(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine Invasion Day 854: drone and missile strikes continue [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.'] Date: 2024-06-25 Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on a Russian ammunition depot in Voronezh Oblast on June 25 and recently conducted strikes on Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in Belgorod Oblast with unspecified weapons. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 25 that it struck a field ammunition depot in Olkovatka, Voronezh Oblast, and geolocated footage published on June 25 shows a smoke plume near Olkovatka.[10] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that an unspecified source stated that GUR conducted the strike with two drones and that the drones struck two ammunition warehouses that held over 3,000 shells.[11] Radio Liberty published satellite imagery from June 25 showing at least two fires at the Olkhovatka ammunition depot.[12] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that unspecified explosives detonated far from civilian buildings in Olkhovatsky Raion after Ukrainian forces conducted strikes on two unspecified cities.[13] The Ukrainian National Guard reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces struck two Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft systems in the Kharkiv direction on unspecified dates.[14] The Ukrainian National Guard posted photos of the aftermath of the strikes, which were geolocated to near Dubovoe (just south of Belgorod City) and Borisovka (west of Belgorod City).[15] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Pantsir system in Dubovoe on June 22.[16] It is unclear what munitions Ukrainian forces used to strike the Pantsir systems, however. A Ukrainian OSINT Telegram account geolocated the position of the Pantsir system near Dubovoe in January 2024 after footage appeared of the air defense system repelling a Ukrainian missile strike — suggesting that Russian forces have not moved the Pantsir system in the past six months.[17] www.understandingwar.org/... Zelensky to sign EU-Ukraine security agreement in Brussels this week. President Volodymyr Zelensky will attend the European Union summit in Brussels on June 27 and sign a security agreement with the EU, Polish media RMF reported, citing an unnamed senior EU diplomat. US to announce $150 million military aid package to Ukraine, AP reports. The new package, which is set to unveiled on Tuesday, will include new HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) rockets, anti-armor weaponry, small arms and grenades, as well as 155 mm and 105 mm artillery shells, AP reported, citing its sources. Ukraine to receive profits from Russia's frozen assets in 2 tranches starting next week, Borrell says. "We have a process in order to make this work quickly. The first tranche of money will come next week, in July. The second will come some months later," Josep Borrell said during the press briefing in Luxembourg. Ukraine reports increase in Russian chemical weapon attacks on battlefield. Ukraine recorded 715 cases of Russian chemical weapons use on the battlefield in May, 271 more than in the previous month, the Ukrainian military's Support Forces said on June 24. x Since September 2022, Ukraine has shut down more than three quarters of Russian combat drones. Ukraine’s air successes have forced Russia to take more risks and caused high attrition rates. 🇺🇦 #StandWithUkraine pic.twitter.com/6MLbGNU8ew — Ministry of Defence 🇬🇧 (@DefenceHQ) June 25, 2024 x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - JUN 25, 2024 ■ Record number of combat engagements (data goes back to Feb 23, 2023) ■ Casualties slightly above average, equipment losses below ■ Increased 🇷🇺 strikes & unusally few 🇺🇦 ones result in an unfavorable ratio See dashboard for further data… pic.twitter.com/pG1jlmOUeT — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 (@ragnarbjartur) June 25, 2024 Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk(northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 25. Geolocated footage published on June 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced along Soborna Street in central Vovchansk.[35] Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on June 25.[36] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Povkh stated on June 23 that the Russian military intends to transfer elements of the "9th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 51st Army" to the Kharkiv direction.[38] Povkh stated that Russian forces have transferred Russian units from Kherson Oblast and other unspecified directions to the Kharkiv direction. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn similarly reported on June 25 that Russian forces intend to transfer elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the "9th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 51st Army" to the Kharkiv direction to compensate for heavy Russian losses.[39] ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military transferred elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) from west and southwest of Donetsk City to the Kharkiv direction but has not observed any reporting on the Russian "51st Army."[40] The Ukrainian officials' statements suggest that the Russian military may have subordinated the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade to the possibly resurrected Second World War-era "51st Army." The Russian military is currently undergoing large-scale reforms, however, including the creation of new combined arms army level formations, and Ukrainian sources' references to a "51st Army" may constitute an early indicator that Russia has formed another combined arms army for deployment to Ukraine.[41] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... 👀🔥 Update! Report from Navy regarding the attack on air defence training center near Yeysk, destroyed: ▪️Shahed – 20 units; ▪️Lancet – 50 units; ▪️ZALA – 40 units; ▪️SuperCam - 10 units. ☠️ There are also deaths among the instructors and technical personnel from Yelabuga. [image or embed] — MAKS 24 👀🇺🇦 (@maks23.bsky.social) Jun 24, 2024 at 2:09 PM x Tonight drones targeted a Russian ammunition storage in Olkhovatka, Voronezh region of Russia. 100km from the frontline. Two drones attacked the territory of the ammunition storage at approximately 2:30 a.m. and the detonation is reportedly still ongoing.… pic.twitter.com/QVZmYlNLgP — Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) June 25, 2024 These tankers belong to owners from countries that do NOT comply with the EU and G7 embargo and “price ceiling”. These tankers are NOT insured by Western insurance companies. Many owners of these tankers are registered in offshore jurisdictions. uatribune.com/... To circumvent these restrictions, the Kremlin stepped up the establishment of its "shadow fleet" of tankers. In this study, we investigate: (i) the process of the shadow fleet’s initial setup with a focus on the vessels’ origins; (ii) the shadow fleet’s current size and operations; (iii) its position within the broader context of global shadow oil trade; (iv) Russia’s shadow fleet needs to become fully independent from sanctions-compliantvessels; (v) Russia’s ability to counteract vessel designations; and (vi) prospects for the shadow fleet’s future expansion. Based on our findings, we develop detailed policy recommendations to rein in the shadow fleet. The key findings from our analysis are as follows: ● We estimate that, as of the first quarter of 2024, 435 vessels are part of the Russian shadow fleet, i.e., they are not owned, managed, or insured by an entity in the sanctions coalition and, thus, the price cap does not apply to them. Most importantly, these tankers do not carry oil spill (P&I) insurance from the International Group (IG). 185 vessels are transporting crude oil and 250 are transporting oil products. ● The vessels of the Russian shadow fleet can cover ~60% of total crude and ~45% of total products exports independent of restricted maritime services. Despite a concerted – and costly – effort to buildup the shadow fleet, Russia still falls short of its ultimate objective with regard to sanctions evasion. ● We identify three key channels through which Russia has built its shadow fleet: (1) transfer of tankers that were previously owned by Russian entities, e.g., Sovcomflot, to new management companies; (2) purchase of vessels older than 15 years from the mainstream (or white) fleet, which had carried P&Iinsurance from the International Group before; and (3) acquisition of very old vessels (20+ years) fromthe shadow and white fleets, which would have otherwise been decommissioned. Stripping mainstreamfleet vessels of their service relationships with coalition countries has been the most important strategy. ● Only a small share of the current Russian shadow fleet was built by transferring vessels from other segments of the global shadow oil trade, e.g., actions related to Iran or Venezuela. We estimate that the non-Russian shadow fleet consists of 575 tankers. Most of these are not suitable for Russia due to their size (VLCCs) or ownership/management structures that do not allow Russia sufficient control. ● In terms of the future expansion of the Russian shadow fleet, we estimate that ~500 Aframax equivalent crude oil tankers – mostly from the white fleet – are potentially available (3.6 times what is needed to become fully independent of the price-cap compliant fleet. For oil products, we assess that ~1,200Seawaymax equivalent vessels are available for further growth (2.8 times what is needed). ● These numbers only indicate the theoretical availability of vessels and do not reflect specific challenges that Russia may encounter when attempting to acquire them for its shadow fleet. First, there are high up-front costs. For instance, Russia has already spent an estimated $8.5 billion1 on the shadow fleet and additional financing may be hard to secure, especially given the risk of sunk costs due to vessel designations. Second, the EU has recently introduced legislation (in its 12th sanctions package) aimed at cracking down on the sale of mainstream tankers into the Russian shadow trade. Importantly, our estimates do not account for attrition within a fleet of overwhelmingly older vessels. ● We observe a high correlation between the share of the shadow fleet in the transport of Russian oil and the spread between Russian oil prices and benchmark North Sea Brent. Thus, the shadow fleet’s expansion is a direct challenge to the effectiveness – and overall leverage – of the international energy sanctions regime, which is supposed to deprive Russia of financing for the war. ● In addition, the shadow fleet represents a significant and growing risk to the environment around the world due to the advanced age of the vessels in question as well as the fact that they are largely uninsured or underinsured. As Russia’s oil export infrastructure is oriented towards traditional markets in the West, the risk is particularly high in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Mediterranean, and Black Sea. ● We believe that the expansion of the Russian shadow fleet can be effectively curtailed through targeted measures. Taking such steps is critical for preserving the overall leverage of the price cap, which is an integral part of the international energy sanctions regime, and addressing urgent environmental risks. kse.ua/... [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2024/6/25/2248483/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-854?pm_campaign=front_page&pm_source=trending&pm_medium=web Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/