[HN Gopher] Briar: Peer-to-Peer Encrypted Messaging
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       Briar: Peer-to-Peer Encrypted Messaging
        
       Author : matthewmorgan
       Score  : 28 points
       Date   : 2022-11-20 22:21 UTC (38 minutes ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (briarproject.org)
 (TXT) w3m dump (briarproject.org)
        
       | bawolff wrote:
       | > The adversary has a limited ability to monitor short-range
       | communication channels (Bluetooth, WiFi, etc).
       | 
       | That seems like a pretty big assumption. From what i understand
       | there already exists deployment of wifi hot spots to track people
       | (both for advertising purposes and for spying purposes) to the
       | extent that phone providers started radomizing MAC addresses.
        
       | lsh123 wrote:
       | Building a completely p2p (no servers) e2ee messaging app is not
       | hard except one big problem: contacts discovery. I looked through
       | briar website and it seems the solution is to constantly ping all
       | contacts and hope that everyone is online plus at least one of
       | IPs stays the same between pings. Did I miss something more
       | interesting?
        
         | jmspring wrote:
         | And for mobile, network connectivity.
        
       | Ptchd wrote:
       | Briar is nice, too bad they don't have a Linux app (only an
       | Android app)... Also, it chews through battery in no time.
        
       | maqp wrote:
       | Briar is one of the most important secure messaging projects
       | currently. Not only does it remove the need to trust the vendor
       | about content (like with all E2EE messaging apps), you also get
       | to keep the metadata about communication to yourself as data
       | transits from one Tor Onion Service to another.
       | 
       | The downside is of course, you need to keep the endpoint powered
       | on when you want to be reachable so it will increase the battery
       | drain on your phone.
       | 
       | Note: There's also a desktop client if that's easier to keep
       | online https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/
       | 
       | One extremely important thing Briar is doing, is it's using the
       | P2P as means to host alternative social interaction formats, like
       | forums and blogs. Similar to Signal/WhatsApp stories (which is
       | somewhat similar to microblogs/FB wall), it's a way to indirectly
       | share information. You could pretty much emulate any social media
       | platform on top of E2EE protocol with ~zero infrastructure cost
       | and without having to worry about data mining. I'd argue what
       | Briar's innovating on here is one of the most important aspects
       | in what's left for secure messaging.
       | 
       | Finally a small caveat: Briar will share your Bluetooth MAC
       | address with all peers so it can automatically use that when
       | you're in close proximity with your peer. Thus sharing your Briar
       | ID publicly is not a good idea for two reasons:
       | 
       | 1) major global adversaries may have access to that information
       | (e.g. if Google aggregates it) which can deanonymize your
       | account. This also allows slightly technical person to confirm
       | identity of briar account if they suspect it's you (a bit wonky
       | threat model but still).
       | 
       | 2) it ties everything you do across your accounts on same device
       | together, so there's strong linkability even if you rotate the
       | identity key by reinstalling the app.
       | 
       | Briar is pretty clear about this in it's FAQ, but it's still not
       | very well known although it definitely should be.
       | 
       | ---
       | 
       | That being said, if you want similar Onion Service based
       | communication with no such linkability, there's https://cwtch.im/
       | which is a fantastic project.
       | 
       | There's also https://www.ricochetrefresh.net/
       | 
       | Both are spiritual successors to John Brooks' `Ricochet`
       | application.
       | 
       | You can also chat and share files (among other things) with
       | https://onionshare.org/
       | 
       | (And finally, you can get remote exfiltration security for
       | keys/plaintexts with TFC https://github.com/maqp/tfc (my personal
       | work), at the cost of losing some features like message
       | forwarding etc that the architecture prevents you from doing.)
        
       | dang wrote:
       | Related:
       | 
       |  _Briar Project - Secure messaging, everywhere_ -
       | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33412171 - Oct 2022 (7
       | comments)
       | 
       |  _Briar has been removed from Google Play_ -
       | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30498924 - Feb 2022 (85
       | comments)
       | 
       |  _Briar Desktop for Linux_ -
       | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30023169 - Jan 2022 (84
       | comments)
       | 
       |  _Briar 1.4 - Offline sharing, message transfer via SD cards and
       | USB sticks_ - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29227754 - Nov
       | 2021 (110 comments)
       | 
       |  _Secure Messaging, Anywhere_ -
       | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27649123 - June 2021 (63
       | comments)
       | 
       |  _Briar Project_ - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24031885
       | - Aug 2020 (185 comments)
       | 
       |  _Briar and Bramble: A Vision for Decentralized Infrastructure_ -
       | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18027949 - Sept 2018 (11
       | comments)
       | 
       |  _Briar Project_ - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17888920
       | - Aug 2018 (10 comments)
       | 
       |  _Briar: Peer-to-peer encrypted messaging and forums_ -
       | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16948438 - April 2018 (1
       | comment)
       | 
       |  _Darknet Messenger Briar Releases Beta, Passes Security Audit_ -
       | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14825019 - July 2017 (85
       | comments)
        
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       (page generated 2022-11-20 23:00 UTC)