(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 362: being anti-war and pro-Putin is not oxymoronic for the left? [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-02-19 Constellations are areas in which a group of visible stars forms a perceived pattern or outline, typically representing an animal, mythological subject, or inanimate object. Today’s anti-war protest featured not a few odd-couples. "The event, which was billed as the March Against the War Machine rally, was put on by a constellation of libertarian and far-left groups." Today's rally in America was possibly the first ever anti-war rally to be dominated by symbols of the country which started the war. unRealpolitik. There may well be more Russian elements online in Luhansk Oblast than ISW has observed at this time. Other research organizations have suggested that additional units of the 6th CAA are operating along the Luhansk Oblast line.[22] ISW cannot verify the sources of these other assessments but has no reason to question them. If elements of the 6th CAA or other formations have indeed been committed, then Russian theater reserves available for commitment to subsequent offensive or defensive operations are even smaller. The offensive will likely continue and may briefly increase in intensity if reserve elements such as the 2nd MRD are committed, but these increases in intensity will likely be brief and unable to make operationally significant gains. The pattern of Russian deployments in other parts of the theater strongly suggests that most of the available maneuver elements of the other military districts and the Airborne Forces are already committed and thus do not constitute a large reserve that Moscow could suddenly hurl into the fray in Luhansk Oblast or elsewhere. ISW has previously assessed that various elements of the Southern Military District (SMD) are currently engaging in unsuccessful offensive efforts throughout Donetsk Oblast and holding defensive positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[16] Elements of the Eastern Military District (EMD) and the 40thand 155th Naval Infantry Brigades have been predominantly fighting near Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast and have suffered catastrophic losses over the past weeks.[17] DNR troops are heavily committed along the outskirts of Donetsk City and elsewhere throughout Donetsk Oblast.[18] The Central Military District (CMD), which suffered devastating losses during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations near Lyman in fall 2022, appears to mainly be reinforcing WMD elements in the Kreminna area.[19] VDV elements are scattered throughout the theater, gradually supplementing and increasingly supplanting the Wagner Group in its assaults around Bakhmut and maintaining a presence in southern Ukraine as well as a limited presence in Luhansk Oblast.[20] The commitment of Russian forces throughout Ukraine suggests that the 2nd MRD is the only obvious candidate for a theater reserve unless the missing tank regiments/brigades begin to appear. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) has previously confirmed this assessment with the suggestion that an absolute majority of the Russian military is already committed in Ukraine.[21] There is a video going viral of this Russian soldier trying to storm a Ukrainian trench. He failed… pic.twitter.com/fI8y2ltqi0 x A few thoughts on the Russian winter offensive, which began 3+ weeks ago, and has so far yielded little progress for RU forces. Poor force quality, loss of junior officers, ammunition, and equipment constraints limit Russian offensive potential. Thread. 1/ — Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael) February 19, 2023 The RU offensive consists of about 5-6 axes of attack focused on the Donbas. Rather than a major push along one part of the front, it is instead a series of distributed battles running north-south from Luhansk, to Bakhmut, and southern Donetsk. 2/ Russian forces are attacking at Vuhledar, Marinka, Adviivka, Bakhmut (and Bilohorivka), Kreminna -> Lyman, with attempts to advance near Kupyansk. The offensive began in the last week of January with a Russian assault on Vuhledar. 3/ The battle for Vuhledar involves two NI brigades (155th, 40th), and has not gone well for the Russian military. RU units refilled with mobilized personnel seem to have lost a fair bit of their offensive edge, but I’m not sure this is a ‘failure to learn.’ 4/ The terrain outside of Vuhledar is very open, heavily mined, and covered by UA ATGM teams. It leaves RU forces few options for an assault. I also wonder if the Russian military may be short on specialized equipment for tasks like mine clearing. 5/ At Kreminna RU VDV seems to have made some incremental gains against UA positions. Depending on how that battle plays out it may force UA to abandon the Kreminna campaign or lead to see-saw battles in the forest west of the city. 6/ There’s a growing likelihood that UA will withdraw from Bakhmut to another defensive line east of Slovyansk/Kramatorsk. The Russian military may then turn north and try to consolidate control up to the Donets river (including Bilohorivka). 7/ RU forces have not had much success at Avdiivka or Marinka. This is another area that’s seen months of fighting. The Russian offensive doesn’t look like much of an offensive because it is playing out in areas that have previously seen unsuccessful Russian attacks. 8/ At this stage it doesn’t seem that RU has employed reserves, and is likely using those units to replace casualties, or perhaps waiting for a breakthrough to exploit. That said, there’s not much evidence of a larger additional RU force in the waiting. 9/ I’ve been skeptical that there is an additional ‘spring offensive’ looming. To conduct such an operation RU would likely need a second mobilization wave, in advance, which never took place. Predictions that 500k troops would be mobilized mid-January proved incorrect. 10/ defense.gov/News/Transcrip… Senior US and NATO military officials have begun saying much the same in recent days. There’s a relative consensus that the Russian offensive to take the Donbas began some time ago, and its going about as expected given the state of the force. 11/ Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman, Joint Chiefs My best guess is Moscow will wait to see what comes of this offensive before proceeding with a second mobilization wave. I would not discount anything, but right now the RU offensive looks to yield mostly incremental gains that come at the expense of equipment and ammunition. 12/ One possibility is that after UA launches an offensive in the spring, RU will then choose to mobilize in the summer, an attempt another operation later. Given UA no longer enjoys a manpower advantage, RU strategy in 2023 could be to grind away at UA manpower. 13/ Russian forces are expending artillery ammunition in this offensive which they will miss in the spring. The coming months will reveal the real situation in RU artillery ammo availability, which I expect is quite problematic, forcing them to ration. 14/ That said, Ukrainian forces may also have issues with artillery ammo and barrels. This remains a near to medium term challenge. Rosy assessments of Western ammo production potential over the long-term might not align well with UA requirements for the coming 6-12 months. 15/ UA is better served absorbing the RU attack & exhausting RU offensive potential, then taking the initiative later this spring. Having expended ammunition, better troops, and equipment it could leave RU defense overall weaker. 16/ My impression is that Surovkin, who stabilized RU lines, preferred a defensive strategy, rebuilding the force, and preferring to defend against a Ukrainian offensive in the south. Then have RU forces launch an offensive later in the summer to try and capture the Donbas. 17/ Instead, Gerasimov is exhausting the Russian armed forces with a feckless series of offensive operations, which may yield some gains, like Bakhmut, but unlikely to change the strategic picture. The second battle for the Donbas may once again leave RU forces vulnerable. 18/ A spring offensive will still prove a difficult operation for UA. Russian mil now has enough manpower & reserves to avoid a depleted frontline as in Kharkiv. Kherson is an imperfect, but probably a better guide for how a future UA offensive may unfold. 19/ Whether Western AFVs make much of a difference depends on employment and the timing of the UA offensive. Its possible, if UA waits for the force to absorb it in quantity, but I suspect this equipment will mostly serve to backfill losses from the next operation. 20/ For a bit more on this I would suggest tuning into this WOTR podcast from yesterday. We talk about the Russian offensive, key battles to watch, and how it could shape Ukraine’s plans for the spring. Russia's Winter Offensive - War on the Rocks • • • x China may support Russia with weapons and ammo right before Putin launches his spring offensive into Ukraine. If this happens, then expect US-China ties to completely bottom out.https://t.co/8IeKxsJHTZ — Derek J. Grossman (@DerekJGrossman) February 20, 2023 x She was a middle-school teacher, and had never held a gun. One year ago, she left her classroom to defend Kyiv. Step by step, she learned how to be a soldier. The New York Times has followed her journey. https://t.co/ObrWduWYH3 pic.twitter.com/7FCxgBsUw7 — The New York Times (@nytimes) February 19, 2023 x Amazing video showing Ukrainian drone spotting a group of russians occupying a house in the Kherson region, coordinates were sent back to the HQ and then Ukrainians obliterated the house with likely a HIMARS strike vanishing everyone inside from existence. pic.twitter.com/49pLaeo8my — Rammstein Fella✙🇺🇦 (@rammstein_fella) February 19, 2023 Seymour Hersh delighted tankies and Russians everywhere by writing fiction-masquerading-as-fact story claiming the United States sabotaged the Nord Stream pipeline. I’ve already noted Snopes excellent takedown of the story, focused on Hersh’s sketchy sourcing. Indeed, the entire story hinges on a single "source with direct knowledge of the operational planning." Supposedly, this source was aware of a top secret task force convened by President Joe Biden to destroy the pipeline. This source is also a legal expert, claiming a Biden press conference created a loophole that eliminated the need to brief congressional leaders. This source also knew about Norway’s secret deliberations over this supposed operation. This source was also in the room at the CIA and State Department as they planned the operation. And this source was aware of the conversations happening in the deep sea diver community. www.dailykos.com/... When first reading through Seymour Hersh’s account of the events, the level of detail he provides could add credence to his story. Unfortunately for Hersh’s story, the high level of detail is also where the entire story begins to unravel and fall apart. It is often stated that people who lie have a tendency to add too much superfluous detail to their accounts. This attempt to “cover all bases” is in many cases what trips these people up. Extra details add extra points of reference that can be crosschecked and examined. In Hersh’s case, this is exactly what appears to have happened. On the surface level, the level of detail checks out to laymen or people without more niche knowledge of the subject matter mentioned. When you look closer though, the entire story begins to show massive glaring holes and specific details can be debunked. oalexanderdk.substack.com/… x An extremely interesting Thread on the NordStream Pipeline Explosion: https://t.co/grmEnSz2DU — OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) February 20, 2023 This story, when deconstructed, is merely a pile of purported second-hand information allegedly collected by someone connected in some unknown way to deliberations of a highly secret, multi-agency task force. Such a story falls prey to the same criticisms of other more recent work published by Hersh, which has relied on similarly questionable anonymous sources. If the U.S. did conspire to destroy the Nord Stream pipeline, Hersh's reporting has not proved that case. Hersh has, instead, made a very successful blog post that essentially transcribes a compelling story someone unknown to the general public told him. Hersch was asked by the Russian news agency TASS about the identity of his source. He told them that, "It's a person, who, it seems, knows a lot about what's going on." www.snopes.com/… The NS1 explosives may have long been a "back up plan" for the responsible party. If NS2 accidentally ruptured, the remaining pipes would probably be inspected revealing the explosives. The plan was then accelerated and NS1 was detonated 17 hours after the NS2 rupture. x The NS1 explosives may have long been a "back up plan" for the responsible party. If NS2 accidentally ruptured, the remaining pipes would probably be inspected revealing the explosives. The plan was then accelerated and NS1 was detonated 17 hours after the NS2 rupture. — Oliver Alexander (@OAlexanderDK) February 20, 2023 Ethical investing is damaging Britain’s defence industry by using “skin-deep” moral arguments which undermine the value of the sector, a company set up by two former Royal Marines has warned x ⚡️An inscription dedicated to the anniversary of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine appeared in the Stockholm metro: February 24, 05:07 “Today a year has passed. You are missed, dad." (Message not sent) 👉 @Flash_news_ua pic.twitter.com/FTACfIcAfC — FLASH (@Flash_news_ua) February 19, 2023 [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/19/2153566/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-362-being-anti-war-and-pro-Putin-is-not-oxymoronic-for-the-left Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/