(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Penetrating Russian Defenses, Part I (Basic Tactics) [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags'] Date: 2023-05-19 TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics 2011 This is my first post here. I’ve really enjoyed the Ukraine coverage on this site. Part I is just basic tactics to help understand the rest of the series. Part II discusses how the Russians plan defenses. Part III discusses how the Ukrainians are likely to breach those defenses. I’ve tried to keep all my descriptions understandable to the layperson while remaining doctrinally correct. Please let me know if I succeeded. Basic Military Tactics: ATP 3-21.10 Infantry Rifle Company 2018 (Infantry Brigade attack depicted — a light infantry battalion maneuvers on AXIS BLUE and stops short of the enemy while a second light infantry battalion assaults through the objective from the west to east on AXIS GREEN and AXIS Yellow. The basic military tactic at all echelons is the flank attack. This simple strategy requires the attacker to lay down a base of fire from a stationary position. This causes the enemy to take cover and makes it difficult for him to reposition quickly. It also draws his attention towards the direction of fire, making it difficult to focus as much in other directions. Meanwhile, another force attacks from the side (flank). The enemy, being positioned to fight an attack from one direction, is unable to effectively mass fires from the other direction or to effectively take cover from two directions at once. Interestingly, this tactic works at the squad level (6-9 Soldiers), the company (60-200 Soldiers), up to the battalion level (600-1000 Soldiers), and sometimes even to Brigade (2000-4000), Division (15,000-22,000), or Corps (50,000-80,000) whether dismounted or using mechanized vehicles. And, despite the predictability of the approach, the flank attack is still usually surprising to the defenders. ATP 3-21.15 Tank Platoon 2019 (Tank Company attack depicted. One tank platoon establishes a support by fire to the southwest, while a mechanized infantry platoon attacks from the south on DIRECTION OF ATTACK GOLD. A tank platoon attacks from the southeast on AXIS BETTY. Tactical Dilemmas The flank attack creates a tactical dilemma for the enemy. The best formation for direct contact is the line formation, where all forces can engage the enemy and mutually support each other. Unfortunately, a line can produce very little fire to the flanks, since Soldiers mask each other's ability to shoot past them at the enemy. Also, if a Soldier is trying to take cover behind an object like a tree, rock, mound of dirt, etc., he needs to keep the object between himself and the enemy. If the enemy is coming from two directions at once, he has a dilemma because whichever side he is takes cover from exposes him to fire from the other enemy, and he does not know in advance how many Soldiers to position on each flank, if any. ATP 3-21.8 Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad 2016 (The picture shows dismounts about to be engaged from different angles. The dismounts should take cover as soon as the first shots are fired and then crawl or otherwise remain hidden while they maneuver. It would be suicidal to run while being shot at) Another common tactical dilemma is to use direct fire (rifles, machine guns, tank guns, and other weapons with a flat trajectory) in combination with indirect fire (mortars, artillery, and other weapons with an arcing trajectory). The correct response to direct fire for dismounted Soldiers is to take cover, return fire, and then slowly maneuver using cover to find more advantageous positions. If a dismounted Soldier stands up or runs, he will be immediately shot. The response to indirect fire, in contrast, is to dive to the ground, wait ATP 3-21.90 Tactical Employment of Mortars (The picture shows a dismount with an airburst mortar firing over his head. The best strategy for the dismount is to dive to the ground until the first rounds finish detonating and then run out of the area. It is suicidal to stay in place under airburst munitions without overhead cover) for the initial explosions to stop, and then run to a new location before the next explosions occur. Thus, if you put both together, the dismounted Soldier has no good choices. If he stays still, he will die from indirect fire, but if he runs, he will die from direct fire. The more tactical dilemmas that you can devise for your enemy, the more likely you are to succeed. Force Ratios Force ratios are general guidelines for determining how much combat power is required to have at least an even chance of success. Combat power is not measured in the number of Soldiers, but rather in the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. In addition to movement and maneuver forces, this includes leadership, sustainment, and a host of other capabilities. The goal is to create a favorable local force ratio by isolating, fixing, using deception operations, or otherwise shaping the battle to reduce the enemy's combat power. Then, use surprise to concentrate your forces where the enemy does not expect in an audacious attack and maintain a fast enough tempo that he is unable to effectively react. ATP 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 2019 Attacking where the enemy is strongest, a frontal attack, is the least preferred type of attack. Historically, during the 20th century, frontal attacks require a force ratio of around 12:1 to succeed. Very often, as in the extensive defenses on both sides of the front in Ukraine, the enemy does not have an assailable flank. In that case, it is possible to rupture enemy defenses in a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. By penetrating the enemy defenses, the attacker can make an assailable flank to defeat the enemy defenses. Historically, attacking a hasty defense requires a force ratio of around 2.5:1, while attacking a deliberate defense requires a force ratio around 3:1. Force ratios are not guarantors of success. Audacious attacks against deliberate defenses have succeeded at 1:3 odds (see Brecourt Manor in WWII), even when the guideline suggests needing a 3:1, just as Russia failed with a 5:1 ratio when attacking Kiev, but it is the planning factor that NATO Armies use. Band of Brothers — Brecourt Manor Part 1 (the plan — 1LT Winters claims he doesn’t know how many defenders there are, although he clearly does) x YouTube Video Band of Brothers — Brecourt Manor Part II (12 infantry attack 60 defenders in a flank attack) x YouTube Video Band of Brothers — Brecourt Manor Part III (another 11 Soldiers join the attackers) x YouTube Video Dismounted tactics are surprisingly similar to mounted tactics. If you draw the graphics for a mounted and dismounted operation, the graphics will look almost the same, other than scale. The biggest differences are speed and tempo. Each maneuver platoon should be within half the maximum effective range of the next. For dismounted infantry, that means that they need to be within about 150 meters. Tank platoons can support each other within about 1500 meters. And, while dismounts can maneuver forward at up to 1 kilometers per hour, mechanized forces maneuver forward up to about 20 kilometers per hour. The decision cycles in mounted operations also must be much more rapid because the time between starting and completing an attack is much shorter. The Ukrainians have an institutional advantage in mounted operations, because they have a more decentralized approach to command and control. The Russians prefer to plan operations and make changes to operations at relatively high levels. Because of communication limitation and the span of control of Russian leadership, decisions are slow, crippling their ability to fight mechanized warfare against an agile opponent. Light Formations Ukraine Marines Training, from Wikipedia (Creative Commons license) Dismounted or light organizations, then, can only attack very slowly, usually moving at 1 kph or less. The attacks are very powerful against light or motorized forces, but infantry antitank weapons are very difficult to employ on the offense, making any attack against a mechanized force suicidal unless conditions are especially favorable. Light units do best in restricted terrain like urban areas, dense forest, and marshlands, where they can negate the mobility of other formations and utilize the terrain to attack heavier formations at short range. In open terrain, they can dig in, but they lack the range to fight mechanized or motorized formations unless they are augmented by additional firepower. They also lack the mobility to rapidly reposition on the defense against motorized or mechanized attacking forces, meaning they can be easily bypassed. Light organizations are relatively inexpensive to train and equip, and they require much few logistics to fight effectively. Motorized Formations U.S. Stryker Infantry Platoon in Samarra, Iraq, from Wikipedia (Public Domain) Think of a motorized formation as being essentially identical to a light formation in capabilities, just with vehicles that can reposition them around the battlefield as “battlefield taxis.” Most vehicles are equipped with anti-infantry weapons like heavy machine guns and grenade machine guns. These weapons have a lot of combat power against dismounted Soldiers, but thin armor makes the vehicles incredibly vulnerable. Generally, infantry needs to dismount well before getting close to the enemy and walk in on foot. The vehicles can follow behind to provide some additional firepower, but are unable to take much damage. Motorized units cannot easily employ anti-tank weapons on offense, meaning that an attack against mechanized forces would be suicidal in most circumstances. On defense, wheeled vehicles enable units to reposition forces to respond to the enemy and have a few more anti-tank weapons and crew-served weapons than light units, making them somewhat more effective, expecially in open terrain. Motorized forces are especially useful in urban combat, protecting lines of communication, destroying enemy bypassed by lead elements, and securing the flanks during an offensive. Logistics requirements are higher than light units but are still fairly low to keep motorized units fighting effectively. Motorized vehicles can travel off-road, but they have a fraction of the off-road capability of mechanized vehicles. Think of a motorized formation as being essentially identical to a light formation in capabilities, just with vehicles that can reposition them around the battlefield as “battlefield taxis.” Most vehicles are equipped with anti-infantry weapons like heavy machine guns and grenade machine guns. These weapons have a lot of combat power against dismounted Soldiers, but thin armor makes the vehicles incredibly vulnerable. Generally, infantry needs to dismount well before getting close to the enemy and walk in on foot. The vehicles can follow behind to provide some additional firepower, but are unable to take much damage. Motorized units cannot easily employ anti-tank weapons on offense, meaning that an attack against mechanized forces would be suicidal in most circumstances. On defense, wheeled vehicles enable units to reposition forces to respond to the enemy and have a few more anti-tank weapons and crew-served weapons than light units, making them somewhat more effective, expecially in open terrain. Motorized forces are especially useful in urban combat, protecting lines of communication, destroying enemy bypassed by lead elements, and securing the flanks during an offensive. Logistics requirements are higher than light units but are still fairly low to keep motorized units fighting effectively. Motorized vehicles can travel off-road, but they have a fraction of the off-road capability of mechanized vehicles. 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