2. The Triple Alliance and the Entente.

     
     
      First, let us remind ourselves in general of the situation that prevailed in Europe during the ten years preceding the war. It was in that period that the Entente between France, Russia, and England was formed and consolidated, over against the existing Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy. Neither of these combinations was in its origin and purpose aggressive[1].
      And, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the relations she entered into with France and with Russia were directed in each case to the settlement of long outstanding differences without special reference to the German Powers. But it is impossible in the European anarchy that any arrangements should be made between any States which do not arouse suspicion in others. And the drawing together of the Powers of the Entente did in fact appear to Germany as a menace. She believed that she was being threatened by an aggressive combination, just as, on the other hand, she herself seemed to the Powers of the Entente a danger to be guarded against. This apprehension on the part of Germany, is sometimes thought to have been mere pretence, but there is every reason to suppose it to have been genuine. The policy of the Entente did in fact, on a number of occasions, come into collision with that of Germany. The arming and counter-arming was continuous. And the very fact that from the side of the Entente it seemed that Germany was always the aggressor, should suggest to us that from the other side the opposite impression would prevail. That, in fact, it did prevail is clear not only from the constant assertions of German statesmen and of the German Press, but from contemporary observations made by the representatives of a State not itself involved in either of the opposing combinations. The dispatches of the Belgian ambassadors at Berlin, Paris, and London during the years 1905 to 1914[2] show a constant impression that the Entente was a hostile combination directed against Germany and engineered, in the earlier years, for that purpose by King Edward VII. This impression of the Belgian representatives is no proof, it is true, of the real intentions of the Entente, but it is proof of how they did in fact appear to outsiders. And it is irrelevant, whether or no it be true, to urge that the Belgians were indoctrinated with the German view; since precisely the fact that they could be so indoctrinated would show that the view was on the face of it plausible. We see, then, in these dispatches the way in which the policy of the Entente could appear to observers outside it. I give illustrations from Berlin, Paris, and London.
      On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, writes as follows:—
        Call it an alliance, entente, or what you will, the grouping of the
  Powers arranged by the personal intervention of the King of England
  exists, and if it is not a direct and immediate threat of war against
  Germany (it would be too much to say that it was that), it constitutes
  none the less a diminution of her security. The necessary pacifist
  declarations, which, no doubt, will be repeated at Reval, signify very
  little, emanating as they do from three Powers which, like Russia and
  England, have just carried through successfully, without any motive
  except the desire for aggrandizement, and without even a plausible
  pretext, wars of conquest in Manchuria and the Transvaal, or which,
  like France, is proceeding at this moment to the conquest of Morocco,
  in contempt of solemn promises, and without any title except the
  cession of British rights, which never existed.
      On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador at London, writes:—
        A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow Press, bears to a
  great extent the responsibility for the hostile feeling between the two
  nations.... It is plain enough that official England is quietly pursuing
  a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and that King
  Edward has not hesitated to use his personal influence in the service of
  this scheme. But it is certainly exceedingly dangerous to poison public
  opinion in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible journals.
      Again, on July 28, 1911, in the midst of the Morocco crisis, Baron Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, writes:—
        I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of the Emperor William,
  in spite of the too frequent exaggeration of some of his gestures. He
  will not allow himself to be drawn on farther than he chooses by the
  exuberant temperament and clumsy manners of his very intelligent Minister
  of Foreign Affairs (Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, in general, less faith in
  the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not be sorry to see the
  others eat one another up.... As I thought from the beginning, it is in
  London that the key to the situation lies. It is there only that it can
  become grave. The French will yield on all the points for the sake of
  peace. It is not the same with the English, who will not compromise on
  certain principles and certain claims.
      [Footnote 1: The alliance between Germany and Austria, which dates from 1879, was formed to guarantee the two States against an attack by Russia. Its terms are:—
      “1. If, contrary to what is to be expected and contrary to the sincere desire of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires should be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are bound reciprocally to assist one another with the whole military force of their Empire, and further not to make peace except conjointly and by common consent.
      “2. If one of the high contracting Powers should be attacked by another Power, the other high contracting party engages itself, by the present act, not only not to support the aggressor against its ally, but at least to observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the other contracting party. If, however, in the case supposed the attacking Power should be supported by Russia, whether by active co-operation or by military measures which should menace the Power attacked, then the obligation of mutual assistance with all military forces, as stipulated in the preceding article, would immediately come into force, and the military operations of the high contracting parties would be in that case conducted jointly until the conclusion of peace.”
      Italy acceded to the Alliance in 1882. The engagement is defensive. Each of the three parties is to come to the assistance of the others if attacked by a third party.
      The treaty of Germany with Austria was supplemented in 1884 by a treaty with Russia, known as the “Reinsurance Treaty,” whereby Germany bound herself not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. This treaty lapsed in the year 1890, and the lapse, it is presumed, prepared the way for the rapprochement between Russia and France.
      The text of the treaty of 1894 between France and Russia has never been published. It is supposed to be a treaty of mutual defence in case of an aggressive attack. The Power from whom attack is expected is probably named, as in the treaty between Germany and Austria. It is probably for that reason that the treaty was not published. The accession of Great Britain to what then became known as the “Triple Entente” is determined by the treaty of 1904 with France, whereby France abandoned her opposition to the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco; and by the treaty of 1907 with Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated their relations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. There is no mention in either case of an attack, or a defence against attack, by any other Power.]
      [Footnote 2: These were published by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and are reprinted under the title “Belgische Aktenstuecke,” 1905-14 (Ernst Siegfried Mittler and Sons, Berlin). Their authenticity, as far as I know, has not been disputed. On the other hand, it is to be assumed that they have been very carefully “edited” by the German to make a particular impression. My view of the policy of Germany or of the Entente is in no sense based upon them. I adduce them as evidence of contemporary feeling and opinion.]