Let us turn now to France. Since 1870 we find contending there, with
varying fortunes and strength, two opposite currents of sentiment and
policy. One was that of revanche against Germany, inspired by
the old traditions of glory and hegemony, associated with hopes of a
monarchist or imperialistic revolution, and directed, in the first
place, to a recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. The other policy was that of
peace abroad and socialistic transformation at home, inspired by the
modern ideals of justice and fraternity, and supported by the best of
the younger generation of philosophers, poets, and artists, as well as
by the bulk of the working class. Nowhere have these two currents of
contemporary aspiration met and contended as fiercely as in France. The
Dreyfus case was the most striking act in the great drama. But it was
not the concluding one. French militarism, in that affair, was scotched
but not killed, and the contest was never fiercer than in the years
immediately preceding the war. The fighters for peace were the
Socialists, under their leader, Jaures, the one great man in the public
life of Europe. While recognizing the urgent need for adequate national
defence, Jaures laboured so to organize it that it could not be
mistaken for nor converted into aggression. He laboured, at the same
time, to remove the cause of the danger. In the year 1913, under Swiss
auspices, a meeting of French and German pacifists was arranged at
Berne. To this meeting there proceeded 167 French deputies and 48
senators. The Baron d'Estournelles de Constant was president of the
French bureau, and Jaures one of the vice-presidents. The result was
disappointing. The German participation was small and less influential
than the French, and no agreement could be reached on the burning
question of Alsace-Lorraine. But the French Socialists continued, up to
the eve of the war, to fight for peace with an energy, an intelligence,
and a determination shown in no other country. The assassination of
Jaures was a symbol of the assassination of peace; but the assassin was
a Frenchman.
For if, in France, the current for peace ran strong in these latter
years, so did the current for war. French chauvinism had waxed and
waned, but it was never extinguished. After 1870 it centred not only
about Alsace-Lorraine, but also about the colonial expansion which took
from that date a new lease of life in France, as it had done in England
after the loss of the American colonies. Directly encouraged by
Bismarck, France annexed Tunis in 1881. The annexation of Tunis led up
at last to that of Morocco. Other territory had been seized in the Far
East, and France became, next to ourselves, the greatest colonial
Power. This policy could not be pursued without friction, and the
principal friction at the beginning was with ourselves. Once at least,
in the Fashoda crisis, the two countries were on the verge of war, and
it was not till the Entente of 1904 that their relations were adjusted
on a basis of give-and-take. But by that time Germany had come into the
colonial field, and the Entente with England meant new friction with
Germany, turning upon French designs in Morocco. In this matter Great
Britain supported her ally, and the incident of Agadir in 1911 showed
the solidity of the Entente. This demonstration no doubt strengthened
the hands of the aggressive elements in France, and later on the
influence of M. Delcasse and M. Poincare was believed in certain
quarters to have given new energy to this direction of French policy.
This tendency to chauvinism was recognized as a menace to peace, and we
find reflections of that feeling in the Belgian dispatches. Thus, for
instance, Baron Guillaume, Belgian minister at Paris, writes on
February, 21, 1913, of M. Poincare:—
It is under his Ministry that the military and slightly
chauvinistic
instincts of the French people have awakened. His hand can be
seen in
this modification; it is to be hoped that his political
intelligence,
practical and cool, will save him from all exaggeration in this
course.
The notable increase of German armaments which supervenes at the
moment
of M. Poincare's entrance at the Elysee will increase the danger
of a
too nationalistic orientation of the policy of France.
Again, on March 3, 1913:—
The German Ambassador said to me on Saturday: “The political
situation
is much improved in the last forty-eight hours; the tension is
generally
relaxed; one may hope for a return to peace in the near future.
But what
does not improve is the state of public opinion in France and
Germany
with regard to the relations between the two countries. We are
persuaded
in Germany that a spirit of chauvinism having revived, we have to
fear an
attack by the Republic. In France they express the same fear with
regard
to us. The consequence of these misunderstandings is to ruin us
both. I
do not know where we are going on this perilous route. Will not a
man
appear of sufficient goodwill and prestige to recall every one to
reason?
All this is the more ridiculous because, during the crisis we are
traversing, the two Governments have given proof of the most
pacific
sentiments, and have continually relied upon one another to avoid
conflicts.”
On this Baron Guillaume comments:—
Baron Schoen is perfectly right, I am not in a position to examine
German
opinion, but I note every day how public opinion in France
becomes more
suspicious and chauvinistic. One meets people who assure one that
a war
with Germany in the near future is certain and inevitable. People
regret
it, but make up their minds to it.... They demand, almost by
acclamation,
an immediate vote for every means of increasing the defensive
power of
France. The most reasonable men assert that it is necessary to
arm to the
teeth to frighten the enemy and prevent war.
On April 16th he reports a conversation with M. Pichon, in which the
latter says:—
Among us, too, there is a spirit of chauvinism which is
increasing,
which I deplore, and against which we ought to react. Half the
theatres
in Paris now play chauvinistic and nationalistic pieces.
The note of alarm becomes more urgent as the days go on. On January
16, 1914, the Baron writes:—
I have already had the honour to tell you that it is MM. Poincare,
Delcasse, Millerand and their friends who have invented and
pursued the
nationalistic and chauvinistic policy which menaces to-day the
peace of
Europe, and of which we have noted the renaissance. It is a
danger for
Europe and for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril, which
menaces the
peace of Europe to-day; not that I have the right to suppose that
the
Government of the Republic is disposed deliberately to trouble
the peace,
rather I believe the contrary; but the attitude that the Barthou
Cabinet
has taken up is, in my judgment, the determining cause of an
excess of
militaristic tendencies in Germany.
It is clear from these quotations, and it is for this reason alone
that I give them, that France, supported by the other members of the
Triple Entente, could appear, and did appear, as much a menace to
Germany as Germany appeared a menace to France; that in France, as in
other countries, there was jingoism as well as pacifism; and that the
inability of French public opinion to acquiesce in the loss of
Alsace-Lorraine was an active factor in the unrest of Europe. Once more
I state these facts, I do not criticize them. They are essential to the
comprehension of the international situation.