(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 356: being sent to "the eastern front" has new meaning in Gigantic Losses [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-02-13 Of his combat experience, he said, “It was the first and last wave for me.” www.nytimes.com/... x 🧵Vuhledar🇺🇦 update: 1/9 This thread includes additional details about the battle of Vuhledar and satellite imagery that helps to understand and visualize the situation better. I had to break this into several parts, so I can publish more imagery of russian losses later. Part 1 pic.twitter.com/uzxXd0i6YC — Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) February 12, 2023 2/9 For the past two weeks, the enemy attempted to advance in multiple directions simultaneously, hoping to outflank defenders. The occupiers tried to advance from Pavlivka and Mykil's'ke, as well as west and east of them, assaulting with the forces of the 155th and 40th brigades For the past two weeks, the enemy attempted to advance in multiple directions simultaneously, hoping to outflank defenders. The occupiers tried to advance from Pavlivka and Mykil's'ke, as well as west and east of them, assaulting with the forces of the 155th and 40th brigades 3/9 Battalions from the 36th and 72nd (russian motor rifle) brigades tried to advance alongside the 155th and 40th brigades but also failed. Special forces partially lost control when the commander of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, colonel Sergey Polyakov was killed. Battalions from the 36th and 72nd (russian motor rifle) brigades tried to advance alongside the 155th and 40th brigades but also failed. Special forces partially lost control when the commander of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, colonel Sergey Polyakov was killed. 4/9 What makes the destruction of the 155th, and 40th brigades especially important? This is not commonly discussed, but on the battlefield, only a small percentage of people participate in the actual assault. Even many combat roles like artillery do not face their enemy directly What makes the destruction of the 155th, and 40th brigades especially important? This is not commonly discussed, but on the battlefield, only a small percentage of people participate in the actual assault. Even many combat roles like artillery do not face their enemy directly 5/9 Not that many people are fit to be in the forward vanguard assault groups that face an enemy first. It takes a lot of experience, courage, or stimulants to attack and act effectively when you know that your chances to be killed or wounded in the assault are almost 90%. Not that many people are fit to be in the forward vanguard assault groups that face an enemy first. It takes a lot of experience, courage, or stimulants to attack and act effectively when you know that your chances to be killed or wounded in the assault are almost 90%. 6/9 The backbone of the 155th and 40th brigades consisted of sergeants and officers who were ready to execute any order - whether it was a risky frontal assault or execution of civilians in Bucha and Irpin, where the 155th brigade committed war crimes. The backbone of the 155th and 40th brigades consisted of sergeants and officers who were ready to execute any order - whether it was a risky frontal assault or execution of civilians in Bucha and Irpin, where the 155th brigade committed war crimes. 7/9 After staggering casualties of the VDV forces in the battle for Kyiv, it took them a year to restore assault capabilities partially, which we can see in the Kreminna area. It will take as long for marines to restore assault capacities, especially after a catastrophic failure After staggering casualties of the VDV forces in the battle for Kyiv, it took them a year to restore assault capabilities partially, which we can see in the Kreminna area. It will take as long for marines to restore assault capacities, especially after a catastrophic failure 8/9 Ukraine achieved this success due to a combination of factors: good planning and selection of positions, the bravery of soldiers, intel, and smart utilization of scarce resources. But to project the Vuhledar experience on the whole war, we need much more ammo and weapons Ukraine achieved this success due to a combination of factors: good planning and selection of positions, the bravery of soldiers, intel, and smart utilization of scarce resources. But to project the Vuhledar experience on the whole war, we need much more ammo and weapons 9/9 I am planning to publish imagery of infamous armored vehicle columns in the coming weeks, so if you don't want to miss it, make sure to follow and retweet, as Twitter algorithms might not be in favor of war-related information. • • • x A video appears to show Russian tanks being destroyed in Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast. https://t.co/1ozorLabKK — Newsweek (@Newsweek) February 14, 2023 This week has been a fascinating contrast in reporting, and once again highlights the ease with which a particular narrative about the war can quickly spread and even start influencing debates and possibly policy. The contrast was about how to understand the obvious uptick in Russian offensive military operations, primarily around Bakhmut and Vuhledar. One story that seemed to take off, was that the Russians had massed a huge force not only of newly trained soldiers, but also tanks and aircraft and that they were poised to mount a hammer blow attack on Russian forces. This article in Foreign Policy, might have been the most extreme example. The Russians had supposedly put together 1800 tanks, 700 aircraft and hundreds of thousands of new troops. Ukraine, on the other hand, didn’t have enough and the Russian assault would start long before new NATO-standard tanks arrived. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/08/ukraine-russia-counteroffensive-abrams-tanks-putin-war/ The story took off like hot cakes as more and more alarmist reporting piled in. The Telegraph soon bumped the 1800 Russian tanks ready to strike up to 2000 and spoke of a ‘huge invasion’ of the Donbas. The New York Times even put out a map, which had the Russians executing a combined arms encirclement (of the kind they have been manifestly unable to execute so far in the war). In this picture, the Russians would be expected to advance faster and further than they have since March. phillipspobrien.substack.com/... All of this sounded extremely alarmist, and much of it seemed to run counter to everything that has been shown for the past year. Russian advances, when they are successful, are incremental, their losses in tanks and aircraft when they engage the Ukrainians are extremely high (especially for tanks) and so far we see no sign of successful combined-arms Russian warfighting which would allow for such an amazing reversal in the course of the war. Moreover, and I know this is my constant personal bugbear, no one bothered to analyse just how such a massive force of machines would be supplied. Once again, logistics lost out to scary hordes of Russian tanks streaking forward in the popular imagination. All I can say, is that I see no indication whatsoever that the Russians could attempt such a major, air-armor breakout and exploitation. I don’t see how they could supply it, I don’t see any indication that their army knows how to execute it, and I cant see how the Ukrainians could be caught by surprise were the Russians to attempt it. [...] However the most extraordinary example of the non-sensical vision of Russian strength was published by Edward Luttwak. https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-russia-can-end-the-war/ [...] Maybe the best description of this adaptation was in the substack just written by Lawrence Freedman. samf.substack.com/… who…..describes a process that is not ‘human wave’ but more human sacrifice. Poor troops are pushed forward to be slaughtered, but in their slaughter they hopefully reveal Ukrainian positions, so that the following Russian troops, better trained, supplied and motivated, can make use of this information to advance. I suppose this can be called learning of a type, in that it is a newer tactic to try and achieve a goal. Though I would argue it remains a long-way from learning, as it provides little strategic advantage to the Russians and actually is causing such a steep rise in Russian casualties that its hopefully hastening their overall defeat. This kind of sacrificial way of using their soldiers, many of whom were prisoner volunteers, is already losing traction. Russian prisoners, who have heard of the fate of their fellows who agreed to serve in the fighting, have stopped volunteering. phillipspobrien.substack.com/... x Look people, I’m doing my best providing these updates free of charge every weekend. Will there be typos, definitely. I actually want to lead a life and can’t spend my whole weekend proofreading. If these bother you, don’t read them. Otherwise, kindly be quiet. https://t.co/d0yxh7OU9S — Phillips P. OBrien (@PhillipsPOBrien) February 12, 2023 [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/13/2152767/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-356-being-sent-to-the-eastern-front-has-new-meaning-in-Gigantic-Losses Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/