(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 414: "Truth is so precious as to be attended by a bodyguard of lies” [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-04-12 Russian forces are visually confirmed to control at least 76.5 percent of Bakhmut. I don’t doubt it. It’s what I was hearing from my sources in Moscow as well. The hawks are very much in charge https://t.co/sn5tGturXZ ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - APR 12 Additions not specified by Oryx, net changes probably corrections or removal of duplicates: -2 🇷🇺, -2 🇺🇦 VISUALLY CONFIRMED: 3.2x losses to date ➡ 2.9x since 🇺🇦 counteroffensive (Aug 29) ➡ 5.7x 30-day average ⬆ 📈 https://t.co/x8fBLceiXV pic.twitter.com/qFzSotCZFs Russian forces continue to construct defenses in southern Ukraine. Russian milbloggers amplified stories from The Washington Post and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty showing satellite imagery in early April showing Russian-constructed fortifications throughout Crimea.[29] The imagery shows defenses along the M18 highway near Medvedivka, and along the North Crimean Canal near Armiansk, Maslove, and Novoivanivka likely constructed in early 2023. The imagery also shows the construction of fortifications along the beaches near Vityne in western Crimea. Milbloggers responded to satellite imagery on April 12 with the observation that it indicates that the Russian command has made the correct decision to address concerns over a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[30] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on April 12 that Russia forces have completed three layers of defenses across about 120km of Zaporizhia Oblast.[31] ISW previously reported that the continued construction of fortifications in Crimea may suggest that Russian forces are unsure of their ability to hold occupied territories in southern Ukraine in anticipation of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[32] Russian sources published footage on April 11 and 12 purportedly showing unspecified special forces elements of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces and the ”Crimea” Volunteer detachment operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[33] Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and did not make any confirmed gains in the city on April 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that fierce fighting is ongoing within Bakhmut and that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Khromove (3km west of Bakhmut) and Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut).[18] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Wagner forces are attacking Bakhmut mainly in small tactical groups with the support of conventional Russian elements.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Wagner assault detachments captured three unspecified city blocks within Bakhmut while Russian airborne (VDV) elements pinned Ukrainian forces down on Wagner’s flanks.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner fighters attacked Ukrainian positions along Petra Chaikovskoho Street in southwestern Bakhmut and continued fighting in northern, central, and southwestern sectors of the city.[21] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces now control 80 percent of Bakhmut, including all central administrative buildings.[22] Russian forces are visually confirmed to control at least 76.5 percent of Bakhmut, per ISW’s April 11 control of terrain assessment.[23] Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna on April 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations near Torske, Nevske, and Makiivka (all within 14 to 21km west or northwest of Kreminna) and that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions near Shyplivka (9km south of Kreminna) and the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[15] Another milblogger claimed that positional battles occurred near Makiivka (21km northwest of Kreminna) and Zhuravka gully (18km west of Kreminna) on April 11.[16] Footage published on April 11 purportedly showed elements of the 76th Airborne Assault Division (VDV) operating near Kreminna.[17] Russian invaders are "human shield" terrorists. In Skadovs'k, in temporarily-occupied Kherson region, militants of the Russian terrorist state have taken over educational institutions. They force teachers to continue conducting classes and pupils to attend. 1/2 pic.twitter.com/6gH1hDoK7A Arming Ukraine has become accepted wisdom, garnering support across the political spectrum and forging passionate commitments, as citizens across the world identify with battered Ukrainians repelling foreign aggression. Yet the arms trade’s underlying dynamics contradict simple narratives of solidarity. The very corporations and governments that direct the buildup previously aided the Russian war effort. And they still inflame conflicts across the Global South to sustain their industrial base and accumulate profits. The strategies they propound — ranging from the “no peer rival” policy to NATO expansion — not only foster war but commodify it. Capital flows reflect the existence of a global military-industrial complex, as interlocking conglomerates collectively organize the defense market – turning public funds into private property. A small number of transnational corporations with the same shareholders shuffle contracts between enterprises, moving profits across borders, while claiming that military spending is a patriotic duty and national imperative. The intense concentration of economic power allows companies to ratchet up prices, stifle competition and extort new contracts from governments. NATO-bloc military spending disproportionately enriches a small clique of corporations. On the eve of the 2022 Russian invasion, five companies alone – Airbus, Leonardo, Thales, Dassault Aviation, and Indra Systems — had received 75 percent of European Defence Industrial Development funds. Instead of competitors, contractors are shades of the same shadow. Edisoft and Naval Group form part of Thales, Thales forms part of Dassault, and Dassault forms part of Airbus. And the pattern peels on. In turn, foreign investment firms like BlackRock and Wellington Management own major shares of both European defense contractors and their American rivals. Russia’s war in Ukraine has turned the HIMARS rocket launcher into a lethal symbol of U.S. innovation. Last year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented President Joe Biden with a military medal from the captain of a Ukrainian HIMARS unit. The Arkansas Chamber of Commerce named it the “ Coolest Thing Made in Arkansas! ” x Much attention at present is being paid to the Ukrainian offensives that are likely to be launched in the coming weeks (or even the coming days). But, what of the Russians? An exploration of potential Russian courses of action in the coming months. 1/25 🧵 pic.twitter.com/BaTWkFrb6S — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) April 12, 2023 2/ One of the fundamental elements of planning is not just understanding friendly purpose and capabilities, but also an estimate of the enemy’s most likely and dangerous courses of action. 3/ To conduct such an appreciation, an update of the strategic and military situation is important. Therefore, I will provide a short update on the situation in Ukraine as a prelude to exploring Russia’s options in the coming months. 4/ The Russians launched their 2023 offensives back in February. A series of thrusts have taken place along the multiple axes of advance. The Russians launched their 2023 offensives back in February. A series of thrusts have taken place along the multiple axes of advance. 5/ A quick look at the maps shows that these assaults are concentrated in the eastern parts of Ukraine, with the Russian forces in the south (largely) retaining a defensive posture. For the most part, the Russians have had limited success with these offensives. A quick look at the maps shows that these assaults are concentrated in the eastern parts of Ukraine, with the Russian forces in the south (largely) retaining a defensive posture. For the most part, the Russians have had limited success with these offensives. 6/ While they have taken ground in many of these areas, attacks in places such as Vuhledar have been disasters, resulting in significant loss of lives and equipment. 7/ And then, of course, there is #Bakhmut. This battle has been ongoing since mid-last year, but new energy and focus was brought to bear when the Wagner Group decided in the back half of 2022 to show the Russian Army how to ‘succeed’ in operations. 8/ Using human wave attacks with convicts & employing more capable troops echeloned behind them to exploit successes, Wagner’s tactics resulted in even higher casualties as well as fomenting institutional friction between Wagner on one hand & the Russian Army on the other. 9/ As a consequence, the Russians over the past 7-8 months have suffered from a 'Bakhmut Fixation'. Regardless of where else their forces have been fighting, their attention appears to constantly return to #Bakhmut. 10/ Bakhmut is representative of the broader Russian 2023 offensive. It has used massive human and equipment resources for very minimal territorial gain. And if that is the only yard stick one was to use, the offensive would be classified as a significant military failure. 11/ But the Russians are also hoping to extend the length of the war in the hope that we in the west grow weary of the support being provided to #Ukraine. So, viewed through this lens, the Russians will probably view the last few months as successful because they have ‘not lost’. 12/ What are the Russian prospects, particularly in the wake of the enormously destructive and bloody fight for #Bakhmut over the last few months as well as the impending Ukrainian offensives? Where do the Russian’s go beyond Bakhmut? 13/ Whether the Russians capture #Bakhmut or not, their forces in the east have been handed a severe beating by the Ukrainians over the past three months. To that end, they are probably considering broad courses of action for the period between now and the northern Summer. 14/ Option 1: Keep Pushing. Over the coming weeks, the Russians could simply keep plodding away with their current offensive activities in the east. This is probably achievable for a few more weeks. 15/ But even large organisations exhaust themselves The Russians, having undertaken dozens of attacks as part of their offensives over the past few months, will be getting individually and organisationally tired. 16/ Option 2: Step It Up. A possible black swan is the Russians have built a strategic reserve that can be used to reinforce their current offensive operations. It is unlikely that the Russians have been able to hide such a large reserve for operations in the east though. 17/ This doesn’t mean they don’t have tactical and operational reserves there. But overall, I think this option is quite unlikely. 18/ Option 3: Shift Axis. The Russians might decide to shift their main effort for offensive operations to the south. They have a large number of units and troops across southern Ukraine and could decide to undertake spoiling attacks to impact on Ukrainian offensives there. 19/ Additionally, the defensive works appear to be better developed in this region. If things don’t go well for any Russian attacks from this direction, they have better defences to withdraw back behind to forestall any Ukrainian pursuit. Additionally, the defensive works appear to be better developed in this region. If things don’t go well for any Russian attacks from this direction, they have better defences to withdraw back behind to forestall any Ukrainian pursuit. 20/ Option 4: Shut it Down. Finally, the Russians might decide to shut down their offensive activities and hunker down for the Ukrainian offensives. They have well-prepared defensive works they can use to construct a defence in depth concept. 21/ If the Russians really are in this for the long haul & are more focussed on attrition of the Ukrainians than taking territory, this is a logical course of action for them. They could go on the defensive on the ground but continue offensive air and missile strikes. 22/ Notwithstanding the losses they have suffered, the Russians remain a formidable presence in #Ukraine. Whichever course of action they select (and it could be different to those above), it will be a complicating factor for Ukrainian planners finalising the coming offensives. 23/ Assessing enemy courses of actions also informs Ukrainian intelligence collection plans, as well as the priorities for operational strikes and the wargaming of different options for Ukrainian offensive actions. 24/ Good planning considers an enemy's objectives & possible courses of action. Not doing so is intellectually lazy & leads to disastrous outcomes for friendly forces. Ukrainian soldiers deserve Good planning considers an enemy's objectives & possible courses of action. Not doing so is intellectually lazy & leads to disastrous outcomes for friendly forces. Ukrainian soldiers deserve the best strategic & operational thinking to give them a foundation for success. End 25/ Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @Liberov @DefenceU @TDF_UA @DefenceHQ @Militarylandnet @madeleinetkelly • • • [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/4/12/2163631/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-414-Truth-is-so-precious-as-to-be-attended-by-a-bodyguard-of-lies Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/