(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 429: abhorring a long war considering Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-04-27 Space and time are not Space/Time, especially in this war. Ukraine launched successful counteroffensives in 2022 at the end of the Battle of Kyiv, around Chernihiv and Sumy, towards Izyum and at Kherson. Much is being made of the next such move in which Ukraine will be expected to reclaim territory, demonstrate it can successfully use Western military assistance and show the war is not a stalemate. This week, Ukraine's deputy defense minister Hanna Maliar said her country's armed forces are already conducting various "actions" and that people should not expect a formal announcement about a counteroffensive, in a nod to their complex nature. www.newsweek.com/... Space and time, on the other hand, could enable the Kremlin to reconstitute its capabilities. Space means Ukrainian territory Russia gets to use as a staging ground for further aggression. Time means a breather on the battlefield resulting from a premature cessation of hostilities or a slowed Ukrainian counteroffensive due to insufficient Western aid. [Space] The US cannot avoid a long Russian war in Ukraine without helping Ukraine liberate its territory. Deprioritizing territory — as some argue[4] — only increases the risk of a long war. Territory is a core part of Russia’s capability to sustain this war, alongside manpower and equipment. Russia will use any territory in Ukraine as a staging ground to launch attacks on Ukraine, in this invasion or in any later effort. Like Crimea and Donbas, any territories that Russia holds in Ukraine will become Russian military bases in perpetuity. We know this is the Russian strategy because we are living it. This has already been a long Russian war in part because the Kremlin was allowed to keep its illegal gains in Ukraine in 2014. If the current lines hold, imagine how much further Russia could advance in future years after reconstituting its forces. [Time] Metering Western support to Ukraine increases the risk of a long war. Momentum matters. Interruptions to Ukraine’s momentum provide a triple advantage to Russia: a chance for Russian forces to stabilize the frontline and reconstitute; lessened domestic pressures on Russian President Vladimir Putin; and a chance for the Kremlin to seize the narrative in the international — and particularly Western — information space. We already observed these effects when Ukraine was not able to exploit Russian battlefield setbacks in December-January through a third successive counteroffensive operation, in part due to insufficient Western aid.[5] This allowed Russia to stabilize its defensive lines, add weight to its offensive in Bakhmut, and prepare additional offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast.[6] Western support trailing Ukraine’s battlefield needs is how this war becomes lengthy and costly. www.understandingwar.org/... Key Takeaways: The poli cy debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a long war for the US, because the US is not fighting this war. Nor is the US fighting a proxy war. The West and Ukraine are not protracting or spreading this war; Russia is. A long Russian war is not an inherent Kremlin goal, but rather the Kremlin’s adaptation in pursuit of its maximalist objectives in Ukraine . . The Kremlin’s ability to sustain a long war in Ukraine is not a given, however, and disproportionately depends on whether Russia is given time and space to rebuild its capabilities. The Kremlin’s ability to threaten the US and NATO, as well as the future of Russia’s power globally, disproportionately depends on Russia’s gains or losses in Ukraine . . Metering Western support to Ukraine and inadequately resourcing all of the required Ukrainian counteroffensives — not just the next one — will protract Russia’s war and increase the associated risks for the US. The US risks facing the same escalation risks under worse conditions if it does not help Ukraine liberate its territory through a series of successive counteroffensive operations. The West has a profound ability to shape the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The West’s problem is not capability; it is perception. The policy debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. The catchall phrase “long war” is skewed by legacy US thinking about wars, intentional Kremlin information operations, and the inherent difficulties in parsing battlefield realities. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a long war for the US, because the US is not fighting this war. Ukraine is defending itself against an unprovoked Russian invasion, and the US is supporting Ukraine. Comparisons to Iraq or Afghanistan are not appropriate. The US is not fighting a proxy war. Ukraine’s choice to defend itself against Russia’s genocidal efforts is exogenous to the West’s decision-making. Ukraine would have defended itself against Russia’s 2022 invasion in the absence of support from its partners — at the cost of more territory and lives. Even in 2014, when Ukraine’s military capability and Western willingness to counter Russia were minimal, barely equipped Ukrainian volunteers rushed to the frontline to combat Russian aggression.[1] The West and Ukraine are not protracting or spreading this war; Russia is. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is entirely a war of choice. The Kremlin chose to launch a full-scale invasion despite the years-long presence of a peace framework (that the Kremlin routinely violated) and years of diplomatic efforts by Ukraine and the West. The Kremlin is choosing to protract this war and can choose to end it at any point. Fixating on the “long war” scenario obfuscates the very real US interest at stake in Ukraine. The US problem is not a long war per se. The US problem is the risk of escalation in which the US will need to fight in this war — a risk that increases if Russia’s war protracts and if Russia keeps its gains in Ukraine. www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27 Key Takeaways The Russian military command appears to be reshuffling the leadership of command organs associated with force generation, sustainment, and logistics. The three command organs that are reportedly receiving new leadership as part of this reshuffle are noteworthy because they are associated with managing aspects of Russian force generation, troop sustainment, and logistical oversight. Western officials expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to conduct a successful counteroffensive. Russian forces are reportedly using new tactics to complicate Ukrainian air defenses’ ability to detect Russian missiles. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have launched a renewed campaign for national attention. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin met with Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu and Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani in New Delhi, India on April 27. Russian forces conducted defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction and limited ground attacks near Kreminna. Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut but may be transferring additional reserves to the Bakhmut area. Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Russian forces are further militarizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to defend against possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. The Washington Post reported that leaked US intelligence documents state that Russian military leaders aim to enlist 815,000 soldiers while balancing concerns about critical labor shortages. Ukrainian partisans conducted three separate attacks in occupied territories on April 26-27. www.understandingwar.org/… x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - APR 27 33 🇷🇺 duplicates removed, no new additions today List maintained by @Rebel44CZ VISUALLY CONFIRMED: 3.1x losses to date ⬇ 2.8x since 🇺🇦 counteroffensive (Aug 29) ➡ 2.6x 30-day average ⬇ 📈 https://t.co/LKSADfcxRG pic.twitter.com/HXOp5O5URa — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 ragnarbjartur@masto.ai (@ragnarbjartur) April 27, 2023 x "People who are prisoners of war... there is no point in keeping them. Well, because we get all the information from them. There is no point in keeping them anymore… they need to be disposed of," the Russian serviceman said. — The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) April 27, 2023 www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces conducted defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 27. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Group of Forces (Western Military District) destroyed four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novoselivkse (30km southeast of Kupyansk), Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk), and Krokhmalne (25km southeast of Kupyansk). [19] A Russian milblogger remarked that the situation in the Kupyansk direction has not changed significantly and that mutual artillery strikes and reconnaissance operations are occurring along the line of contact. [20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction did not conduct any offensive actions and are continuing to fortify their positions and use UAVs to adjust artillery fire. [21] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut on April 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to attack within Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut). [24] A milblogger claimed on April 27 that Wagner forces reached the main entrance to Bakhmut from Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske and cut the main but not final Ukrainian logistics line into Bakhmut, but ISW cannot confirm this claim. [25] One Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group forces broke through Ukrainian lines near Khromove, but another claimed that Wagner forces have not yet entered the settlement. [26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Wagner Group assault detachments captured four unspecified blocks in northwestern, western, and southwestern Bakhmut. [27] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces are further militarizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in order to defend against possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on the east (left) bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir in Zaporizhia Oblast. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 27 that satellite imagery shows that Russian forces have constructed firing positions on the roofs of several reactor buildings at the ZNPP. [36] A Russian milblogger argued on April 27 that Russian forces needed to strengthen defensive positions at the ZNPP in preparation for Ukrainian counteroffensives and a possible Ukrainian landing on the east (left) bank in the area. [37] The milblogger called on Russian forces to strengthen defenses at the ZNPP, near Enerhodar, and along the entire east (left) bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir. [38] www.understandingwar.org/... Russian readers have found much that is resonant in the book. How the Greek dictatorship, for example, collapsed after an attempt to annex Cyprus, which it regarded as a historical part of the country. Or how the Portuguese regime caved in as a result of a colonial, imperialist war that dragged on for years. Or how Salazar, plagued by health problems, was removed from power but continued to think that he was ruling the country. (To maintain the illusion, a special newspaper was published just for him.) And then there is the story of how in Spain, the idea of a transition to democracy slowly took hold and was brought about by the ruling elite itself. Unsurprisingly, the book has infuriated some pro-Kremlin propagandists. Mobile network operators blocked one bookstore’s campaign of promotional text messages, a clear sign the book is seen as dangerous. Nevertheless, there is no legal way for the authorities to ban it. And in any case, prosecuting a book that focuses on the transition from conservative or fascist dictatorship to democracy risks looking overly defensive. In one chapter, I write that political energy, like any other kind of energy, doesn’t simply disappear — it merely takes on different forms. Russians’ interest in “The End of the Regime,” it seems, is a good example of that energy finding an outlet. www.nytimes.com/... x As Putin sends kids off to die in his ruinous war against #Ukraine, a best-seller emerges in Russia: How do dictatorships end? People want to know.https://t.co/rYo0JKiXQu — David Beard (@dabeard) April 26, 2023 [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/4/27/2166174/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-429-abhorring-a-long-war-considering-Vietnam-Afghanistan-and-Iraq Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/