We have reached, then, the year 1913, and the end of the Balkan
wars, without discovering in German policy any clear signs of a
determination to produce a European war. We have found all the Powers,
Germany included, contending for territory and trade at the risk of the
peace of Europe; we have found Germany successfully developing her
interests in Turkey; we have found England annexing the South African
republics, France Morocco, Italy Tripoli; we have found all the Powers
stealing in China, and in all these transactions we have found them
continually on the point of being at one another's throats.
Nevertheless, some last instinct of self-preservation has enabled them,
so far, to pull up in time. The crises had been overcome without a war.
Yet they had, of course, produced their effects. Some statesmen
probably, like Sir Edward Grey, had had their passion for peace
confirmed by the dangers encountered. In others, no doubt, an opposite
effect had been produced, and very likely by 1913 there were prominent
men in Europe convinced that war must come, and manoeuvring only that
it should come at the time and occasion most favourable to their
country. That, according to M. Cambon, was now the attitude of the
German Emperor. M. Cambon bases this view on an alleged conversation
between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians.[1] The conversation
has been denied by the German official organ, but that, of course, is
no proof that it did not take place, and there is nothing improbable in
what M. Cambon narrates.
The conversation is supposed to have occurred in November 1913, at a
time when, as we have seen,[2] there was a distinct outburst in France
of anti-German chauvinism, and when the arming and counter-arming of
that year had exasperated opinion to an extreme degree. The Kaiser is
reported to have said that war between Germany and France was
inevitable. If he did, it is clear from the context that he said it in
the belief that French chauvinism would produce war. For the King of
the Belgians, in replying, is stated to have said that it was “a
travesty, of the French Government to interpret it in that sense, and
to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by
the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of
unscrupulous agitators.” It should be observed also that this supposed
attitude on the part of the Kaiser is noted as a change, and that he is
credited with having previously stood for peace against the designs of
the German Jingoes. His personal influence, says the dispatch, “had
been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace.” The fact
of a change of mind in the Kaiser is accepted also by Baron Beyens.
Whatever may be the truth in this matter, neither the German nor the
French nor our own Government can then have abandoned the effort at
peaceable settlement. For, in fact, by the summer of 1914, agreements
had been made between the Great Powers which settled for the time being
the questions immediately outstanding. It is understood that a new
partition of African territory had been arranged to meet the claims and
interests of Germany, France, and England alike. The question of the
Bagdad railway had been settled, and everything seemed to favour the
maintenance of peace, when, suddenly, the murder of the Archduke sprang
upon a dismayed Europe the crisis that was at last to prove fatal. The
events that followed, so far as they can be ascertained from published
documents, have been so fully discussed that it would be superfluous
for me to go over the ground again in all its detail. But I will
indicate briefly what appear to me to be the main points of importance
in fixing the responsibility for what occurred.
First, the German view, that England is responsible for the war
because she did not prevent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as
childish, if it is not simply sophistical. The German Powers
deliberately take an action which the whole past history of Europe
shows must almost certainly lead to a European war, and they then turn
round upon Sir Edward Grey and put the blame on him because he did not
succeed in preventing the consequences of their own action. “He might
have kept Russia out.” Who knows whether he might? What we do know is
that it was Austria and Germany who brought her in. The German view is
really only intelligible upon the assumption that Germany has a right
to do what she pleases and that the Powers that stand in her way are by
definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordinary attitude that has
been one of the factors for making war in Europe.
Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir
Edward Grey. It is, indeed, possible, as it is always possible after
the event, to suggest that some other course might have been more
successful in avoiding war. But that is conjecture, I, at any rate, am
convinced, as I believe every one outside Germany is convinced, that
Sir Edward Grey throughout the negotiations had one object only—to
avoid, if he could, the catastrophe of war.
Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is perfectly clear. She was
determined now, as in 1913, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, at the
risk of a European war. Her guilt is clear and definite, and it is only
the fact that we are not directly fighting her with British troops that
has prevented British opinion from fastening upon it as the main
occasion of the war.
But this time, quite clearly, Austria was backed by Germany. Why
this change in German policy? So far as the Kaiser himself is
concerned, there can be little doubt that a main cause was the horror
he felt at the assassination of the Archduke. The absurd system of
autocracy gives to the emotional reactions of an individual a
preposterous weight in determining world-policy; and the almost insane
feeling of the Kaiser about the sanctity of crowned heads was no doubt
a main reason why Germany backed Austria in sending her ultimatum to
Serbia. According to Baron Beyens, on hearing the news of the murder of
the Archduke the Kaiser changed colour, and exclaimed: “All the effort
of my life for twenty-five years must be begun over again!”[3] A tragic
cry which indicates, what I personally believe to be the case, that it
has been the constant effort of the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe,
and that he foresaw now that he would no longer be able to resist war.
So far, however, it would only be the war between Austria and Serbia
that the Kaiser would be prepared to sanction. He might hope to avoid
the European war. And, in fact, there is good reason to suppose that
both he and the German Foreign Office did cherish that hope or
delusion. They had bluffed Russia off in 1908. They had the dangerous
idea that they might bluff her off again. In this connection Baron
Beyens records a conversation with his colleague, M. Bollati, the
Italian Ambassador at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that
at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, in spite
of
the official assurances exchanged quite recently between the Tsar
and
M. Poincare, as to the complete preparations of the armies of the
two
allies, was not in a position to sustain a European war and would
not
dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure.
Baron Beyens continues:—
At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face a European
war
prevailed not only in the official world and in society, but
among
all the manufacturers who specialized in the construction of
armaments.
M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an opinion,
announced
on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that
the
Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of
the German
army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly
on the
part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to
make war
on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4]
But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am
inclined to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just
suggested, there were other and more important factors to be
considered. It appears almost certain that at some point in the crisis
the control of the situation was taken out of the hands of the
civilians by the military. The position of the military is not
difficult to understand. They believed, as professional soldiers
usually do, in the “inevitability” of war, and they had, of course, a
professional interest in making war. Their attitude may be illustrated
from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince Lichnowsky in
1912[5]: “The soldiers think about war. It is their business and their
duty. They tell us that the German army, is in good order, that the
Russian army has not completed its organization, that it would be a
good moment ... but for twenty years they have been saying the same
thing,” The passage is significant. It shows us exactly what it is we
have to dread in “militarism.” The danger in a military State is always
that when a crisis comes the soldiers will get control, as they seem to
have done on this occasion. From their point of view there was good
reason. They knew that France and Russia, on a common understanding,
were making enormous military preparations; they knew that these
preparations would mature by the beginning of 1917; they knew that
Germany would fight then at a less advantage; they believed she would
then have to fight, and they said, “Better fight now.” The following
dispatch of Baron Beyens, dated July 26th, may probably be taken as
fairly representing their attitude:—
To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion
which
prevails in the German General Staff, that war with France and
Russia is
unavoidable and near, an opinion which the Emperor has been
induced to
share. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and
Pangerman party,
might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances
which
are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not
again
present themselves for some time. Germany has finished the
strengthening
of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the
other hand,
she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in
armaments
with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The
Wehrbeitrag
has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it
has
demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made
the
mistake of making a display of her strength before having
finished her
military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for
several
years: at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary
for its
deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her
deficiency
in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is this arm that will
decide
the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last
two
years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to
detach from
France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her
Irish
quarrels.[6]
It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have
been in the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other
hand, as late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign
Office had been working throughout for peace. Describing an interview
he had had on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:—
From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr
Zimmermann
spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department
for
Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict
had been
on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it
that
its views and counsels had not prevailed... A superior power
intervened
to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from
Germany to
Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna
Cabinet
was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose
the
war.[7]
Why was that ultimatum sent? According to the German apologists, it
was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the
critical moment, and so made war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt
that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days
by mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly
pointed out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian
Ambassador at Petrograd to his Government:—
As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of
Russian
troops, Count Pourtales [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has
called the
Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the
fact that
nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous
form of
diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military
consideration
of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and
if that
button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out
of
control.[8]
On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had
mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and
Austria had mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either
case. Moreover, in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is
difficult to believe that a day or two would make the difference
between security and ruin to Germany. However, it is possible that the
Kaiser was so advised by his soldiers, and genuinely believed the
country to be in danger. We do not definitely know. What we do know is,
that it was the German ultimatum that precipitated the war.
We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last
moment the German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:—
As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg by noon the next
day
[after the dispatch of the German ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and
Zimmermann
(I have it from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the
Kaiser to
prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, and to
persuade
his Majesty to wait till the following day. It was the last
effort of
their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience.
Their
efforts were broken against the irreducible obstinacy of the
Minister of
War and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the
disastrous
consequences of a delay of twenty-four hours.[10]
[Footnote 1: French Yellow Book, No. 6. In “L'Allemagne avant la
guerre” (p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this conversation was held at
Potsdam on November 5th or 6th; the Kaiser said that war between
Germany and France was “inevitable and near.” Baron Beyens, presumably,
is the authority from whom M. Cambon derives his information.]
[Footnote 2: Above, p. 25.]
[Footnote 3: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 273.]
[Footnote 4: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 280 seq.]
[Footnote 5: See “L'Enigme Allemande,” p. 96.]
[Footnote 6: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8.]
[Footnote 7: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52.]
[Footnote 8: Austrian Red Book, No. 28.]
[Footnote 9: See Chapter 14.]
[Footnote 10: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 301.]