(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 344: GLSDB says “Leave Ukraine and peace talks can begin” [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-02-01 U.S. readies $2 billion-plus Ukraine aid package with longer-range weapons as “Ukraine's defence minister has said Russia is preparing a major new offensive, and warned that it could begin as soon as 24 February.” On February 1 the Russian fascist invaders launched 6 missile attacks, 4 of which hit civilian infrastructure in Slov'yans'k, Kramators'k and Druzhkivka in Donetsk region. They conducted 4 air strikes and fired 73 shots from rocket salvo systems. People died from Russian strikes. pic.twitter.com/uHnvQWF5VZ President Volodymyr Zelensky is under pressure over his country’s bid to join the E.U. as some European leaders plan a Friday visit to Kyiv. Ukrainian officials are continuing to warn about Russia’s intention of conducting a decisive offensive operation in Donbas in February and/or March, supporting ISW’s most likely course of action assessment (MLCOA). Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated on February 1 that Ukraine is on the eve of an active phase of combat that will take place over the next two months.[1] Yusov noted that the poor state of Russian military equipment will force the Russian military command to mass forces to outnumber Ukrainian defenders in order to make gains. Ukrainian Colonel Serhiy Hrabskyi stated that Russia does not have sufficient forces to conduct an attack along the entire 1,500km frontline in Ukraine and will concentrate its efforts on seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[2] A prominent Russian milblogger observed that the prospect of a Russian offensive operation does not appear to be triggering panic among Ukrainian forces, who are continuing to build out their counteroffensive plans.[3] ISW reported on January 31 that Ukrainian military officials reiterated their intent to launch major counteroffensive operations by summer 2023.[4] x WTF is a #GLSDB? I’ve got something you can read on that: Factbox: U.S. rocket-powered bomb would double Ukraine's strike range https://t.co/Kw0JU7yH2M — Mike Stone (@MichaelStone) February 1, 2023 The State of the War x fwiw, if look directly at the Pew poll, a higher percentage of Americans (31%) say US giving about the right amount of aid to Ukraine. 26% say giving too much. and 15% say say US should be giving more. but write up focused on the 1/4 minorityhttps://t.co/10yti0vWnE — Laura Rozen (@lrozen) February 1, 2023 Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast) Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 1. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on February 1 that Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in heavy fighting near Kreminna and Svatove. Haidai added that Russian forces have not yet formed an assault group in the Svatove-Kreminna direction but are continuing to accumulate manpower and military equipment in the area.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 31 that the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District continued offensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line, with the 488th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment reportedly advancing 800 meters into Ukrainian positions.[15] The milblogger added that elements of the 254th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are continuing to carry out counterbattery fire against Ukrainian forces on unspecified segments of the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that the 144th Motorized Rifle Division also repelled Ukrainian efforts to advance into Kreminna, targeted Ukrainian supply routes in the area, and advanced into the forests west of Kreminna.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[17] www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne (25km northeast), Rozdolivka (15km northeast), Blahodatne (5km north), Krasna Hora (5km north, and Paraskoviivka (6km north); and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest).[18] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that as of February 1, Russian forces still have not taken Bakhmut into an operational encirclement and denied January 31 claims from a Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) source that Russian forces took control of Sacco i Vanzetti village (17km north of Bakhmut).[19] Geolocated combat footage shows that Russian forces have made slight advances northeast of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora and on the northeastern and eastern outskirts of Bakhmut, as well as south of Bakhmut near Opytne and on Bakhmut’s southern outskirts.[20] A Russian milblogger posted video footage of a Wagner Group fighter in Blahodatne who claimed that Wagner has pushed Ukrainian forces three to four kilometers away from Blahodatne.[21] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner has advanced along certain streets on the northern and eastern outskirts of Bakhmut itself.[22] Russian sources continued to claim that Wagner Group forces are pushing northwest of the Klishchiivka area towards Ivanivske and Bakhmut’s southwestern outskirts in order to cut the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[23] www.understandingwar.org/... “There’s a couple of shots I made that day that will be with me,” he said. One was a Russian in a T-shirt who was carrying a box of ammunition more than 1,800 metres behind the front line – a distance Teflon says was the longest shot he’s ever made. “He saw no threat, he thought he was safe. But it’s my job to ensure that they know that they’re not safe anywhere,” www.theglobeandmail.com/... x How Many Su-27 Interceptors Does Ukraine Have Left? via @forbes https://t.co/V46MPQ214s — Joe Panda (@JoeShutter) February 1, 2023 Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces are continuing to carry out disruption missions on islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast in an effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from gaining ground on the islands. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on February 1 that Russian forces are increasing the number of reconnaissance and sabotage attempts in the area of the Dnipro River delta likely in an effort to simulate the threat of an escalation south of Kherson City.[31] Geolocated footage published on January 30 also likely showed the aftermath of Ukrainian artillery fire on Russian forces conducting a raid on one of the islands in the delta.[32] Humenyuk noted that Russian force composition, weather conditions, terrain, and the use of civilian boats are not sufficient to force the Dnipro River, however. Humenyuk added that there are no concentrations of the Russian special purpose forces or forces with high combat readiness that could threaten the west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian forces did not have the capacity to hold western Kherson Oblast with an abundance of ammunition and elite forces due to disrupted logistics in fall 2022 and are unlikely to be able to restore lost positions in the region. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), in turn, claimed that Russian forces destroyed two motorboats and eliminated up to 10 Ukrainian servicemen near Kruhle Lake, about 5km south of Kherson City.[33] www.understandingwar.org/... x Video posted two weeks ago of a Russian T-72B3 tank with a roof screen in Kherson Oblast. https://t.co/Vf6x09oqa7 pic.twitter.com/PhVQb34JU7 — Rob Lee (@RALee85) February 2, 2023 x Ukraine sinks five Russian boats carrying recon and sabotage teams https://t.co/PVpTHNKo9U — becky theone stewart (@StewartTheone) February 1, 2023 x Vladimir #Putin has signed a decree allowing the Kremlin to crack down on domestic activities deemed contrary to its interests, according to ISW. The order allows for entire regions of Russia to be deemed "under terrorist threat" indefinitely, ISW wrote.https://t.co/bfv3Fgab8S — ISW (@TheStudyofWar) February 1, 2023 Flashpoint’s new report on the role of open-source intelligence (OSINT) in the Russia-Ukraine war has now been released. As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, Flashpoint has released its report of ten real-life examples detailing how OSINT has helped organisations across the public and private sectors understand a hybrid war that spans cyber, physical, and informational domains. “It has become a near imperative for just about every organisation in the world, from governments to enterprises, to be able to acknowledge and calculate their risk profiles in relation to the war,” said Andras Toth-Czifra, Senior Intelligence Analyst at Flashpoint. “And because we will likely still see changes in how this war is fought—by what means and at which targets—the importance of obtaining accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence remains essential.” Report highlights include: Recruitment on the frontlines: Where the convergence of cyber and physical intelligence identifies how internet-driven communication and funding influence and enable kinetic movement and warfare. Cryptocurrency and illicit financing Destructive malware wipers Killnet: Russia’s favourite DDoS hacktivist collective has conducted distributed denial-of-service attacks on entities it deems to be supportive of Ukraine. Despite Killnet’s loud claims of being an ideologically motivated collective, the group still accepts commercial orders. All of those mentions of Killnet in the world’s top publications have likely brought new DDoS customers to the table. Battle for the Russian-Language darknet. One of the ongoing processes that Russia’s February invasion has accelerated is the fragmentation of the Russian-speaking cyber underground. This includes a rivalry that emerged over the summer between two leading competitors, RuTor/OMGOMG and WayAWay/Kraken. Documenting violence: For the duration of the war, eyewitnesses, military bloggers, correspondents, soldiers, and mercenaries alike have shared both textual information and visual media on Telegram and other platforms. These have been used as material for open-source investigations of the placement, activities, and identities of invading troops, as well as the atrocities committed by them. In future court proceedings on war crimes, this data could be crucial evidence. War bloggers and policy: Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) bring strength to Russian military Mobilisation protests in Russia . . Disinformation, conspiracy theories, and justification narratives: x Father and son Zimenkov acted as intermediaries between subsanctioned defense companies and the governments of countries interested in buying Russian and Belarusian weapons, mostly from Africa and Latin America. 2/2https://t.co/Nfa1G0IKxK — NEXTA (@nexta_tv) February 1, 2023 x I think this is an interesting article, mainly because it discusses battlefield learning and #adaptation in #Ukraine. There are many skills needed by military institutions to be successful in combat. But fostering a learning culture is vital. 1/15https://t.co/Ozd5kPeaAN — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) February 1, 2023 2/ It is very likely, in the coming weeks and months, that both Ukrainian and Russian military forces will commence offensive campaigns in different areas of #Ukraine. It is very likely, in the coming weeks and months, that both Ukrainian and Russian military forces will commence offensive campaigns in different areas of 3/ As I wrote in a recent article exploring the coming campaigns: "Over winter both sides will have been preparing and shaping the environment for these offensives." The Campaigns to Come 4/ Further: "They will have been training soldiers, deploying units, conducting reconnaissance while seeking weaknesses to exploit in the offensives to come." 5/ Perhaps one of the most important endeavours of both sides since their major campaigns in 2022 will have been their programs to examine the key lessons from operations in 2022, and then turn them into force-wide adaptations for their 2023 campaigns. 6/ Both sides have adapted during the war. Russia, expecting to undertake a coup de main in the first days of the war, had to adapt from around D+3 to conduct combat operations. It had to reorient the mindset of its troops and adjust its logistics to do this. 7/ Ukraine has adapted its battlefield tactics, and its long range targeting and strike activities. More adaptation will occur if Ukraine receives the 150km range GLSDB. Ukraine has adapted its battlefield tactics, and its long range targeting and strike activities. More adaptation will occur if Ukraine receives the 150km range GLSDB. Ukraine Poised to Become First Operator of 150-Kilometer Precision Bomb 8/ So, a vital undertaking for both sides in the lead up to their 2023 campaigns will have been to assess where they can quickly improve tactics, recon and intel collection & dissemination, force structure, C2, and fire / logistic support. 9/ Some of this learning is done away from the battlefield - particularly the operational analysis and dissemination of lessons through new training, techniques and doctrine. Some of this learning is done away from the battlefield - particularly the operational analysis and dissemination of lessons through new training, techniques and doctrine. 10/ But ultimately, the most important 'classroom' in this war is combat. Whether it is close combat in urban environments or trench warfare, or long range combat through artillery duels and aerial combat, combat is the great teacher of soldiers. 11/ And therein lies the importance of this @BBCNews article. It gets to the heart of the importance of learning, and of adapting more quickly (and at a higher quality) than the enemy. And therein lies the importance of thisarticle. It gets to the heart of the importance of learning, and of adapting more quickly (and at a higher quality) than the enemy. 12/ A Ukrainian soldier quoted in the piece states: "We understand that Russia is learning every day and changing their strategy. And I think we need to learn faster." 13/ He has described a key battlefield advantage that both sides will want to build and sustain in the lead up to, and during, the 2023 offensives: the ability to learn, to share lessons and adapt at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, and do it faster than the enemy. 14/ As Barno & Bensahel write: “preparing to adapt in the next war is just as important as preparing to fight itself.” So while tanks and munitions are vital, winning the adaptation battle, built on tactical & institutional learning, is a core part of war. End. 15/ Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread: @BBCNews @DefenceHQ @DefenceU @DefensePost @TDF_UA Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread: • • • x WTF is a #GLSDB? I’ve got something you can read on that: Factbox: U.S. rocket-powered bomb would double Ukraine's strike range https://t.co/Kw0JU7yH2M — Mike Stone (@MichaelStone) February 1, 2023 x Visual of the approximate area which will get in range if Ukraine are provided with 150km standoff weapons. This might be happening according to Reuters. pic.twitter.com/hW4iHpI3zh — Def Mon (@DefMon3) January 31, 2023 Norwegian academics, rights campaigners, bestselling authors and a former minister have urged Oslo to increase its support for Ukraine, saying the government must do more to help after earning billions in extra oil and gas revenue from Russia’s war. In a letter published in the VG tabloid, signatories including the former foreign minister Knut Vollebæk, the anthropologist Erika Fatland and Henrik Urdal of the Oslo Peace Research Institute said Norway was “the only country in Europe” to be profiting from the war. The wealthy Scandinavian country’s oil and gas revenues have soared to record levels over the past 12 months as energy prices tripled after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Norway replaced Russia as Europe’s largest supplier of natural gas. public pledges of support for Ukraine over the same period amounted to just €1.27bn. Compared with original estimates, Oslo’s state budget projected an additional €180bn (£160bn) in oil and gas income for 2022 and 2023, the signatories wrote, adding that the government’sover the same period amounted to just €1.27bn. Norway’s prime minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, has dismissed any suggestion that the country was profiteering from the war. “It’s a notion I flatly refuse”, Støre told AFP on Tuesday, adding that a major “multi-year support package” would be announced in the coming days. The letter acknowledged more humanitarian and military support would be coming and the value of arms supplies, in particular, was hard to calculate, but said: “Either way, Norway can afford to contribute more to Ukraine than we are doing. Far more.” www.theguardian.com/... [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/1/2150607/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-344-GLSDB-says-Leave-Ukraine-and-peace-talks-can-begin Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/