc wrote: | > Second, Bitcoin transactions are order-dependent within a | block. | | That's a little confused. Yes, bitcoin transactions are order | dependent but only in the extremely narrow sense that a | transactions can't double spend the same inputs and can't spend | an output that hasn't been created yet. | | Significant care has gone into assuring that bitcoin's script | language remains a pure function of the transaction itself, so | that all script validation can be performed once for a given | transaction, can be performed with total parallelism with all | other transactions, and isn't changed by | adding/removing/reordering transactions. This means that any | dependency between transactions must be explicit, by having the | transactions consume outputs (which can be zero value) from the | transactions they depend on. | | Reordering transactions might change their validity due to | input conflicts (which can be resolved very quickly using a | hash table), but not due to the expensive-to-validate scripts | in the transactions. | | In ethereum contracts have fairly promiscuous access to shared | data, including arbitrarily computed on the fly addresses. To | discover a transactions dependencies you must execute it. One | could imagine an implementation that executed all transactions | eagerly in parallel, recorded a transcript of the data they | touched, performed a union-find to cluster them, accepted one | transaction from each disjoint cluster, then sequentially | executed every remaining transaction (you can't execute the | clusters in parallel, because their dependencies will change on | re-execution with different state). ... but since dependencies | are extremely common (people love to think sequentially, and | the system makes that the easiest way to program) I expect that | this would actually be a lot slower in practice in spite of the | initial parallelism. | | Aside, please don't link "bitcoinsv" -- it's a scam site setup | by a conman that pretends to be Bitcoin's creator and uses | billion dollar lawsuits to silence people who call out his | fraud. | [deleted] | jqpabc123 wrote: | Without regulation, the marketplace --- any marketplace --- | becomes a platform for scams and extortion. | | Show me a marketplace without regulation and I will show you a | marketplace best avoided if possible. | qudat wrote: | Could you elaborate by what you mean by regulation? Regulations | come in many forms. | chrisco255 wrote: | Show me a regulated market that is free of front-running. It | doesn't exist. | BobbyJo wrote: | Lesser evil? | viro wrote: | are you saying that front running is better than | regulation? | ironSkillet wrote: | They are saying the occurrence of front running in a | regulated market is a lesser evil compared to the | absolute shitshow of scams and con games that play out in | an unregulated market. | rurp wrote: | There are varying degrees of front running and a well | regulated market will generally have much less of it. | | It's kind of like saying "show me a market without | corruption". Obviously all markets have some amount of shady | behavior, but it hardly means every market is equally | corrupt. | tootie wrote: | Show me a human endeavor of any kind free of corruption. | wussboy wrote: | So, because we cannot eliminate every issue with regulation, | we shouldn't have any regulation? | | Surely the answer is in "just the right amount" of | regulation. Getting to this sweet spot is a process, but one | human societies have been approaching for some time. We would | be foolish to throw out all that effort because it couldn't | be perfect. | chrisco255 wrote: | What does that even mean in this case? There is no | regulation against front-running. Take the stock market for | example. Everyone knows that high frequency traders moved | all of their infrastructure to be as close as possible to | Wall Street to get sub-second advantages on trades. No one | batted an eye. Of course, could you stop it if you tried? | Information is asymmetrically distributed someone will | always find and exploit an advantage somewhere and it's | impossible to be fair. | | Everyone knows that Wall Street got bailed out in 2008 by | the very same regulators you say are for our own good. | Everyone knows Wall Street and Black Rock got the biggest | squeeze from the Covid stimulus. In return we got $1400, | 10% inflation, and a drop in real income. And front-running | still happens. Hell the whole business model for Robinhood, | the app, which charges zero trading fees, is to package up | their retail users trades and sell the orders to high | frequency traders who will squeeze out profits from front | running or sandwiching the orders. | | Also, everyone knows that Congress does insider trading and | the speaker of the House is the worst offender. Everyone | knows that the revolving door that moves between regulators | and the financial sector is incestuous. | | The regulations you praise are written by the lobbyists and | companies who benefit the most. And I'm not in that club. | Maybe you are and that's why you defend it. But it ain't | me. | yucky wrote: | >Show me a marketplace without regulation and I will show you a | marketplace best avoided if possible. | | I buy all of my vegetables from the roadside stands that are | completely unregulated, and often set up in proximity to other | stands with other offerings. I get a higher quality at a lower | price - works out great. | moralestapia wrote: | Oh, those are regulated, for sure. | | Try to steal from them and the cops will come after you, plus | the risk to your physical integrity. | jqpabc123 wrote: | _I get a higher quality at a lower price - works out great._ | | Are you sure? A lot of these are "the hippies ripping off the | yuppies". | | In my area, they often sell the same stuff as the grocery | stores --- just priced differently. A little basket of 4 | tomatoes (usually about 2 lbs) is $5. The grocery store price | is $1.49/lb (or less if you shop at Lidl or Aldi). | | The price isn't regulated but there are lots of other | regulations involved along with legal liability if they | poison customers. | whymauri wrote: | Really depends on where you live. In South Florida, the | roadside and farm-affiliated vendors really do sell higher | quality product for less money. I have picked up better | quality mangoes off the side of the road than I can buy at | a supermarket. But I grew up in Homestead, near the Redland | agricultural area. | aardvarkr wrote: | And what about the unregulated supply chain for those goods? | Do you know they're actually higher quality? How do you know | they're not just buying the cheapest thing from Mexico or the | passed over produce from a local farmer and hawking it to you | at premium prices? | otterley wrote: | Come on, there's still plenty of regulation involved. There | are regulations controlling the quality of the water that's | irrigating the fields, and they're not using raw human waste | to fertilize the plants. | shagie wrote: | > and they're not using raw human waste to fertilize the | plants. | | Nope... industrial waste. | | 'Forever chemicals' upended a Maine farm -- and point to | larger problem -- https://wapo.st/3OeHPEf | yucky wrote: | The water used on fields in my area is non-potable. As far | as human waste goes, I don't think it's regulations | preventing that, but rather efficiency. Other animal waste | is used as fertilizer, because it works better. | otterley wrote: | That is incorrect. You'll find the relevant regulations | here: https://www.epa.gov/biosolids/biosolids-laws-and- | regulations | cool_dude85 wrote: | Well, then this is also true of crypto - there are | regulations about how the electricity used for PoW is | generated, transmitted, distributed, regulations about how | these transactions should be reported for tax purposes, | etc. | | But that's not what he's talking about. | otterley wrote: | You also can't injure your customers with your produce. | | You can't put your produce stand in the middle of a | public roadway. | | You can't lie about what kind of produce you're selling, | and you can't lie about its grading. | | You can't doctor the scales. | | You can't charge a higher sales tax than is levied by the | locality and pocket the difference. | eldenwrong wrote: | Darknet markets? Amazing quality, safety and customer support | with literally 0 regulations. | | Sorry but thats a failed argument | CameronNemo wrote: | There are scams on DNMs. But there are also high quality | vendors. And there are also scams that are part of regulated | markets. So yeah still failed argument. | eldenwrong wrote: | Sure but the feedback system works well enough to weed them | out quite fast. When people get burned they learn, big papa | gov regulations prevents learning. | | Darknet markets are the best example of self regulating | markets. Its truly amazing and it doesn't get enough credit | | Of course most are run or acquired by intelligence agencies | eventually.... | jqpabc123 wrote: | Pure bovine excrement. Scammers can change their identity | at will on the darknet. | eldenwrong wrote: | Trustworthy vendors rely on their reputation. They | usually value it a lot. | | So what if they do? They have to start again from 0 | (usually).Its also very easy to avoid them... | jqpabc123 wrote: | Scammers only care about ripping you off. And the darknet | is the ideal environment for them. | jqpabc123 wrote: | Safety? Customer support? Really? | | What do you do if you're scammed on the darknet? Let me guess | --- nothing because you can't identify who you're dealing | with or where they are located. | eldenwrong wrote: | Yes? The quality of products is millions of times higher | than in the streets. | | Everything gets continually tested by a lot of people. | Entire forums dedicated to weed out bad sellers and | identity good products .. | | Yeah, sellers are usually super responsive and will | normally fix any issue if you are polite and abide by the | rules. | | Ummm what exactly do you do if you are scammed in real | life? Go to the police and file a complaint that will never | go anywhere? Lol | | Or you mean if in the real world you get scammed by a | company? Can YOU really start a lawsuit? What amount of | money are we talking about? 10k,100k, 1m? | jqpabc123 wrote: | _What amount of money are we talking about? 10k,100k, | 1m?_ | | Zero. Lot of lawyers searching for clients with a | legitimate legal case. They get a portion of what they | win. | ComradePhil wrote: | Show me a regulated marketplace and I'll show you regulations | put in place by big players to weed out the competition. | jqpabc123 wrote: | Ok, lets take the obvious example ---- traditional banking. | Lots of small players doing quite well in a highly regulated | market. | cryptica wrote: | That's why DEXs should rely on order books, not AMMs. Front | running can be avoided by allowing traders to place limit orders. | AMM orders are even worse than market orders because slippage | provides more room for manipulation. | pshc wrote: | While many contracts within Ethereum have clear flaws, that | doesn't mean Eth as a whole is broken. | | Time bandit attacks go away once proof of stake finality arrives. | Also, trading ought to be done in Layer 2s. Does MEV work on L2s? | | Re: certain token drops wasting lots of gas, it's up to the token | authors to use an implementation that avoids gas wars. | | Once you go into claiming equivalences with P = NP, you've lost | me. Theoretical optimums are an academic game, in reality you can | get 95% of the way there with heuristics. | | _> Because Ethereum transactions are programs, the halting | problem means that it isn 't possible to accurately predict the | resources needed to execute them._ | | Ah, more appeals to theory. They're programs with a low ceiling | on the number of steps and possible codepaths. They barely even | have loops half the time. Estimating isn't that hard in practice. | throwaway82652 wrote: | >that doesn't mean Eth as a whole is broken | | That's true in the sense that it's not why ETH is broken. ETH | as a whole is broken because it's cryptocurrency. The whole | idea of smart contracts is never going to work as advertised, | it's impossible to make a more complex contract without running | into any number of these flaws and spending an inordinate | amount of your time and energy trying to mitigate and | workaround them. But at the same time these are the types of | contracts that drive developers to ETH. It's a lose-lose | situation, at best it's equivalent to a payment API that's | extremely unpredictable and insecure and will never have those | issues fixed because they're part of the design. These flaws | aren't inherent in making online transactions, they only pop up | when you insist on using blockchains for everything, when | there's no real reason to do that. | | >Also, trading ought to be done in Layer 2s. | | It's really baffling to me how L2 chains have become a serious | thing. If you ask me those are just workarounds for flaws in | the design of the L1 chains, nobody actually wants to use L2 | chains but they're forced to because ETH (and other L1 chains) | are so poorly designed that it can't accommodate most things | people actually want to do. | | >They're programs with a low ceiling on the number of steps and | possible codepaths. They barely even have loops half the time. | Estimating isn't that hard in practice. | | Ok but why should anybody have to estimate in the first place? | There's no reason for it with a trivial transaction, requiring | this is just bad design. | pavel_lishin wrote: | > _once proof of stake finality arrives_ | | Which it hasn't, despite being six months away for years now. | | You _cannot_ handwave away problems by promising you 'll fix | them with X in Y months, when you consistently fail to deliver | X. | pshc wrote: | I keep seeing this "eternal six months away" FUD, but no one | wants to admit the devs delivered on the Beacon Chain which | has been running smoothly for 1.5 years, and the Merge | testnets are working quite well. Bitcoin maximalists are out | there all day grousing about made-up deadlines promised by | strawmen and laundered through hearsay. It has nothing to do | with reality. | tick_tock_tick wrote: | Is Ethereum PoS yet? Simple Yes or No. | | That's what people are complaining about they are years | behind on what they promised. | michaelsbradley wrote: | _What's New in Eth2_ is a biweekly newsletter that 's a | good resource for tracking progress toward PoS: | | https://hackmd.io/@benjaminion/eth2_news | | From the current edition: Go/no-go | decision on doing the Merge or postponing the difficulty | bomb to be discussed on the 29th of April [2022] ACD | call. If it's "go" then start merging the | existing testnets at 2 week intervals with a view to | doing the real thing in July [2022]. | | ACD call == AllCoreDevs meeting. Here's a summary of the | most recent one (includes a link to a recording of the | call): | | https://github.com/ethereum/pm/blob/master/AllCoreDevs- | Meeti... | dmitriid wrote: | > Is Ethereum PoS yet? Simple Yes or No. | | It seems you've given a long answer which can be | simplified to "No" | michaelsbradley wrote: | Along with pointers to current and historical information | as to why arriving at PoS has been such a long and | interesting road to hoe, while also being an open/source | process involving teams and individuals all over the | world. | dmitriid wrote: | > I keep seeing this "eternal six months away" FUD, but no | one wants to admit | | that it has literally just been postponed again | https://twitter.com/TimBeiko/status/1514010098145759232 | [deleted] | trompetenaccoun wrote: | Postponed would mean the date was officially announced by | one of the devs? | | I've not had time to pay attention much over the past | months, but to me that June date was always a silly | rumor. Correct me if I'm wrong. End of year is what I | heard, but even that isn't set in stone of course and I | wouldn't be surprised if it doesn't happen till then. | dmitriid wrote: | > Postponed would mean the date was officially announced | by one of the devs? | | In true "decentralised fashion" the devs spread their | info thin over multiple veues so it's hard to hunt down | their statements. | | But we could take to ethereum.org which previously stated | [1] | | --- start quote --- | | When's it shipping? | | ~Q2 2022 | | This upgrade represents the official switch to proof-of- | stake consensus. This eliminates the need for energy- | intensive mining, and instead secures the network using | staked ether. A truly exciting step in realizing the | Ethereum vision - more scalability, security, and | sustainability. | | --- end quote --- | | Same is still on Consensys: | https://consensys.net/knowledge-base/ethereum-2/faq/ | | [1] http://web.archive.org/web/20220202044446/https://eth | ereum.o... | michaelsbradley wrote: | There will be a go/no-go decision on April 29 (two weeks | from now) re: "do[oing] the real thing in July". | | See my previous comment above. | thefourthchime wrote: | Wasn't the original PoS called Casper? IIRC that was like | 3-6mo away 5 years ago. | recursive wrote: | I understand the arguments about how cryptocurrencies use | too much electricity, but I understand none of what you've | just said. | pshc wrote: | I can try to contextualize this... at least explain my | understanding of the history. | | Bitcoin grows popular and its proof of work burns | increasing amounts of electricity. Ethereum devs do not | want to see Eth go the same way, and prioritize Proof of | Stake, which will not require any more waste. The devs | sketch out new roadmaps, do research, and make slow but | steady progress; software always takes longer than you | think. | | Meanwhile, Bitcoin has completely fossilized for | political reasons and basically cannot be improved at | this point. Bitcoin maximalists (diehards) recognize Eth | as an existential threat and start pushing this meme of | PoS being always 6 months away, despite the actual Eth | devs never promising such things. ___________________________________________________________________ (page generated 2022-04-14 23:01 UTC)