(C) Meduza This story was originally published by Meduza and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . The Real Russia. Today. Wednesday, May 22, 2024 — Meduza [1] [] Date: 2024-05-23 The war in Ukraine A new long-form report by BBC Russia journalists Elizaveta Fokht and Nina Nazarova describes the threat of domestic violence from returning Russian soldiers. Their story focuses on the experiences of a 30-year-old mother in the Tyumen region whose common-law husband, Ilya Reshilov, started abusing her, their children, and her mother after serving in Ukraine with Wagner Group to escape a nine-year prison sentence for killing a man in a fight. After coming home from the war, Ilya began drinking heavily and beating his family. One night, while drunk, he even threatened to decapitate his wife, saying she had the “face of a Ukrainian,” and vowed that his Wagner Group comrades would save him from any punishment. After midnight, a few nights of death threats and assaults later, Ilya’s wife finally reported him to the police, but officers didn’t rush to the scene but waited until noon the next day. He was eventually sentenced to six years in prison, and his wife moved away with their children, but Ilya is now reportedly back in Ukraine, a soldier freed from prison once again. The BBC Russia investigation also describes the general trends of domestic abuse by soldiers (many of whom are violent convicts released early) returning home with PTSD. The Russian government has been reluctant to study the issue, let alone devote resources to psychological care for veterans or preventative healthcare. The reigning expert consensus among the authorities, embodied by work from psychologist Mikhail Reshetnikov, claims that Western research exhibits a “hysteria over the possible number of post-traumatic disorders.” Reshetnikov and his adherents in the government argue that American experiences with traumatized soldiers and domestic violence don’t apply to Russian veterans because the latter are merely defending their families and way of life, not fighting “unjust wars on foreign soil.” In this environment, violent veterans often avoid serious punishments (which they can evade at any rate by returning to the war), and women fear turning to the police, worried that their abusers will get off lightly and return home soon, only angrier and more dangerous. A new investigation from The Insider describes the rise of desertion in the Russian army. According to research by journalists at Mediazona, the authorities have filed more than 8,000 AWOL and desertion cases since February 2022, and courts now issue up to 700 sentences each month for these offenses. The Insider explains that career officers, volunteers, and contract soldiers are increasingly appealing to the “Get Lost” project for help with desertion. The most common reasons for wanting to leave the Russian military are exhaustion from the war, supply issues, and suicidal orders from commanders. Soldiers typically sneak away while on leave, when hospitalized, and during redeployments. Desertion early in the war was closely associated with ethnic minorities, and the biggest single instances of mass desertion occurred in Wagner Group and “Storm-Z” units that consisted mainly of recruited convicts. More recently, says The Insider, deserters report that attitudes among their relatives back home in Russia have shifted, and it’s become easier to reconcile them to their decision to flee the military and the war. As the world turns On May 21, the Russian Defense Ministry published a draft decree that, if approved, would unilaterally change its maritime borders with Lithuania and Finland. Then, on Tuesday, multiple Russian state media outlets reported that, according to a “military-diplomatic source,” the authorities were never planning to alter the boundary. By Wednesday afternoon, the document had disappeared from the Russian government’s website. Meduza explains how the episode unfolded and how Russia’s neighbors on the Baltic responded. Seeking to evade sanctions and circumvent the G7’s oil price cap, Russia has begun using a shadow fleet of decrepit second-hand tankers to covertly move oil around the world. These ships, registered to overseas shell companies, ferry oil to buyers willing to flout the G7 cap. While this scheme has allowed the Kremlin to continue selling oil at higher prices, the choice might be more political than financial. The independent news outlet iStories dug into Russia’s reasons for creating its own shadow fleet and found out how the network works and what the West is doing to stop it. Investigative journalists at Agentstvo identified two of the actresses who appear in a new music video spread online earlier this week by the “Dvoinik” Russian disinformation botnet. Both Alisa Valikova and Daria Carlo confirmed their participation in the filming but did not reveal who produced the video. The music clip begins with a joke that Biden’s 2020 election victory was a hoax and then features actors depicting Joe Biden and Donald Trump in a rapid, sometimes incoherent, montage of scenes lampooning the incumbent president’s immigration and Ukraine policies. An apparent mix of traditional makeup and AI software, someone depicting musician Ilya Prusikin also sings in the footage, which is itself designed to look like a music video from Prusikin’s popular band Little Big. We got The Beet. Don’t miss Meduza’s weekly newsletter (separate from the one you’re reading here)! Russian politics and policy Researchers at Verstka Media and the DumaBingo monitoring project publish monthly reports on lobbying trends in Russia’s State Duma. In April 2024, deputies submitted 60 bills for consideration and adopted the third and final reading of eight draft laws, sending them to the Federation Council for approval before they go to the president. Here are the month’s most egregious examples of lobbyist legislation: The National Guard and Novatek: Deputy Alexander Khinshtein drafted legislation that designates Russia’s National Guard as the operator of a government information system that collects data on gun ownership, private security companies, and detective agencies. Verstka identifies Khinshtein as a longtime lobbyist for the National Guard, regularly submitting bills to expand the agency’s authority. Additionally, deputy Vasily Piskarev added a rider to the bill’s second reading that permits energy companies (specifically Novatek) to field private security teams at their facilities. Verstka notes that lawmakers didn’t even discuss this amendment when passing the revised bill. Russ Outdoor’s ad monopoly: United Russia lawmakers overcame opposition from the Communist Party and Just Russia to pass legislation drafted by deputy Maxim Topilin that will protect the current distribution of outdoor advertising rights on public lands, effectively preserving existing monopolies in the industry. Topilin’s bill stipulates that 10 percent of ads placed through these rights must be PSAs, including war propaganda. Verstka describes Topilin as a lobbyist for Russ Outdoor, which controls almost half of Russia’s outdoor advertising market. The new legislation extends advertising rights on public lands for another decade without requiring the solicitation of new bids on state contracts. Topilin led a successful campaign to block amendments from minority party deputies that would have diluted the law. The All-Russian Union of Insurers: Deputy Nikolai Tsed has drafted legislation that would require regional officials to develop and implement voluntary insurance programs to compensate people for housing damage. The bill follows severe flooding in Russia’s Orenburg region and would lighten the compensation burden shouldered by private insurers. Verstka reports that the All-Russian Union of Insurers is lobbying for the legislation’s passage. Association of Road Freight Transporters and Freight Forwarders: Legislation drafted by Yevgeny Moskvichyov would restrict freight transportation permits to carriers who register on a special platform managed by the Transportation Ministry. Moskvichyov argues that the new rules will boost transparency and safety and bring in registration revenue, but journalists note that “industry players” (such as the Association of Road Freight Transporters and Freight Forwarders) widely support the initiative. The Association of International Road Carriers, which Moskvichyov oversees while serving as an acting lawmaker, also supports the initiative. DumaBingo researchers characterize Moskvichyov as a lobbyist for Russia’s freight transportation industry. Land powers in Crimea: A coalition of lawmakers with business and political ties to Crimea has drafted legislation for a second extension of special powers granted to Crimean regional officials pertaining to land and property rights registration and the demolition of illegal buildings. Verstka says it’s unclear why lawmakers are acting in staggered, multiple steps. Journalists at Agentstvo Media report that Russian judges sentenced five times as many convicts in “political cases” to compulsory psychiatric treatment last year as they did in the two prior years. Judges sent at least 25 “political case” defendants to psychiatric hospitals in 2023 and at least eight defendants in the first 4.5 months of 2024. The outlet says this is a conservative estimate, given that some defendants likely aren’t reporting their sentences due to stigmas about psychiatric care. Others might fear drawing unwanted attention to their case, possibly risking prison terms. (Agentstvo defines political cases as convictions for “repressive criminal statutes,” including “inciting extremism,” “justifying terrorism,” “discrediting the army,” “disseminating disinformation,” “calling for sanctions against Russian nationals and entities,” and so on.) Agentstvo notes that the Russian judicial system’s growing reliance on compulsory psychiatric treatment still falls well short of how widespread the practice was in ruling against Soviet dissidents. Additionally, the vast majority of contemporary sentences involve general psychiatric hospitals, not the special “intensive observation” facilities under police control operated in the USSR. Vladimir Putin has signed a new executive order requiring Russians with access to high-level state secrets to notify the Federal Security and Foreign Intelligence services at least 30 days before traveling abroad. Notifications must include travel dates, border-crossing points, detailed itineraries, duration, and addresses abroad. The new rules exempt officials who are carrying out direct presidential orders and other senior officials guarded by the Federal Protective Service (perhaps to conceal this agency’s actions from the FSB and SVR). The new rules also make some exceptions for late notifications in case of medical emergencies or unscheduled travel. The executive order also applies to lawyers, raising fears that it will be used to pressure attorneys defending suspects in treason cases. For example, the new travel restrictions could become grounds for increased surveillance of lawyers, violations of the new rules could be used to deny attorneys access to key case evidence, and federal officials might even ban attorneys from going abroad at all. No country can be free without independent media. In January 2023, the Russian authorities outlawed Meduza, banning our work in the country our colleagues call home. Just supporting Meduza carries the risk of criminal prosecution for Russian nationals, which is why we’re turning to our international audience for help. Your assistance makes it possible for thousands of people in Russia to read Meduza and stay informed. Consider a small but recurring contribution to provide the most effective support. Donate here. 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