(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 343: The question is who will strike first and where [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-01-31 Sooner or later, most likely in the next few months, one side will make its move and try to break the deadlock. The question is: who will strike first and where. The pattern of delivery of Western aid has powerfully shaped the pattern of this conflict. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be attempting to fully supplant Wagner forces near Bakhmut and frame the traditional Russian military command structure as the sole victor around Bakhmut, assuming Russian forces eventually take the city. The Russian MoD and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin have made competing claims over recent Russian gains around Soledar and Bakhmut following the capture of Soledar. [xvi] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces captured Blahodatne just west of Soledar on January 31 after Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces seized the settlement on January 28. [xvii] Prigozhin is likely overcompensating for Wagner forces’ reduced combat capabilities and reliance on conventional forces by claiming territorial gains before the MoD can feasibly claim them for Russian conventional forces. [xviii] The Russian MoD likely aims to undermine the Wagner Group’s influence in Ukraine despite the MoD’s reliance on Wagner forces to sustain the Russian effort around Bakhmut since July and to take horrendous losses for minimal territorial gains. [xix] To cut the conflict short, Ukraine is hoping to deliver a defeat big enough to shock Russia out of its current state of passive acceptance. It is far from clear yet what (form) that will take. Since the all out invasion of Ukraine the Russian army has lost at least 1700 tanks. This has caused the Russian army some supply problems, when they are re-forming their mauled units. Fighting has also revealed the need for upgrades on most of the Russian tank designs. The most obvious issues with the existing Russian tank fleet are the insufficient armor protection, the lack of reverse mobility and the vulnerability of the automatic loaders and their ammunition carousels. Although the last one has gifted us the sport of Turret Throwing. blog.vantagepointnorth.net/... x Russian propaganda tries to convince its audience that US Abrams tanks are worse than even Soviet tanks. pic.twitter.com/ykuN0v6zpm — Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) January 31, 2023 x Ukraine to receive up to 140 tanks in the first wave, reports Sky News. "The tank coalition now has 12 members. I can note that in the first wave of contributions, the Ukrainian armed forces will receive between 120 and 140 Western-model tanks." foreign minister Kuleba said. pic.twitter.com/FVNTKX97Sk — NOËL 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) January 31, 2023 General Atomic is ready to sell Ukraine two "smart" Reaper MQ-9 drones for just $1 f-16 Rivet Joint and other ISR for the war ISW does not forecast the imminent fall of Bakhmut to Russian forces, although the Ukrainian command may choose to withdraw rather than risk unacceptable losses. It is extraordinarily unlikely that Russian forces will be able to conduct a surprise encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut. Yaroslavskyi noted that the Ukrainian military command would conduct a controlled withdrawal of forces from Bakhmut to save Ukrainian soldiers’ lives, likely if the Ukrainian command assesses that the risk of an encirclement of the city is imminent.[vi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be attempting to fully supplant Wagner forces near Bakhmut and frame the traditional Russian military command structure as the sole victor around Bakhmut, assuming Russian forces eventually take the city. The Russian MoD and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin have made competing claims over recent Russian gains around Soledar and Bakhmut following the capture of Soledar.[xvi] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces captured Blahodatne just west of Soledar on January 31 after Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces seized the settlement on January 28.[xvii] Prigozhin is likely overcompensating for Wagner forces’ reduced combat capabilities and reliance on conventional forces by claiming territorial gains before the MoD can feasibly claim them for Russian conventional forces.[xviii] The Russian MoD likely aims to undermine the Wagner Group’s influence in Ukraine despite the MoD’s reliance on Wagner forces to sustain the Russian effort around Bakhmut since July and to take horrendous losses for minimal territorial gains.[xix] www.criticalthreats.org/... x #RussianUkrainianWar #RussiaIsATerroristState "Every trip—to the store, to the barber, to a friend—in Bakhmut can be your last": The struggle of everyday life in a besieged Ukrainian city https://t.co/0Z0JCZSrgN via @WSJ — MayBe (@thebronxing) January 31, 2023 the manual given to Russian soldiers for this war...As Russia makes basic military training mandatory in schools, pupils that forget their kit are warned they’ll have to drive tanks in their vest and pants. instructions for UA troops to surrender to RF forces x "Following the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion [of Ukraine], cyberattacks have frequently preceded or accompanied more conventional military operations."@YShchyhol details the lessons of Russian cyber warfare in #UkraineAlert ⬇️ https://t.co/OooPAZzGGb — Eurasia Center (@ACEurasia) January 31, 2023 x If you would like to have a greater understanding of intelligence and espionage, the Economist's defence editor has picked seven good books on spying.#RussianUkrainianWar https://t.co/6IoDVpf8tk — Michael Greer 💙 (@MGreer_PR) January 30, 2023 x A thread about Western Orientalism towards Eastern Europe 🧶 Centering of Western points of view and othering attitudes towards the East (Orientalism) have for a long time been commonplace in Western social and political thinking. (1/22) pic.twitter.com/6A9Dfqma28 — Mart Kuldkepp @martkuldkepp@mastodon.social (@KuldkeppMart) January 29, 2023 That this is the case is inherently problematic because Western-centrism is a form of injustice towards the out-group (Easterners, however defined). But it is also something that has distorted the West’s judgement and is therefore detrimental to the West’s own interests, (2/22) imposing costs on Western states and societies that might otherwise have been avoided. Western Orientalism has not only targeted Asia. Another type of it has been directed at Eastern Europe: an ill-defined region between the West and Russia, (3/22) differentiated from the former primarily by its real or imagined proximity to the latter. In fact, it has been exactly the lack of clarity about the borders of Eastern Europe – rather than outright racism, (4/22) as would be the case with Asia – that has enabled the West to dismiss Eastern European views and voices. Instead of being accorded independent agency and existence, (5/22) Eastern Europe has long been cast as a form of malleable buffer zone and space of competition between the West and Russia. Eastern European interests have been defined only or primarily in reference to Western and Russian interests, (6/22) and Eastern European lived experience has been seen as no more than a form of peripheral discourse that is either serving or reacting against the two centres that are pulling it in opposite directions. The usual conclusion drawn from this is that, ultimately, (7/22) the fate of Eastern Europe must be decided over its own heads: through negotiations between the centres. Eastern Europeans themselves have also been deeply affected by this thinking. (8/22) Their need to survive has dictated that they must reject Russian imperialism and colonialism as decisively as possible. The way to accomplish that has been through alignment with the West to the greatest possible extent, (9/22) which has included rejection of any labels of ‘Eastern-Europeanness’, usually by reimagining the region’s borders in a way that would exclude one’s own nation. Being Eastern European has been a form of imprisonment on the mental map of the West. Conversely, (10/22) to become Central, Northern or Western European has meant to escape the prison. The wish to align with the West has directly translated into Eastern European willingness to be rule-takers from the West, (11/22) and readiness for self-denial when their historical experience does not align with Western norms of appropriateness. Needing to counter Orientalist stereotypes of Easterners being ‘immature’, ‘emotional’, ‘aggressive’, ‘backwards’, ‘nationalistic’ etc., (12/22) Eastern Europeans have ill-afforded expressions of views or behaviour that would be seen as reinforcing exactly these stereotypes. Nowhere has this been more notable than in Eastern European memories and ongoing experiences of Russian imperialism and colonialism, (13/22) which they have had to consistently downplay, deny, and diminish as much as possible, to be seen as West-alike as possible. This learned naivety, superficial as it is, (14/22) had been internalised by many Eastern Europeans to the extent that they themselves found surprising when faced with Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Nevertheless, (15/22) their surprise was minor compared to the cognitive challenge experienced by the Western societies that, for the most part, were completely unprepared for Russia’s all-out war. Directly as a consequence of having failed to learn the requisite lessons, (16/22) the West committed a series of strategic errors, which have cost Ukrainian lives and would likely have cost more, had there not appeared a (belated and partial) willingness to take Eastern European voices seriously. At the same time, (17/22) the failure to adequately judge Russia in good time has tested the resilience of the West itself, forcing it to adopt all manner of ad hoc measures to deal with the changed security situation. Right now, (18/22) the painful period of Western learning and course-correction is still ongoing. The extent and seriousness of the Russian threat is still being misjudged in important ways. Orientalism towards Eastern Europe remains a stumbling block. But as liberal democracies, (19/22) Western European states are capable of learning, and their Eastern European interlocutors now feel more empowered than ever to guide them. It is notable how this process has been significantly easier for the extra-European Western powers, the UK, and the US, (20/22) that see the continent as a more integrated whole and have therefore been able to act with less prejudice towards its Eastern periphery. (21/22) END. (22/22) • • • George Kennan, the remarkable U.S. diplomat and probing observer of international relations, is famous for forecasting the collapse of the Soviet Union. Less well known is his warning in 1948 that no Russian government would ever accept Ukrainian independence. Foreseeing a deadlocked struggle between Moscow and Kyiv, Kennan made detailed suggestions at the time about how Washington should deal with a conflict that pitted an independent Ukraine against Russia. He returned to this subject half a century later. Kennan, then in his 90s, cautioned that the eastward expansion of NATO would doom democracy in Russia and ignite another Cold War. [...] Notwithstanding the vicissitudes of the last 75 years, Kennan’s advice remains relevant today. A federation allowing for regional autonomy in eastern Ukraine and perhaps even in Crimea could help both sides coexist. Many analysts tend to portray the current conflict as “Putin’s war,” but Kennan believed that almost any strong Russian leader would eventually push back against the total separation of Ukraine. Finally, the realities of demography and geography dictate that Russia in the long run will remain the principal power in these often tragic “bloodlands.” For the sake of both regional stability and long-term U.S. security, Washington needs to sustain a hardheaded, clear-eyed empathy for the interests of the Russians as well as of the Ukrainians and other nationalities. www.foreignaffairs.com/... x ⚡️ In Ukraine, public control over the purchase of food and fuel for the army is returned "We agreed to return public control over the purchase of clothing, fuel and lubricants, taking into account the restrictions of martial law," said Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov. — FLASH (@Flash_news_ua) January 31, 2023 x The point is not how much oil Russia exports (in fact, the more the better), but how much money it gets in turn. An ideal Western policy mix would let Russia flood global oil markets (to ease pressure on low-income countries), but at a huge discount. pic.twitter.com/z3BC59aanX — Lion Hirth (@LionHirth) January 30, 2023 x The Kremlin has called Boris Johnson a liar and denied claims made by the ex-PM that Vladimir Putin threatened to kill him with a missile https://t.co/xiJUEHwcCn — Sky News (@SkyNews) January 30, 2023 [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/1/31/2150432/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-343-The-question-is-who-will-strike-first-and-where Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/