[HN Gopher] Dragon's teeth - Stopping tanks in their tracks ___________________________________________________________________ Dragon's teeth - Stopping tanks in their tracks Author : Kaibeezy Score : 134 points Date : 2022-11-08 14:06 UTC (8 hours ago) (HTM) web link (tankhistoria.com) (TXT) w3m dump (tankhistoria.com) | tenebrisalietum wrote: | Also Czech hedgehogs: | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech_hedgehog | smcl wrote: | I saw these in a forest in jizni cechy near the Austrian | border, they preserved some of the old border defenses. I | thought "oh it's like the anti-tank things from Normandy" - had | no idea it was originally Czech | thehills wrote: | All that time and energy and a lump of concrete is enough to hold | up 60 tons of mental. | Tuna-Fish wrote: | Dragon teeth alone won't hold against a tank for more than a | few minutes, if the tank just has a bulldozer attachment. Not | for bulldozing the teeth, but for pushing enough soil over them | so it can effortlessly go over. | | The purpose is to force enemy to spend time and effort dealing | with the obstacle, while you direct fire on them. | dsfyu404ed wrote: | A tank battalion is going to have N engineering and M recon | units attached (values of M and N and specific makeup of said | units varies by country and service). The point of | "inconveniences" like barriers is to a) make the enemy throw | an engineering unit at them thereby tipping you off to a | probable attack buying you time to mass force there b) just | choose to attack somewhere else that is more conveniently | defensible for you or where you already have more manpower. | hadlock wrote: | The neat thing about earth moving devices is that they | converge at a time and place in a manner in which artillery | and nearly any other conceivable weapon can hit them very | reliably | nomel wrote: | > Dragon teeth alone won't hold against a tank for more than | a few minutes | | This doesn't seem accurate. | | While searching for a video that shows a tank trying to go | over (unsuccessful), I found a video showing three ways to | get over them, and only the explosives would take a few | minutes: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRld768HDyc | | Anchored concrete blocks can be made more difficult to move | than the dirt under the tracks. | Someone wrote: | Hundreds of lumps of concrete. A tank will go around a single | one in seconds. | peterclary wrote: | There are Dragon's Teeth on the banks of the River Wey behind | Waverley Abbey in Surrey, England. | https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dragon%27s_Teeth,_Wa... | xnorswap wrote: | And down the road in Guildford: | https://www.exploringsurreyspast.org.uk/through-the-dragons-... | arethuza wrote: | Remnants of the defensive lines from WW2? | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GHQ_Line | onion2k wrote: | That must be why you never see tanks around there. | lapetitejort wrote: | I've noticed there aren't a ton of tanks in my area and I'm | wondering if there's some dragon's teeth buried in my lawn | somewhere. Might do some random digging to find out. | bombcar wrote: | Lisa, I'd like to buy your Tiger[1] stopping rock. | | [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I | _nalply wrote: | The top image is in Wimmis in Switzerland at the bottom of the | Niesen mountain. The mountain resembles a giant pyramid. That's | nice: many small pyramids and a giant one. You see the mountain | starting to rise in the background of the photo. There is a | narrow side valley (Spissi) leading to Western Bernese Oberland | and from there you can reach Valais and the Leman basin. Above | Wimmis there is a small steep limestone hill (Burgflue) and | inside it there is a military bunker with holes to shoot out of. | | https://s.geo.admin.ch/9b8456f6ad (a topographic map) | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niesen | | I live not far away therefore I immediately knew it. I verified | it with a reverse image search. | | https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Panzersperre_in_Wimm... | superkuh wrote: | It's funny how they seem to understand how to display one photo | at the top as html but then all the other photos don't display | unless you execute their javascript. I call this a browser trap. | This URL should probably be changed to something that actually | has content like | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragon%27s_teeth_%28fortificat... | lucideer wrote: | > _I call this a browser trap_ | | Fwiw the idea here is bandwidth-minimisation. I.e.: you only | incur the image download cost if you choose to scroll. It's | common practice on a lot of article/blog/content websites. | | That said it's possible to implement this in a "graceful" way | (where the mechanism only kicks in if JS is enabled & JS-less | users just download all images at once), but this best practice | is sadly rarely followed as it is admittedly somewhat more | complex to implement. | dspillett wrote: | _> (where the mechanism only kicks in if JS is enabled & JS- | less users just download all images at once)_ | | This can fail and increase the bandwidth used if you only | have a couple of images or have users on very fast | connections. | | I've seen it done by sending the image tag, and at the end of | the document scanning the DOM for marked image tags and | changing the URL specified to a low-quality copy (much | smaller data size but looks a little like the image) or a | small place-holder (perhaps even a data:url image) with the | original getting put back when the image is visible (or about | to be). The issue being that with a small number of images or | a fast connected user the main large files start loading | before the HREF attribute is updated and the transfer is not | aborted when it is changed so the user always loads both the | main and place-holder image. You can improve this plan a | little by emitting the JS to alter each relevant image tag | immediately after it, but that can cause multiple- | reflow/-repaint issues. | | _> admittedly somewhat more complex to implement_ | | Aye, and sometimes it is simply worth losing a few viewers to | save a bit of faf. Though care should be taken with regard to | collateral damage: as with all methods that exclude people | who have chosen to have JS turned off this can easily exclude | those with accessibility issues which is far less acceptable. | | _> where the mechanism only kicks in if JS is enabled_ | | Of course there is now a commonly available method of doing | lazy loading built-in so that is the best way to go, for | those few with an ancient or otherwise alternative browser | that doesn't support the feature yet the images just load | immediately: https://caniuse.com/loading-lazy-attr. You can | augment this is JS for those that have it turned on if you | wish, perhaps on long documents implementing early-lazy | loading (start the load when the user scrolls to within on | display-window of content rather than when first visible) by | removing the lazy attribute at an appropriate time detected | using the same methods as you do for entirely manual lazy | loading support, or using the replace-with-low-res-copy | method in place of attribute based lazy-loading when JS is | available. | superkuh wrote: | That's not why these types of sites do it. They do it because | they only make money if you run the arbitrary javascript from | their advertisers. If you won't run their code they won't | show you what you're there to see. It's a computational | paywall. | __alexs wrote: | Also Chrome does it out of the box now: | https://chromestatus.com/feature/4969496953487360 | rkangel wrote: | "This feature is enabled for Chrome Lite Mode users only" | __alexs wrote: | Also Chrome Lite Mode no longer exists :'( | TonyTrapp wrote: | In fact, it's super-easy to implement these days: Add | loading="lazy" to the img tag and let the browser do the | magic. | breckenedge wrote: | Does the lazy attribute on img not address this exact issue | with zero JS? | lucideer wrote: | It does but it's a relatively new feature - not every | website is recently coded (& many do their best to support | some older browsers). | hn_throwaway_99 wrote: | Curious from someone with more knowledge. Given some of the | results from the war in Ukraine, what's the latest viewpoint on | tanks in modern warfare? | | All I can say is I would rather be an infantryman than a tank | operator. Seems way too easy to be a sitting duck given the | effectiveness of anti-tank missiles. Honestly I don't really | understand the need for manned tanks in any case. Why couldn't | they just be operated remotely, and then put your actual soldiers | in more nimble forms of transport? | jjk166 wrote: | It should be noted that we're not seeing large russian infantry | formations walking around safely while the tanks and other | armored vehicles are sitting ducks. Yes, tanks aren't | invulnerable, but anti tank missiles are expensive, bulky, and | require some advanced training. With advances in technology and | western support, Ukraine is fielding more anti-tank weapons | than the russians anticipated, but it still is nothing compared | to the number of more traditional weapons like machine guns or | mortars it could have pulled out of cold war stockpiles. The | russians decided to send in mechanized units with minimal to no | infantry support because 1) they needed to advance quickly | since their logistics could not support a prolonged war, and 2) | any russian walking through Ukraine's flat and open terrain | without a few inches of armor around them is a dead man. It's | Zap Brannigan logic - a Ukrainian squad can only carry a | limited number of anti-tank munitions so you just need to keep | sending tanks until they reach their kill count and shut down. | This turned out to be a bad strategy which mostly has just | resulted in lots of destroyed tanks with few strategic gains, | but had they done things differently odds are there would just | be a lot of dead infantrymen around those destroyed tanks. | | As for unmanned tanks, these have been explored time and again | but they don't really work well. Truly autonomous tanks are | extremely difficult to implement compared to say UAVs because | it's very difficult to navigate. Remote control relies on | reliable communication which is pretty difficult to achieve, | especially if your adversary is being supported by a more | technologically advanced superpower. You basically need a tank | crew in another armored vehicle very nearby. This armored | vehicle is still vulnerable so you're risking soldiers lives | and those soldiers are basically doing twice the work operating | and maintaining two vehicles instead of one, plus consuming | twice the fuel, without doubling the firepower. | shadowpho wrote: | >All I can say is I would rather be an infantryman than a tank | operator. | | You still should be tank operator rather than infantryman. | | If you are in a tank people who have AT missiles can shoot at | you. If you are outside the tank ANYONE can shoot and kill you. | | Yes there's a lot of videos of tanks blown up. But that's | because of their high propaganda value and relative ease of | capturing videos (new AT have command center further away = | safer) | scottLobster wrote: | Against an enemy with signal jamming capability remote | operation is not a given. Plus tanks communicate in real time | with infantry/other elements. The lag introduced by remote | operation/communication would be a serious hindrance even if | everything was working, which it often isn't. Tanks have to | respond in real time, they don't have the luxury of seconds of | delay like say an orbiting drone. There's also the case of not | wanting disabled tanks to fall into the hands of the enemy. | Short of rigging the tanks with a self-destruct system (which | would likely just make them explode more easily when hit), you | need soldiers to do that. | | Keep in mind that anything operating in battlefield conditions | must be resilient. The entire situation is a constant stream of | edge cases. | | Also, don't look to Russia in Ukraine for an example of how | tanks are used. Tanks are generally not meant to act alone. | Either they're operating with a lot of other tanks, substantial | supporting infantry, or both. | | There are tons of other reasons as well, The Chieften, a former | Tanker, has a good video on the subject: | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8 | [deleted] | Fomite wrote: | From a former tanker I know: This has proved that poorly driven | and commanded tanks are vulnerable. | | The Russians are _really_ bad at doing the things necessary to | protect themselves. They 're all buttoned up. There are a ton | of pictures where they're essentially ambushed while in parade | formation, rather than how you'd be on a road in a hostile | area. | lawn wrote: | As an aside, it's been interesting to see the impact drones has | had in the war. Reconnaissance, blowing up non-tank vehicles, | bombing trenches and suicide bombers. | | Maybe tanks will still have a place in warfare, but I doubt | they'll be as ubiquitous as before? | themadturk wrote: | Also tank design is a factor. Is your spare ammo arranged in a | ring around the turret (as in Russian tanks) or an armored | container behind the turret (US M1)? | chrisseaton wrote: | Difficult to see where tanks go forward from today. Still | defeated by these basic WW2 obstacles, and currently completely | overmatched by anti-tank weapons. The best chance of active | protection systems from here rely on always-on active radar which | means you're lighting yourself up. | jcranmer wrote: | Difficult to see where infantry can still be useful. Still | defeated by basic Napoleonic-era weapons, and completely | overmatched by... almost everything. Yet no one seriously | proposes to eliminate infantry battalions, whereas people | constantly do the same for things like tanks and aircraft | carriers. | | Weapon systems are not obsolete just because they can be | defeated--warfare is not a case where one weapon system just | totally creams everything else, but closer to a rock-paper- | scissors scenario where nothing is truly dominant. Tanks are | not useless because they are easily defeated in some scenarios, | but rather, tanks are useful as "part of the complete package". | For example, tanks proved to be a critical component to the | successful Ukrainian operation that led to the Russian rout in | Kherson Oblast a few months ago. | spywaregorilla wrote: | > Weapon systems are not obsolete just because they can be | defeated--warfare is not a case where one weapon system just | totally creams everything else, but closer to a rock-paper- | scissors scenario where nothing is truly dominant. | | Not really. War is unbalanced and the metagame is strict. | Weapon systems do get obsoleted if they can be defeated | cheaply and easily. But, when you have weapons, you tend to | use them. The Russian meta is to hide behind a wall of meat | shields and blow shit up with artillery from further back. | The Ukranian meta is to... blow shit up with longer range | artillery and then when the enemy is so weakened, | demoralized, underequipped, and dead; rush them with vehicles | and artillery. | | In this war long range artillery is the thing that matters. | In a war against the US, you would see a lot of elements | downplayed simply due to a capable airforce. | | Also I think you meant Kharkiv | rmah wrote: | "Blow shit up with longer range artillery and then when the | enemy is so weakened, demoralized, underequipped, and dead; | rush them with vehicles and artillery" | | That was the primary tactical doctrine in 1919. In fairness | it started with "rush them with infantry", but that was | countered with static defenses. Which was then countered | with tanks (your statement). Which was countered with anti- | tank weaponry. Which was countered with infantry. Which was | countered with mechanized infantry. Which was countered | with mobile artillery. Which was countered by aircraft. | Which was countered with.. Seeing a pattern here? | spywaregorilla wrote: | > That was the primary tactical doctrine in 1919. | | As I understand it, this is not quite accurate. Trenches | are pretty resilient to artillery fire. Especially shitty | WWI artillery. Trench rushes tended to be pretty | effective, but it was very difficult to solidify any | gains because the enemy would always have a second line | of trenches to quickly counterattack while you were | inevitably overextended. The modern precise artillery and | intel of the west at least is effective on an entirely | different level where supply lines far behind the front | are in danger. | | > Seeing a pattern here? | | That military tech evolves? I mean, yeah, obviously. The | claim being addressed here is that things don't become | obsolete. Many things do. | jcranmer wrote: | > Also I think you meant Kharkiv | | Ah yes, I did mix up Kherson and Kharkiv. | chrisseaton wrote: | > Difficult to see where infantry can still be useful. | | Infantry can disperse to defeat the weapon systems you're | thinking about. That's where tanks currently really struggle. | | Tanks have been overmatched for some time both in the open, | and in the close, in both conventional and unconventional | conflicts, and we don't really seem to have major ideas to | solve that (with the exception of active protection, which | only works against an unsophisticated enemy as you're | broadcasting your position.) | | Also - I said 'where they go forward from today' - I didn't | say they were useless. | bluGill wrote: | >(with the exception of active protection, which only works | against an unsophisticated enemy as you're broadcasting | your position.) | | Modern war (what NATO does, not what Russia does) has radar | sharing, so one radar behind the lines, or in an airplane | well behind the lines - shares the information to everyone. | Just a few well hardened/defended radars it all you need, | nobody else is using active radar. | chrisseaton wrote: | > Just a few well hardened/defended radars it all you | need | | No, these systems have vehicle mounted radars. You can't | network that - they are responding in sub-millisecond | times. | | > nobody else is using active radar. | | You're bonkers. Trophy. Arena. Quick Kill. All active | radar. | nradov wrote: | Where we go forward today is that tanks will evolve along | the same lines as naval surface combatants (frigates / | destroyers / cruisers) have, just a few decades later. | Warships used to primarily rely on cannons for offense | (with large gun crews) and armor for defense, but the | advent of strike aircraft and then guided missiles made | those designs obsolete. Now surface ships have minimal gun | armaments and little or no armor. Instead they rely on | their own guided missiles and aircraft (helicopters and | drones) for offense, and speed plus active measures | (interceptor missiles, EW, decoys) for defense. | | I predict that the "tank" of the future will have a smaller | main gun and thinner armor. Instead of slugging it out toe- | to-toe with enemy armored vehicles and fortifications it | will hang back and locate targets using it's own drones | plus data links from other platforms. Then attack those | targets using indirect fire missiles and suicide drones. | Crews will be smaller, probably just two, with the option | to operate temporarily uncrewed under remote control or | with some limited autonomy. Survivability will be provided | through high mobility, some low-observability (stealth) | technology, EW, and updated active protection systems. | Think of a mini "frigate" driving around on land. | Ancapistani wrote: | Truly modern, "Western-style" warfare is more about the pace | of battle and maintaining consistency in the "information | space" than anything else. | | You do everything you can to make your troops as mobile and | fast to respond as possible, then you keep moving around and | probing until you find a place where the enemy isn't ready | for you. Exploit that, then move the battle somewhere else | while the enemy scrambles to adapt. | | Ukraine has been doing exactly that in this war. Russia has | enough trouble keeping their units supplied when they're in | neat deployments - expecting them to be able to respond to | multiple probing attacks along an extended front while | maintaining force in all the areas not currently under attach | is impossible for them. | [deleted] | mellavora wrote: | > currently completely overmatched by anti-tank weapons | | The Chieftan disagrees with you. | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8 | | I suspect he has more practical and theoretical knowledge on | the topic than the sum total of all posters on this thread. | arethuza wrote: | I believe _chrisseaton_ is actually in the British Army? | chrisseaton wrote: | Well obviously it's a matter for reasoned opinion, rather | than a mathematical fact, and you'll find opinions both ways. | I'm saying I'm currently struggling to see it the positive | for the situations we think we're likely to face next. | | Other weapon systems do go completely obsolete over time - | it's not a truism that all claims of obsolesce are wrong. | | Also - I said 'where they go forward from today' - I didn't | say they were obsolete. | jcranmer wrote: | I'll submit Rob Lee's opinion, if you'd rather read than | watch a video: https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/the-tank-is- | not-obsolete-a... | spywaregorilla wrote: | Depends who you're fighting, where you're fighting, and how | fast you need to win. | DeWilde wrote: | That is a take I see often on Twitter and HN but actual | military experts tend to disagree [0]. | | The truth is the tank was never meant to be invulnerable piece | of military hardware but one that can withstand small and | medium calibre arms and shrapnel/fragmentation while also | delivering direct fire to a front line location. In that regard | there is nothing that can replace it yet and will continue to | be used. | | [0] https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/the-tank-is-not- | obsolete-a... | chrisseaton wrote: | > can withstand small and medium calibre arms and | shrapnel/fragmentation while also delivering direct fire to a | front line location. In that regard there is nothing that can | replace it yet | | But an AFV can do this. | DeWilde wrote: | Its not comparable, a tanks armor and main gun are several | classes above. | gigaflop wrote: | A modern tank can measure its weapon range in kilometers, | and explosive shells can be used to destroy buildings or | other cover. | | In my opinion, AFVs are better suited for situations where | speed is more important than the absolute firepower of a | tank. | balderdash wrote: | To the extent you meant IFV, while they are largely | impervious to small arms fire, they are susceptible to | heavy machine gun fire (especially if directed at anything | others than the front arc of the vehicle)... | breischl wrote: | But... a tank _is an_ AFV. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_fighting_vehicle | | You may have meant an IFV, and in some cases those work. | But that's like saying that a rifle and a machine gun both | shoot bullets, so why would you want a machine gun? | chrisseaton wrote: | Any AFV can do it - it doesn't need to be a tank for what | the person I was replying to said they thought they | needed. | | https://www.forces.net/news/whats-difference-between- | armoure... | | Yeah many AFV are undergunned compared to a tank, and we | can always want more firepower and more armour, but | trade-off on support and things like that starts to break | down. | | The point is if you say you want 'protected mobility and | direct fire to support infantry' then you don't need a | tank, you just need any AFV. | | People normally want tanks for anti-tank - well that may | well be better done by infantry for the foreseeable | future - and for shock action, but that doesn't seem to | work brilliantly in the current environment either as in | most environments it's going to be the tank getting the | shock not you. | andrewflnr wrote: | What critique of tanks on the modern battlefield doesn't | also apply to any other armored vehicle? The same | weaknesses and weapons apply to all of them, and the | payloads, troop carrier, big gun, etc, can also be | supplied by other means if that works out. So I can't see | why distinguishing tanks, AFVs, and IFVs helps this | discussion... | | Anti-tank can't be the only role for anti-tank, by the | way, or they never would have been invented. I don't buy | that line of argument at all. | chrisseaton wrote: | Most AFV have some kind of integral infantry support | (literally in the back) while a tank needs to be battle- | teamed to do that. Battle-teaming is hard to do because | inevitably the two vehicles don't quite match capability. | | I didn't say tanks only did anti-tank - I said they also | do shock action. It's the only reason they exist in that | it's the only thing that they are needed for that you | couldn't do with another AFV. | CamperBob2 wrote: | Who uses small-arms fire against tanks? I'm sure tanks can | withstand arrows and crossbow bolts too, but that won't help | in an environment where the enemy has a healthy supply of | Javelins. | | When your weapon costs >10x more than the weapon needed to | eliminate it with near-100% certainty, your weapon is | obsolete. Tanks for the memories. | DeWilde wrote: | Nobody will use small-arms against a tank because it has no | effect. That is the point. | | Humans are also vulnerable to bullets yet we still use them | on the battlefield. Cost of bullet vs human is probably a | bit more than 10x. | | There are no perfect weapons, tanks are vulnerable to ATGMs | but if used correctly will overrun an ATGM positions. Ita a | game of rock papper sciscors but with more than three | options :D. | newsclues wrote: | People (insurgents) who lack RPGs and other ATGMs. | | There are cases within the the last few years such as the | siege of Marawi where small arms attacking armoured | vehicles sensors disabled the vehicles. | jasonwatkinspdx wrote: | > rely on always-on active radar which means you're lighting | yourself up. | | Because these systems have to work in formation without | interfering with each other, they use pseudo random noise like | signals and correlation based receivers. They're also mmw | systems working at short range. It's not quite the suicidal | beacon you're assuming, because it ends up the folks who design | this stuff are in fact aware of the principle of emissions | control. | chrisseaton wrote: | Yeah of course they try to reduce the emissions as much as | they can within physics. But the appetite for _any_ emissions | is extremely low in a peer or near-peer fight. | dr-detroit wrote: | Kaibeezy wrote: | The only defense I could find was to plow soil up onto them. | Still a slowdown and vulnerability. | chrisseaton wrote: | You always try to cover an obstacle with fire, so the idea is | while they're milling around slowly piling up soil they're | vulnerable to fire. You can see in some of the photos the | troops looking down on the obstacle from I presume potential | fire positions. | mellavora wrote: | > You always try to cover an obstacle with fire, | | I misread your comment to mean flames/burning stuff (not | weapons fire), and wanted to pause for a moment to admire | your approach to life. | | :) | spyremeown wrote: | I live in Aachen, Germany, and there are a bunch of these near | the tri-border with the Netherlands and Belgium. I think most | people don't even know what they are, and some of them are so | covered with dirt and vegetation only a keen eye can spot them. | | Still a very nice piece of history. | pfdietz wrote: | As I'm sure you know, there was a lot of fighting around there | in October 1944. | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aachen | exar0815 wrote: | Was immediately thinking about those, passing them every | morning on my way to work, as they weren't removed except where | the road is! | bamboozled wrote: | _As with any fortification, they are not indestructible. A well | prepared force can employ engineers to destroy the blocks with | relative ease and create paths through the dragon's teeth. | | This occurred on many occasions during WWII._ | | So not really that good at stopping tanks? | inasio wrote: | Reminds me of my Starcraft strategy (definitely not competitive, | playing vs the computer) to build tons of supply depots as dragon | teeth, worked also because advancing hordes would not only open a | path, but want to destroy them all, leaving them vulnerable | amalcon wrote: | Warcraft 2 had sole-purpose obstacles you could build for this. | However, most people didn't use them. Farms were more cost | effective in that role and also gave you army capacity. | | I always thought this was why Starcraft didn't have those: why | complicate things when people can just use supply depots | anyway. | mkup wrote: | I agree, but IIRC Warcraft 2 hadn't sole-purpose obstacles | which can be freely constructed by the player, only Warcraft | 1 had those ones. Though in Warcraft 2 sole-purpose obstacles | were available as a preexisting objects on the map. | Nition wrote: | Total Annihilation also had sole-purpose obstacles you could | build for this and they were called... Dragon's Teeth. | piva00 wrote: | I played competitive SC:BW and WC3 and when thinking about | building placement and base design you always take in | consideration paths of invasion to block weak points, e.g.: | access to your workers gathering resources should be blocked as | much as possible; create choke points inside the base to use as | killing zones; use choke points to break enemy units' path | finding; block off ramps with supply buildings to block vision | and place a turret with range on the border of the killing zone | on the ramp; keep a turret to defend against air drops or | flying units coming for your workers. | LordHeini wrote: | That is used in competitive as well (usually a single depot or | turrets) to mess up the path finding. Or as sim city where the | whole base is designed to block paths or mess up the ai so that | it funnels trough choke points. | | Destroying buildings takes a lot of shots so it is often very | hard to push those structures. Since the damage is not used on | the more dangerous units. | | Actually that is quite similar to the real thing because | obstacles like dragon teeth need active protection from troops | behind as well. | | Otherwise it is quite easy to move some engineers up end place | some explosives or dig dirt over them. | gigaflop wrote: | SC2 for context: | | From watching pros play, an early wall-off can be vital. At | their level of play, slipping in 1 to 3 combat units can have | devastating early effect. Terrans can easily solve this by | including a supply depot in their wall, which can be raised | or lowered at the push of a button. Or a building that can | lift off and reposition. | | Another take: Especially in a Terran vs Zerg game, the Zerg's | creep kind of acts like an inverse blockade. Since Zerg units | move faster on it, and the Zerg player will have vision of | what's on the Creep, the Terran will often prefer to slow- | crawl their siege tanks and etc closer, and be forced to use | resources to clear out the Creep before moving too far in. | Stronger Terran players can often be proactive about pushing | back Creep, and have an easier time applying pressure. | | For those who don't know, Creep is a purple-ish goop that | covers the map terrain (requires active effort to propagate), | and Zerg are bug-looking alien things that grow out of eggs. | Terrans are the humans. | jollyllama wrote: | "Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man." - | George S. Patton | brudgers wrote: | The Maginot Line worked perfectly. | | It denied the best line of attack to the enemy. | | The mistake was relying on the terrain of the _unfortified_ | Ardennes to deny a line of attack through the Low Countries. | | Patton hisself was rather caught out by the same thinking in | the winter of 1944. | rstupek wrote: | Patton wasn't in command of the forces opposite the Ardennes | nor was he in charge of the forces in the Western Front. | hef19898 wrote: | One can only wonder why that was... Maybe someone should | ask Omar Bradley waht he did differently. | | On a more serious note, while Patton wasm't in charge, he | was still a high ranking General and had some influence. | nordsieck wrote: | I get what he's saying: the Maginot line was a pretty epic | blunder. | | But it's easy to over generalize what he's saying. | | It's absolutely best practice for modern infantry to improve | their defensive posture while staying in place. You can see | this by the extensive trench system both sides of the Ukraine | war have constructed whenever positions get fixed for even a | relatively short period of time. | [deleted] | alan-crowe wrote: | You also need to watch out for the geopolitical issues before | the war starts. Imagine that country A and country B are | rivals, but each has its own internally divided politics with | Fighters versus Peace-niks. In country A the Fighters bully | the Peace-niks into accepting an increase in "defense" | spending. Country B isn't deceived, and country B's Fighters | try to persuade country B's Peace-niks to agree to more | defense spending. Having succeeded they still have to decide | how to split the money between tanks and static defenses. | | The naive analysis just looks at the military effectiveness | of the options. But there may be political implications. | Perhaps if country B spends the money on tanks, that gets | noticed in country A. That changes the politics in country A | and lets the Fighters there persuade their own Peace-niks | that more "defense" spending is needed. Whoops! The money | that country B spends on tanks doesn't help defend country B | as much as you would expect, if in unleashes counter-spending | in country A. | | What about country B spending the money on static defenses? | That could help Peace-niks in country A push for cuts in | country A's "defense" spending. That would multiply the | effectiveness of country B's spending on static defenses. | | I don't think it worked like that with the Maginot Line. | Nevertheless, what a General says about military | effectiveness misses part of the story. | jcranmer wrote: | > I get what he's saying: the Maginot line was a pretty epic | blunder. | | What is often forgotten about the Maginot Line is that... _it | worked_ , it did exactly what it was supposed to. The failure | was in French military leadership, largely for reasons that | probably would have played out the same without the Maginot | Line (e.g., refusal to believe intelligence reports, slowness | in response, etc.). | jmcomets wrote: | Just adding to this for the uninitiated-but-curious: the | German army invaded by going around the line. This meant | taking tanks through the Ardennes, a bordering region | consisting of mountains and forests, not quite the Panzer's | ideal terrain... | | Nowadays it's still used as a French expression to describe | a "seemingly impassable defense that's useless in the end". | iso1631 wrote: | One thing I read recently said one of the aims of the | maginot line was to delay the Germans (it did -- they had | to go through NL/BE), and another was to ensure they went | through BE and thus brought the British in to the fight | (due to a UK/BE defence guarantee). It did that too. | dmichulke wrote: | I think the British also guaranteed Poland, so they we're | already in in September '39 | mrguyorama wrote: | Wasn't that that "Quiet war" ie, both france and great | britain had guaranteed poland, and declared war, but | didn't actually push out troops or really do anything | until france was invaded? | goodcanadian wrote: | Phoney War. War was declared, but no real fighting was | going on: | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoney_War | breischl wrote: | But when the line was conceived and built, they couldn't | have known Germany would invade Poland first. | jollyllama wrote: | While Patton's quote is open to interpretation, the Maginot | Line is a case where he's dead on. What was the opportunity | cost of building these giant and somewhat extravagant | fortifications? Hindsight is 20:20 but maybe things could | have worked out better for the French if they had used the | massive amounts resources in a different way. | bluGill wrote: | Who knows, but the plan itself was sound and it worked. | It forced Germany to go via small route and thus made | much less land that needed to be defended. They just | didn't have a plan to defend that land - if they had a | workable plan Germany would have been in real trouble - | their troops were overextended on hindsight. It worked | because France was incompetent not because Germany had a | great battle plan. | bnralt wrote: | Indeed, I believe the initial plan was to continue the | line, but Belgium opposed it. And the Ardennes was | thought to be difficult enough terrain that it didn't | need to be strongly defended. It was actually the | Ardennes that failed expectations as defensive terrain, | not the Maginot line (though as you noted, it would have | worked as defensible terrain if there was more competent | leadership). | | It's kind of like building a giant fence around an area, | then leaving an opening in the middle of it, and then | deciding that you don't need to have people guard that | opening. And when people inevitably get through the large | unguarded opening, you declare that fences are idiotic | and useless. | vkou wrote: | Continuing the line was an impossibility because it would | have driven the low countries straight into aligning with | the Axis. | | Just because political concerns ruin your tactic, doesn't | mean those political concerns aren't real. The Maginot | line was great tactically, but worse than useless | strategically, because it completely failed to achieve | it's big-picture objective - keeping the Germans out of | France. | bnralt wrote: | The low countries were against it because they feared the | Axis, and didn't want to be left on the other side of | defensive fortifications. But in the end they fell to the | Axis anyway, so I'm not sure how not continuing the long | helped. | | Either way it's a moot point. As I said, the Ardennes | would have been an effective barrier if it was better | defended. You can't leave an unguarded opening in your | fence and then declare that fences are useless. | | Yes, France still fell in the end. Static defenses | weren't able to overcome weak leadership, but - | importantly - it's mobile forces weren't able to overcome | it either. In the end the mobile forces ended up being | _much_ more susceptible to poor leadership than the | static defenses, leading to a large chunk of the army | getting disastrously cut off (and the need to get | evacuated from Dunkirk). | foobarian wrote: | > Yes, France still fell in the end | | For a little bit, anyway. But what does that actually | mean? I often wonder what would have happened had Germany | not pursued genocide, and just stopped at France. It's | not like the French people would magically turn German | overnight. Would the resulting entity end up like a | confederacy? | | Same reasoning with Napoleon, too. What if they had | stopped before the Russia disaster? | bluGill wrote: | Poland has treaties with France and England: both were in | process of mobilizing after the fall of Poland. I think | it is inevitable that England would have at least made | some attempt at war. | | Though I wonder if Hitler could have made things worth if | he had not started the Eastern front. (I'm not clear on | how that started, and Stalin wasn't to be trusted) | yamtaddle wrote: | Right--it's not like they'd have done better without it. | Odds are they would have lost even sooner, in fact. The | little air war after Poland was invaded would have | instantly been a bloody ground war in the West, too, rather | than most of the action on that front waiting until Germany | marched through the low countries. Not like they'd have | been better off with that border unfortified--it likely | bought them some weeks or months, not that it mattered for | the ultimate outcome. Hell, without it, Germany may have | decided to attack West first, then turn East, rather than | vice-versa. | bell-cot wrote: | Critical context for the Maginot line in the first few | paragraphs here: | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Central_front | | Quick summary: The French Army's high command was | stuporhumanly slow and weak in their response to the German | attack through the Ardennes (just north of the north end of | the Maginot line). _Especially_ considering how quickly the | German Army had conquered Poland less than a year earlier. | And had conquered Denmark just one month before. And was | wrapping up the conquest of Norway at the same time as they | started attacking France... | | If you know in advance that your soldiers are solid (and the | French soldiers were) but your military high command will be | worse than useless - then relying on fixed fortifications is | actually the _best possible_ national strategy. Your good | soldiers can hold out for a while in the fortifications, | taking (mostly) not-too-horrible casualties, without needing | any orders from or action by your brain-dead high command. | bombcar wrote: | Militaries are always fighting the last war - it's really | hard for some reason to get them to recognize changes in | warfare, and blitzkrieg caught them with their proverbial | pants down, and then they _did nothing_. | bell-cot wrote: | True... _somewhat_. But read a detailed history of the | Battle of France. And compare the command performance of | the B.E.F. (under General John Vereker, Lord Gort) with | the command performance of General Maurice Gamelin | (C-in-C of the French Armed Forces) and the next tier or | two of French generals under him. | | For Lord Gort - it wasn't his country, he'd only been | appointed to command the B.E.F. the prior September, and | he'd been shuffled through a lot of different jobs in the | prior decade. (Including time spent in China and India - | hardly useful experience for WWII in Europe.) Still, Gort | and his immediate subordinates got their sh*t together, | moved fast and made good decisions in very new, chaotic, | and challenging circumstances, and did extremely well. | | For Gamelin & Co. - it _was_ their country, defending it | against a German invasion had been their d*mn-obvious Job | # 1 since _at least_ the German invasion of the Rhineland | (March 1936), and they 'd been building the Maginot line | since 1930. Yet their performance in the event was | laughably slow and weak even by the _1914_ standards of | French General Joseph Gallieni. (Who had been recalled | from retirement, was in obvious poor health, and had | served most of his career in French overseas colonies.) | hef19898 wrote: | I'll take any quotes from one of the most self engranding | generals of WW2 with more than a grain of salt. Especially one | who ended the serving under one of his former subordinates, | Omar Bradley. Patton did have a talent for PR so, including | catchy quotes. | frozen11b wrote: | You realize that Patton's quote about fixed fortifications does | not apply to dragon's teeth which are not actually fixed. He | was more addressing the Maginot line and other such fixed | defensive permanent positions. | | Edited cause voice to text can be dumb | xnorswap wrote: | It's funny to say they're not fixed when they're still here | 70 years after having been laid. | | The ones near me even have a little plaque describing the | date on which they were laid. | exabrial wrote: | Dang, beat me to it. | ISL wrote: | Here's Patton in a foxhole: | https://www.bridgemanimages.com/it/american-photographer/gen... | throwawayacc4 wrote: | A foxhole isn't necessarily a fixed fortification though. | ISL wrote: | They sure don't move. | aidenn0 wrote: | That's an easy stone to throw when you are fighting a war on | foreign soil. Particularly since the allies struggled to oust | Germans from several fixed fortifications in Europe. | rjsw wrote: | The one at Metz managed to stop him. | melling wrote: | I was just trying to find that line from the movie. My Google | skills failed me. | ridgered4 wrote: | While that applies to World War II it seems like medieval | castles or WWI trenches were pretty effective. | nimbius wrote: | Give me 25lbs of easy mix Dexpan and a hammer drill, and ill | show you a gravel pit in about three hours. | MagnumOpus wrote: | Three hours are a very long time when pounded with artillery | or raked with automatic arms... | arethuza wrote: | Didn't someone make a similar comment about Cheyenne Mountain | and SS-18s with 25Mt warheads? | chrisseaton wrote: | You're going to survive three hours of pre-targeted direct or | indirect fire? | 6stringmerc wrote: | How would this work in very thick clay like I have here in | Texas? Caliche is the native term. | ISL wrote: | TIL about Dexpan. Clever idea. | | Also, as sibling says, good luck hammer-drilling under fire. | mattkrause wrote: | Do you need the hammer-drill if you can coax the OPFOR into | firing onto their own fortifications? | gamblor956 wrote: | For those talking about the "3 hours under fire": Dexpan is | an expanding cement that cracks concrete over a few hours. | | Once placed into a hole or crack, you don't need to hang | around to do anything. | | The reason for the hammer drill is to make holes in the | dragon's teeth to put the Dexpan into. For that, you only a | minute per tooth, and it doesn't matter _where_ you put the | hole, so you can use the teeth as cover from defensive fire | while you drill. | mcguire wrote: | Somehow, this sounds like one of those "use paintballs to | blind enemy tanks" things that work out better in theory | than practice. | | A snazzy demo video for an anti-personnel artillery round: | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G18Rwoa7c1kt25 | | The demo starts at :20 or so. | piva00 wrote: | You forgot the 3 hours of complete ceasefire you will | require. | dadarourou wrote: | In Switzerland, we call them Toblerones, because they have the | same shape as the chocolates. | mauvehaus wrote: | Are the tank traps also getting smaller as the result of | shrinkflation? The 200g to 170g change in Toblerone bars is the | first example in the Wikipedia article: | | https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shrinkflation | layer8 wrote: | It would make a lot of sense if the tanks shrinkflate as | well. | daedrdev wrote: | That idea is more credible than you might think, videos of | Russian Dragon Teeth show smaller spikes more spread apart | without a base slab. | layer8 wrote: | I suddenly feel the urge to spread a crackpot theory that the | pyramids of Giza are really the remnants of a range of dragon's | teeth protecting against giant forgotten-ancient-civilization | tanks. | akiselev wrote: | I believe Dr Daniel Jackson proved conclusively that they were | used as landing platform for Ha'tak class capital ships. | layer8 wrote: | The one doesn't exclude the other. | 323 wrote: | The ones which Russia is now deploying in Ukraine don't appear to | be anchored in the ground, just laid on top of it - you can just | push them away with a bulldozer or a group of people. | tedmcory77 wrote: | Former infantry here - One of the things that was drilled into | my head, obstacles should always be covered by fire to deter | these sorts of things. If you can't cover it by fire, then | maybe it's not worth putting on obstacle on. | ddoolin wrote: | By fire do you mean weapon fire? Sorry, maybe it's obvious | but my brain keeps jumping to literal fire. | tedmcory77 wrote: | Yea, either direct (person with a rifle) or indirect | (artillery/mortars). Ultimately obstacles slow, not | prevent. | tedmcory77 wrote: | This wiki article provides good clarity, especially the | "obstacle negotiation" part. | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obstacles_to_troop_movement | HonestOp001 wrote: | Correct, weapon's fire. | ASalazarMX wrote: | Excuse me, do you mean weapon's fire, or actually the | bullets they project after firing? | | Sorry beforehand, I can't resist mocking military speak. | sa46 wrote: | Also former infantry: To expand the point, in US Army | doctrine, an obstacle has one of four effects, block, turn, | fix, or disrupt. | | Typically, you use obstacles in engagement area development | as part of a defense. An obstacle that's not observed isn't | valuable because it's easy to circumvent. You can probably | use a bulldozer (guessing, I was light infantry, not a | tanker) to breach the dragon's teeth relatively quickly so | the obstacle doesn't have the intended effect. However, it's | much harder to breach the dragon's teeth if someone is | shooting at you. Now you need an armored bulldozer, or enough | suppressing fire to cover the breach. | gerdesj wrote: | Sounds like a job for something like Python if they are | unanchored. Or an AVRE. | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Python_Minefield_Breaching_Sy | s... | Arrath wrote: | You do have to be careful with these systems, they like | to go boom: | | https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1590087764070268928 | | Video description: Drone video of a Russian armored | column advancing when a mine-clearing vehicle gets hit, | suffers earth shattering kaboom when the mine-clearing | charge goes up. | AnimalMuppet wrote: | Or a remote-controlled bulldozer. (Though that could be | jammed...) | marginalia_nu wrote: | Where is Marvin Heemeyer when you need him. | hdjjhhvvhga wrote: | Based on what we've seen in Ukraine so far, I have absolutely | no expectations. | favorited wrote: | I saw a video of a Russian tank approaching an anti-tank | mine sitting in the middle of the road, and they just... | drove over it, causing detonation. It wasn't camouflaged at | all, it was just sitting there. | | I'm not sure what the soldiers in the tank expected. Maybe | they missed the "don't drive over obvious mines" day in | tank school. | pfdietz wrote: | I wonder how many fake mines had also been placed on the | roads. | watwut wrote: | Tanks don't have all that great visibility, soldiers | sleep a little in bad conditions, often eat a little + | crappy food and are under high stress. Triple so in | Russian army by all accounts I read. | | Drivers in cars in best conditions fail to notice things, | so it is not all that surprising that Russian army | soldier would not notice things. | codenesium wrote: | Probably thought it was the run over and blow up kind not | the kind with a magnet. | pmontra wrote: | Quoted from the article | | > One of the best methods of overcoming these obstacles was | by bulldozing soil over them. | | I also thought about it before that point. But | | > However, in many situations this was much easier said than | done while under fire. | | I didn't consider this. I'm only a keyboard tactician. | DeWilde wrote: | Source on that? | 323 wrote: | Video of them being installed. At 0:17 sec it's clear they | are just laid down: | | https://twitter.com/saintjavelin/status/1580011095573827585 | ok_dad wrote: | Right next to trenches where they can be pushed into and | covered in dirt. I would laugh if it weren't for the fact | that people are dying to these clowns. | dmix wrote: | https://www.reddit.com/r/NonCredibleDefense/comments/ycj5zl/. | .. | kazinator wrote: | But imagine there were other obstacles interspersed among them: | barbed wire, landmines. The Wikipedia article mentions tactics | like that. | dkjaudyeqooe wrote: | Or drag them out of the way with... a tank. | 6stringmerc wrote: | Something something OSS 'easy field sabotage manual' and | "Screw this I didn't want to be here in the first place" | fatigue... | ASalazarMX wrote: | I was wondering if firing at the teeth would be a good | tactic. Even a space one tank wide would make a big | difference. | Moru wrote: | If you know the exact location a tank will be in at a | certain time, the term "sitting duck" comes to mind. There | is nothing effektive to stop a human that wants to get from | point A to point B. Except for another human. | ancientworldnow wrote: | The video in question is a kill zone intended to be covered by | fire. The obstacles only need to impede movement. If you stop | to remove them, you will get destroyed (if the plan holds). | foobarian wrote: | While on the topic of ways to stop tanks, there is also the | "hedgehog," or the "Czech hedgehog [1]." | | [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech_hedgehog | arethuza wrote: | Ancient hill-forts in the UK often have _cheval de frise_ which | are pretty similar in concept e.g. | | https://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/3966108 | worstenbrood wrote: | Dont forget https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tankgracht | saiya-jin wrote: | Swiss have their own version in the western part, called now | Toblerone line, built after WWI. Now a tourist attraction with | hike paths around them, each block weighting 9 tons (and it runs | 10km straight up to Jura mountains), the line basically cutting | off westernmost part of country (basically Geneva) off the rest. | | They don't treat it as something ancient though, there is also | modern part of it integrated into road [1], but nothing I could | notice on highway though. Bear in mind this would protect | Switzerland from an attack from France, which these days seems... | unprobable. | | [1] | https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Toblerone_Line_road_... | i_am_proteus wrote: | Should you have a forest handy, abatis will also serve: | | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abatis | canadianfella wrote: | malfist wrote: | Interestingly this is a very effective defensive tactic for | factorio. Offsetting bollards channels enemies through choke | points that leave them vulnerable and predictable, as well as | slowing them down. | [deleted] ___________________________________________________________________ (page generated 2022-11-08 23:01 UTC)