16. The Last Years.

     
     
      We have reached, then, the year 1913, and the end of the Balkan wars, without discovering in German policy any clear signs of a determination to produce a European war. We have found all the Powers, Germany included, contending for territory and trade at the risk of the peace of Europe; we have found Germany successfully developing her interests in Turkey; we have found England annexing the South African republics, France Morocco, Italy Tripoli; we have found all the Powers stealing in China, and in all these transactions we have found them continually on the point of being at one another's throats. Nevertheless, some last instinct of self-preservation has enabled them, so far, to pull up in time. The crises had been overcome without a war. Yet they had, of course, produced their effects. Some statesmen probably, like Sir Edward Grey, had had their passion for peace confirmed by the dangers encountered. In others, no doubt, an opposite effect had been produced, and very likely by 1913 there were prominent men in Europe convinced that war must come, and manoeuvring only that it should come at the time and occasion most favourable to their country. That, according to M. Cambon, was now the attitude of the German Emperor. M. Cambon bases this view on an alleged conversation between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians.[1] The conversation has been denied by the German official organ, but that, of course, is no proof that it did not take place, and there is nothing improbable in what M. Cambon narrates.
      The conversation is supposed to have occurred in November 1913, at a time when, as we have seen,[2] there was a distinct outburst in France of anti-German chauvinism, and when the arming and counter-arming of that year had exasperated opinion to an extreme degree. The Kaiser is reported to have said that war between Germany and France was inevitable. If he did, it is clear from the context that he said it in the belief that French chauvinism would produce war. For the King of the Belgians, in replying, is stated to have said that it was “a travesty, of the French Government to interpret it in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.” It should be observed also that this supposed attitude on the part of the Kaiser is noted as a change, and that he is credited with having previously stood for peace against the designs of the German Jingoes. His personal influence, says the dispatch, “had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace.” The fact of a change of mind in the Kaiser is accepted also by Baron Beyens.
      Whatever may be the truth in this matter, neither the German nor the French nor our own Government can then have abandoned the effort at peaceable settlement. For, in fact, by the summer of 1914, agreements had been made between the Great Powers which settled for the time being the questions immediately outstanding. It is understood that a new partition of African territory had been arranged to meet the claims and interests of Germany, France, and England alike. The question of the Bagdad railway had been settled, and everything seemed to favour the maintenance of peace, when, suddenly, the murder of the Archduke sprang upon a dismayed Europe the crisis that was at last to prove fatal. The events that followed, so far as they can be ascertained from published documents, have been so fully discussed that it would be superfluous for me to go over the ground again in all its detail. But I will indicate briefly what appear to me to be the main points of importance in fixing the responsibility for what occurred.
      First, the German view, that England is responsible for the war because she did not prevent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as childish, if it is not simply sophistical. The German Powers deliberately take an action which the whole past history of Europe shows must almost certainly lead to a European war, and they then turn round upon Sir Edward Grey and put the blame on him because he did not succeed in preventing the consequences of their own action. “He might have kept Russia out.” Who knows whether he might? What we do know is that it was Austria and Germany who brought her in. The German view is really only intelligible upon the assumption that Germany has a right to do what she pleases and that the Powers that stand in her way are by definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordinary attitude that has been one of the factors for making war in Europe.
      Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward Grey. It is, indeed, possible, as it is always possible after the event, to suggest that some other course might have been more successful in avoiding war. But that is conjecture, I, at any rate, am convinced, as I believe every one outside Germany is convinced, that Sir Edward Grey throughout the negotiations had one object only—to avoid, if he could, the catastrophe of war.
      Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is perfectly clear. She was determined now, as in 1913, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, at the risk of a European war. Her guilt is clear and definite, and it is only the fact that we are not directly fighting her with British troops that has prevented British opinion from fastening upon it as the main occasion of the war.
      But this time, quite clearly, Austria was backed by Germany. Why this change in German policy? So far as the Kaiser himself is concerned, there can be little doubt that a main cause was the horror he felt at the assassination of the Archduke. The absurd system of autocracy gives to the emotional reactions of an individual a preposterous weight in determining world-policy; and the almost insane feeling of the Kaiser about the sanctity of crowned heads was no doubt a main reason why Germany backed Austria in sending her ultimatum to Serbia. According to Baron Beyens, on hearing the news of the murder of the Archduke the Kaiser changed colour, and exclaimed: “All the effort of my life for twenty-five years must be begun over again!”[3] A tragic cry which indicates, what I personally believe to be the case, that it has been the constant effort of the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe, and that he foresaw now that he would no longer be able to resist war.
      So far, however, it would only be the war between Austria and Serbia that the Kaiser would be prepared to sanction. He might hope to avoid the European war. And, in fact, there is good reason to suppose that both he and the German Foreign Office did cherish that hope or delusion. They had bluffed Russia off in 1908. They had the dangerous idea that they might bluff her off again. In this connection Baron Beyens records a conversation with his colleague, M. Bollati, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that
        at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of
  the official assurances exchanged quite recently between the Tsar and
  M. Poincare, as to the complete preparations of the armies of the two
  allies, was not in a position to sustain a European war and would not
  dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure.
      Baron Beyens continues:—
        At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face a European war
  prevailed not only in the official world and in society, but among
  all the manufacturers who specialized in the construction of armaments.
  M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an opinion, announced
  on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the
  Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of the German
  army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly on the
  part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to make war
  on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4]
      But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am inclined to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just suggested, there were other and more important factors to be considered. It appears almost certain that at some point in the crisis the control of the situation was taken out of the hands of the civilians by the military. The position of the military is not difficult to understand. They believed, as professional soldiers usually do, in the “inevitability” of war, and they had, of course, a professional interest in making war. Their attitude may be illustrated from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince Lichnowsky in 1912[5]: “The soldiers think about war. It is their business and their duty. They tell us that the German army, is in good order, that the Russian army has not completed its organization, that it would be a good moment ... but for twenty years they have been saying the same thing,” The passage is significant. It shows us exactly what it is we have to dread in “militarism.” The danger in a military State is always that when a crisis comes the soldiers will get control, as they seem to have done on this occasion. From their point of view there was good reason. They knew that France and Russia, on a common understanding, were making enormous military preparations; they knew that these preparations would mature by the beginning of 1917; they knew that Germany would fight then at a less advantage; they believed she would then have to fight, and they said, “Better fight now.” The following dispatch of Baron Beyens, dated July 26th, may probably be taken as fairly representing their attitude:—
        To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which
  prevails in the German General Staff, that war with France and Russia is
  unavoidable and near, an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to
  share
. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and Pangerman party,
  might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which
  are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again
  present themselves for some time. Germany has finished the strengthening
  of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the other hand,
  she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments
  with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The Wehrbeitrag
  has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has
  demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the
  mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her
  military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for several
  years: at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its
  deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency
  in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is this arm that will decide
  the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two
  years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from
  France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish
  quarrels.[6]
      It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have been in the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other hand, as late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign Office had been working throughout for peace. Describing an interview he had had on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:—
        From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann
  spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department for
  Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had been
  on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that
  its views and counsels had not prevailed... A superior power intervened
  to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to
  Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet
  was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the
  war.[7]
      Why was that ultimatum sent? According to the German apologists, it was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the critical moment, and so made war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd to his Government:—
        As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian
  troops, Count Pourtales [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the
  Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that
  nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of
  diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military consideration
  of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that
  button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of
  control.[8]
      On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case. Moreover, in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to Germany. However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger. We do not definitely know. What we do know is, that it was the German ultimatum that precipitated the war.
      We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last moment the German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:—
        As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg by noon the next day
  [after the dispatch of the German ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann
  (I have it from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the Kaiser to
  prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, and to persuade
  his Majesty to wait till the following day. It was the last effort of
  their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. Their
  efforts were broken against the irreducible obstinacy of the Minister of
  War and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the disastrous
  consequences of a delay of twenty-four hours.[10]
      [Footnote 1: French Yellow Book, No. 6. In “L'Allemagne avant la guerre” (p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this conversation was held at Potsdam on November 5th or 6th; the Kaiser said that war between Germany and France was “inevitable and near.” Baron Beyens, presumably, is the authority from whom M. Cambon derives his information.]
      [Footnote 2: Above, p. 25.]
      [Footnote 3: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 273.]
      [Footnote 4: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 280 seq.]
      [Footnote 5: See “L'Enigme Allemande,” p. 96.]
      [Footnote 6: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8.]
      [Footnote 7: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52.]
      [Footnote 8: Austrian Red Book, No. 28.]
      [Footnote 9: See Chapter 14.]
      [Footnote 10: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 301.]