Having established this general fact that a state of mutual
suspicion and fear prevailed between Germany and the Powers of the
Triple Entente, let us next consider the positions and purposes of the
various States involved. First, let us take Great Britain, of which we
ought to know most. Great Britain is the head of an Empire, and of one,
in point of territory and population, the greatest the world has ever
seen. This Empire has been acquired by trade and settlement, backed or
preceded by military force. And to acquire and hold it, it has been
necessary to wage war after war, not only overseas but on the continent
of Europe. It is, however, as we have already noticed, a fact, and a
cardinal fact, that since the fifteenth century British ambitions have
not been directed to extending empire over the continent of Europe. On
the contrary, we have resisted by arms every attempt made by other
Powers in that direction. That is what we have meant by maintaining the
“balance of power.” We have acted, no doubt, in our own interest, or in
what we thought to be such; but in doing so we have made ourselves the
champions of those European nations that have been threatened by the
excessive power of their neighbours. British imperialism has thus, for
four centuries, not endangered but guaranteed the independence of the
European States. Further, our Empire is so large that we can hardly
extend it without danger of being unable to administer and protect it.
We claim, therefore, that we have neither the need nor the desire to
wage wars of conquest. But we ought not to be surprised if this
attitude is not accepted without reserve by other nations. For during
the last half-century we have, in fact, waged wars to annex Egypt, the
Soudan, the South African Republics, and Burmah, to say nothing of the
succession of minor wars which have given us Zululand, Rhodesia,
Nigeria, and Uganda. Odd as it does, I believe, genuinely seem to most
Englishmen, we are regarded on the Continent as the most aggressive
Power in the world, although our aggression is not upon Europe. We
cannot expect, therefore, that our professions of peaceableness should
be taken very seriously by outsiders. Nevertheless it is, I believe,
true that, at any rate during the last fifteen-years, those professions
have been genuine. Our statesmen, of both parties, have honestly
desired and intended to keep the peace of the world. And they have been
assisted in this by a genuine and increasing desire for peace in the
nation. The Liberal Government in particular has encouraged projects of
arbitration and of disarmament; and Sir Edward Grey is probably the
most pacific Minister that ever held office in a great nation. But our
past inevitably discredits, in this respect, our future. And when we
profess peace it is not unnatural that other nations should suspect a
snare.
Moreover, this desire for peace on our part is conditional upon the
maintenance of the status quo and of our naval supremacy. Our
vast interests in every part of the world make us a factor everywhere
to be reckoned with. East, west, north, and south, no other Power can
take a step without finding us in the path. Those States, therefore,
which, unlike ourselves, are desirous farther to extend their power and
influence beyond the seas, must always reckon with us, particularly if,
with that end in view, by increasing their naval strength they seem to
threaten our supremacy at sea. This attitude of ours is not to be
blamed, but it must always make difficult the maintenance of friendly
relations with ambitious Powers. In the past our difficulties have been
mainly with Russia and France. In recent years they have been with
Germany. For Germany, since 1898, for the first time in her history,
has been in a position, and has made the choice, to become a
World-Power. For that reason, as well as to protect her commerce, she
has built a navy. And for that reason we, pursuing our traditional
policy of opposing the strongest continental Power, have drawn away
from her and towards Russia and France. We did not, indeed, enter upon
our arrangements with these latter Powers because of aggressive
intentions towards Germany. But the growth of German sea-power drove us
more and more to rely upon the Entente in case it should be necessary
for us to defend ourselves. All this followed inevitably from the logic
of the position, given the European anarchy. I state it for the sake of
exposition, not of criticism, and I do not imagine any reader will
quarrel with my statement.