[HN Gopher] Meta's Adversarial Threat Report, Third Quarter 2022
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Meta's Adversarial Threat Report, Third Quarter 2022
Author : holdingunsteady
Score : 49 points
Date : 2022-11-27 22:36 UTC (6 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (about.fb.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (about.fb.com)
| icelancer wrote:
| Whoa, US military involvement as well.
|
| >>>
|
| 1. United States: We removed 39 Facebook accounts, 16 Pages, two
| Groups and 26 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy
| against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated
| in the United States and focused on a number of countries
| including Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
| Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
| Yemen. The operation ran across many internet services, including
| Twitter, YouTube, Telegram, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki. It
| included several clusters of fake accounts on our platforms, some
| of which were detected and disabled by our automated systems
| prior to our investigation. The majority of this operation's
| posts had little to no engagement from authentic communities.
|
| We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into
| suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. We've
| shared information about this network with independent
| researchers at Graphika and the Stanford Internet Observatory,
| who have published their findings about this network's activity
| across the internet on August 24, 2022. Although the people
| behind this operation attempted to conceal their identities and
| coordination, our investigation found links to individuals
| associated with the US military.
| cstejerean wrote:
| * US: 39 accounts * China: 81 accounts * Russia: 1,633 accounts
|
| Either Russia invests orders of magnitude more in these
| coordinated inauthentic behavior campaigns, or they are just that
| much worse at flying under the radar.
| droopyEyelids wrote:
| Or russians used more accounts per campaign. Or facebook puts
| more effort into finding russian campaigns. Or russian
| campaigns are inherently easier to identify, or trying to
| achieve more difficult goals.
| throwaway_4ever wrote:
| > "This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily
| Germany, and also France, Italy, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
| The operation centered around a large network of websites
| carefully impersonating legitimate news organizations in Europe.
| There, they would post original articles that criticized Ukraine,
| praised Russia and argued that Western sanctions on Russia would
| backfire. They would then promote these articles, memes and
| YouTube videos on Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, Twitter,
| petitions websites Change[.]org and Avaaz, and LiveJournal"
| smrtinsert wrote:
| The transparency is much appreciated.
| arbitrary_name wrote:
| >Together, these two approaches worked as an attempted smash-and-
| grab against the information environment, rather than a serious
| effort to occupy it long-term.
|
| I.e disintermediation: fascinating to see evidence of this in the
| field, and to see evidence of the investment made in this at the
| nation state level.
| yuliyp wrote:
| This feels like it's a drop in the ocean. 100 accounts is nothing
| as far as bad actors go. It probably set the attackers back a few
| dollars.
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(page generated 2022-11-28 05:00 UTC)