(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 349: The east is a logical political and military objective for Russia [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-02-06 As Kyiv pursues an anti-corruption campaign that has led to dismissals and resignations, President Vladimir Putin signed a law to suspend public disclosure rules. Tom Friedman is now several Friedman Units late but asks the same middling question with which the war began: “There are also many voices on the left, though, who are legitimately asking: Is it really worth risking World War III to drive Russia all the way out of Eastern Ukraine? Haven’t we hurt Putin so badly by now that he won’t be trying something like Ukraine again soon? Time for a dirty deal?” Ukrainian officials assess that Russian forces are preparing to launch a large-scale decisive offensive in eastern Ukraine in mid-to-late February. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov stated on February 5 that the Ukrainian military is expecting Russia to start its decisive offensive around February 24 to symbolically tie the attack to the first anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[1] Reznikov also clarified that the Ukrainian military has not observed the formation of Russian offensive groups in the Kharkiv and Chernihiv directions or Belarus; Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk noted that Russian forces are likely concentrating on launching offensive operations in the east rather than in southern Ukraine.[2] An unnamed advisor to the Ukrainian military told Financial Times that Russia intends to launch an offensive in the next 10 days (by February 15), a timeline that would allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian positions before the arrival of Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.[3] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are continuing to deploy reserves to Luhansk Oblast to strike after February 15.[4] But is Russian General Valery Gerasimov and his severely wounded Russian military capable of launching an offensive in late-February or early March? The short answer is yes, but it will be ugly. Particularly because of the greatly diminished quality of Russian troops available to him. Ukraine’s new MBTs could be on the battlefield in as little as “3 to 6 weeks,” and Ukrainian soldiers begin training next week in Germany and Poland. That would mean an estimated time of arrival on the battlefield as soon as March 18. Given this quickly closing window, it is unlikely Russia would wait, let alone accommodate, a train-up period and deployment of the Leopard 2 MBTs to the front lines without first launching a preemptive strike. Muddy fields notwithstanding, Putin may be forced to accelerate his planning and move Moscow’s timeline forward. Increasingly in the months ahead, Ukraine will become militarily stronger, especially from a combined offensive force standpoint. The weapon systems and ammunition, including the Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBT), pledged by NATO are indeed formidable – and potentially decisive. Russian forces are keeping Ukrainian troops tied down with attacks in the eastern Donbas region as Moscow assembles additional combat power there for an expected offensive in the coming weeks, Ukrainian officials said Monday. ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - FEB 6 7-day average of Troops, Tanks, Artillery, APVs & Vehicles increases between days TODAY'S REPORTED LOSSES: 4x daily changes over 7-day average 5x 7-day average increases + 7-day average of land-based equipment up as well 📈 https://t.co/5Ems5fK4IN pic.twitter.com/kGToADIWHm Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast) Russian forces likely made tactical gains northeast of Kupyansk between February 4 and 6. Multiple Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured Synkivka (10 km northeast of Kupyansk) on February 6, though one milblogger reported that this capture is unconfirmed.[43] A prominent Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses in Dvorichne (about 9 km north of Synkivka) and established positions on the settlement’s western outskirts on February 4.[44] Geolocated combat footage posted on February 5 shows Ukrainian artillery striking Russian forces in western Dvorichne, supporting the milblogger's report.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff did not report that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in these areas between February 5 and 6. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of previous positions on the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 5 - 6. A Russian milblogger reported that unspecified Russian airborne elements (likely of the 76th Airborne Division) advanced through the Serebryanka forests south of Dibrova and that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are clearing mines in an unspecified area near Yampolivka as of February 5.[46] This milblogger also reported that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division pushed Ukrainian forces from unspecified high ground along the Makiivka-Ploshchanka-Nevske line.[47] A different Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Nevske on February 5.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Kreminna and Shypylivka on February 5 but did not mention repelling attacks further west near Yampolivka or Nevske on February 5 or 6.[49] www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces have not yet succeeded in encircling Bakhmut as of February 6. A Ukrainian soldier who is fighting in Bakhmut stated on February 5 that while Russian forces are continuing efforts to interdict the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut road west of Bakhmut and the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway north of Bakhmut, supply to the city continues.[53] The soldier noted that Ukrainian troops are maintaining supply to their grouping in Bakhmut despite constant Russian shelling of critical roads.[54] Several Russian sources additionally reiterated on February 5 that Ukrainian troops are not yet withdrawing from Bakhmut.[55] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin noted that fierce battles are occurring in Bakhmut and emphasized that Ukrainian troops are not withdrawing from any part of the city, indicating that the Ukrainian command has not yet deemed the threat of encirclement imminent or exigent.[56] www.understandingwar.org/... Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces did not make any confirmed territorial gains on the southern axis on February 5 or February 6. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on February 6 that Russian forces continue aerial reconnaissance and use civilian boats for reconnaissance operations on islands in the Dnipro River delta but are not making preparations for an attack from the south and have not changed positions in the southern direction.[71] Kherson Oblast advisor Serhiy Khlan, however, stated that Russian forces may go on the offensive in the southern direction, indicating that certain Ukrainian officials are keeping the possibility of a Russian offensive in the south within their forecast cone.[72] Humenyuk also stated that Ukrainian troops destroyed two Russian concentration areas and two sabotage and reconnaissance groups on the Kinburn Spit, suggesting that Ukrainian troops are continuing to strike rear concentration areas.[73] Video footage posted on February 5 reportedly shows Russian forces dropping incendiary munitions on Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[74] The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration stated on February 5 that Russian forces focus on maintaining occupied lines and shelling civilian infrastructure along the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast.[75] Russian forces continued routine shelling in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv Oblasts on February 5 and February 6.[76] Geolocated satellite footage shows that Russian forces built a fortified base on the Arabat Spit in northeastern Crimea between October 18, 2022, and January 21, 2023.[77] www.understandingwar.org/... x Ukraine's Defence Minister Oleksiy Reznikov will be replaced by the military intel chief amid corruption scandals and ahead of an expected Russian offensive, a senior MP said Sunday. Reznikov is expected to move to the Strategic Industries Ministry. ➡️ https://t.co/sSJJ5T9JZj pic.twitter.com/A4HvdOpW4i — AFP News Agency (@AFP) February 5, 2023 The armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine started in 2014. Between then and early 2022, it had already killed over 14,000 people. Over the course of eight years, Ukrainian government forces fought Russian-backed separatists for control over much of the two heavily industrialised regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, also known as Donbas. Fierce battles in 2014-2015 ended with one third of the regions’ territory, its most urbanised part, occupied by two Russian proxy statelets, the self-described Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Between September 2014 and February 2015, Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany signed several iterations of the so-called Minsk agreements, which eventually stopped the forward movement of troops and reduced fighting significantly. But the agreements were never implemented, and the fighting transformed into a trench war, with roughly 75,000 troops facing off along a 420-km-long front line cutting through densely populated areas. The war ruined the area’s economy and heavy industries, forced millions to relocate and turned the conflict zone into one of the world’s most mine-contaminated areas. www.crisisgroup.org/... x "Ukraine has always been cynical about institutions, has created a society with a very strong sense of grassroots self-organization, and with the Orange Revolution, the sense of agency amongst many young Ukrainians has grown and grown." - @GillianTetthttps://t.co/7R7ZnkrN0M — Institute of Politics (@HarvardIOP) February 7, 2023 x Poland Plans to Become the Most Powerful Military Power in Europe https://t.co/4MwrswSDLc, by @left_voice — Left Voice (@left_voice) February 6, 2023 x BREAKING: The Polish Border Guard has announced that Poland will start building a 200 km fence along the border with Kaliningrad, Russia next month. The fence will be equipped with cameras and electronic sensors. pic.twitter.com/uakxNAQi51 — Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) February 6, 2023 x A pro-Kremlin Twitter account tweets a nonexistent Turkish newspaper, claiming “NATO soldiers” have been killed in Ukraine. @elonmusk, evidently very concerned about media corruption and fake news, takes the bait, then is asked by the account to “mediate.” pic.twitter.com/lKbB7kP1E0 — Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) February 6, 2023 x Recently there has been more speculation about the timing & size of 2023 Russian offensives in #Ukraine. That the Russians will attempt them is almost a given. Russia has been assembling the pieces of their 2023 offensives since late last year. 1/21 🧵 https://t.co/xWJNjnB1OP — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) February 7, 2023 2/ Russia has provided a political rationale through Putin’s annexation declaration, the personnel and industrial resources with the mobilisation decree in late 2022, and the changes in command that resulted in General Gerasimov being appointed as unified commander. 3/ The east is the most likely location for Russian attacks, although attacks in the south are also possible. Russian forces might use attacks in the south as feints or demonstrations to draw away Ukrainian forces in the east before launching their main effort in the Donbas. 4/ The east is a logical political and military objective for Russia. It has been supporting separatists there since 2014, and before launching his 2022 invasion, Putin recognised the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Putin announces Donetsk and Luhansk recognition 5/ What will the Ukrainians be doing to confirm this or ascertain other Russian intentions, locations for attacks and numbers and types of forces to be used? 6/ First, they would be seeking as much western intelligence as possible. This will include information on troop movements between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine as well as production numbers, and stock holdings, of long range missiles, drones, and artillery ammunition. 7/ The visit to Ukraine by the CIA director in mid-January probably facilitated the provision of some of this intelligence but there are other nations in Europe which will also be providing intelligence to The visit to Ukraine by the CIA director in mid-January probably facilitated the provision of some of this intelligence but there are other nations in Europe which will also be providing intelligence to assist the Ukrainians for the coming offensive s. 8/ Second, Ukraine will also have been conducting tactical reconnaissance in the south and east with ground and aerial reconnaissance elements. This would have been occurring for months now as they seek Russian strong and weak points in their defensive lines. 9/ These close reconnaissance missions would also be looking for locations of ammunition stockpiles and supplies, headquarters, concentrations of reserve troops, and Russian army engineer equipment that is vital in the advance to get through obstacles and over rivers. These close reconnaissance missions would also be looking for locations of ammunition stockpiles and supplies, headquarters, concentrations of reserve troops, and Russian army engineer equipment that is vital in the advance to get through obstacles and over rivers. 10/ But beyond targeting, the locations of Russian concentrations of ammunition, reserves and engineer equipment provide insights into what might be Russia’s main effort for the coming offensives. 11/In ascertaining the most likely Russian main effort, the Ukrainians can ensure they have defensive forces in place and can plan pre-emotive strikes to weaken and spoil Russian attacks. And, it can assist the Ukrainians in deciding where and when to commit operational reserves. 12/ Third, Ukraine will continue to leverage open sources of intelligence like satellite images, blogs, social media for discussions on Russian troop movements etc. this has become a very important source of intelligence. Open Secrets 13/ The meshing of civil and military collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence in this war has been one of its defining features. While perhaps not yet revolutionary, it is a significant evolution in the conduct of warfare. 14/ Finally, Ukraine will probably be using human intelligence & resistance networks in Russian-occupied areas to provide insights. This has been a source of information for deep strikes against Russian logistics, headquarters and troop accommodation locations with #HIMARS Finally, Ukraine will probably be using human intelligence & resistance networks in Russian-occupied areas to provide insights. This has been a source of information for deep strikes against Russian logistics, headquarters and troop accommodation locations with 16/ General Gerasimov was not appointed to defend current Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine & will be under pressure from Putin to deliver fast results in early 2023. Putin will definitely want something to talk about by the 1 year anniversary of his invasion. 17/ However, as we have seen from the first day of this invasion, Putin wanting battlefield victories and Putin getting battlefield victories are two very different things. 18/ Despite the influx of tens of thousands of mobilised troops, it is highly likely that there will again be a gap between Putin’s expectations for the 2023 offensive operations of the Russian military in , and their capacity to actually deliver their results. Despite the influx of tens of thousands of mobilised troops, it is highly likely that there will again be a gap between Putin’s expectations for the 2023 offensive operations of the Russian military in #Ukraine , and their capacity to actually deliver their results. 19/ It is almost certain that the Russian Army will undertake offensive operations to meet Putin’s political objectives of securing his annexed territory in the coming weeks and months. It is unlikely they will be any more successful than in 2022. Divining Russia's Main Effort in 2023 20/ The Ukrainians will be doing everything possible to estimate the most likely areas where these offensives will take place. If they can do this, they may be able to both blunt the Russian attacks while undertaking their own offensives to recapture Ukrainian territory. End. 21/ Thank you to the following for the links and images used in this thread: • • • x A few thoughts on the current course of the war. Although winter has proven a transitional phase, with both sides focusing on force reconstitution and positional fighting. The outlines of the coming months & likely offensive operations are steadily becoming clearer. Thread. 1/ — Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael) February 6, 2023 After Kharkiv & Kherson, the Russian military was at its most vulnerable going into the winter. Mobilization helped stabilize Russian lines, raise manning levels, and establish reserves. Consequently, Ukraine no longer enjoys a significant manpower advantage. 2/ RU adopted a largely defensive strategy under Surovikin focused on force reconstitution, entrenchment, and a strike campaign against UA critical infrastructure. Bakhmut was not an exception, largely fought by Wagner PMCs from RU prison system. 3/ When mobilization was launched I was wary of the uncertainty it introduced, and its potential to significantly extend the war. At the time, a reasonable timeline to assess what RU could make of mobilized personnel was 3-4 months. 4/ Unroll available on Thread Reader It’s fair to say since October RU has likely doubled the force deployed in Ukraine, and significantly reduced the length of the front being defended after retreating from Kherson. Force density has therefore increased relative to territory being occupied. 5/ washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/… The UA official figure on RU forces (320k) strikes me as a bit high, but 250k+ is probably fair. RU may have another 150,000 mobilized personnel still in Russia, not deployed. However, readiness level and quality of these units remains unclear. 6/ How strong the Russian defensive lines are in practice has yet to be truly tested. RU has manpower in quantity now & continues to pull equipment out of storage, but force quality appears relatively low. This limits offensive potential & force employment options. 7/ In brief, mobilized units in aggregate do not appear as poor as anecdotes might lead one to believe, and RU can likely offer a stubborn defense, but are less liable to be suitable for offensive operations and represent weak replacements for lost regulars. 8/ RU still depends on airborne and naval infantry at key points along the front as the reserve, for counter attacks, and the main assault force. These units backstop mobilized personnel, but seem to have lost some of their offensive edge due to replacements. 9/ After Soledar, the situation around Bakhmut increasingly looks precarious for UA, and I wouldn't be surprised if they ultimately withdraw from the city. However, UA has strong defensive lines outside Slovyansk/Kramatorsk while RU looks ill positioned to sustain momentum. 10/ Bakhmut is geographically important, but has developed a degree of sunk cost mentality for both sides. A fair bit of UA defense there seems to consist of TDF, NG, and foreign legion units suggesting UA is trying to manage the impact of attrition on its force availability. 11/ Having lost Izyum and Lyman, RU has no supporting axis of attack into Donetsk from the north, nor have their forces been able to make breakthroughs in the south of Donetsk. Hence gaining Bakhmut, in my view, offers opportunities for RU that they're not positioned to exploit. 12/ Since June I've been skeptical that RU could make break through to Slovyansk/Kramatorsk. They're still at Bakhmut 7 months later. That said, UA has ceded much of the initiative since October in Donetsk, and recently Luhansk. 13/ Unroll available on Thread Reader UA had made progress at Kreminna and Svatove, though now under counter-attack by the VDV's 76th GAAD. Kreminna is a gateway to Rubizhne. For UA, a breakthrough the Svatove-Kreminna line can eventually lead to the RU logistical hub of Starobilsk. 14/ Hence the battle for Kreminna is arguably more significant than Bakhmut. That said there’s been a fair amount of reorganization in RU logistics, and adaptation. I think the conversation on RU logistical problems in general suffers from too much anecdotalism & received wisdom. 15/ In my view Donbas remains the primary goal of RU mil operations, hence RU offensives are likely to focus on seizing this territory. I’m skeptical of claims that Russian forces will attempt a much larger scope offensive involving the cities of Kharkiv, Sumy, Kyiv, etc. 16/ I would consider a Russian attempt to advance Kreminna -> Lyman as likely, also Kupyansk, along with attacks across southern Donetsk, i.e. at Vuhledar. The fighting for Vuhledar, along with attacks elsewhere, suggest that this offensive has already begun in practice. 17/ RU’s better forces and kit, VDV and NI, have been trying to unsuccessfully press UA forces out of Vuhledar. The 155th couldn’t do it under Surovikin at Pavlivka in November, so its unsurprising Gerasimov taking over has done nothing to improve RU offensive performance. 18/ With respect to Belarus, a repeat assault on Kyiv makes little sense. An operation to sever supply lines in the west, or to seize the nuclear powerplant by Rivne, may be more feasible, but this would require a much larger force than what RU currently has deployed in Belarus. 19/ How large of a RU offensive to expect is unclear, but I suspect it may prove underwhelming, focused largely on the Donbas. RU may not need another large mobilization wave, and instead could keep mobilization quietly rolling at a sustainable rate. 20/ Arguably, UA is better served absorbing the RU attack & exhausting RU offensive potential, then taking the initiative later this spring. Having expended ammunition, better troops, and equipment it could leave RU defense overall weaker. 21/ But, I suspect Kyiv does not believe that time is on Ukraine's side. Wary of Russian entrenchment and seeking to avoid the perception of a stalemate, UA is likely to move sooner than later. That's been the trend thus far. 22/ Western equipment may not arrive in time to be relevant for a UA offensive, but more significant in that it will allow UA to launch operations this spring knowing they have replacements secured. Hence the likely losses entailed won't leave UA vulnerable later this year. 23/ In general UA is still advantaged going into 2023, backed by countries with much greater GDP and defense industrial capacity. However, that depends on sustainability of external material support, and in the end potential is not predictive of outcomes. 24/ The challenge is providing Ukraine with sufficient relative advantage to enable offensive operations under changed conditions in 2023. Unlikely to be solved by any single capability, but through a combination of means, organizational adaptations, and changes in force employment. • • • [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/6/2151260/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-349-The-east-is-a-logical-political-and-military-objective-for-Russia Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/