(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 422 'unknown practical jokers' and continued ground attacks [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-04-20 Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine out of concern for a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive.· Colonel Konstantin Sivkov, deputy president of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, received his own bust, though it doesn't seem to have been quite as lethal as Tatarsky's. Unknown practical jokers are sending statues of Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov to Russian propagandists, stoking a genuine panic as evidenced by their posts on Telegram. Russian propagandist and war criminal Vladlen Tatarsky was killed by explosives hidden in a Zhukov bust that was gifted to him at an event in a St. Petersburg café on April 2. english.nv.ua/... Key Takeaways The Kremlin demoted the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet Sergei Avakyants amid an ongoing surprise readiness check that began on April 14. It is unclear if the Kremlin demoted Avakyants due to his poor performance in the ongoing rills or for other reasons. · A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military’s use of Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces as frontline infantry in Ukraine. · The Russian State Duma adopted a law granting members of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Militias veterans' status which could possibly cover PMC personnel but does not formally recognize PMC formations. · Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to resolve issues at the Gukovo checkpoint during a meeting with government officials, indicating continued Russian challenges integrating illegally annexed Ukrainian territory. · Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northwest of Svatove. · Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast. · The Kremlin may be eliminating or deprioritizing formal force structures controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and permitting private military companies (PMCs) to absorb their soldiers. · Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian youth to consolidate societal control of occupied territories. www.understandingwar.org/... x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - APR 20 No additions from @Rebel44CZ today, duplicates being reviewed VISUALLY CONFIRMED: 3.2x losses to date ➡ 2.9x since 🇺🇦 counteroffensive (Aug 29) ➡ 5.8x 30-day average ➡ 📈 https://t.co/VNnIHiGJsf pic.twitter.com/PjKRDECJMr — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 ragnarbjartur@masto.ai (@ragnarbjartur) April 20, 2023 www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area on April 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to improve their tactical positions in the Kreminna area and conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near the southern outskirts of Kreminna and near Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna).[25] Ukrainian sources reported battles near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces are operating near the settlement.[26] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that previous Russian claims that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Spirne (13 km south of Bilohorivka) were premature and that Ukrainian forces still control the settlement as of April 20.[27] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in the direction of Torske (15 km west of Kreminna), Terny (17 km northwest of Kreminna), and Nevske (17 km northwest of Kreminna).[28] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued assault operations in Bakhmut and its vicinity on April 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 22 Russian attacks in the Bakhmut direction – specifically in Bakhmut city and in the area of Khromove (2km northwest of Bakhmut).[30] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian conventional forces attempted to advance towards Stupochky (about 14km southwest of Bakhmut) while Wagner Group forces continued to attack Ukrainian forces from central, southern, and northern parts of Bakhmut.[31] A Russian source claimed that Wagner forces are changing the direction of the main attack against Bakhmut and are intensifying efforts to advance towards the O0506 highway that runs through Khromove into Bakhmut.[32] A milblogger claimed that Wagner forces attacked near Khromove and were able to advance to an unspecified highway - likely the O0506 - that Ukrainian forces use as a ground line of communication (GLOC) into Bakhmut.[33] Geolocated footage posted on April 20 showed Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions northwest of Khromove.[34] A Wagner-affiliated source published a video purportedly showing Wagner tank crews firing at Ukrainian forces in central Bakhmut using T-90 tanks.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner forces are ”confidently” holding positions in the area of the Bakhmut administration building and the central square forces while Ukrainians hold a ”relatively small” portion of the urban area.[36] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian “Grim” (“Thunder”) Tactical Group Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 20 that Russian forces in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast are equipping defensive lines, looting, and transporting looted goods in cars, as Russian forces feel insecure about their positions.[48] Pletenchuk noted that discourse about the likely upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive is filling the Russian information space.[49] Pletenchuk stated that minefields actively inhibit Russian advances in an unspecified area in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces will transfer 400 conscripts from Izyumivka (14km northwest of Feodosia) to defensive positions in Volodymyrivka, Crimea (18km southwest of Yevpatoria).[50] Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces operated a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system, normally a military district-level asset, near Novodanylivka (36km southwest of Hulyaipole) in western Zaporizhia Oblast, which could indicate a Russian prioritization to augment Russian defensive positions along this line.[51] www.understandingwar.org/... Patriot systems arrive in Ukraine from three countries – the United States, Germany, the Netherlands x Germany transfers another critical IRIS-T air defense system to Ukraine / The New Voice of Ukraine https://t.co/CmTT5y1U3V #Ukraine #UkraineRussiaWar #Russia #UkraineWarNews — Sue Stone (standing with 🇺🇦) (@knittingknots) April 19, 2023 x The Come Back Alive Foundation handed over all the necessary equipment to form the reconnaissance and strike systems of three territorial defense brigadeshttps://t.co/pyKoMtvTrm#Ukraine #UkraineRussiaWar #Volunteers #TDF pic.twitter.com/Jlq0EiWb5k — Militarnyi (@militarnyi_en) April 19, 2023 According to the New York Times, senior tax and trade officials from the U.S. and the European Union noticed a "surge" in chips and other electronic components sent to Russia that were "deemed as critical to the development of weapons, including Russian cruise missiles that have struck Ukraine." The components are being sent to Russia through Armenia, Kazakhstan, and other countries, the New York Times reported on April 18. Heavy sanctions were imposed on Russia following the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to prevent such technology from being used on the battlefield. The European Council announced on Feb. 25 its tenth package of sanctions against Russia, which included "further export bans on critical technology and industrial goods, such as electronics, specialized vehicles, machine parts, spare parts for trucks and jet engines, as well as goods for the construction sector, which can be directed to Russia's military, such as antennas or cranes." However, electronic component sales through unofficial channels and Russian-allied nations make the official sale figures much lower than the total number of technology sent to Russia. In late January 2023, a Dutch investigation revealed that millions of microchips made by Dutch companies had reportedly ended up in Russia since Feb. 24, 2022. The investigation showed a “clear pattern” of a small group of Chinese companies obtaining Dutch chips and exporting them to Russia month after month. kyivindependent.com/... x NYT: 'Surge' in electronic components sent to Russia via Armenia, Kazakhstan https://t.co/hhHqks9ABJ #Ukraine #UkraineRussiaWar #Russia #UkraineWarNews — Sue Stone (standing with 🇺🇦) (@knittingknots) April 19, 2023 x this a really excellent look not just at #Ukraine nationalism in light of #UkraineRussiaWar, but what it could mean in context of #EU membership The Rise and Role of Ukrainian Ethnic Nationalism https://t.co/LgYqCinkxS — marydejevsky (@marydejevsky) April 20, 2023 x The Russians have published what they claim are secret wiretapped recordings of voice messages sent between NATO troops in Ukraine. Its supposed to be mainly American soldiers. The accents are slightly off though pic.twitter.com/qHbjDtfVBu — Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) April 19, 2023 x Sanctions were supposed to deny Russia's ability to finance the war. But sanctions were delayed and it didn't happen. Now sanctions are finally starting to bite. At the end of 2022 liquid reserves were slightly above 1 month of import. More facts: 1/ pic.twitter.com/NXfRCKre1r — Tymofiy Mylovanov (@Mylovanov) April 20, 2023 Before the invasion, Russia's reserves were $634B. Sanctions immobilize about $313B. This leaves Russia with $146B in gold and about $107B in FX assets (largely yuan). 2/ Russia’s economy faces an extended period of stagnation. There was essentially 0 productivity growth post-2014; now it will turn negative due to sanctions and war. Russian economy will further suffer due to emigration and brain drain. 3/ Russia reports a record deficit of 2.4T rubles in 2023Q1 - 82% of the full-year budget target. December had a record single-month deficit of more than 4T rubles. Key drivers are revenue underperformance, notably oil and gas, and elevated expenditures due to the war. 4/ Oil and gas revenues for January-March are 45% below their level the last year. Russia is increasing its tax on oil. However, this is estimated to bring about 600B - not even close to cover Ts in lost revenues. 5/ EU embargoes on crude oil (Dec. 5, 2022) and oil products (Feb. 5, 2023) were delayed. But now together with Europe’s exit from Russian gas, over 50% pre-invasion exports are sanctioned. The sanction gaps are East Asian democracies as well as China, India, and Turkey. 6/ Russia was able to redirect crude oil to China, India, and Turkey. The exclusion of shipping services from the EU embargo allowed to keep Russian oil on the market. But Russia has had to accept heavy discounts. 7/ Sanctions succeeded in maintaining oil market stability while reducing Russian export earnings. Global oil prices have returned to pre-full-scale invasion levels. Russia’s inability to find alternative buyers for its gas decreased gas production. 8/ High prices and redirection to alternative buyers supported Russian exports. But total exports have weakened since 2022Q4 as energy prices moderated and additional sanctions took effect. In imports, Russia has not been able to replace EU and US trade. 9/ KSE Institute expects significant declines in oil and gas export volumes (-12.9%, -27.9%) as well as prices (-32.6%, -49.4%) in 2023. 10/ KSE Institute projects that lower export volumes and prices will cut oil and gas earnings in half this year (41% for oil, 64% for gas). The current account surplus will narrow to $63 billion. This is a problem because Russian budget assumes $123 billion surplus. 11/ kse.ua/wp-content/upl… Thank you @KSE_Institute @Nataliia_Shapo @ben_hilgenstock @elinaribakova @JPavytska 12/12 Sanctions are working. Slowly but surely. Let's add more. You can read the entire KSE Institute sanction chartbook and suggestions for further sanctions hereThank you12/12 • • • [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/4/20/2164954/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-422-unknown-practical-jokers-and-continued-ground-attacks Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/