First, let us remind ourselves in general of the situation that
prevailed in Europe during the ten years preceding the war. It was in
that period that the Entente between France, Russia, and England was
formed and consolidated, over against the existing Triple Alliance
between Germany, Austria, and Italy. Neither of these combinations was
in its origin and purpose aggressive[1].
And, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the relations she
entered into with France and with Russia were directed in each case to
the settlement of long outstanding differences without special
reference to the German Powers. But it is impossible in the European
anarchy that any arrangements should be made between any States which
do not arouse suspicion in others. And the drawing together of the
Powers of the Entente did in fact appear to Germany as a menace. She
believed that she was being threatened by an aggressive combination,
just as, on the other hand, she herself seemed to the Powers of the
Entente a danger to be guarded against. This apprehension on the part
of Germany, is sometimes thought to have been mere pretence, but there
is every reason to suppose it to have been genuine. The policy of the
Entente did in fact, on a number of occasions, come into collision with
that of Germany. The arming and counter-arming was continuous. And the
very fact that from the side of the Entente it seemed that Germany was
always the aggressor, should suggest to us that from the other side the
opposite impression would prevail. That, in fact, it did prevail is
clear not only from the constant assertions of German statesmen and of
the German Press, but from contemporary observations made by the
representatives of a State not itself involved in either of the
opposing combinations. The dispatches of the Belgian ambassadors at
Berlin, Paris, and London during the years 1905 to 1914[2] show a
constant impression that the Entente was a hostile combination directed
against Germany and engineered, in the earlier years, for that purpose
by King Edward VII. This impression of the Belgian representatives is
no proof, it is true, of the real intentions of the Entente, but it is
proof of how they did in fact appear to outsiders. And it is
irrelevant, whether or no it be true, to urge that the Belgians were
indoctrinated with the German view; since precisely the fact that they
could be so indoctrinated would show that the view was on the face of
it plausible. We see, then, in these dispatches the way in which the
policy of the Entente could appear to observers outside it. I give
illustrations from Berlin, Paris, and London.
On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, writes
as follows:—
Call it an alliance, entente, or what you will, the
grouping of the
Powers arranged by the personal intervention of the King of
England
exists, and if it is not a direct and immediate threat of war
against
Germany (it would be too much to say that it was that), it
constitutes
none the less a diminution of her security. The necessary
pacifist
declarations, which, no doubt, will be repeated at Reval, signify
very
little, emanating as they do from three Powers which, like Russia
and
England, have just carried through successfully, without any
motive
except the desire for aggrandizement, and without even a
plausible
pretext, wars of conquest in Manchuria and the Transvaal, or
which,
like France, is proceeding at this moment to the conquest of
Morocco,
in contempt of solemn promises, and without any title except the
cession of British rights, which never existed.
On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador at London,
writes:—
A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow Press,
bears to a
great extent the responsibility for the hostile feeling between
the two
nations.... It is plain enough that official England is quietly
pursuing
a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and that
King
Edward has not hesitated to use his personal influence in the
service of
this scheme. But it is certainly exceedingly dangerous to poison
public
opinion in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible
journals.
Again, on July 28, 1911, in the midst of the Morocco crisis, Baron
Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, writes:—
I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of the Emperor
William,
in spite of the too frequent exaggeration of some of his
gestures. He
will not allow himself to be drawn on farther than he chooses by
the
exuberant temperament and clumsy manners of his very intelligent
Minister
of Foreign Affairs (Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, in general, less
faith in
the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not be sorry to
see the
others eat one another up.... As I thought from the beginning, it
is in
London that the key to the situation lies. It is there only that
it can
become grave. The French will yield on all the points for the
sake of
peace. It is not the same with the English, who will not
compromise on
certain principles and certain claims.
[Footnote 1: The alliance between Germany and Austria, which dates
from 1879, was formed to guarantee the two States against an attack by
Russia. Its terms are:—
“1. If, contrary to what is to be expected and contrary to the
sincere desire of the two high contracting parties, one of the two
Empires should be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties
are bound reciprocally to assist one another with the whole military
force of their Empire, and further not to make peace except conjointly
and by common consent.
“2. If one of the high contracting Powers should be attacked by
another Power, the other high contracting party engages itself, by the
present act, not only not to support the aggressor against its ally,
but at least to observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the
other contracting party. If, however, in the case supposed the
attacking Power should be supported by Russia, whether by active
co-operation or by military measures which should menace the Power
attacked, then the obligation of mutual assistance with all military
forces, as stipulated in the preceding article, would immediately come
into force, and the military operations of the high contracting parties
would be in that case conducted jointly until the conclusion of peace.”
Italy acceded to the Alliance in 1882. The engagement is defensive.
Each of the three parties is to come to the assistance of the others if
attacked by a third party.
The treaty of Germany with Austria was supplemented in 1884 by a
treaty with Russia, known as the “Reinsurance Treaty,” whereby Germany
bound herself not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. This treaty
lapsed in the year 1890, and the lapse, it is presumed, prepared the
way for the rapprochement between Russia and France.
The text of the treaty of 1894 between France and Russia has never
been published. It is supposed to be a treaty of mutual defence in case
of an aggressive attack. The Power from whom attack is expected is
probably named, as in the treaty between Germany and Austria. It is
probably for that reason that the treaty was not published. The
accession of Great Britain to what then became known as the “Triple
Entente” is determined by the treaty of 1904 with France, whereby
France abandoned her opposition to the British occupation of Egypt in
return for a free hand in Morocco; and by the treaty of 1907 with
Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated their relations in Persia,
Afghanistan, and Thibet. There is no mention in either case of an
attack, or a defence against attack, by any other Power.]
[Footnote 2: These were published by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung, and are reprinted under the title “Belgische
Aktenstuecke,” 1905-14 (Ernst Siegfried Mittler and Sons, Berlin).
Their authenticity, as far as I know, has not been disputed. On the
other hand, it is to be assumed that they have been very carefully
“edited” by the German to make a particular impression. My view of the
policy of Germany or of the Entente is in no sense based upon them. I
adduce them as evidence of contemporary feeling and opinion.]