[HN Gopher] Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS...
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       Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites
        
       Author : thcipriani
       Score  : 120 points
       Date   : 2023-07-15 17:49 UTC (5 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.rtl-sdr.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.rtl-sdr.com)
        
       | 1letterunixname wrote:
       | And possibly intentional misuse for criminal and perhaps non-
       | criminal activity too.
       | 
       | 121.5 and 243 MHz are no longer officially monitored for voice
       | distress signals, but I wonder if they're still being gathered on
       | the fleet.
       | 
       | Perhaps the best mitigation, I suppose a reduced set of these
       | signals are monitored for voice distress calls. The satellites
       | should support geofenced/location-selective rejection of signals
       | on 406 MHz and 1544.2 MHz identified as non-emergency traffic to
       | prevent misuse by pirates, drugs dealers, and warlords
       | coordinating attacks.
        
         | jcrawfordor wrote:
         | What you're proposing is an enormous increase in complexity of
         | equipment, which would have an impact not only on price but
         | also reliability of the space segment. A "bent-pipe" space
         | segment with minimal control logic is a well-established norm
         | in communications satellites for a few reasons, ranging from
         | reliability to making it possible to use existing transponders
         | with future modes. Even still, more and more communications
         | satellites use digital transponders that can authenticate
         | source messages, and so this issue mostly exists with legacy
         | satellites that can't be retrofitted.
         | 
         | Besides, there's not really much motivation to mitigate this
         | problem. First, pirate satellite communications by SARSAT
         | transponders are rare compared to other satellite systems very
         | popular with pirates like legacy US Navy communications
         | satellites. Second, satellite piracy isn't that popular
         | overall. Mitigating the ability of criminal organizations to
         | communicate this way would require taking down a lot of
         | different satellite systems, and then they would just fall back
         | to HF radio, which is already the more popular approach. It's
         | doubtful there would be any major reductions in crime and the
         | type of crime that seems to motivate the most use of satellite
         | piracy---unlicensed fishing near the Phillipines---isn't super
         | high on the list of international priorities.
        
         | dweekly wrote:
         | What is your basis for a claim that 121.5 (guard) is
         | unmonitored?
         | 
         | As a pilot I can say that claim is false - guard is very
         | actively monitored everywhere in the United States. Were you
         | referring to some other locations?
        
           | jcrawfordor wrote:
           | COSPAS-SARSAT no longer monitors 121.5, for various reasons,
           | so no satellite systems regularly monitor 121.5. This means
           | that 121.5-only ELTs are obsolete, and prohibited for
           | installation by the FAA since 2018. Modern ELTs are COSPAS-
           | SARSAT transponders like EPIRBs and PLBs with only minor
           | aviation-specific features.
           | 
           | ATC does still monitor 121.5, but that's with an eye towards
           | voice transmissions, not radio beacon activations. COSPAS-
           | SARSAT has never carried voice traffic on 121.5, the
           | satellites attempted onboard Doppler direction finding of the
           | beacon tone (not very accurate at all, one of the reasons it
           | is obsolete). At the same time, ATC no longer has RDF
           | capability from most (all?) GATRs, so receiving the ELT
           | beacon tone is mostly useless to ATC, and ATC is unlikely to
           | receive it anyway since GATRs have very poor coverage down to
           | ground. ELTs do still transmit on 121.5 for convenience of
           | search aircraft, but it's becoming increasingly irrelevant
           | with high COSPAS-SARSAT coverage (if the ELT activated at
           | all, rescue coordinators already know the location by GPS
           | coordinates) and increasing rarity of direction finding
           | equipment (and pilot experience with RDF) on aircraft.
           | 
           | One way to sum it up is this: 121.5 is monitored for distress
           | calls from aircraft in the air, but it is _not_ monitored for
           | distress calls from aircraft on the ground. The latter is the
           | goal of search and rescue systems, and the use of 121.5 has
           | been replaced by the much more modern COSPAS-SARSAT system
           | originally developed for maritime rescue.
        
             | doctor_eval wrote:
             | I had to look this up. Wow!
             | 
             | https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Cospas-
             | Sarsat_...
             | 
             | > The International Cospas-Sarsat Programme is a satellite-
             | aided search and rescue (SAR) initiative. It is organized
             | as a treaty-based, nonprofit, intergovernmental,
             | humanitarian cooperative of 45 nations and agencies (see
             | infobox). It is dedicated to detecting and locating
             | emergency locator radio beacons activated by persons,
             | aircraft or vessels in distress, and forwarding this alert
             | information to authorities that can take action for rescue.
             | Member countries operate a constellation of around 66
             | satellites orbiting the Earth which carry radio receivers
             | capable of locating an emergency beacon anywhere on Earth
             | transmitting on the Cospas-Sarsat frequency of 406 MHz.
        
       | patrakov wrote:
       | Quick summary:
       | 
       | > Many navigational and meteorological satellites carry a search
       | and rescue (SAR) repeater which is intended to receive UHF
       | emergency locator beacons and rebroadcast them in the L-band or
       | higher. However the repeaters appear to be picking up all sorts
       | of other signals from the ground, including voice transmissions.
        
       | somethingsaid wrote:
       | Shouldn't we link to the original YouTube video? This website
       | just reposts it with no analysis, a bunch of ads, and some janky
       | scroll hijacking.
        
         | superkuh wrote:
         | It's text and not video. Just speaking personally I wouldn't
         | have clicked on or commented on a youtube video link. rtl-
         | sdr.com is pretty decent aggregator as far as hobby SDR goes
         | despite their bias in promoting their custom rtl-sdr dongle.
        
           | somethingsaid wrote:
           | Yeah, I understand the preference for text, and I'm not
           | against the site itself for posting it (I don't have enough
           | knowledge to comment on its quality), but I think we should
           | give credit where credit (and ad revenue) is due, and link to
           | the original creator's work where possible.
        
           | Retric wrote:
           | In the vast majority of cases I prefer text, but in this
           | specific case the video is actually useful for all the little
           | details about what he's doing that aren't in this article or
           | the words he's using.
           | 
           | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_pCHTeamn8
        
         | fortran77 wrote:
         | Submit the link and see if it gets voted to the front page.
        
       | [deleted]
        
       | runjake wrote:
       | Direct link to video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_pCHTeamn8
        
         | scrum-treats wrote:
         | Alternative link to video:
         | https://invidious.tiekoetter.com/watch?v=U_pCHTeamn8.
        
       | bryancoxwell wrote:
       | A fun video and well explained.
        
       | acaloiar wrote:
       | Few things evoke feelings of the early internet like intercepting
       | unencrypted communications in the wild with off the shelf
       | hardware and software.
       | 
       | It's some how comforting to realize this is still possible today.
        
         | charcircuit wrote:
         | Considering how much progress that has been made in encrypting
         | internet traffic radio seems painfully slow in evolving to be
         | more secure.
         | 
         | Edit: specifically radio protocols not carrying internet
         | traffic
        
           | withinboredom wrote:
           | That's because there isn't a point. In order for encryption
           | to work, you need to exchange keys at some point. Doing that
           | half a world away is rather pointless. Doing it over the air,
           | how do I know Alice won't intercept and broadcast her keys
           | louder than me? Or just interfere and prevent me from sending
           | keys?
           | 
           | As we all learned in WWII, a code is better than encryption
           | when you need complex PKI to achieve encryption. It's more
           | flexible, and can even convey nuances not intended. Ah, sorry
           | I mean a language, not a code. But still, code words and
           | phrases are still a thing.
        
             | charcircuit wrote:
             | You are ignoring HTTPS allows people half a world awaywo
             | exchange keys with a server and prevents other people
             | follow interfering other than DoS attacks.
             | 
             | >As we all learned in WWII, a code is better than
             | encryption when you need complex PKI to achieve encryption
             | 
             | I was never in WWII and I'm not sure what you mean by code
             | as typically that's just encryption but less formalized.
        
               | rootw0rm wrote:
               | Referring to Navajo code talkers I assume...
               | 
               | https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_talker
        
               | withinboredom wrote:
               | Https works because there is a destination address that
               | goes to a physical network card. Over the air, there is
               | no 'routing'. Alice can intercept my transmission, then
               | literally, just use a more powerful radio to 'talk over
               | me' with her keys. Ergo, MITM. I worked with guys in the
               | military who did this for a living...
               | 
               | Radio is like being able to packet sniff (and modify)
               | packets from anywhere.
        
               | jiggawatts wrote:
               | HTTPS is secure against man in the middle attacks and
               | will protect transmissions even over radio.
        
               | withinboredom wrote:
               | Yes, once you form the connection it is secure. The
               | handshake is the part that isn't secure on open airwaves.
               | This is how 'evil middle boxes' mitm connections from
               | corporate networks.
               | 
               | Edit to add: yes, there are CA's to sign the bits on a
               | network. There is no CA for the radio, only proprietary
               | ones. These can be reverse engineered, subpoenaed, or
               | bought by state actors. Chances are, if you're
               | broadcasting loud enough to be heard by them, they're
               | going to start listening.
        
               | uw_rob wrote:
               | I think there is some confusion here. HTTPS is secure.
               | Even with MITM attacks.
               | 
               | This is because the MITM will not have a valid
               | certificate to provide authenticity for the public key
               | returned.
               | 
               | The reason why middle boxes in corp networks can MITM is
               | because the the corp owns the device and has installed
               | their own domain trust to the device. This means the MITM
               | can return a cert and public key that your device will
               | trust. This is because the cert returned will be signed
               | by the installed domain trust.
               | 
               | Another way to think about why HTTPS is secure over
               | radio: HTTPS is at the highest level of the OSI
               | networking model. You could do HTTPS with pen and paper
               | and the mail if you wanted. Think about starlink! The
               | internet today is literally going over radio waves.
               | 
               | This is likely why there isn't progress on encrypting old
               | fashion radios! There is no need to encrypt old fashioned
               | radios -- you'll just use internet over radio instead if
               | you wanted encryption.
               | 
               | You bring a good point through. Since it's radio, anyone
               | can jam your transmissions, but, they won't be able to
               | spoof your intended friend if you are using https via
               | radio.
        
               | withinboredom wrote:
               | > I was never in WWII and I'm not sure what you mean by
               | code
               | 
               | I ignored this part in my original reply. I don't know if
               | you're just being an ass, never paid attention in school,
               | or just simply don't know through no fault of your own.
               | I'm going to assume the latter.
               | 
               | Check it out:
               | https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_talker
               | 
               | It's pretty wild.
        
               | niij wrote:
               | I'd take it easy with the name calling. Your replies in
               | this thread have shown a pretty fundamental
               | misunderstanding of the OSI model, PKI, and encryption in
               | general.
        
             | fortran77 wrote:
             | > In order for encryption to work, you need to exchange
             | keys at some point.
             | 
             | Not since 1976.
             | 
             | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography
        
               | withinboredom wrote:
               | You still need to exchange keys. You can't get around
               | that. Otherwise, how do I know the public key you sent me
               | over the radio is YOUR public key and not someone else
               | with a more powerful radio?
        
               | krisoft wrote:
               | By having the key signed by someone who you trust. Which
               | in a military typically means the central command.
        
               | kelnos wrote:
               | Sure, but then you need the central command's public key
               | in order to verify that signature. How do you get that?
               | 
               | Ultimately it boils down to you needing to bootstrap your
               | web/chain of trust somehow. In a military it might be
               | easier; radios would be distributed to field troops with
               | the needed trusted keys already present.
               | 
               | But more "public" radio? We don't have a sort of "radio
               | CA", and there are no radios that know how to deal with
               | such a thing. I suppose we could reuse the TLS CAs,
               | though, and build SDRs to use it, which wouldn't rely on
               | any particular hardware. But the point is that this just
               | isn't set up at all.
        
             | stevezsa8 wrote:
             | I watched some documentary where the US were monitoring
             | enemy communications but didn't know what a specific code
             | word was referring to. If I recall correctly, the US staged
             | a fake transmission that one of their islands had some
             | issue or other... and suddenly they picked up enemy
             | broadcast with the code word in question. So then the US
             | knew what the code word referred to.
        
               | Y_Y wrote:
               | AF meant Midway
               | 
               | https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/museums/nmas/edu
               | cat...
               | 
               | It's very easy to look these things up.
        
           | TechBro8615 wrote:
           | Aren't there FCC regulations that forbid encryption over non-
           | military radio?
        
             | mirashii wrote:
             | For amateur radio, but no in general.
        
               | tarxvf wrote:
               | And it's not even actually illegal for amateur radio
               | though there continues to be debate on the topic due to
               | the phrasing.
               | 
               | I do think that encryption is firmly outside of the
               | amateur culture in most cases, but legality is well
               | covered here: https://www.n5dux.com/ham/files/pdf/Data%20
               | Encryption%20is%2...
        
               | warble wrote:
               | It's legal to encrypt as long as anyone can decrypt as I
               | understand it.
        
               | warble wrote:
               | Sorry, has the means to decrypt it.
        
             | charcircuit wrote:
             | Well there are radio protocols like wifi and 5g which are
             | encrypted, so I doubt it's illegal.
        
           | ajsnigrutin wrote:
           | Most of them are pretty secure, a few really old or
           | intentionally open (ham radio) are not, but the rest, are
           | (wifi, 5g, ...)
        
             | mananaysiempre wrote:
             | Does 5G finally use some sort of viable cryptosystem? 3G
             | and below are hopeless and IIUC LTE is theoretically
             | possible to secure but in practice the implementations
             | suck.
        
               | toast0 wrote:
               | IIRC, LTE is mutually verified encryption. The SIM
               | contains a private key for the subscriber and a public
               | key for the network. I'd expect 5G to also have that.
        
       | userbinator wrote:
       | Some of those voices sound like Chinese... and I wouldn't be
       | surprised if cheap walkie-talkies and the like are used over
       | there, which are either actually using a frequency that gets
       | picked up by these satelllites, or have poor/nonexistent
       | filtering that their signal harmonics are.
        
       | libpcap wrote:
       | What did the conversation overheatd in that video say?
        
         | OnlyMortal wrote:
         | "People of Earth, your attention, please. This is Prostetnic
         | Vogon Jeltz of the Galactic Hyperspace Planning Council. As you
         | will no doubt be aware, the plans for development of the
         | outlying regions of the Galaxy require the building of a
         | hyperspatial express route through your star system. And
         | regrettably, your planet is one of those scheduled for
         | demolition. The process will take slightly less than two of
         | your Earth minutes. Thank you."
        
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