(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . A hypothetical NATO response to a Russian tactical nuke in Ukraine [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-05-14 An F-35 Lightning II Much is frequently made over the Russian threat of the use of nuclear weapons. I’m not going to go into all the reasons why Russian nuclear weapons are highly unlikely to be used, but if you wish to pursue that I suggest the video from Perun below as to the overall reasons as to why it is unlikely. Instead, I will be focusing solely on what a NATO response might be to the Russian use of a tactical nuke in Ukraine. For those unfamiliar with nuclear weapons, there is a wide range of the size of explosion possible (known as the yield). The largest fusion bombs are considered strategic weapons large enough to wipe out entire cities. While the smallest yield bombs are meant for tactical use against military units, fleets, or similar military targets. These small tactical nukes can be delivered as a bomb dropped from an airplane, delivered by cruise missile, or even shot from an artillery piece (preferably one with a very long range...). The theoretical worry some people have regarding the Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons is that as the Russian conventional military is wiped out Putin will be tempted to pull a rabbit out of his hat by using a nuke in some way. Part of the work of NATO in this situation is to make very clear to Russia (via private communications) that such an act would be a net loss for Russia. And so, how would NATO accomplish that? First, NATO needs to not have just one response ready to go, but a variety of options for both different triggers and for different severity. A response of overwhelming force risks not having any further threat value after it is accomplished. If NATO wipes out every Russian unit Ukraine (in some magical way) then that can only be accomplished once. NATO can’t do it again if there are no units left. Second, a NATO response needs to apply a sufficient penalty to Russia with a minimum of further escalation risk. A NATO response of launching ICBMs triggers an immediate full nuclear exchange. Russia would have to launch its missiles before they could determine where the NATO missiles are targeting. So even if the US launches with the intention of only hitting a few select bases, Russia cannot afford to wait to see if that is the case. Furthermore, NATO can not launch attacks versus Russia which would eliminate its capacity to defend itself in a nuclear exchange. So that means NATO cannot attack certain command centers, radar facilities, and other infrastructure required for Russia to launch its own nukes or detect NATO launches. More specifically, this eliminates any large scale NATO attack on Russian air defense across critical areas of Russia, its nuclear sub fleet, and the use of any aircraft capable of launching nuclear weapons anywhere near valuable Russian targets (ie, a lot of them). Basically, if a NATO attack looks like it could render Russia unable to launch its nuclear arsenal after the attack, then Russian nuclear doctrine permits a nuclear launch BEFORE it loses that capacity. So no NATO response should ever be tried which could be misconstrued as an attack on Russia’s ability to launch its strategic nuclear missiles. That does leave a fair amount of responses that don’t reach that level yet would still be a deterrent to Russia’s use of a tactical nuke. SEAD/DEAD in/near Ukraine SEAD/DEAD is the acronym for Suppression of Enemy Air Defense and Destruction of Enemy Air Defense. Destruction is fairly obvious. Suppression is the use of certain weapons such as AGM-88 HARMS which lock onto and destroy radar systems which encourages the enemy to not turn on their radar in the first place. If the enemy is afraid to turn on its radar, then that radar is considered suppressed. A SEAD/DEAD campaign in Ukraine would be the prerequisite for many other potential NATO actions. NATO possess the missiles, planes, and most importantly, highly skilled pilots required to more safely complete SEAD/DEAD missions. A highly trained pilot is important as in many cases the first step of the mission is to convince the enemy to turn on its radar, an action most pilots try really hard to avoid. NATO possesses sufficient quantity of cruise missiles and planes capable to suppressing Russian air defenses inside of Ukraine and close to the border of it. Suppression of air defenses deeper inside of Russia would be off limits. Such missions would begin to threaten Russia’s ability to shoot down NATO bombers potentially carrying nuclear bombs, and hence would escalate the situation, not deter more nuke use. But everything inside of Ukraine is fair game. And NATO SEAD/DEAD against Russia in Ukraine would be highly valuable for Ukraine, allowing them to more safely use their own Air Force in close air support and interdiction missions. No SEAD/DEAD is perfect, so some danger would always remain. But NATO could greatly reduce the danger to Ukrainian aircraft and thereby increase their effectiveness. Air attack on Russian ground forces Once Russian air defenses are significantly reduced, NATO could turn its own aircraft towards the destruction of Russian units, equipment, command and control, and other high value targets. While B-52 carpet bombing is probably out due to the danger of the B-52 flight being interpreted as a nuclear mission against Russia, NATO fighter and attack jets could launch a large number of missions making any movement of military equipment highly dangerous to the Russians. Such attacks would give a significant advantage to Ukrainian ground forces and enable them to push the Russians back even quicker with far fewer Ukrainian losses. A full NATO air to ground campaign would pretty much guarantee a Ukrainian victory all on its own. Destruction of Russian Infrastructure Any bets on how long it would take NATO to drop the Kerch bridge and sink the ferries? Russian trains would be unable to operate anywhere in Ukraine. Every bridge, ammo dump, and truck depots of any value would go up in smoke very quickly. Sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet Another option for NATO would be the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This fleet is frequently used by Russia to launch missiles into Ukraine. Furthermore, it would make Crimea more vulnerable to small scale Ukrainian incursions if the raiding boats didn’t have to worry about running into a Russian warship. And of course, the destruction of the fleet would be a significant loss to Russia in terms of the loss of experienced sailors and the expense if it were to be rebuilt. This fleet is not needed as a nuclear deterrent and therefore would be unlikely to escalate the nuclear risk. Sinking of the Russian Surface Fleet Elsewhere A more aggressive option would be the sinking of Russian warships elsewhere in the world. This would not target Russian nuclear ballistic missile subs as that would endanger them to launch. However, surface vessels not used in a strategic missile launch role could be targeted and sunk. In addition, Russian flagged freighters could be boarded and confiscated around the world. This action would pose difficulties around certain commodities such as grain and fertilizer as encouraging Russia to stop exporting those and similar commodities would have a negative effect on many third party countries. Various Ground Invasions Part of the US 82nd Airborne has been stationed in Romania to strengthen NATO’s capacity to quickly deploy troops in response to various Russian aggressions. Its role is primarily defensive in this case. They can be rushed to any NATO country at short notice to defend that country from a Russian invasion. However, in the event of a Russian tactical nuke in Ukraine, they could be rushed to various parts of Ukraine to boost defenses there. Or, it could be used to secure specific objectives inside Russian controlled space. They could temporarily secure specific objectives disrupting Russian logistics and deployment while Ukrainian forces pushed towards that objective. One example would be taking the Crimean Isthmus or even taking Sebastopol. A US Marine Expeditionary Unit would be quickly deployed to reinforce the airborne units. All of these options are well within NATO capabilities and Russia knows that. Biden and others will have made it very clear to Russia that some version of these penalties will occur should Russia use a WMD. Furthermore, they will have made it clear that there will be an increasingly severe penalty should further WMDs be used. NATO responding in conventional, yet extremely damaging ways will serve the double purpose of maintaining the moral upper hand by not responding with NATO WMD, while still making it very clear that the use of WMD will have severe consequences. Russia will be punished and be even more of pariah state while NATO looks noble for not using nukes of its own. Hence, any use of Russian nukes (or other WMD) is highly unlikely as there will be almost no cases where the use of a nuke is worth the penalty that would be paid. [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/5/14/2169248/-A-hypothetical-NATO-response-to-a-Russian-Tactical-nuke-in-Ukraine Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/