(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 324: Russian forces continue offensive operations around Bakhmut and Avdiivka [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-01-12 Disinformation continues as does the battle for Soledar whose salt mines may be occupied by Wagner forces. Russia's Ministry of Defense spokesman Igor Konashenkov says Russia has already destroyed 4 Bradley Fighting Vehicles in Ukraine. Which is indeed remarkable in that none have been delivered yet. pic.twitter.com/7wRRhPfDEm Russian forces’ likely capture of Soledar on January 11 is not an operationally significant development and is unlikely to presage an imminent Russian encirclement of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage posted on January 11 and 12 indicates that Russian forces likely control most if not all of Soledar, and have likely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the western outskirts of the settlement.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks against Sil in Donetsk Oblast—a settlement over a kilometer northwest of Soledar and beyond previous Ukrainian positions.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff and other senior military sources largely did not report that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults against Soledar on January 12 as they have previously.[3] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Soledar of remaining Ukrainian forces as of January 12.[4] Russian milbloggers posted footage on January 12 of Wagner Group fighters freely walking in Soledar and claimed that they visited the settlement alongside Russian forces.[5] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not announced that Russian forces have captured Soledar, but Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov congratulated Russian forces for successful offensive operations in the settlement.[6] All available evidence indicates Ukrainian forces no longer maintain an organized defense in Soledar. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s January 12 statement that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Soledar may be referring to defensive positions near but not in Soledar.[7] Moscow is building up troop numbers in the east as a fierce battle for the small town of Soledar continues, a top Ukrainian official said. Another problem facing Russia as it gears up to train a new 300,000-strike force – presumably in preparation for another offensive – is that these new units are not likely to match even the quality of the troops that went into action in Ukraine in February of last year. The Russian force that General Valery Gerasimov’s reforms created is proving to be a mismatch for the conventional attrition battlefield that is Ukraine. The forces Russia has put in the field since the Battle of Kyiv in 2022 are poorly trained and equipped, lack non-commissioned officers and, most of all, are unable to deploy the most vaunted new Russian weapons platforms. Putin’s new forces may meet the same fate as the first and second military waves in this war. Should that happen, it would constitute the strategic breakthrough Ukraine is looking for. To make the situation even more difficult for Moscow, the stockpiles of ammunition that Russia brought in from Belarus appear nearly all but used up. And Russia’s limited capacity to replenish them raises the question of whether a “ Soviet way of war ” is something its military-industrial complex can sustain. But the Ukraine war is fast becoming a war of numbers. Simply put: “It’s about the ammo, stupid!” And this applies to both the Russians and the Ukrainians . The vaunted Russian stocks are being depleted at rates only Soviet-era planners could stipulate in the event of an all-out war against NATO. At the height of the summer, when Moscow took a page from the Soviet playbook to substitute a massive artillery hammer for maneuver, the Russians were firing some 60,000 rounds per day , occasionally more. Today the Russians shoot at most 20,000 rounds a day – often fewer, and they are digging deep into their own residual stockpiles to sustain even that limited rate . All the while, Russia is shopping around the world for munitions, including in Iran and North Korea . More than anything else, and contrary to the “Realist” paradigm in Political Science, Ukraine has shown yet again what a mobilized free and patriotic people can accomplish when their home is attacked and their fellow citizens murdered. Another mutiny of mobilized Russians on an army base in Kazan. They were given rusted AKs, not enough water & food. There have been multiple such mutinies since Russia initiated the draft, due to shortages of supplies & poor living conditions. pic.twitter.com/qUb57yIxFP ISW had previously assessed that the Kremlin’s force generation campaigns are unlikely to decisively affect the course of the war unless Russia addresses its fundamental problems with supplying its war effort in Ukraine. Russian forces achieved some victories in the first stages of the invasion due to Russia’s rapid use of its manpower and reliance on artillery superiority, and the Kremlin’s inability to replace expended personnel and munitions may further undermine its ability to wage protracted combat. Russian sources are increasingly also acknowledging that Russia’s ammunition and supply shortages are decisively impeding the ability of Russian forces to advance. A prominent Russian milblogger (and member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mobilization working group) stated on a federal TV program that Russian force generation efforts such as mobilization are not sufficient, noting that Russia’s success on the frontlines is contingent upon its economy and military-industrial complex. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces previously depleted their reserves of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells and other reserves over the summer of 2022 under an assumption that excessive artillery fire would lead to faster results. Cherevaty noted that Russian forces must now transfer additional shells from rear areas in Russia and purchase additional munitions from foreign countries to counteract such shortages, resulting in a reduced rate of fire. Cherevaty added that Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots and logistics have also inhibited Russia’s ability to unload munitions close to the frontlines, reducing the intensity of Russia’s artillery fire. US and Ukrainian officials told CNN on January 10 that Russia’s daily rate of artillery fire has decreased in some areas by 75%, a historic low since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. These officials noted that Russian forces may be rationing artillery shells as a result of dwindling supplies, or could be reassessing their tactics. The Russian army had a long history of engagement with #leopards , and quite a bloody one. The leopard (almost extinct), tiger, and cheetah (both extinct) at the National Museum of Georgia are a vivid testimony of the environmental change that Russian imperialism brought along. 🧵 pic.twitter.com/lFJ4qavBpu “I want to especially mention the paratroopers of the 77th separate airmobile brigade, who together with the fighters of the 46th separate airmobile brigade in Soledar hold their positions and inflict significant losses on the enemy. Thank you, guys!” Zelensky said. President Volodymyr Zelensky has thanked all Ukrainian defenders and praised the paratroopers and soldiers who are holding their positions in Soledar and inflicting significant losses on the enemy. President Volodymyr Zelensky said this in his video address to the nation, Ukrinform reports. New @hrw World Report #Rights2023 is out. Ukraine chapter summarizes the atrocities & other abuses Russian forces carried out in war against 🇺🇦 & shattering toll on civilians. More than 6900 civilians killed since Feb 24. https://t.co/Z02FK9FsEl pic.twitter.com/F9Upl8zcNI Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast) Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove).[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups within 44km northwest of Svatove near Kyslivka, Vilshana, Tabaivka, Krokhmalne, and Pershotravneve in Kharkiv Oblast.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Kreminna, which may indicate that Ukrainian forces have made further advances towards the settlement.[21] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that heavy fighting continued on the approaches to Kreminna over the last two days and that Russian forces have transferred elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) to the vulnerable Kreminna sector of the front line.[22] The UK MoD suggested that Russian commanders are attempting to deploy VDV units in their doctrinal role as an elite rapid reaction force, instead of the past Russian practice in Kherson Oblast of deploying these formations as long-term, ground-holding forces.[23] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Ukrainian forces improved their tactical positions near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and are preventing Russian forces from attacking the settlement.[24] www.understandingwar.org/... x “Out of its force of nearly 50,000 mercenaries— including 40,000 convicts—[Wagner Group] has sustained over 4,100 killed and 10,000 wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December near Bakhmut,” a senior admin official said. https://t.co/rBoxxa8EVA — Natasha Bertrand (@NatashaBertrand) January 10, 2023 Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) See topline text for information regarding Russian offensive operations in Soledar. Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself; within 19km northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka, Sil, Krasna Hora, Paraskoviivka, and Pidhorodne; and within 22km southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Mayorsk.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are storming Ukrainian positions near Blahodatne (11km northeast of Bakhmut) and that Wagner Group elements are attempting to advance in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[26] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces completely captured Opytne (4km south of Bakhmut), although ISW cannot independently verify that Russian forces have done so.[27] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are conducting assaults on Bakhmut from the direction of Opytne and circulated footage purporting to show Russian forces engaging in small arms fire with Ukrainian forces in southern parts of the city.[28] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka) and near Krasnohorivka (23km southwest of Avdiivka).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to attack near Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka) from Opytne (4km southwest of Avdiivka) and conducted an assault in the direction of Nevelske (15km southwest of Avdiivka).[30] Another Russian milblogger posted footage on January 11 purporting to show Russian forces on the western outskirts of Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka) and claimed that he was able to walk around the western outskirts as Russian forces now completely control the settlement.[31] ISW cannot independently verify that Russian forces have completely captured Marinka. Geolocated footage posted on January 11 shows that Russian forces hold positions further west of Novoselivka Druha (10km northeast of Avdiivka).[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[33] www.understandingwar.org/... Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued defensive operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 12 that Russian forces constructed a network of trenches and dugouts in Radensk, Kherson Oblast (25km southeast of Kherson City along the E97 Kherson City-Kalanchak highway), using shipping containers that they had previously used at hospitals in the surrounding areas.[34] Russian sources claimed on January 12 that Russian forces still control part of Velyki Potemkin Island, southwest of Kherson City in the Dnipro River delta, although ISW cannot independently verify these claims.[35] Russian forces continued routine strikes on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on January 12.[36] Russian forces are continuing efforts to establish further control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as of January 12. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian forces are bringing engineers from Russia to the ZNPP as existing ZNPP workers continue to refuse to sign a contract with Rosatom.[37] www.understandingwar.org/... x The #Kremlin will now enforce Russian maps that claim sovereignty over #Crimea & parts of #Ukraine. Any person in opposition will receive hefty fines and jail time. But, as we all know, saying something doesn't make it so, @mfa_russia. #CrimeaIsUkraine https://t.co/vs3c3lSOnT — Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member (@SenateForeign) January 12, 2023 x Top Putin regime propagandist Vladimir Solovyov is now casually calling for Russia to launch false flag terror attacks against France and Britain pic.twitter.com/Lg2nB8uEmn — Business Ukraine mag (@Biz_Ukraine_Mag) January 12, 2023 “The pattern unfortunately that seems to underlie a lot of the most enthusiastic Russian propagandists is that they have been dealing with severely damaged personalities and personal failure for most of their lives. In fact, the overlap between the number of Russian propagandists who also turn out to be convicted sex offenders is absolutely startling. There are some deep-seated fundamental personality flaws that actually predispose people to being available to be made use of by Russia. And if you look back at the KGB handbooks for recruiting agents of influence, agents of subversion, or indeed propagandists, then you can see very clearly that Russia understood the misfits make the good targets - the people with a grudge, the people who feel they've been treated unfairly by the world because they've been consistent failures, and therefore seek revenge. And the revenge coming through so strongly in some of the verbal attacks that you hear from the trolls, from the so-called independent journalists, the ones pushing the Russian propaganda lines, because the bile and the vitriol and the hatred that they pour out when they're talking about people who criticize Russia, it's extremely personal. And it's plainly tapping deeply into their own personality defects.”-Keir Giles on RADICALIZED Truth Survives podcast, January 10, 2023 x ‘Reds Under the Bed’ - Russia’s War on Everybody No, really. https://t.co/38ygb57eDg — Heidi Cuda (@Heidi_Cuda) January 13, 2023 x A new strategic offensive in the spring or early summer by Russia is a distinct possibility, says @GeneralClark. It could happen through Belarus or in Ukraine’s east, but probably not in Ukraine’s south. Watch more from this week’s @ACEurasia event: 🇺🇦➡️ https://t.co/leuLq2balP pic.twitter.com/oRPzoTBujL — Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) January 12, 2023 x ⚡️ Generators with a total capacity as one nuclear power unit were brought to Ukraine - Forbes The average capacity of all imported devices is at least 1 GW. During 11 months of 2022, almost 354,000 generators were imported to Ukraine. 👉 @Flash_news_ua pic.twitter.com/zzHBHamRoE — FLASH (@Flash_news_ua) January 12, 2023 x #Ukraine: A Russian T-72B tank was destroyed in Marinka, #Donetsk Oblast by a Ukrainian commercial drone with a HEAT munition installed. A Russian BMP and T-72B3 tank were also hit by the same drones but the results are unclear. pic.twitter.com/Ehuw0TPJVz — 🇺🇦 Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) January 12, 2023 x Italy has sent three more 155mm M109L self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine after pre-sale repair. pic.twitter.com/hc7DH26yu7 — NOËL 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) January 12, 2023 x The European Union is catching up on support for Ukraine after lagging behind the United States throughout the summer and early autumn of 2022, writes @LianaFix. https://t.co/esuULC3KFy — Council on Foreign Relations (@CFR_org) January 13, 2023 x Ukraine aid is a point of contention on the international left. Its ambiguity is indicative of broader complex issues anti-imperialists will face as great power competition heats up in an increasingly multipolar world. https://t.co/T0Oj02TVcV — September (@septemberreload) January 12, 2023 x Our @AtlanticCouncil briefing "How allied Sweden and Finland can Secure Northern Europe" in the Finnish press @hsfi 🇫🇮to-the-point headline: "Northern Europe must have such a strong armed force that Russia will not dare attack."@AnnwieAnna @JesperLehto https://t.co/02CFpFVybT — Eric Adamson (@eadamson91) January 12, 2023 x To the fronts. If you want to see an overview of what's happening at all the front lines, check out my interactive map https://t.co/LVAcxP8mbZ — NOËL 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) January 12, 2023 You only have to google the words “Ukraine” and “reconstruction” to see that a lot of thought has already gone into postwar planning. The eye-watering sums of money currently mooted by the European Union, international financial institutions, and the governments of Ukraine and its allies would, if they came through, pay for everything from rebuilding housing and infrastructure to decarbonization. Those sums can only be notional as long as the war continues. But assuming that a very large part of Ukraine—if not all of it—remains or becomes free of the Russians, it is worth beginning to ask about the country’s future. How you see that future depends on whether you are an optimist or a pessimist. The pessimistic view is that Ukraine will be a giant new Bosnia. If, for example, a hypothetical peace deal restored Ukraine’s borders but gave some form of autonomy to Crimea and the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk that were under de facto Russian control from 2014 and annexed last year, the country could become a seriously dysfunctional state. That is what happened in Bosnia, where decentralization and constant threats of secession by the Serb-controlled region make it difficult and sometimes impossible for the country’s fourteen different governments—which emerged as part of the deal that ended the Bosnian war in 1995—to provide their 3.2 million citizens with basic services. Every year the country’s population shrinks and ages, a trend that was already underway in pre-invasion Ukraine. For the moment, however, most Ukrainians are optimists, buoyed by the remarkable victories of their army, which has expelled the Russians from half the territory they seized in the spring…. No one really knows how many people are left in Ukraine. The UNHCR reports that 7.9 million have fled the country, although by September some 1.2 million were reported to have come home. Because most men of fighting age are not allowed to leave, the vast majority of the refugees are women and children. The longer the war goes on, the fewer will return as they put down roots abroad, where after the war the men may join them. Based on GDP per capita—$4,835 in 2021, according to the World Bank—Ukraine is the poorest country in Europe. But you only have to be there a short while to see that it is far richer than official statistics suggest. If the country was really so poor, most Ukrainians’ standard of living would be drastically worse than it is. Tymofiy Mylovanov, the president of the Kyiv School of Economics, thinks that if you take into account the informal economy—everything from the production of counterfeit goods to tax evasion—Ukraine’s real economy might be double the size it is on paper. But the war has also prompted Mylovanov to reevaluate his thinking about economics. GDP calculations continue to measure the same things during a war as before one, he told me, but in wartime “there is a structural shift in what people want.” Take, for example, an IT specialist who had a $200,000 salary before the invasion and is now mobilized and working in satellite communications security: “In GDP calculations it will show that we lost $200,000 of value added, but in practice he is saving lives.” Mylovanov doesn’t think there is any prospect of Ukraine languishing for decades like Bosnia has. The dynamism Ukrainians have discovered during the war, he suspects, will pay dividends long into the future, attracting investment and encouraging members of the diaspora to return. The power of the prewar oligarchs is in abeyance and the country already has a highly diversified economy, with strengths in agriculture, tech, steel, and several other sectors. Even more importantly, Mylovanov argues that the extraordinary and unexpected course of the war since February has changed Ukraine’s place in the world. In the past it was seen as poor, corrupt, harassed, in hock to oligarchs, and attacked by Russia. Now it is seen as a “a winner country…a country of resilience, antifragility, and remarkable heroism.” It had, he told me, become “an international brand.” www.nybooks.com/... [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/1/12/2144730/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-324-Russian-forces-continue-offensive-operations-around-Bakhmut-and-Avdiivka Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/