I turn now to the Balkan question. This is too ancient and too
complicated to be even summarized here. But we must remind ourselves of
the main situation. Primarily, the Balkan question is, or rather was,
one between subject Christian populations and the Turks. But it has
been complicated, not only by the quarrels of the subject populations
among themselves, but by the rival ambitions and claims of Russia and
Austria. The interest of Russia in the Balkans is partly one of racial
sympathy, partly one of territorial ambition, for the road to
Constantinople lies through Rumania and Bulgaria. It is this
territorial ambition of Russia that has given occasion in the past to
the intervention of the Western Powers, for until recently it was a
fixed principle, both of French and British policy, to keep Russia out
of the Mediterranean. Hence the Crimean War, and hence the disastrous
intervention of Disraeli after the treaty of San Stefano in 1878—an
intervention which perpetuated for years the Balkan hell. The interest
of Austria in the peninsula depends primarily on the fact that the
Austrian Empire contains a large Slav population desiring its
independence, and that this national ambition of the Austrian Slavs
finds in the independent kingdom of Serbia its natural centre of
attraction. The determination of Austria to retain her Slavs as
unwilling citizens of her Empire brings her also into conflict with
Russia, so far as Russia is the protector of the Slavs. The situation,
and the danger with which it is pregnant, may be realized by an
Englishman if he will suppose St. George's Channel and the Atlantic to
be annihilated, and Ireland to touch, by a land frontier, on the one
side Great Britain, on the other the United States. The friction and
even the warfare which might have arisen between these two great Powers
from the plots of American Fenians may readily be imagined. Something
of that kind is the situation of Austria in relation to Serbia and her
protector, Russia. Further, Austria fears the occupation by any Slav
State of any port on the coast line of the Adriatic, and herself
desires a port on the Aegean. Add to this the recent German dream of
the route from Berlin to Bagdad, and the European importance of what
would otherwise be local disputes among the Balkan States becomes
apparent.
During the period we are now considering the Balkan factor first
came into prominence with the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1908. Those provinces, it will be remembered, were
handed over to Austrian protection at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.
Austria went in and policed the country, much as England went in and
policed Egypt, and, from the material point of view, with similarly
successful results. But, like England in Egypt, Austria was not
sovereign there. Formal sovereignty still rested with the Turk. In
1909, during the Turkish revolution, Austria took the opportunity to
throw off that nominal suzerainty. Russia protested, Austria mobilized
against Serbia and Montenegro, and war seemed imminent. But the
dramatic intervention of Germany “in shining armour” on the side of her
ally resulted in a diplomatic victory for the Central Powers. Austria
gained her point, and war, for the moment, was avoided. But such
diplomatic victories are dangerous. Russia did not forget, and the
events of 1909 were an operative cause in the catastrophe of 1914. In
acting as she did in this matter Austria-Hungary defied the public law
of Europe, and Germany supported her in doing so.
The motives of Germany in taking this action are thus described, and
probably with truth, by Baron Beyens: “She could not allow the solidity
of the Triple Alliance to be shaken: she had a debt of gratitude to pay
to her ally, who had supported her at the Congress of Algeciras.
Finally, she believed herself to be the object of an attempt at
encirclement by France, England, and Russia, and was anxious to show
that the gesture of putting her hand to the sword was enough to dispel
the illusions of her adversaries.”[1] These are the kind of reasons
that all Powers consider adequate where what they conceive to be their
interests are involved. From any higher, more international point of
view, they are no reasons at all. But in such a matter no Power is in a
position to throw the first stone. The whole episode is a classical
example for the normal working of the European anarchy. Austria-Hungary
was primarily to blame, but Germany, who supported her, must take her
share. The other Powers of Europe acquiesced for the sake of peace, and
they could probably do no better. There will never be any guarantee for
the public law of Europe until there is a public tribunal and a public
force to see that its decisions are carried out.
The next events of importance in this region were the two Balkan
wars. We need not here go into the causes and results of these, except
so far as to note that, once more, the rivalry of Russia and Austria
played a disastrous part. It was the determination of Austria not to
give Serbia access to the Adriatic that led Serbia to retain
territories assigned by treaty to Bulgaria, and so precipitated the
second Balkan war; for that war was due to the indignation caused in
Bulgaria by the breach of faith, and is said to have been directly
prompted by Austria. The bad part played by Austria throughout this
crisis is indisputable. But it must be observed that, by general
admission, Germany throughout worked hand in hand with Sir Edward Grey
to keep the peace of Europe, which, indeed, otherwise could not have
been kept. And nothing illustrates this better than that episode of
1913 which is sometimes taken to throw discredit upon Germany. The
episode was thus described by the Italian minister, Giolitti: “On the
9th of August, 1913, about a year before the war broke out, I, being
then absent from Rome, received from my colleague, San Giuliano, the
following telegram: 'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her
intention to act against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive,
hoping to apply the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance, which
I consider inapplicable. I intend to join forces with Germany to
prevent any such action by Austria, but it will be necessary to say
clearly that we do not consider such eventual action as defensive, and
therefore do not believe that the casus foederis exists. Please
telegraph to Rome if you approve.'
“I replied that, 'if Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is
evident that the casus foederis does not arise. It is an action
that she undertakes on her own account, since there is no question of
defence, as no one thinks of attacking her. It is necessary to make a
declaration in this sense to Austria in the most formal way, and it is
to be wished that German action may dissuade Austria from her most
perilous adventure.'“[2]
Now this statement shows upon the face of it two things. One, that
Austria was prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European war;
the other, that the Italian ministers joined with Germany to dissuade
her. They were successful. Austria abandoned her project, and war was
avoided. The episode is as discreditable as you like to Austria. But,
on the face of it, how does it discredit Germany? More, of course, may
lie behind; but no evidence has been produced, so far as I am aware, to
show that the Austrian project was approved or supported by her ally.
The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded the second Balkan War, left
all the parties concerned dissatisfied. But, in particular, it left the
situation between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia
more strained than ever. It was this situation that was the proximate
cause of the present war. For, as we have seen, a quarrel between
Austria and Russia over the Balkans must, given the system of
alliances, unchain a European war. For producing that situation
Austria-Hungary was mainly responsible. The part played by Germany was
secondary, and throughout the Balkan wars German diplomacy was
certainly working, with England, for peace. “The diplomacy of the
Wilhelmstrasse,” says Baron Beyens, “applied itself, above all, to calm
the exasperation and the desire for intervention at the Ballplatz.”
“The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of Vienna in its tortuous
policy of intrigues at Sofia and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann said to me
at the time, the Imperial Government contented itself with maintaining
its neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from any
intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their quarrels. There is no
reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement.”[3]
[Footnote 1: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 240.]
[Footnote 2: It is characteristic of the way history is written in
time of war that M. Yves Guyot, citing Giolitti's statement, omits the
references to Germany. See “Les causes et les consequences de la
guerre,” p. 101.]
[Footnote 3: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” pp. 248, 262.]