(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 369: Russia failed to establish air superiority and control [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-02-26 Ukraine has issued postage stamps featuring a mural by renowned UK graffiti artist Banksy to mark the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion. The mural depicts a man resembling Russian President Vladimir Putin being flipped during a judo match with a young boy. The original art is on a house that was devastated by Russian shelling in the town of Borodyanka, near the capital Kyiv. A phrase with an abbreviated expletive addressing the Russian leader has been added to the bottom left corner of the stamps. (BBC) A Czech company supplied 75 Himars and M270 MLRS inflatable models to Ukraine every month. This explains how the Aggressor's Army manages to destroy a minimum of 5-6 Himars every day. NATO allies collectively rejected Ukraine's request for a no-fly zone in Ukrainian air space as it would potentially lead to a full-fledged world war. x "Although the consequences of Russia’s terrible war in Ukraine will unfold over decades, three lessons from the conflict are already clear—and, in retrospect, should have been apparent all along," @PhillipsPOBrien writes: https://t.co/Oa8a9RqER5 — The Atlantic (@TheAtlantic) February 27, 2023 x A Czech company supplied 75 Himars and M270 MLRS inflatable models to Ukraine every month. This explains how the Aggressor's Army manages to destroy a minimum of 5-6 Himars every day.https://t.co/ZmOj1bwQTp#9GAG pic.twitter.com/f03VVrlWbg — Random 9GAG (@RND_9GAG) February 27, 2023 From an analytical viewpoint, there are two distinct sets of lessons to be drawn from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. One set of lessons pertains to battlefield tactics, while the other is about strategic war lessons. Let us begin with the lessons learnt on the battlefield, as these are more revealing of the changing nature of modern warfare. The first takeaway for military observers is that capital assets are no longer capable of dominating the battlefront in the ways they once did. The war in Ukraine has shown that big warfighting platforms such as tanks, warships, and fighter aircraft are more vulnerable than ever to low-cost defensive systems. Consider this. The Ukrainian forces used US Stinger and Javelin missiles to attack Russian forces with devastating effect; the Russian flagship, Moskva, was sunk with just two hits of the Neptune anti-ship cruise missile. The war in Ukraine has shown that big warfighting platforms such as tanks, warships, and fighter aircraft are more vulnerable than ever to low-cost defensive systems. It is relevant that the old-fashioned battle tank is waning in prowess. Indeed, a vast majority of Russian tanks attacked in the initial phase of the war were destroyed by cheap shoulder-fired Ukrainian missiles and drones. Beyond the obvious lack of armour and mobility, Russia’s tank offensive was also undermined by the military leadership’s failure to use tanks in combined arms operations alongside artillery, air support, reconnaissance, and artillery. The second tactical lesson from the war is that, while artillery remains an important component of warfare, it is only more lethal when precision-guided munitions are used in well-planned attacks. It is instructive that Russian artillery bombardments failed to penetrate Ukrainian defences. Even when command-and-control centres or logistics facilities were hit, the damage was minimal, and the facilities were quickly restored. In contrast, NATO’s High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, which fires GPS-guided projectiles up to 50 miles, repeatedly destroyed Russian ammunition dumps, command posts, and key bridges. Ukraine was able to carry out attacks from a safe distance, avoiding Russian counterfire. The third lesson of the Ukraine war is that drone warfare is a potential game-changer with the ability to permanently alter battlefield dynamics. Large drones, such as the Turkish Bayraktar, have been extremely effective in striking large targets in Ukraine, and even smaller drones have played an important role in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. On multiple occasions, small Ukrainian drones snuck into Russian battle formations, attacking long convoys, disrupting supply lines, and targeting ammunition dumps. The war also showed that airpower in an unprotected military environment is highly vulnerable. In nearly a year of warfighting, Russia failed to establish air superiority and control the skies over Ukraine. In contrast, a much smaller Ukrainian air force was able to survive and even launch effective attacks on enemy positions. www.orfonline.org/... 🇷🇺A-50 long-range radar tracking and control aircraft was damaged after being shelled by unknown means at an air base in #Belarus. Key inflections in ongoing military operations on February 26: Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky stated that Ukrainian forces will be ready for a counteroffensive this upcoming spring and that one of Ukraine’s strategic goals will be to drive a wedge into the Russian front in southern Ukraine between Crimea and the Russian mainland.[43] Russian President Vladimir Putin falsely stated that the West is trying to break up the Russian Federation and suggested that Western security assistance to Ukraine makes the West a participant in the war.[44] Putin leaned on a longstanding rhetorical line of effort for raising domestic support for the war by falsely claiming that the West is threatening the survival of the Russian people as a unified ethnic group.[45] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the types of systems that the West provides to Ukraine will determine how far Russian forces need to push threats away from Russia’s borders, likely in support of an ongoing Russian information operation aimed at discouraging the Western provision of specific systems to Ukraine.[46] US Central Intelligence Director William Burns stated on February 25 that the CIA is confident that Chinese leadership is considering the provision of lethal equipment to Russia but has not made a final decision.[47] Russian forces continued to conduct unsuccessful operations northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna.[48] x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - FEB 26 7-day average of Troops, Artillery & Vehicles increases between days TODAY'S REPORTED LOSSES: No daily change over 7-day average x3 7-day average increases + 7-day average of land-based equipment up as well 📈 https://t.co/esWd0sD3Qh pic.twitter.com/zv5WmiBdHa — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 ragnarbjartur@masto.ai (@ragnarbjartur) February 26, 2023 www.understandingwar.org/... Putin’s clear efforts to prepare the Russian people for a protracted and painful war suggest that he has realized that only the Russian MoD can actually sustain the large mechanized forces he needs to have any hope of achieving his ambitions in Ukraine. Putin has apparently still hesitated to order the additional reserve call-up that Russian officials were reportedly preparing at the start of 2023.[41] He has not turned back to voluntary recruitment and is unlikely to do so, but he seems to remain nervous about how much sacrifice he can impose on his people. Putin’s need for the ultranationalist community has changed but has not vanished. Putin no longer needs that community to draw volunteers to allow him to avoid involuntary mobilization at this time, but he still needs it to serve as the most reliable pro-Kremlin voice sustaining support for the war effort. He is unlikely, therefore, to allow the MoD fully to censor or shut it down, but he may allow Gerasimov to sideline or remove entirely some milbloggers who have been too strident in their criticisms now that their services as active recruiters are no longer necessary. Putin may find himself facing another dilemma after another wave or two of reserve call-ups, as the pool of reservists appropriate for front-line fighting is finite. The Russian conscription system generates roughly 260,000 new soldiers each year, drawn in two semi-annual call-ups. The combination of the pre-war reserve call-up, the recruitment efforts that drew partly on reservists, and the partial reserve call-up of September have likely made significant inroads into the available reserve manpower in the age groups and with the experience appropriate to replace losses in front-line combat units. Putin may need to consider expanding conscript service itself, drawing a higher proportion of young Russian men against their will into military service each year. But demographics do not favor such an approach. Roughly 800,000 young men turn 18 each year in Russia.[42] Expanding conscription much beyond the 260,000 of those already forced into military service risks not only taking young men with physical conditions unsuitable for war but also beginning to pull too many young men out of the Russian economy, which Putin is simultaneously attempting to put on a war footing. The specter of limitless Russian manpower is a myth. Putin has already been forced to make difficult and suboptimal choices to offset the terrible losses his war has inflicted on the Russian military, and he will face similarly difficult choices in 2023 if he persists in his determination to use military force to impose his will on Ukraine and the West. Russia can mobilize more manpower, and Putin will likely do so rather than give up. But the costs to Putin and Russia of the measures he will likely need to take at this point will begin to mount rapidly. www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Representative of the Ukrainian Tavriisk operational direction Oleksiy Dmytrashkivyskyi reported that Russian forces are accumulating a large amount of Russian personnel and equipment near Vasylivka and Hulyaipole in #Zaporizhia Oblast. www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Lithium x Since Feb. 2022, the US has exported about 38% more crude products to Europe than the prior 12 months: Kpler data. US natural gas shipments to Europe more than doubled last yr. “US energy now is becoming one of the foundations of European energy security.” https://t.co/zMLTrP5brQ — Lisa Abramowicz (@lisaabramowicz1) February 26, 2023 x ⚡️Ombudsman: Russia holds 180 political prisoners in occupied Crimea. There are currently 180 political prisoners, including 116 Crimean Tatars, illegally held in Russian-occupied Crimea, Ukraine's human rights ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on Feb. 26. — The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) February 26, 2023 x 🇲🇩 "Moldova is engaged in a shadow war with the Kremlin amid concerns that Russia is trying to topple the democratically elected government of the small but geographically key republic wedged between Romania and Ukraine." Denis Cenusa https://t.co/k3H4xLb0aq — CEPA (@cepa) February 27, 2023 [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/26/2155148/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-369-Russia-nbsp-failed-nbsp-to-establish-air-superiority-and-control Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/