(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Quick Explainer: Why Tanks are still "King of the Battlefield" under the right conditions [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-04-27 I’m going to start off by saying, the diagram I posted as the header of this article is a gross simplification that does not do justice to the complexities of modern combat at all, or take into account the capabilities of various types of weapon systems. Certain infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), like the M2 Bradley’s TOW2 missile system, have enough anti-armor punch that they can easily take on and defeat older main battle tanks. Certain tanks like the M1A1 or M1A2 Abrams with advanced Active Protection Systems (APS) are very resistant to infantry based anti-tank weapons. Furthermore this “triad” conceptualization entirely ignores factors like mines, entrenchments, artillery, air support, drones, mobile gun platforms and many other things besides. However, it does serve to broadly conceptualize the strengths and weaknesses of the primary front line combat elements of an army. As a broad generalization, unsupported tanks will struggle against infantry. Unprotected IFVs will get dominated by tanks. And isolated infantry will be powerless against enemy IFVs. This rock-paper-scissors like triad conceptualization may help people understand the role that tanks are asked to play, particularly in “tank country.” Understanding the Triad of Combined Arms So to begin with the basics, let’s explain what each of the terms mean. Tank (MBT) Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) are heavily armored tracked vehicles with a main gun between 100mm~125mm at high armor penetrating flat trajectories. The best MBTs have armor capable of withstanding multiple hits from enemy tank guns or missiles before being disabled, and tend to be more heavily protected from in front than the flanks or behind. Ex: Leopard 2, Abrams, Challenger 2, T-72, T-90, PT-91. Leopard 2A4 MBT Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) A lightly armored vehicle with a small rapid firing main gun (20mm~30mm) and usually the ability to carry 6-8 soldiers who can fight as dismounted infantry. The armor is sufficient to protect against small arms or indirect explosions from artillery or rockets, but generally not heavy enough to withstand direct hits from a tank gun. Ex: Bradley, Marder, BMP2, BMP3, Rosomak M2 Bradley IFV Dismounted Infantry An infantry soldier who is fighting on foot is referred to as “dismounted,” in contrast to an infantry soldier fighting on an IFV or being carried by an armored personnel carrier (APC). They are referred to as “mounted.” Dismounted infantry can fight with small arms, or a variety of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). ATGM Examples: Javelin, NLAW, Kornet, Fagot Ukrainian infantry armed with NLAW ATGM A tank gun differs significantly from either the main gun on a self-propelled howitzer (Like the Paladin) or an IFV (like the Bradley). A howitzer fires a low-velocity artillery round on a parabolic trajectory. That is, the round flies up into the air, then begins descending. It “falls onto” the target from above. They ordinarily fire quite slowly, around 6-8 rounds per minute. A tank fires a high velocity flat trajectory round. The high velocity of the round is necessary to give it the kinetic energy to punch through the armor of a tank. Rate of fire is still fairly slow, around 10-12 rounds per minute. An IFV is often equipped with a rapid firing autocannon usually around 20mm — 30mm. For example, the M2 Bradley has a 25mm autocannon that fires 200 rounds per minute. It can equip high explosive antipersonnel rounds, or armor piercing rounds to destroy enemy light armored vehicles. They generally cannot penetrate a main battle tank’s armor. This difference in rate of fire is a big part of why IFVs are great against infantry, where as tanks can be overwhelmed. A tank can destroy a heavily armored IFV in one shot, but firing only once every 6-10 seconds, it can struggle to deal with numerous dismounted infantry. An IFV fires small shells at a high rate of fire. To get an idea of how powerful a 25mm round is, look at how big these rounds are. Ducking behind a tree or a residential home might provide you with pretty solid protection against small arms fire. When an IFV rolls up and opens up with its autocannon, what can be good protection against small arms fire can quickly become no protection at all. And if infantry can approach a tank from the flanks to close range, the tank can be destroyed by ATGMs. If enough infantry get close enough to an isolated and unprotected tank, they might even be able to overwhelm the tank and kill or chase off the tank crew without needing to destroy the tank. Combined Arms Principles To understand how each of these weapon systems fits together into a whole, it’ is necessary to understand something called “fire suppression.” Suppression is a term usually applied when used against infantry in cover. While a person in cover may be safe from enemy fire, while they are hiding, they are not peeking out to observe enemy movements, aim their weapons, or firing their weapons. They are not moving to gain a better tactical position. So one way to tactically neutralize or greatly diminish infantry in good fire is simply to keep shooting at their position even knowing you are unlikely to actually kill any infantry. This can be accomplished either through small arms fire (like light machineguns or even 50-calibur heavy machine guns), or through heavier weapons like 25mm autocannons or even high explosive rounds from a tank.. The idea is that if a soldier is hiding in a building or a trench while explosions or bullet rip all around their position, they are less likely to be able to shoot back or move from that position (or if they do, they will be exposed and in danger of being hit). For example, if you had some Russian infantry in a fortified building, you might attack it with a pair of IFVs in something like this kind of a way. 1 IFV sets up and lays down suppressive fire (infantry might dismount and begin suppressive fire using small arms as well). IFV 2 uses this covering fire to approach the flank of the fortified position even as it, too, fires suppressive fire. The IFV2 sets up on the flank of the Russian position and unloads a squad of troops, who (with support from both IFVs) attack the enemy position from the flank. The Russian infantry will find it difficult to tactically maneuver to respond to the aggressive move by IFV 2, since the IFV 1 laying down suppressive fire will make it hard for the Russian infantry to reposition themselves or deploy heavy weapons like the tripod-launched Kornet antitank missile during the attack. Things would be obviously more complicated if the Russian position was supported by its own IFV. It would be more dangerous for Infantry to dismount for an assault under fire from an enemy IFV. The enemy IFV is considerably more difficult to “suppress” in any way, and its freedom of movement is more difficult to restrain. This is why IFVs also carry anti-armor ammunition for their main guns. The M2 Bradley anti-armor sabot round can penetrate the armor of most Russian IFVs, making it easier for them to dominate an IFV on IFV fight. And the Bradley can always reach for its TOW2 antitank missile, which will destroy virtually any Russian IFV in one shot. But if a Russian IFV is protecting a Russian position, I don’t think it is difficult to see how the presence of such a vehicle adds considerably to the fighting power of the defensive position, and how it becomes much harder for the Ukrainian IFVs to operate freely. Add a single tank to the Russian defensive position, and things get far more precarious. A single direct hit from any MBT is likely to disable or destroy an IFV, even more heavily protected IFVs like the Bradley or the Marder. IFVs simply rolling up to the defensive position at long range and opening fire might be near suicidal, as it will likely be within range of the Russian MBT. If you are in a place with highly limited visibility, sending a dismounted infantry squad to try and approach close enough to fire ATGM (antitank guided missiles) might be the best option, but would require dismounted infantry to launch a far more precarious attack. If you have Javelins. NLAWs or TOW2 missiles, western antitank missiles that can consistently destroy Russian tanks from extreme long ranges beyond Russian tank firing ranges, that greatly simplifies things. But not every Ukrainian platoon is going to HAVE such a weapon, so it helps to understand the defensive value of the MBT—it severely restricts the freedom of movement of IFVs that can, themselves, dominate infantry. Thus a combined arms defense can be a very difficult thing to overcome. So that’s why tanks’ abilities to win long range tank on tank engagements are so important. If a Ukrainian MBT begins the fight by engaging the Russian MBT and destroys it, suddenly, you have an overwhelming advantage. The Russian IFV cannot go head to head with the Ukr. MBT, so it must either fight extremely cautiously or pull back. The Ukr. MBT can continue to contribute by laying down suppressive fire on the Russian entrenched infantry position, but by destroying or forcing the withdrawal of the enemy MBTs/IFVs, it has done its job. Without that armored protection, you’re essentially back to that first scenario of Ukr. IFVs attacking an isolated entrenched Russian infantry position. A fight that the IFVs should dominate. The fact that the tank is not particularly effective at taking on the entrenched infantry position is largely irrelevant. its role is to dominate any and all AFVs (armored fighting vehicles: tanks, IFVs, armored personnel carriers, etc), and strip the armored protection off the enemy front line defense. Once that protection is gone, that position will be far more vulnerable to systematic suppression and assault tactics from IFVs and infantry. By its mere appearance, the MBT exerts an influence over the entire tactical battlefield, and shuts out all “lesser” armored forces. That’s why it is still sometimes called “the king of the battlefield.” Conclusion So, in the real world, none of this is so simple. In cities, in forested or hilly areas, combat ranges tend to become compressed, and all the fighting takes place at closer ranges. There are few places in the streets of Bakhmut where you can see more than a 100~200m, and in many areas visual range is much less. In the forests of northern Ukraine, you can see combat take place at ranges of only 200m-300m or even less. Forested area west of Svatove, Luhansk Oblast These types of terrain favor infantry, and disfavor tanks. It is a lot easier to sneak up on a tank to fire off an anti-tank missile if you can’t even be seen till you’re within 100-200m. Sending out lots of dismounted infantry, but also positioning IFVs and armored vehicles around the tanks to protect them is a must, and their utility will also be curtailed for lack of lines of fire. By contrast, nothing favors tanks like wide, flat plains or farmland. Southern Ukraine (Eastern Kherson Oblast) An infantry squad would be visible near the horizon (5000m+) and sneaking up on a tank would be virtually impossible in this kind of terrain. A tank round could be fired literally as far as the eye can see. This type of terrain is called “tank country,” because if one side has tanks and the other doesn’t, the tank will utterly dominate the battlefield. if there is a clash of tanks, the victor will most likely have a dominant tactical position. Russia has dug miles and miles of trenches through positions like this in Southern Ukraine in hopes of being able to survive an armored attack from Ukraine. However, for all the tank obstacles, land mines and trenches the Russians lay down, if Ukrainian Leopard 2s, Challenger 2s and PT-91s can dominate the Russian tanks in the area and destroy them, it is difficult to see (for me) how the Russians can tactically respond to methodical breaching attacks. (a topic I covered in greater detail here) Whether or not tanks still rule the battlefield may be tested in Southern Ukraine. It is a test I expect that tanks will still pass. Special thanks to BarbeCul for his editing work on my diaries [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/4/27/2166173/-Quick-Explainer-Why-Tanks-are-still-King-of-the-Battlefield-under-the-right-conditions Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/