Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, Morocco. The salient
features here were, first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the Great
Powers, including, of course, Germany, were parties, and which
guaranteed to the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment; secondly,
the interest of Great Britain to prevent a strong Power from
establishing itself opposite Gibraltar and threatening British control
over the Straits; thirdly, the interest of France to annex Morocco and
knit it up with the North African Empire; fourthly, the new colonial
and trading interests of Germany, which, as she had formally announced,
could not leave her indifferent to any new dispositions of influence or
territory in undeveloped countries. For many years French ambitions in
Morocco had been held in check by the British desire to maintain the
status quo. But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 gave France a free
hand there in return for the abandonment of French opposition to the
British position in Egypt. The Anglo-French treaty of 1904 affirmed, in
the clauses made public, the independence and integrity of Morocco; but
there were secret clauses looking to its partition. By these the
British interest in the Straits was guaranteed by an arrangement which
gave to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibraltar and a strip
on the north-west coast, while leaving the rest of the country to fall
to France. Germany was not consulted while these arrangements were
being made, and the secret clauses of the treaty were, of course, not
communicated to her. But it seems reasonable to suppose that they
became known to, or at least were suspected by, the German Government
shortly after they were adopted.[1] And probably it was this that led
to the dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier,[2] when he
announced that the independence of Morocco was under German protection.
The result was the Conference of Algeciras, at which the independence
and integrity of Morocco was once more affirmed (the clauses looking to
its partition being still kept secret by the three Powers privy to
them), and equal commercial facilities were guaranteed to all the
Powers. Germany thereby obtained what she most wanted, what she had a
right to by the treaty of 1880, and what otherwise might have been
threatened by French occupation—the maintenance of the open door. But
the French enterprise was not abandoned. Disputes with the natives such
as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases, led to fresh
military intervention. At the same time, it was difficult to secure the
practical application of the principle of equal commercial opportunity.
An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby both Powers
were to share equally in contracts for public works, was found in
practice not to work. The Germans pressed for its application to the
new railways projected in Morocco. The French delayed, temporized, and
postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position
in Morocco. The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez.
Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the
capital (a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many
Frenchmen), it clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the
country. The patience of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made
the coup of Agadir. There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr.
Lloyd George and the Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby
Germany recognized a French protectorate in Morocco in return for
concessions of territory in the French Congo. These are the bare facts
of the Moroccan episode. Much, of course, is still unrevealed,
particularly as to the motives and intentions of the Powers concerned.
Did Germany, for instance, intend to seize a share of Morocco when she
sent the Panther to Agadir? And was that the reason of the
vigour of the British intervention? Possibly, but by no means
certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Germany had that
intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between France
and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption of
Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of
Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the
French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by
diplomacy, but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of
war, and in such a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of
anger and mistrust in all the parties concerned.
The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at
length, with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book “Morocco in
Diplomacy.” The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by
the various Powers. But I do not believe that any instructed and
impartial student will accept what appears to be the current English
view, that the action of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer
aggression without excuse, and that the other Powers were acting
throughout justly, honestly, and straightforwardly.
The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a
painful impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war.
Thus Baron Beyens writes:—
The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard
another
war as a necessary evil.[4]
And again:—
The pacific settlement of the conflict of 1911 gave a violent
impulse to
the war party in Germany, to the propaganda of the League of
Defence and
the Navy League, and a greater force to their demands. To their
dreams
of hegemony and domination the desire for revenge against France
now
mingled its bitterness. A diplomatic success secured in an
underground
struggle signified nothing. War, war in the open, that alone, in
the eyes
of this rancorous tribe, could settle definitely the Moroccan
question by
incorporating Morocco and all French Africa in the colonial
empire they
hoped to create on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the
heart of
the Black Continent.[5]
This we may take to be a correct description of the attitude of the
Pangermans. But there is no evidence that it was that of the nation. We
have seen also that Baron Beyens' impression of the attitude of the
German people, even after the Moroccan affair, was of a general desire
for peace.[6] The crisis had been severe, but it had been tided over,
and the Governments seem to have made renewed efforts to come into
friendly relations. In this connection the following dispatch of Baron
Beyens (June 1912) is worth quoting:—
After the death of Edward VII, the Kaiser, as well as the Crown
Prince,
when they returned from England, where they had been courteously
received, were persuaded that the coldness in the relations of
the
preceding years was going to yield to a cordial intimacy between
the
two Courts and that the causes of the misunderstanding between
the two
peoples would vanish with the past. His disillusionment,
therefore, was
cruel when he saw the Cabinet of London range itself last year on
the
side of France. But the Kaiser is obstinate, and has not
abandoned the
hope of reconquering the confidence of the English.[7]
This dispatch is so far borne out by the facts that in the year
succeeding the Moroccan crisis a serious attempt was made to improve
Anglo-German relations, and there is no reason to doubt that on both
sides there was a genuine desire for an understanding. How that
understanding failed has already been indicated.[8] But even that
failure did not ruin the relations between the two Powers. In the
Balkan crisis, as we have seen and as is admitted on both sides,
England and Germany worked together for peace. And the fact that a
European conflagration was then avoided, in spite of the tension
between Russia and Austria, is a strong proof that the efforts of Sir
Edward Grey were sincerely and effectively seconded by Germany.[9]
[Footnote 1: See “Morocco in Diplomacy,” Chap. XVI. A dispatch
written by M. Leghait, the Belgian minister in Paris, on May 7, 1905,
shows that rumour was busy on the subject. The secret clauses of the
Franco-Spanish treaty were known to him, and these provided for an
eventual partition of Morocco between France and Spain. He doubted
whether there were secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty—“but it
is supposed that there is a certain tacit understanding by which
England would leave France sufficient liberty of action in Morocco
under the reserve of the secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish
arrangement, clauses if not imposed yet at least strongly supported by
the London Cabinet.”
We know, of course, now, that the arrangement for the partition was
actually embodied in secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty.]
[Footnote 2: According to M. Yves Guyot, when the Kaiser was
actually on his way to Tangier, he telegraphed from Lisbon to Prince
Buelow abandoning the project. Prince Buelow telegraphed back
insisting, and the Kaiser yielded.]
[Footnote 3: See Bourdon, “L'Enigme Allemande,” Chap. II. This
account, by a Frenchman, will not be suspected of anti-French or
pro-German bias, and it is based on French official records.]
[Footnote 4: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 216.]
[Footnote 5: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 235.]
[Footnote 6: See above, p. 63.]
[Footnote 7: This view is reaffirmed by Baron Beyens in “L'Allemagne
avant la guerre,” p. 29.]
[Footnote 8: See above, p. 79.]
[Footnote 9: Above, p. 111.]