[HN Gopher] Why Did Heroku Fail?
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       Why Did Heroku Fail?
        
       Author : rckrd
       Score  : 25 points
       Date   : 2022-05-13 21:22 UTC (1 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (matt-rickard.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (matt-rickard.com)
        
       | jmull wrote:
       | Heroku failed?
        
       | nberkman wrote:
       | > If Heroku and Engine Yard were too early, we would have seen
       | more widespread adoption of next-generation PaaS (e.g., fly.io,
       | Render).
       | 
       | Seems premature to assess adoption of fly.io when it's barely
       | gotten off the ground.
        
       | monus21 wrote:
       | A compelling successor to both Heroku and App Engine is Google
       | Cloud Run. Dead simple to setup, no frills and cheap to run.
        
       | simplehuman wrote:
       | It didn't?
        
       | craigkerstiens wrote:
       | As someone that put a good portion of their working career into
       | helping create Heroku alongside many others, several who
       | contributed way more and had a larger impact, the notion that it
       | failed is probably the first thing that should be up for debate.
       | But because we seem to want to debate this on a weekly basis...
       | 
       | Heroku made reproducible builds and deployments a thing at a time
       | people were used to ssh'ing in and scp'ing files around for
       | deployment. While 12factor later become canonized it was built
       | into Heroku since day 1. Heroku was created because you could
       | spend a month building a MVP app in Rails, but then it'd take as
       | long to deploy it as to build it. Deploying software was too
       | hard. And today we're still trying to get back to that, sometimes
       | very unsuccessfully by adding abstraction layer on top of
       | abstraction layer. Did Heroku fail? We're still talking about it
       | over 10 years since being acquired as a gold standard for
       | developer experience.
       | 
       | Okay, fine, but it wasn't acquired for something like GitHub...
       | While two very different companies Heroku was acquired nearly 10
       | years earlier. It was the first large scale acquisition out of
       | YC. I do not know the internals of YC, but it's been commented by
       | others that know it better the exit of Heroku helped greatly YC
       | for the time and place it was. It was a different time. Heroku to
       | this day generates revenue and likely it's different from what
       | people expect.
       | 
       | Yeah this one is selfish, but you can largely thank Heroku for
       | Amazon RDS. Way back in the day we had Rails devs asking for a
       | database. We thought how hard could this be, it turns out it was
       | much more work than we expected. We bet on Postgres because one
       | of our engineers said it had a great track record of security and
       | reliability (not playing fast and loose with data semantics)-it
       | was the right choice. Years later when Amazon adding support for
       | Postgres on RDS the team sent some personal notes that
       | essentially said, this is because you made it so in demand.
       | 
       | Now... what went wrong.
       | 
       | Yes, several people left after the acquisition, some at 2-3
       | years, some at 4-5 years, some are still there and have been
       | before the acquisition. Acquisition or not when some of the
       | technical and product visionaries leave it's hard to replace
       | that. Adam gave his absolute all, he was spent after. 12factor
       | felt like his going away letter. But that void was never fully
       | filled, some of us may have had a shot of it, but after long runs
       | were also tired.
       | 
       | Was Heroku cocky at times toward Salesforce integration, at times
       | yes. At times I don't think was always the case. Did we want to
       | run 20GB J2EE apps when Rails/Django/Node were lighter-weight, of
       | course not. Did we want to login to gus to open a support ticket
       | on a VPN? No. Did we want to move into the SDFC offices that were
       | cube farms vs. large ceilings with a lot of natural lighting?No.
       | But could Salesforce help us make Heroku more available to
       | customers and accelerate adoption? Sure. Could we have focused
       | more on enterprise requirements around security and compliance to
       | reach the enterprise audience? Yep. In retrospect maybe we should
       | have proactively integrated a bit more, I know many of us there
       | at that time feel that way, but there were pockets of
       | integration. I recall hosting the Sayonara team at the Heroku
       | office for a Friday happy hour. We made sure to have it well
       | catered and make them feel as welcome as possible. There was good
       | and bad in the integration, but a common metric of acquisition
       | metrics is how many that are employed at time of acquisition are
       | employed x years later. Heroku had a lot of us still there, 2, 3,
       | 4, 5 and even beyond.
       | 
       | Was pricing and business model a factor? Maybe. But I'm not sure
       | you can get what Heroku gives you out of a single employee. I'm
       | excited for what others are building in this space now, but it's
       | not about being a "cheaper" Heroku it's about creating some
       | advancements about easier networking, packaging what defines as
       | an app as multiple services, signed/secure builds.
        
       | bko wrote:
       | I read the article but I'm still confused by the premise. What
       | does it mean that Heroku failed? They're still around although
       | owned by Salesforce. Are there are metrics that they're not
       | making money or have no/negative growth? What am I missing?
        
         | bogwog wrote:
         | The article also says that OpenShift failed, even though it is
         | also still around and (presumably) making money.
        
           | Spooky23 wrote:
           | The all in one app platform model just doesn't work for
           | everything.
           | 
           | What CIO/CTO is going to bet everything on some magic high
           | level platform?
        
         | bastawhiz wrote:
         | They have not pushed out any notable updates in a long time,
         | bugs have remained unfixed for many years, customer support is
         | unhelpful. All of the most talented engineers at Heroku left,
         | the team now functions as an internal infra team for
         | Salesforce. It's a zombie of a company.
         | 
         | The product and pricing are pretty good for small projects, but
         | almost everyone outgrows Heroku well before they transition
         | from "small" to "medium". The pricing model hasn't changed in
         | many years. Dyno sizing hasn't changed or improved pretty much
         | ever. Now that compelling alternatives to Heroku exist (Render,
         | fly, even Netlify) there's no good reason to launch a new
         | project on Heroku. Hell, even Elastic Beanstalk manages to give
         | a decent experience for many folks compared to Heroku.
        
           | throwawaysfdc wrote:
           | > the team now functions as an internal infra team for
           | Salesforce
           | 
           | This is definitely false. Though some internal apps are
           | deployed on Heroku, it is not the primary deployment target
           | for new projects. Heroku staff work on Heroku. Salesforce has
           | a large internal infra program and team that has no overlap
           | with Heroku. past codename projects have been proposed to
           | change this, but none have ever come to be.
        
             | sergiomattei wrote:
             | Even if the parent comment is wrong, there must be a public
             | relations problem if so many people believe the product to
             | be abandoned.
        
             | throwaway427 wrote:
             | Since you seem to have some insight into this, I
             | interviewed a former Heroku eng a while back and he said
             | that they deploy Heroku infra on Heroku, essentially
             | dogfooding their own product. I also see a lot of claims
             | that Heroku has essentially stagnated on features. I'm
             | curious how do internal teams deal with this (do they just
             | work around the stagnation?) and is there a layer that is a
             | choke point for product improvement that also affects to
             | internal teams (if so that would seem demoralizing)?
        
       | 2c2c2c wrote:
       | i started at a company as engineer #1 and my first task was to
       | take an outsourced MVP built on heroku, port it from ruby to
       | python, and make it work on aws.
       | 
       | there was seemingly no logical reason to do any of this-- the
       | product was at an early stage with nearly no traffic. even if the
       | product were to become immensely successful, the traffic would
       | probably never require more than a single box.
       | 
       | but none of this seemed to matter. nor did the considerable
       | amount of time making things just work. the ceo, who was at one
       | point a technical engineer mind you, just wanted to be able to
       | say his stuff ran on aws
       | 
       | situations like this are probably more common than you would
       | think. it's purely a brand recognition thing for them
        
       | aquaticsunset wrote:
       | The implication here is that Heroku is a standalone company with
       | its full efforts being put toward the product.
       | 
       | The article should, in my opinion, focus on why Salesforce
       | allowed Heroku to stagnate and grow uncompetitive.
       | 
       | [Disclaimer: Salesforce employee, thoughts and opinions are my
       | own]
        
         | filmgirlcw wrote:
         | Exactly this.
        
         | njudah wrote:
         | - Heroku generates hundreds of millions of dollars a year in
         | revenue. There are plenty of interesting things to debate about
         | its past and future, but it was not a failure by any reasonable
         | definition.
         | 
         | - Salesforce did ~27b in revenue in 2022; its very hard for a
         | comparatively small business to get resources / mindshare in
         | that environment, especially when you focus on a market /
         | audience that is different than the rest of the business. From
         | a strategy POV, for better or worse, Salesforce is not
         | particularly focused on integrated acquired products - its
         | interested in selling them largely as is to existing customers.
         | Fundamentally its a financial engineering and sales exercise,
         | not a product innovation one. (Not to say I support or think
         | thats the best way of driving growth, but offering my POV on
         | the structural dynamics.)
        
           | tschellenbach wrote:
           | I heard revenue and margins weren't sustainable prior to the
           | acquisition
        
       | tpmx wrote:
       | Salesforce also owns Slack... Is this a preview of what will
       | happen to it?
        
         | [deleted]
        
         | stormbrew wrote:
         | It's a preview of all big fish:small fish acquisitions really.
         | There are some notable exceptions, but for the most part you
         | should assume that an acquisition of a product you use will
         | eventually mean you'll need to go elsewhere imo.
        
           | rhizome wrote:
           | Acquisitions always ruin the thing being acquired.
        
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       (page generated 2022-05-13 23:00 UTC)