15. Morocco.

     
     
      Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, Morocco. The salient features here were, first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the Great Powers, including, of course, Germany, were parties, and which guaranteed to the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment; secondly, the interest of Great Britain to prevent a strong Power from establishing itself opposite Gibraltar and threatening British control over the Straits; thirdly, the interest of France to annex Morocco and knit it up with the North African Empire; fourthly, the new colonial and trading interests of Germany, which, as she had formally announced, could not leave her indifferent to any new dispositions of influence or territory in undeveloped countries. For many years French ambitions in Morocco had been held in check by the British desire to maintain the status quo. But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 gave France a free hand there in return for the abandonment of French opposition to the British position in Egypt. The Anglo-French treaty of 1904 affirmed, in the clauses made public, the independence and integrity of Morocco; but there were secret clauses looking to its partition. By these the British interest in the Straits was guaranteed by an arrangement which gave to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibraltar and a strip on the north-west coast, while leaving the rest of the country to fall to France. Germany was not consulted while these arrangements were being made, and the secret clauses of the treaty were, of course, not communicated to her. But it seems reasonable to suppose that they became known to, or at least were suspected by, the German Government shortly after they were adopted.[1] And probably it was this that led to the dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier,[2] when he announced that the independence of Morocco was under German protection. The result was the Conference of Algeciras, at which the independence and integrity of Morocco was once more affirmed (the clauses looking to its partition being still kept secret by the three Powers privy to them), and equal commercial facilities were guaranteed to all the Powers. Germany thereby obtained what she most wanted, what she had a right to by the treaty of 1880, and what otherwise might have been threatened by French occupation—the maintenance of the open door. But the French enterprise was not abandoned. Disputes with the natives such as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases, led to fresh military intervention. At the same time, it was difficult to secure the practical application of the principle of equal commercial opportunity. An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby both Powers were to share equally in contracts for public works, was found in practice not to work. The Germans pressed for its application to the new railways projected in Morocco. The French delayed, temporized, and postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position in Morocco. The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez. Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the capital (a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the country. The patience of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir. There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby Germany recognized a French protectorate in Morocco in return for concessions of territory in the French Congo. These are the bare facts of the Moroccan episode. Much, of course, is still unrevealed, particularly as to the motives and intentions of the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for instance, intend to seize a share of Morocco when she sent the Panther to Agadir? And was that the reason of the vigour of the British intervention? Possibly, but by no means certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Germany had that intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between France and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption of Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy, but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in all the parties concerned.
      The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length, with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book “Morocco in Diplomacy.” The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various Powers. But I do not believe that any instructed and impartial student will accept what appears to be the current English view, that the action of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without excuse, and that the other Powers were acting throughout justly, honestly, and straightforwardly.
      The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a painful impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war. Thus Baron Beyens writes:—
        The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard another
  war as a necessary evil.[4]
      And again:—
        The pacific settlement of the conflict of 1911 gave a violent impulse to
  the war party in Germany, to the propaganda of the League of Defence and
  the Navy League, and a greater force to their demands. To their dreams
  of hegemony and domination the desire for revenge against France now
  mingled its bitterness. A diplomatic success secured in an underground
  struggle signified nothing. War, war in the open, that alone, in the eyes
  of this rancorous tribe, could settle definitely the Moroccan question by
  incorporating Morocco and all French Africa in the colonial empire they
  hoped to create on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the heart of
  the Black Continent.[5]
      This we may take to be a correct description of the attitude of the Pangermans. But there is no evidence that it was that of the nation. We have seen also that Baron Beyens' impression of the attitude of the German people, even after the Moroccan affair, was of a general desire for peace.[6] The crisis had been severe, but it had been tided over, and the Governments seem to have made renewed efforts to come into friendly relations. In this connection the following dispatch of Baron Beyens (June 1912) is worth quoting:—
        After the death of Edward VII, the Kaiser, as well as the Crown Prince,
  when they returned from England, where they had been courteously
  received, were persuaded that the coldness in the relations of the
  preceding years was going to yield to a cordial intimacy between the
  two Courts and that the causes of the misunderstanding between the two
  peoples would vanish with the past. His disillusionment, therefore, was
  cruel when he saw the Cabinet of London range itself last year on the
  side of France. But the Kaiser is obstinate, and has not abandoned the
  hope of reconquering the confidence of the English.[7]
      This dispatch is so far borne out by the facts that in the year succeeding the Moroccan crisis a serious attempt was made to improve Anglo-German relations, and there is no reason to doubt that on both sides there was a genuine desire for an understanding. How that understanding failed has already been indicated.[8] But even that failure did not ruin the relations between the two Powers. In the Balkan crisis, as we have seen and as is admitted on both sides, England and Germany worked together for peace. And the fact that a European conflagration was then avoided, in spite of the tension between Russia and Austria, is a strong proof that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey were sincerely and effectively seconded by Germany.[9]
      [Footnote 1: See “Morocco in Diplomacy,” Chap. XVI. A dispatch written by M. Leghait, the Belgian minister in Paris, on May 7, 1905, shows that rumour was busy on the subject. The secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish treaty were known to him, and these provided for an eventual partition of Morocco between France and Spain. He doubted whether there were secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty—“but it is supposed that there is a certain tacit understanding by which England would leave France sufficient liberty of action in Morocco under the reserve of the secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish arrangement, clauses if not imposed yet at least strongly supported by the London Cabinet.”
      We know, of course, now, that the arrangement for the partition was actually embodied in secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty.]
      [Footnote 2: According to M. Yves Guyot, when the Kaiser was actually on his way to Tangier, he telegraphed from Lisbon to Prince Buelow abandoning the project. Prince Buelow telegraphed back insisting, and the Kaiser yielded.]
      [Footnote 3: See Bourdon, “L'Enigme Allemande,” Chap. II. This account, by a Frenchman, will not be suspected of anti-French or pro-German bias, and it is based on French official records.]
      [Footnote 4: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 216.]
      [Footnote 5: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 235.]
      [Footnote 6: See above, p. 63.]
      [Footnote 7: This view is reaffirmed by Baron Beyens in “L'Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 29.]
      [Footnote 8: See above, p. 79.]
      [Footnote 9: Above, p. 111.]