(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 361: Russia has mobilized its people and industry, but incompetently [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-02-18 “Russian forces likely do not have the potential to conduct large-scale assaults throughout Donetsk Oblast and are beginning to lose momentum along this sector of the front.” There will be more war. With the sacrifice of tens of thousands of fresh troops and the remnants of its much-reduced, but still large, armoury, Russia will try to hold the parts of Ukraine it has seized and take the rest of the four south-eastern regions Putin has declared belong to Moscow. Ukraine will try to drive a wedge between Russian forces in Crimea and the Donbas as a prelude to sweeping them out of the country. Neither effort is likely to succeed entirely. Russia has mobilised its people and its industry, but incompetently and half-heartedly; the west has ransacked its old stockpiles to arm Ukrainians, but done little to build up capacity to replace them. At some point in the next year or two, it seems likely the most savage, destructive phase of the Russian onslaught will peter out, without having come close to achieving Putin’s aims, but without Ukraine being able to drive every Russian soldier and sailor out of Ukraine. www.theguardian.com/... Ukrainian officials continue to question the Russian military’s ability to conduct a large-scale offensive throughout Donetsk Oblast. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the Tavriisk operational direction Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on February 18 that Russian forces likely do not have the potential to conduct large-scale assaults throughout Donetsk Oblast and are beginning to lose momentum along this sector of the front.[30] Dmytrashykivskyi also stated that Russian forces are committing motorized rifle detachments to offensive operations throughout Donetsk Oblast with insufficient equipment and without armored vehicle support.[31] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military’s costly campaign in Ukraine has likely significantly depleted the necessary Russian equipment and manpower reserves for large-scale offensives in Ukraine.[32] The Russia military's likely degraded ability to conduct mechanized maneuver warfare tactics may be denying the Russian military any tactical advances throughout Ukraine outside of marginal gains in the Bakhmut area.[33] ISW has observed that there are likely some Russian conventional units uncommitted in the current fighting that may constitute a reserve to support the ongoing offensive, although likely not on a large scale or in a way that would likely generate significant Russian momentum. ISW will explore this topic in more detail in its special edition on February 19. United States Vice President Kamala Harris announced on February 18 that the US had determined that Russia had committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine.[34] Harris stated during the Munich Security Conference that Russian forces “have pursued a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population” by committing murder, torture, rape, and deportation. Harris noted that Russian forces forcibly deported hundreds of thousands of people from Ukraine to Russia, including children. Harris noted that after the review of evidence there is “no doubt” that Russia committed crimes against humanity. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken added that the US reserves the determination of crimes against humanity for the “most egregious crimes.”[35] www.understandingwar.org/... Key Takeaways United States Vice President Kamala Harris announced on February 18 that the US had determined that Russia had committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine. Russian forces conducted another missile strike attack targeting Ukrainian infrastructure. Russian news aggregators are advocating for Russia to carry out “retaliatory strikes” that would systematically target electrical infrastructure supporting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to force Ukraine to conduct emergency shutdowns of its NPPs. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) reported dismissal of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military spokesman Eduard Basurin as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR militia under the Russian MoD triggered another wave of Russian milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment. The Kremlin continues to fail to honor its commitments to financially incentivized volunteer forces, which will likely have detrimental ramifications on Russia’s ability to generate volunteer forces in the long-term. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promoted the Western and Eastern Military District (WMD/EMD) commanders after confirming their appointments to the roles as part of an ongoing effort to present the Russian military as a well-organized fighting force. Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have rebuffed overtures from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a renewed informational campaign against the Russian MoD. Ukrainian officials continue to question the Russian military’s ability to conduct a large-scale offensive throughout Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove and in the Kreminna area. Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, along the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces are continuing to reinforce defensive positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian authorities continue to exaggerate the extent of a Ukrainian threat to Russia’s border regions, attempting to convince the public of the “existential necessity” of the war in Ukraine. www.understandingwar.org/... Many of those in the west most eager for an early start to peace talks with Russia seem to believe that what is at stake is how much violently seized land Putin gets to keep. If only, writes Jürgen Habermas, the German philosopher, the west had made clear at the beginning of the war that Russia need not retreat further than the borders of the land it grabbed in 2014, proper negotiations could begin. This is a misreading of Russia’s consistent message for the latter period of Putin’s rule: regardless of what bits of Ukraine Russia absorbs, it considers itself permanently entitled to a degree of control over the remainder. Russia got involved in Donbas in 2014 not because it particularly wanted to own the region, but because it seemed to offer a means to control the entire country politically – to turn it into a vassal state, like Belarus. A long armistice might be punctuated not just by peace talks but by waves of Russian rockets, drones and cruise missiles Russia is certain to treat negotiations with Ukraine and the west – and Putin will do his utmost to make the latter his interlocutors, rather than Kyiv – as acceptance of his conquests. The Kremlin will make talks the starting point for one-sided demands for a leading role in defining Ukraine’s future, its constitution, elections, the size of its military, attempting to join with Washington, Berlin and Paris in an imitation of the post-second world war division of Europe. Clearly this is unacceptable; were Russia to keep, by agreement or by boots on the ground, some parts of Ukraine, Kyiv would rightly expect the west to back it in making clear it would have no role in the rest. And yet the west has barely begun to formulate a coherent vision for how its preferred future Ukraine would fit into this dangerous world. Having set the precedent in recent months, a long armistice between Russia and Ukraine might easily be punctuated not just by peace talks but by waves of Russian rockets, drones and cruise missiles launched to stunt the recovery of a painfully rebuilding country. If Putin’s ideal Ukraine is a shrunken Russian vassal, Ukraine’s own ideal is security against Russia, and integration with the west, to which the west’s reply is: not yet. Not yet – perhaps never – to Nato, not yet to the EU, not yet to an effective air force. If the west is to keep faith with Ukraine, and encourage it to accept any loss of territory – to lay the grounds, one far-off day, for the good relations it ought to have with a better-run Russia that has learned to lose its contempt for its neighbour’s statehood – it has to make a better offer than “not yet”. It will be exceptionally difficult, since the offer would have to include a military element of peacekeeping troops or air power that will infuriate Putin, and trade terms with the EU that will be politically hard for Europe. It will be expensive, it will be open-ended, and it will come under constant and furious political attack from inside the west and from outside. It will be hostage to the future politics of Ukraine, Russia, the US and Europe. It’s worth it. A year ago, the world doubted Ukraine’s survival; now is the time to plan how to help it live and thrive. www.theguardian.com/... x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - FEB 18 43:15 🇷🇺/🇺🇦 added by Oryx's @Rebel44CZ (42:13 net change to totals) VISUALLY CONFIRMED: 3.11x losses to date ➡ 2.69x since 🇺🇦 counteroffensive (Aug 29) ⬆ 3.15x 30-day average ➡ 📈 https://t.co/Kn8H6goDRJ pic.twitter.com/AXTHCbX6VV — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 ragnarbjartur@masto.ai (@ragnarbjartur) February 18, 2023 x ⚡️UK Defense Ministry: Russian losses may have reached 200,000 troops. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia's army and private mercenary groups have likely lost 175-200,000 people in Ukraine, of which up to 60,000 were killed, the ministry reported on Feb. 17. — The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) February 17, 2023 Wagner mercenaries reached the center of Paraskoviivka. The settlement is now under Russian control. (source) The enemy advanced closer to Zaliznianske settlement east of Blahodatne. (source) Russian recon element crossed the water canal south of Chasiv Yar, but were stopped by a Ukrainian tank. (source) Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of: Paraskoviivka, Dubovo-Vasylka, Barkhivka, Bakhmut, Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, militaryland.net/... In a question and answer sessions, NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby confirmed three things about Bakhmut: The city is of “no strategic value to the Russians.” The operations there is “almost exclusively run by Mr. Prigozhin and the Wagner Group” rather than the Russian military. If Wagner is able to turn “incremental gains” around the city into success in capturing Bakhmut, “it will prove of no real worth to them.” www.dailykos.com/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces secured marginal advances amidst continued offensive operations around Bakhmut. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself; within 23km north of Bakhmut near Vyimka, Fedorivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka, Rozdolivka, Paraskoviivka, and Berkhivka; and within 12km west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Chasiv Yar.[46] Geolocated footage published on February 18 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal advances northwest of Bilohorivka (21km northeast of Bakhmut) and near Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut).[47] Geolocated footage published on February 17 shows Russian forces closer to Zaliznianske (11km north of Bakhmut) and a section of the E40 highway north of Bakhmut.[48] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on February 17 that Wagner Group fighters completely captured Paraskoviivka (7km north of Bakhmut) and posted a picture of Wagner Group fighters in the settlement that was later geolocated, indicating that Wagner Group fighters likely captured at least northern Paraskoviivka.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Paraskoviivka and that Russian forces conducted assaults on Berkhivka (5km north of Bakhmut), where fighting is reportedly ongoing on the eastern outskirts of the settlement.[50] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are currently clearing Paraskoviivka and surrounding areas and that the capture of the settlement will allow Russian forces to launch further assaults on Ukrainian positions in northern Bakhmut and its suburbs.[51] Geolocated footage published on February 18 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal advances in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[52] Geolocated footage published on February 17 indicates that Russian forces have advanced closer to the T0504 highway northeast of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 18 that Russian forces advanced close to the southern and southeastern outskirts of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) on February 17.[54] www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast ( Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued ground assaults on the Kupyansk-Svatove line on February 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Hryanykivka (55km northwest of Svatove) and Synkivka (45km northwest of Svatove) in Kharkiv Oblast, and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) in Luhansk Oblast.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian units from the western group of forces seized Hryanykivka.[37] A Russian milblogger expressed doubt that Russian forces could take Kupyansk (46km northwest of Svatove) despite Russian claimed capture of Hryanykivka.[38] ISW has no independent verification that Russian forces seized Hryanykivka. www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces are continuing to reinforce defensive positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov published footage showing 43 buses with Wagner Group personnel moving via Melitopol in the Zaporizhia direction.[65] Geolocated footage also showed servicemen with Wagner uniforms and symbology at a bus stop in Melitopol.[66] The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported on February 11 that Wagner recruited 1,200 convicts in occupied Crimea, but the relationship between the two reports is unclear at this time.[67] Fedorov also reported that Russian forces have also deployed mobilized men from Vladivostok to Melitopol and are studying underground tunnels in Melitopol, possibly for fortification purposes.[68] Fedorov added that Russians are using sea shipping containers to build fortifications near Novomykhailivka (about 70 northeast of Melitopol).[69] www.understandingwar.org/... While everyone is talking about Western tanks, Bradleys, and even F-16s, there is a diminutive U.S. weapon system that is having an outsized impact in Eastern Ukraine. The Remote Anti-Armor Mine System (RAAM) is a devious bit of U.S. kit that allows an army to seed landmines over a large area from a distance. The key capability here is that these mines are delivered by a 155mm artillery shell from miles away. The RAAM artillery shell is stuffed with no less than nine anti-tank mines providing an excellent stand-off area denial capability to Ukraine forces. wesodonnell.medium.com/... x https://t.co/ANXksJNC6F — ⚜️🐸⛄🤘Batracien du Nord🤘⛄🐸⚜️ (@VoisinSt) February 17, 2023 x ソース。https://t.co/X3tKLUjpnF — Peacekeeper (@Peaceke81017283) February 17, 2023 The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has provided an invaluable opportunity to assess the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) and the implications of a range of capabilities for modern warfare. Many publicly made judgements on these issues have lacked supporting data or insight into Ukrainian operational planning and decision-making. To ensure that those drawing lessons from the conflict do so from a solid foundation, this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022. As the underlying source material for much of this report cannot yet be made public, this should be understood as testimony rather than as an academic study. Given the requirements for operational security, it is necessarily incomplete. Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a 10-day period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022. The Russian plan presupposed that speed, and the use of deception to keep Ukrainian forces away from Kyiv, could enable the rapid seizure of the capital. The Russian deception plan largely succeeded, and the Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio advantage north of Kyiv. The very operational security that enabled the successful deception, however, also led Russian forces to be unprepared at the tactical level to execute the plan effectively. The Russian plan’s greatest deficiency was the lack of reversionary courses of action. As a result, when speed failed to produce the desired results, Russian forces found their positions steadily degraded as Ukraine mobilised. Despite these setbacks, Russia refocused on Donbas and, since Ukraine had largely expended its ammunition supply, proved successful in subsequent operations, slowed by the determination – rather than the capabilities – of Ukrainian troops. From April, the West became Ukraine’s strategic depth, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) only robbed Russia of the initiative once long-range fires brought Russian logistics under threat. The tactical competence of the Russian military proved significantly inferior compared with the expectations of many observers based within and outside Ukraine and Russia. Nevertheless, Russian weapons systems proved largely effective, and those units with a higher level of experience demonstrated that the AFRF have considerable military potential, even if deficiencies in training and the context of how they were employed meant that the Russian military failed to meet that potential. rusi.org/... The State of the War Vuhledar: A disastrous Russian assault on the Ukrainian city, viewed as an opening move in an expected spring offensive, has renewed doubts about Moscow’s ability to sustain a large-scale ground assault. A disastrous Russian assault on the Ukrainian city, viewed as an opening move in an expected spring offensive, has A Sea of Crosses : A bleak, snowy cemetery is filling with more and more dead soldiers from the Wagner mercenary forces, a sign of the huge casualties Russia is suffering in Ukraine. A bleak, snowy cemetery is filling with more and more dead soldiers from the Wagner mercenary forces, Bakhmut: With Russian forces closing in, Ukraine , in what could be a prelude to a Ukrainian withdrawal. With Russian forces closing in, Ukraine is barring aid workers and civilians from entering the besieged city , in what could be a prelude to a Ukrainian withdrawal. Arms Supply: Ukraine and its Western allies are trying to solve a fundamental weakness in its war effort: Kyiv’s forces are firing artillery shells much faster than they are being produced. Ukraine and its Western allies are trying to solve a fundamental weakness in its war effort: Kyiv’s forces are [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/18/2153673/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-361-Russia-has-nbsp-mobilized-its-people-nbsp-and-industry-but-incompetently Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/