(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Quick Explainer: The Counteroffensive--the Case for a Cakewalk [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.'] Date: 2023-06-01 I’m going to start this diary by saying, I don’t think a cakewalk is the most likely outcome for the Ukrainian Counteroffensive. If you asked me to slap some kind of probability to likely outcomes based on entirely arbitrary gut instinct, I’d say hard-fought Ukrainian victory (60%), cakewalk (30%), stalemate/Russian victory (10%). But I do think there is a non-trivial chance that Ukraine just rolls right over the Russian defenses and when the Leopards and Challengers start rolling forwards. We might see the Russian defense catastrophically collapse even worse than what we saw at Kharkiv in September. So, as I said, I don’t believe that a cakewalk is the most likely outcome—but I think there are signs that such an outcome is a possibility. Here are the reasons why I think that’s the case. Russian Drone Defense Vulnerabilities Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) produced a report that many sources found credible that Russian Jamming knocks out around 10,000 Ukrainian drones a month. It was pointed out that many of the drones that Ukraine relies upon are cheap commercial drones costing only $400-$1000 to replace, thus the 10,000 drone losses may only be a monthly Ukrainian expenditure of $4M~$10M. The higher-end cost estimate would be less than the cost of 4 storm shadow missiles, the point being that these would be easily sustainable losses for Ukraine. However, this remains a seemingly high figure of drones lost of jamming—so why would I think Russian drone defenses are vulnerable? This is because Ukraine uses many types of drones, and the specific types of drones Ukraine uses in the counteroffensive may be very difficult for Russia to stop through jamming. Ukraine uses numerous types of drones with regularity, such as the grenade-dropping quadcopters or the various types of observation drones that Ukraine sends on reconnaissance missions. Drones that are designed to go forward and come back in missions like these are more susceptible to jamming for two reasons. First, the drone needs to come back. For a suicide drone, drones with terminal guidance abilities can complete their strike if they get close enough, are already armed, and are in their final approach. For other drone types, if they get jammed, unless they have a return flight AI, they will generally be lost. Another issue is altitude. Ukraine relies upon large numbers of cheap drones to act as observers of the battlefield, loitering in the sky. These reportedly have some of the highest loss rates, because GPS jamming technology largely relies on line of sight (LOS) targeting. The jamming weapon needs an unobscured view of the drone to jam it, so buildings, trees, hills, or other visual obstacles can obstruct the ability of Russian jamming technology. Furthermore, The Economist reports on testing conducted on captured Russian anti-drone technology, which found that it was significantly less effective than advertised. The primary Russian long-range jamming weapons remained reliant on LOS targeting, thus requiring forward observation drones that visually detect incoming drones was necessary. The advertised range was jamming at up to 45km, but testing found the system was only effective up to 20km. Additionally, due to the vulnerability of the system (and presumably due to the limited ability to replace these units), Russia places its more sophisticated and powerful anti-drone units 10km or further back from the front lines, which helps protect the units, but leaves the front line units more vulnerable to low-altitude drone attacks. Frontline Russian units are also provided with less sophisticated jammers, but these present their own issues. Russian army frontline platoons have GPS jammers in the form of anti-drone “rifles” that are electronic directional jammers that don’t fire bullets. These are less effective against suicide drones with terminal homing, as infantry in a trench often will not see a low-altitude drone coming until it is already in its final attack. Platoons in key positions are also issued larger directional jammers that can disrupt drone control, but these are vulnerable due to their large size and need for a generator, making them very visible. Additionally, Defense One interviewed a Cyprus -based drone manufacturer whose drones have been purchased by Ukraine called Swarmly. According to the company official at Swarmly, Russian jamming technology is very unsophisticated. Swarmly produced jamming-resistant drones that were intended to evade jamming by unsophisticated enemies, like jamming conducted by Boko Haram or ISIS, but did not expect that their technology would block sophisticated state actors’ jamming weapons. Swarmly evaluates that Russian jamming technology is largely reliant on commercially manufactured jammers, widely available for online purchase. They also use chirp jammers, which are effective against commercial drones with no EW (electronic warfare) protections but are easily evaded by properly shielded drones. I took this interview with a grain of salt. For one, Swarmly is a drone company that is trying to market its drones, so boasting or inflating its abilities to evade Russian defenses may be par for the course. It was also the evaluation of an anonymous private contractor, basing their evaluation on second-hand information passed on by Ukrainian drone operators. However, Russia’s inability to domestically produce sophisticated electronic devices is well documented, such as its lack of encrypted radios, or the lack of spare electronic parts for its armored vehicles. Furthermore, that Russia was unprepared for the importance of drone warfare at the outset of hostilities is not in dispute. Thus, if Russia did not have a ready stockpile of Western electronic parts for anti-drone warfare, that it would need to resort to making purchases online on AliExpress to obtain drone jamming technology seems plausible. Ukrainian Drone Technology Given these weaknesses, the weapon that might devastate frontline Russian defenses? FPV (First Person View) suicide drones, for two reasons. First, the FPV suicide drones being used in the counteroffensive may be a step up in sophistication from those used up till now. I described in a previous diary how the $860M FPV drone purchase initiative announced by Ukraine in early April aimed at procuring a new generation of suicide drones with new technology that made them more effective. These included terminal AI targeting, which allows a jammed drone to take over the controls to guide the drone on its final approach and detonate. Also, jamming resistance abilities were described as a new attribute. What’s notable is that despite Russia placing jamming technology in defense of its facilities in Crimea as well as at Engels Air Force Base in Saratov Oblast, Ukrainian drones are penetrating the electronic defenses and striking targets. This suggests that Ukraine has technology for its more sophisticated drones that allows it to bypass Russian electronic warfare defenses. If the new generation of FPV drones is similarly jamming resistant, FPV suicide drones may simply bypass frontline Russian drone defenses. Second, Ukraine may bypass the majority of Russian drone defenses with a low-altitude approach with massed FPV drones. Since so many Russian drone defenses depend on LOS targeting, drones that are equipped with resistance against passive jamming could fly low until they got near the trench line, pop up temporarily to find their target, then zoom down to strike. While such tactics would be more difficult against non-stationary tactical targets on the move, when Russian infantry are immobile in fixed trench positions, prior intelligence on the locations of the trenches would make such tactics more effective. That FPV drones are capable of such maneuvers is well known. The difficulty to defend would be doubled in a night attack with IR camera-equipped suicide drones. Lightweight commercial IR cameras are available for less than $200, thus drones equipped with IR cameras could fly in the darkness and would be very difficult to detect by Russian troops unless they have been issued with night fighting equipment—a known weakness for Russian infantry. Videos of Ukrainian FPV drones striking Russian infantry in trenches are available. Consequences of a Collapse of Russian Drone Defense If Russian drone defenses prove ineffective, and FPV suicide drones can freely strike Russian trenches, the Russian defenses will utterly collapse. The trenches will have no meaning. FPV drones can be equipped with RPG-7 antipersonnel warheads that spray shrapnel that can kill everyone within a 7m (23ft) radius. Most drones with a small antipersonnel warhead, terminal AI, and basic anti-jamming capabilities only cost around $1000. Even adding in an IR camera, antijamming upgrades, and most small FPV drones should cost no more than $4000~$5000 at the very high end. If Ukraine has been saving a stockpile of suicide drones for use during the counteroffensive, as they almost undoubtedly have, a very conservative estimate for the size of the stockpile would be in the thousands, more likely in the tens of thousands. A Russian blogger suggested that Ukraine may have stockpiled between 50,000 and 100,000 suicide drones, although it was unclear where that information had been obtained or its reliability. And Ukraine has had more than two additional months to stockpile even more drones since that time. Ukraine is also known to have been training drone pilots in preparation for the counteroffensive. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense claimed 10,000 Ukrainian drone pilots will be ready to go for the offensive. Even if that were an exaggeration to strike fear into the Russian mobiks, it’s not unreasonable to assume that Ukraine has thousands of pilots available for the counter-offensive and that the initial assault on the Russian trench lines could be accompanied by a thousand FPV drones. The US military has demonstrated communication technology that allows 40 drones to operate in the same area. x At sunrise this morning a swarm of 40 quadcopters all equipped with cameras, MILES, and lethal munition capable launched in advance of 11th ACR’s attack on a prepared defense by 1AD. Drones will be as important in the first battle of the next war as artillery is today. pic.twitter.com/zPQ2I8SoqN — NTC Lead 6 (@NTCLead6) September 11, 2022 It’s unclear what the maximum number of operable drones is in a given area for Ukraine, but simultaneous drone attacks on a 2-mile (3.2km) trench section by 10 to as many as 30-40 drones seems entirely feasible. Under ordinary Russian defensive doctrine, 1 platoon (30-40 soldiers) has the responsibility to defend about a 1.5-2km stretch. A wave of even 10 drones getting through to attack such a stretch might feasibly knock out 1/3 to half of a platoon—machine gun teams and ATGM teams need to stick together in groups of 2 or 3, thus even if only half the drones score a hit, they are likely to knock out multiple infantry. If half a platoon is wiped out as tank shells and rockets rain down on a position, low morale mobiks are likely to break down and flee. Even if they don’t, a second or third wave of drones could wipe out any remaining defenders. If Ukraine sends in successive waves of drones in preparation for the advance, along with Ukrainian tanks firing at any armored targets, Ukrainian drones and tanks could conceivably wipe out Russian defenses before the Sappers (combat engineers) advance to begin clearing mines and obstacles. With a few waves of drones, a few Western tanks outranging any Russian tanks or other armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) in the area, and Ukraine could simply set a path through the enemy minefield and advance unopposed. Russian Fixed Defense Vulnerability The concerns for the Russian fixed defense vulnerabilities go further. The M30A1 GMLRS rocket can fire 182,000 tungsten balls that can wipe out enemy infantry in a wide area. x M30A1 GMLRS missiles delivered by HIMARS together with its 182 000 tungsten balls. The tungsten balls pierce every type of armor. Russian troops are obliterated every time there is a Ukrainian HIMARS strike. pic.twitter.com/bj4uNcb51I — Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) November 20, 2022 GMLRS missiles can be programmed to impact the target from different angles, thus on flat terrain, the tungsten balls can be fired horizontally to achieve maximum spray area, but against a trench, the missile can be programmed to plunge and hit into the trench from a steep angle. Furthermore, Ukrainian artillery with digital fire controls and drone spotters have terrifying accuracy. Ukrainian troops overran several Russian trench lines north of Bakhmut, and the ease with which Ukrainian artillery seem to strike Russian trenches should be terrifying to Russian mobiks. x The 2nd battalion of the 67th brigade attacking positions of the Russians west of Dubovo-Vasylivka. The advance goes beyond this area 😊👍 pic.twitter.com/0jWohH9yiq — NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) May 17, 2023 Trenches have been in use for over a century as an effective means to protect infantry against artillery. Since the advent of trench warfare first seen on a large scale in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the past 120 years have seen progressive improvements in accuracy and rates of fire in artillery. Trenches, by and large, have not changed. Most modern weapons rely on “shoot and scoot” principles of using mobility to counter the improved accuracy of artillery, yet trenches remain as static as when they were first introduced. With fully modern military capabilities of HIMARS, digital fire controls, observation drones for spotting, GPS coordinates, and GPS/laser-guided shells, are trenches still effective as a means to hold off a fully modern offensive? Up till now, both Russia and Ukraine have relied more upon the 1980s-1990s era technology with limited supplies of guided projectiles. Ukraine was somewhat hamstrung during the Battle of Kherson, as it needed to devote a large proportion of its guided munitions solely to damaging Russian bridges—a purpose for which the GMLRS was not well suited, but was forced into. Now, Ukraine has available JDAMs, Storm Shadows, and other long-range munitions that are well suited to destroy larger infrastructure in enemy territory, and HIMARS GMLRS rockets can be used for the intended purposes: counter-battery fire and precision fire support. With this added firepower, will Ukraine still struggle to overcome Russian trench defenses? it’s a legitimate question in my opinion. Lack of Russian Armored Reserve Forces The other factor that works severely against Russia is the depletion of its armored forces. Traditional Soviet Doctrine does not see trenches as a primary means of defense, merely a way to slow down the enemy advance, so artillery can wear it down, then the armored reserve units and converge to destroy the enemy penetration. The problem for Russia is that the armored reserve may have essentially ceased to all but exist. US Intelligence estimated that Russia had just 419 tanks on the front lines in Ukraine by late February 2023. Oryx verified that Russia lost approximately an additional 170 tanks since late February, primarily around Vuhledar and Mariinka. While Russia undoubtedly brought in replacement tanks and some additional tanks were likely repaired or newly built, Russian tank production capacity is estimated at fewer than 20 per month, and they can refurbish an additional 50-60 tanks. Simple math suggests that Russia likely has made good and then some. But what tanks have Russia been refurbishing? It was commented that Russia refurbished and sent around 120 T-54s and T-55s to the front from April — May 2023. x Russian T-54/T-55 tank allegedly in the Russia-occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast of Ukraine.https://t.co/CoGLEJqgvN pic.twitter.com/CbRclzrcV4 — Status-6 (@Archer83Able) April 13, 2023 Replacing the T-80 and T-72 tanks lost around Vuhledar and Mariinka with T-55 tanks does not maintain Russian combat power. The quality of Russian Infantry Fighting vehicles (IFVs) has seen a similar precipitous decline, as Russia replaces its BMP2 losses with the aging BMP1s. The BMP1 was revolutionary when first introduced, as the world’s first IFV. However today, it is under-armed and severely under-armored. The BMP1 frontal armor can be penetrated by NATO antitank heavy machinegun rounds. UK intelligence believed that the redeployment of several battalions to Bakhmut to strengthen the flanks against Ukrainian attacks, as well as to replace Wagner front-line units in defense represented a move of a high percentage of Russia’s available reserves. On the southern front, Russia may only have 4-5 battalions (3000-4000 soldiers) of reserve troops to stop the counteroffensive, perhaps a little more than a hundred tanks. My estimate for the size of the Ukrainian counteroffensive predicted that based on equipment deliveries to Ukraine, Ukraine could field 400+ tanks and around 1300~1500 IFVs and APCs, with 90,000-100,000 soldiers, about half of whom would be highly trained regular army troops. The size of the Russian reserve force is, in short, pitifully small compared to the size of the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive. And a considerable number of those Russian reserve forces will likely be equipped with T-62s, T-55s, BMP1s, and other early Cold War era weaponry that is hopelessly outdated, much in the way Russia threw T- 62 units in front of the advancing Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade, only to watch them be annihilated. If the Russian frontline trenches melt away in a drone assault, even if Russia can send its reserves to try to face down the advancing Ukrainian spearhead, the Russian reserves are likely to be both outnumbered and at a severe qualitative disadvantage. This is further complicated by Ukraine’s advanced weaponry designed to disrupt Russian reserves from operating effectively. The devastating effectiveness of aerially deployed mines against under-trained Russian tankers was well demonstrated at Vuhledar. Ukraine can use its 155mm artillery to deploy antitank mines as far as 20-25km behind Russian lines. With satellite intelligence, Ukraine can predict where Russian armored reserves are likely to reinforce its front line and drop aerially deployed mines along roads to slow down the movement of Russian reserve forces. These mines are designed to self-detonate after 24 hours, so Ukraine could spray these liberally to shield against an attack, and given how Russia performed against such unexpected minefields at Vuhledar, it seems likely these will have a devastating effect on the speed and effectiveness of Russian reserve force movement. Conclusion So, this is how I see the Ukrainian counteroffensive turning into a cakewalk. Russian electronic warfare fails to stop the Ukrainian FPV drones from clearing the front-line trenches in advance of the Ukrainian attack. Ukrainian Western tanks pick off any Russian AFVs protecting the trench line, who flee or are destroyed from being out-ranged. Unopposed, Ukrainian engineers clear a route of advance. This should take no more than 15-20 minutes with no opposition. Ukrainian forces just drive right over the empty trenches. Russian reserve forces try to mobilize. Ukraine anticipates this and fires aerial deployed mines at key intersections and choke points. Undertrained Russian mobiks drive right into these, taking losses and paralyzing the Russian movement. Ukrainian forces penetrate deep into the second layer of Russian defense before they are ready—Ukrainian drones zoom in. 30-40 minutes later, Ukrainian troops are overrunning the Russian 2nd line of defense unopposed. Panic sets in, and a repeat of Kharkiv happens as Ukrainian troops arrive in rearward areas far faster than Russian troops anticipated. Mechanized Ukrainian forces exploit this panic and drive deeper into Russian territory, destroying uncoordinated Russian units as they come across them. Within 24 hours, the entire Russian defensive line disintegrates. I’m not saying this is the most likely outcome. As I said, I think there’s no better than a 1 in 3 chance of this happening. Maybe less. It mostly depends on whether or not reports of Russian weakness in drone defense are true. If the Russian drone defense doesn’t work, however, I think the Ukrainians will utterly wipe the floor with the Russian defenses. 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