We have spoken so far of the West. But the Entente between France
and Russia, dating from 1894, brought the latter into direct contact
with Eastern policy. The motives and even the terms of the Dual
Alliance are imperfectly known. Considerations of high finance are
supposed to have been an important factor in it. But the main
intention, no doubt, was to strengthen both Powers in the case of a
possible conflict with Germany. The chances of war between Germany and
France were thus definitely increased, for now there could hardly be an
Eastern war without a Western one. Germany must therefore regard
herself as compelled to wage war, if war should come, on both fronts;
and in all her fears or her ambitions this consideration must play a
principal part. Friction in the East must involve friction in the West,
and vice versa. What were the causes of friction in the West we have
seen. Let us now consider the cause of friction in the East.
The relations of Russia to Germany have been and are of a confused
and complicated character, changing as circumstances and personalities
change. But one permanent factor has been the sympathy between the
governing elements in the two countries. The governing class in Russia,
indeed, has not only been inspired by German ideas, it has been largely
recruited from men of German stock; and it has manifested all the
contempt and hatred which is characteristic of the German bureaucracy
for the ideals of democracy, liberty, and free thought. The two
Governments have always been ready to combine against popular
insurrections, and in particular against every attempt of the Poles to
recover their liberty. They have been drawn and held together by a
common interest in tyranny, and the renewal of that co-operation is one
of the dangers of the future. On the other hand, apart from and in
opposition to this common political interest, there exists between the
two nations a strong racial antagonism. The Russian temperament is
radically opposed to the German. The one expresses itself in
Panslavism, the other in Pangermanism. And this opposition of
temperament is likely to be deeper and more enduring than the sympathy
of the one autocracy with the other. But apart from this racial factor,
there is in the south-east an opposition of political ambition.
Primarily, the Balkan question is an Austro-Russian rather than a
Russo-German one. Bismarck professed himself indifferent to the fate of
the Balkan peoples, and even avowed a willingness to see Russia at
Constantinople. But recent years have seen, in this respect, a great
change. The alliance between Germany and Austria, dating from 1879, has
become closer and closer as the Powers of the Entente have drawn
together in what appeared to be a menacing combination. It has been,
for some time past, a cardinal principle of German policy to support
her ally in the Balkans, and this determination has been increased by
German ambitions in the East. The ancient dream of Russia to possess
Constantinople has been countered by the new German dream of a hegemony
over the near East based upon the through route from Berlin via Vienna
and Constantinople to Bagdad; and this political opposition has been of
late years the determining factor in the relationship of the two
Powers. The danger of a Russo-German conflict has thus been very great,
and since the Russo-French Entente Germany, as we have already pointed
out, has seen herself menaced on either front by a war which would
immediately endanger both.
Turning once more to the Belgian dispatches, we find such hints as
the following. On October 24, 1912, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian
Ambassador to London, writes as follows:—
The French Ambassador, who must have special reasons for speaking
thus, has repeated to me several times that the greatest danger
for
the maintenance of the peace of Europe consists in the
indiscipline and
the personal policy of the Russian agents. They are almost all
ardent
Panslavists, and it is to them that must be imputed the
responsibility
for the events that are occurring. Beyond a doubt they will make
themselves the secret instigators for an intervention of their
country
in the Balkan conflict.
On November 30, 1912, Baron de Beyens writes from Berlin:—
At the end of last week a report was spread in the chancelleries
of
Europe that M. Sazonov had abandoned the struggle against the
Court
party which wishes to drag Russia into war.
On June 9, 1914, Baron Guillaume writes from Paris:—
Is it true that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has imposed upon
this
country [France] the adoption of the law of three years, and
would
now bring to bear the whole weight of its influence to ensure its
maintenance? I have not been able to obtain light upon this
delicate
point, but it would be all the more serious, inasmuch as the men
who
direct the Empire of the Tsars cannot be unaware that the effort
thus
demanded of the French nation is excessive, and cannot be long
sustained.
Is, then, the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based
upon the
conviction that events are so imminent that it will be possible
to use
the tool it intends to put into the hands of its ally?
What a sinister vista is opened up by this passage! I have no wish
to insinuate that the suspicion here expressed was justified. It is the
suspicion itself that is the point. Dimly we see, as through a mist,
the figures of the architects of war. We see that the forces they wield
are ambition and pride, jealousy and fear; that these are
all-pervasive; that they affect all Governments and all nations, and
are fostered by conditions for which all alike are responsible.
It will be understood, of course, that in bringing out the fact that
there was national chauvinism in Russia and that this found its excuse
in the unstable equilibrium of Europe, I am making no attack on Russian
policy. I do not pretend to know whether these elements of opinion
actually influenced the policy of the Government. But they certainly
influenced German fears, and without a knowledge of them it is
impossible to understand German policy. The reader must bear in mind
this source of friction along with the others when we come to consider
that policy in detail.