(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 368: levée en masse doesn't mean what you think it does [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-02-25 While Ukraine is fully mobilized (levée en masse), Russia is not and claims even its partial effort will allow for a major offensive. It has yet to fully materialize even with so many casualties. Jomini of the West @JominiW says the past 2 weeks of February saw the Russian Winter Offensive intensify as major pushes continued in Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Vuhledar. Russian made few gains, Ukrainian defenses continue to hold. “We keep repeating that Russia cannot win, but what does that mean? If the conflict drags on with this intensity, Ukraine's losses will become unbearable," a senior French official told the WSJ. “And no one believes they can get Crimea back.” In the space of a single year, the pro-Putinists on this site have been forced to retreat from "Kyiv will fall in three days" to "There's no such thing as Kyiv, it's all fake." Read @NinaTannenwald on how Russia’s nuclear might is prolonging the war in Ukraine—and neutralizing the West’s conventional military superiority. https://t.co/yIRWjyggpZ Putin is unlikely to ever change his maximalist intent to secure control over Ukraine. Putin has long rejected Ukrainian sovereignty and the existence of an independent Ukrainian nation, repeatedly claiming that Russia “created” Ukraine, and only Russia can be the “single real guarantee of Ukrainian sovereignty.” As ISW fellow Nataliya Bugayova argues, Putin has tried to gain control over Ukraine in increasingly extreme ways for two decades—first seeking to dominate Ukraine’s politics in the 2000s and early 2010s; through military intervention in 2014 and manipulating the Minsk II peace framework afterwards; and finally resorting to a full-scale and likely genocidal invasion in 2022. Putin has only abandoned each of these efforts to control Ukraine after being defeated and will not abandon his current invasion easily—but Ukraine can and must defeat him again. We cannot yet assume a Ukrainian victory, however, and do not know how this war will end. We cannot say that Putin has lost strategically (despite endemic Russian tactical incompetence and repeated operational failures) simply because he has not yet won. Ukraine has inflicted devastating battlefield defeats on Russian forces. The Russian military will struggle to replace its substantial losses for years to come. Ukraine is poised to conduct further counteroffensives in 2023 after the ongoing Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast culminates. Western unity behind Ukraine remains high, and Putin has lost ground in the global information space. Nonetheless, the Russian military remains dangerous, Putin’s objectives have not changed, and even a partial Russian victory would be crippling for Ukraine . Ukraine’s heroic resistance against the first year of Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian defeats continue to stun the world, but the outcome of the war remains in doubt. Ukraine achieved striking successes in 2022 through smart operational planning, the effective use of large-scale Western support, and the enduring will of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine has defeated Russia’s initial invasion, conducted several successful counteroffensives, and inflicted devastating losses on the Russian military. When Putin launched his full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, few predicted the magnitude of Ukraine’s successes one year on. It’s possible that the two sides will agree to freeze the conflict, which would entail minimal fighting but no peace settlement. But according to Ukrainian political scientist Volodymyr Fesenko , “there is a common understanding” among experts that this scenario “will not bring peace, but will only be a pause in the war.” He predicts that meaningful negotiations won’t begin before the end of the year, and that the next six months (at least) will be marked with active combat. Military experts warn that the situation could morph into a stalemate and the war might drag on for months or even years, with neither side able to make any significant progress. 1/ Ukraine TVD, 8-19 FEB 23. The past 2 weeks of February saw the Russian Winter Offensive intensify as major pushes continued in Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Vuhledar. Russian made few gains, Ukrainian defenses continue to hold. #UkraineRussiaWar #RussianArmy #UkraineFrontLines pic.twitter.com/vznyMcqJzg 2/ Operational Terms. To assist in easy of comprehension of the threads graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (note: I am still refining and updating this list, please bear with me as I do, thank you). Operational Terms. To assist in easy of comprehension of the threads graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (note: I am still refining and updating this list, please bear with me as I do, thank you). 3/ Luhansk OD. Russian forces press their attack in the Kreminna area. Svatove has been reinforced by the 98th GABD, signaling a Russian intent to push toward Kupyansk soon. UKR forces will continue to defend in depth & transition to the offense when opportunities arise. #Luhansk Luhansk OD. Russian forces press their attack in the Kreminna area. Svatove has been reinforced by the 98th GABD, signaling a Russian intent to push toward Kupyansk soon. UKR forces will continue to defend in depth & transition to the offense when opportunities arise. 4/ Kreminna AO. The 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division supported by the 90th Guards Tank Division, 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, and BARS Battalions continue their attack south through the Kreminna Forest towards Serebryanka. Attacks westward have stalled. #Kreminna Kreminna AO. The 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division supported by the 90th Guards Tank Division, 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, and BARS Battalions continue their attack south through the Kreminna Forest towards Serebryanka. Attacks westward have stalled. 5/ Donetsk OD. Donetsk Oblast remains the decisive OD for Russian Ground Forces. If Russian Airborne & Wagner Group units can complete their steady progress in Bakhmut in the coming weeks it increases the likelihood of a 2d Army Corps supported attack towards Siversk. #Donetsk Donetsk OD. Donetsk Oblast remains the decisive OD for Russian Ground Forces. If Russian Airborne & Wagner Group units can complete their steady progress in Bakhmut in the coming weeks it increases the likelihood of a 2d Army Corps supported attack towards Siversk. 6/ Bakhmut AO. Bakhmut remains the most critical Objective Point of Maneuver in the Ukrainian TVD. With the fall of Krasna Hora & Paraskovilka & steady advances west from Blahodatne, Russian forces are positioned to force a general withdrawal from Bakhmut. #Bakhmut Bakhmut AO. Bakhmut remains the most critical Objective Point of Maneuver in the Ukrainian TVD. With the fall of Krasna Hora & Paraskovilka & steady advances west from Blahodatne, Russian forces are positioned to force a general withdrawal from Bakhmut. 7/ Zaporizhzhia OD. The SVRF continues its efforts to capture Orkhiv and Vuhledar at whatever cost is required. Russian forces have found no success in the Vuhledar region. The high loss in troops & equipment have grinded larger scale action to a stand still. #Zaporizhzhia Zaporizhzhia OD. The SVRF continues its efforts to capture Orkhiv and Vuhledar at whatever cost is required. Russian forces have found no success in the Vuhledar region. The high loss in troops & equipment have grinded larger scale action to a stand still. 8/ Vuhledar AO. The Russian attempt to seize Vuhledar will likely remain a top priority through the spring. High losses have slowed the pace of operations, however newly arrived units from the Melitopol area & VMF replacements are being integrated for new assaults. #Vuhledar Vuhledar AO. The Russian attempt to seize Vuhledar will likely remain a top priority through the spring. High losses have slowed the pace of operations, however newly arrived units from the Melitopol area & VMF replacements are being integrated for new assaults. 9/ Kherson OD. Russian forces will continue an active defense on the Dnipro River with a focus on gaining control over the Dnipro Delta. UKR forces will continue to probe Russian defenses while missile & artillery strikes target logistic nodes in Kherson and Crimea. #Kherson Kherson OD. Russian forces will continue an active defense on the Dnipro River with a focus on gaining control over the Dnipro Delta. UKR forces will continue to probe Russian defenses while missile & artillery strikes target logistic nodes in Kherson and Crimea. 10/ Ukraine OTMO. The Black Seas Fleet remains focused on force protection of vessels, facilities, & personnel rather than offensive operations or active patrolling of sea lanes & the northern Black Sea coast / littoral. #Sevastopol Ukraine OTMO. The Black Seas Fleet remains focused on force protection of vessels, facilities, & personnel rather than offensive operations or active patrolling of sea lanes & the northern Black Sea coast / littoral. 11/ Ukraine SVKO. Russian aerospace forces continue to prioritize targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure & troop concentrations over suppression of Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian HIMARS & UCAVs will continue targeting Russian supply & command nodes. #airdefensefofukraine Ukraine SVKO. Russian aerospace forces continue to prioritize targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure & troop concentrations over suppression of Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian HIMARS & UCAVs will continue targeting Russian supply & command nodes. 12/ This is another short update focused on theater wide actions of the past two weeks. I am starting to get back into the rhythm of regular updates and will likely start to increase content in the coming weeks. Thank you for your patients, suggestions, & continued support. 13/ This open-source operational summary of the Ukrainian TVD is based on information from the ZSU & VSRF daily operations briefs, various Ukrainian & Russian Telegram channels, western intel agencies public statements, military analysts, & my own professional experience. 14/ Any errors to the information presented here is strictly my own and will be corrected as soon as it is discovered. • • • Recently, authors writing in these pages (see here and here) have criticized the progress made by the United States, and by implication its allies, on protecting civilians during combat operations. To fully and fairly assess them, such charges merit in-depth contextual examination. For instance, sense of scale can be skewed by zeroing in on operations gone wrong, to the neglect of those in which efforts to avoid, or at least reduce, civilian casualties have proved successful. And discussion of the subject often inadequately captures the complexity of some battlefields, where opponents fail to distinguish themselves, operate among the civilian population, use human shields, or even engage in activities meant to cause civilian casualties that can be blamed on their enemy, an especially reprehensible form of so-called “lawfare” (see, e.g., here and here). www.justsecurity.org/… The reasoning behind the Nordstream lines was because Russia was paying quite a bit to Ukraine in transit fees for the existing lines flowing through it. A direct line like the NS had no fees. Seymour Hersh– I think the point I’m making is I’m still going to do more reporting on this, because there’s still things I need to write about later. I think that this has probably been, in the view of some of the people who did it, one of the dumbest things the American government has done in years. 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