(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 359: is there a Crimean 'red line' on either side [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-02-16 Head of Luhansk Regional Military Administration: Russian troops suffer significant losses near Bilohorivka, Kreminna - LB.ua news portal Redlines are rarely followed as specific premises for military action, especially with a ‘special military operation’ and a ‘specially constructed reality’. The Russian offensive is here. You may have missed it because it’s far less dramatic and effective than previously advertised. Russian forces have been attacking up and down the front of the Donbas, pushing west, trying to take as much territory as possible before the one-year anniversary of their invasion of Ukraine, on February 24. The most proximate prize is the now razed city of Bakhmut, which has taken on outsize significance in both Russia and Ukraine. Russia decided it wanted the city because it would extend Russian lines and could give Russian forces a way to encircle the far more strategic cities of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. But Russia doesn’t have the necessary footholds in Kharkiv in the north to pull off the maneuver, so taking Bakhmut will be a largely symbolic victory that can be used for propaganda purposes back home. It is now a universally held belief among Western analysts that Bakhmut will soon fall to the Russians, but Russia has also demonstrated that a country whose political elites regularly threaten to invade NATO countries has spent six months and tens of thousands of lives trying to take a pretty small city—and mostly failing. puck.news/... What is the "Korean scenario?" This scenario is based on a historical precedent – specifically, how hostilities halted following the Korean War of 1950-1953 . Formally, it was a war between North Korea and South Korea, although China and the USSR supported North Korea’s communist regime, while the U.S. and a number of Western countries under the United Nations (UN) flag joined the war to protect the sovereignty of South Korea. It was the first local "hot" war after the beginning of the Cold War – a confrontation between the capitalist countries of the West and Communist authorities in the eastern camp. Both sides of the conflict involved major powers in possession of nuclear weapons. However, the main interest is the way the Korean war ended – without a peace treaty, and based only on an agreement to end hostilities by fixing a division line along the territory of Korea, known as the 38th parallel. [...] Putin cannot win this war, but he doesn’t want to lose either. So, it begs the question – does Russia have enough resources for a protracted conflict on anything like the same scale? A humiliating defeat for the Kremlin would involve the loss of all occupied territories, including Crimea. This would likely spur an internal political crisis in Russia. However, freezing the current war in Ukraine, while retaining control over at least part of the land it has grabbed, would be partially beneficial for Moscow. Propaganda could pass that off as a relative victory. Such a scenario would also preserve the levers of military and political pressure on Ukraine and indirectly on the West. Undoubtedly, strong pro-Russian war supporters would be dissatisfied and there would be criticism and accusations, leading to a maelstrom of internal political instability within Russia. Still, freezing the current war against Ukraine could potentially look like the lesser of two evils for Putin. [...] So, how likely does the “Korean scenario” look on balance? The risks and problems look too difficult. 1. The attitude of Ukraine’s Western partners – based on direct and indirect signaling – is evidently ambiguous. There is a sincere desire to help Ukraine to resist Russia’s invasion; and there is an understanding that most Ukrainians do not want to give up any of the occupied territories; 2. It is already apparent that Putin would not make a civilized partner during negotiations and that he cannot be trusted 3. Our Western friends are concerned that the war with Russia may drag on; 4. There are limited resources of weapons and ammunition, while internal socio-economic and political problems are emerging; 5. Fears remain about a potentially uncontrolled escalation of the military conflict in Ukraine and the risk of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, threatening to turn itself into global nuclear war. To summarize, the "Korean scenario" is not a priority for Western leaders and political elites. However, it has not been fully rejected and can still be considered under certain conditions. But, the "Korean scenario" doesn’t look likely because both Russia and Ukraine hope to turn the tide of the war in their favor. For the next six months, or rather until October, both sides will try to conduct offensive actions and realize their political interests by military means. Based on the results of these military operations, the question will inevitably arise: "What's next?" The "Korean scenario" will be considered if the war remains protracted, and if it becomes clear that neither side stands to gain an advantage and deliver a decisive win. That's when negotiations could begin. www.kyivpost.com/... x The ‘Korean Scenario’ to Ending the War: How Likely Is it? https://t.co/2QSlbkoD2c — Ukraine News🇺🇦 (@UaNews_online) February 13, 2023 This week has been a fascinating contrast in reporting, and once again highlights the ease with which a particular narrative about the war can quickly spread and even start influencing debates and possibly policy. The contrast was about how to understand the obvious uptick in Russian offensive military operations, primarily around Bakhmut and Vuhledar. phillipspobrien.substack.com/... x "Rather than providing ATACMs in March, Reapers in June, and jets in September, NATO should go for a Big Bang. Plans to provide all these systems should be announced on February 24, 2023, the first anniversary of Putin’s invasion."https://t.co/2fQLszhCDg — Michael McFaul (@McFaul) February 10, 2023 x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - FEB 16 No update from Oryx's @Rebel44CZ today (only 30-day average changes) VISUALLY CONFIRMED: 3.11x losses to date ➡ 2.68x since 🇺🇦 counteroffensive (Aug 29) ➡ 3.18x 30-day average ⬇ 📈https://t.co/JPM21K9e8P pic.twitter.com/ZuQY5UNGXy — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 ragnarbjartur@masto.ai (@ragnarbjartur) February 16, 2023 x U.S. Vice President To Discuss Ukraine, China In Talks With Foreign Leaders In Munich https://t.co/AvVzupYuFY — Ukraine News🇺🇦 (@UaNews_online) February 16, 2023 [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/16/2153305/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-359-is-there-a-Crimean-red-line-on-either-side Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/