Chapter 2

Equality and Liberty

Since this book is written by a Christian let us first deal with the well-known cliché according to which, even though we are neither identical nor equal physically or intellectually, we are at least “equal in the eyes of God.” This, however, is by no means the case. None of the Christian faiths teaches that we are all equally loved by God. We have it from Scriptures that Christ loved some of his disciples more than others. Nor does any Christian religion maintain that grace is given in equal amount to all men. Catholic doctrine, which takes a more optimistic view than either Luther or Calvin, merely says that everybody is given sufficient grace to be able to save himself, though not to the same extent. The Reformers who were determinists did not even grant that minimum. It is obvious that the Marquis de Sade and, let us say, St. Jean Vianney or Pastor von Bodelschwingh were not “equals in the eyes of God.” If they had been, Christianity no longer would make any sense, because then the sinner would equal the saint and to be bad would be the same as to be good.

It is, however, interesting to observe what inroads secular “democratic” thinking has made among the theologians. Obviously equality does not figure in Holy Scripture. Freedom is mentioned several times, but not equality. Yet there are far too many minds among religious thinkers who would like to bridge the gap between religion, i.e., their Christian faith and certain current political notions. Hence they talk about adverbial equality—and are not really aware that they are playing a trick. They will start out saying that all men have souls equally, that they are equally called upon to save their souls, that they are equally created in the image of God, and so forth. But two persons who equally have noses or banking accounts, do not have equal noses or equal banking accounts. While our physical and intellectual differences, inferiorities, and superiorities can be fairly obvious, our spiritual status is much more difficult to determine. We do not know who among us is nearer to God, and because we do not know this very important fact, we should treat each other as equals. This, however, is merely procedural. We are in a similar position to the postman who delivers two sealed letters indiscriminately, the one that carries a worthless ad and the other that brings great joy. He does not know what is inside. The comparison is far from perfect, because all human beings have the same Father and we are therefore brothers—even if we are spiritually on different levels and have different functions in human society. (From a social viewpoint one person obviously can be more important than another; however, since everybody is unique, everybody is indispensable. To state the contrary is democratic nihilism.)

This is also the place to say a few words about the other equality mentioned by so many people in a most affirmative way: equality before the law. At times, equality before the law might be an administrative expedient, saving money and the strain of lengthy investigations. In other words, equality before the law is “practical.” The question remains whether it is really desirable, whether it always should be adhered to, and, finally, whether it is just. It is obvious that a child of four having committed manslaughter (it does happen!) should be dealt with differently from a child of twelve, an adolescent of seventeen, or a mature man of thirty. The egalitarian will accept this but will add that all men or women at the age of thirty should be punished the same way. Yet most (not all) courts in the civilized world take “circumstance” into consideration. St. Thomas, for instance, insisted that stealing in a real emergency is no sin—for instance: a desperate beggar having received no alms and thereupon stealing a loaf of bread for his family. The Austrian law practice, under such circumstances, would invoke unwiderstehlicher Zwang (irresistible urge) and the “criminal” would get either a suspended sentence or go free. When the Germans were freezing in the winter of 1945-1946 Cardinal Frings of Cologne told the faithful that, under the circumstances, to steal coal was no sin, no crime in the eyes of God. (Hence the phrase: Kohle fringsen, to fringsize coal). In certain situations the difference between the sexes will put obstacles on the path of equality before the law. Women, for instance, can decide to conceive and thereby get pregnancy leave with pay, while a man cannot do this. When the topless bikini became a fad in 1964 a German paper humorously protested against police interference because it was a violation of the highly democratic and egalitarian Staatsgrundgesetz (“Basic Law” of the Federal Republic) which forbids all discrimination between the sexes; Why should women be compelled to cover the upper part of their bodies while men are not? Has not God discriminated physically between the sexes? Equality before the law might be highly unjust: witness the outcry, Summum ius, summa iniuria. Indeed, justice is better served by Ulpian’s principle which we have already quoted, Suum cuique, to everybody his due.

A third kind of equality is invoked by a great many: equality of opportunity. In the narrow sense of the term it can never be achieved and should not even be attempted. It would be much wiser to demand the abolition of unjust discrimination, arbitrary discrimination without a solid “factual” foundation. In employing labor we must discriminate between the skilled and the inexperienced, the industrious and the lazy, the dull and the smart, etc. It is interesting to see, however, that there is a trend in many trade unions to protest against such just discrimination and insist on “indiscriminate” wage rates and employment security. (On the other hand, trade unions have an ugly record of racial discrimination which is patently unjust—especially so in the Union of South Africa where the “common man” tends to be a racist while capital and big business are “color-blind”!1

“Just discrimination,” in other words, “preference based on merit” is conspicuously absent in a process which, in our society, has a deep and wide influence as a sanctified example—political elections. Whether it is a genuinely democratic election in the West or a plebiscitarian comedy in the East, the one-man-one-vote principle is now taken for granted. The knowledge, the experience, the merits, the standing in the community, the sex, the wealth, the taxes, the military record of the voter do not count, only the vegetable principle of age—he must be 18, 21, 24 years old and still “on the hoof.” The 21-year-old semiliterate prostitute and the 65-year-old professor of political science who has lost an arm in the war, has a large family, carries a considerable tax burden, and has a real understanding of the political problems on which he is expected to cast his ballot—they are politically equal as citizens. Compared with a 20-year-old student of political science our friendly little prostitute actually rates higher as a voter. One should therefore not be surprised if in the “emerging nations”—and even in others—literacy is not required for voting. It is this egalitarianism of the voters which has psychologically fathered (as we shall see later) other egalitarian notions and which has been so severely criticized by Pope Pius XII.2 And not only by him.3

Let us return to “Equality of opportunity.” In a concrete sense, not even a totalitarian tyranny could bring this about, because no country could decree that a child upon entering this world should have “equal parents.” They might be equal to all other parents in the nation as far as wealth is concerned, but will they have equal pedagogical qualifications? Will they provide equal heredity? Will they give their child the same nutrition as other parents? The cry for an identical and equal education has been raised again and again in democracies, totalitarian or otherwise, and the existence of various types of schools has been deemed “undemocratic.” Just because parents are so different (every marriage offers another “constellation”) egalitarians have advocated not only intensive schooling, but boarding schools for all. Children should be taken out of their homes and collectively educated twenty-four hours a day. This, at present, is the tendency in the Soviet Union where (if everything really goes according to plan) more than 90 percent of all children after the age of six will be in boarding schools after 1980. (How this will affect the birthrate is quite another matter).4 Yet even all these measures will never result in complete equality of opportunity unless one also totally disregards idoneity (capacity, skills, etc.). If this should happen, a general decline of all levels would set in.

However, as Friedrich August von Hayek has pointed out, a certain equality of treatment is necessary in a free society.5 Only by treating people equally do we find out who is superior to whom. We must give the same test to a group in order to classify its members. We have to see that the horses in a race all start from the same line. By treating people equally (we are back at the adverb) we are not making them equal. Naturally, in a free and open society the timocratic principle will prevail: Those more qualified than others will get ahead faster. “Honor to whom honor is due.” There can be no doubt that from the point of view of the common good, the commonweal, the open society is best, because talents have a better chance to be developed in it than in societies divided by castes or estates.6 It is in the nature of class barriers that they can be transcended. It would, however, be a great mistake to think that the absence of fixed social handicaps increases personal happiness. The gifted bourgeois who failed in pre-Revolutionary French society always had the consolation that an iniquitous system prevented his rise to the top. The man in a free society must either blame himself (which leads to the melancholia of those plagued by inferiority complexes) or will be bound to accuse imaginary conspiracies of ill-wishers and downright enemies.

Psychologically his stand is now a far more difficult one. A society with great mobility naturally will bring a great many fulfillments but, as it is in the nature of things, even more disappointments. In fact, we would not be surprised to find that the number of psychological disturbances, “nervous breakdowns,” and suicides among males increases with social mobility (as well as with something quite different, loss of religious convictions). This, however, does not cancel the intrinsic superiority of an open society over a closed one.

Egalitarianism, as we have already intimated, cannot make much progress without the use of force: Perfect equality, naturally, is only possible in total slavery. Since nature (and naturalness, implying also freedom from artificial constraints) has no bias against even gross inequalities, force must be used to establish equality. Imagine the average class of students in a boarding school, endowed with the normal variety of talents, interests, and inclinations for hard work. The powerful and dictatorial principal of the school insists that all students of the class should score Bs in a given subject. This would mean that those who earned C, D, or E would be made to work harder, some so hard that they would collapse. Then there would be the problem of the A students whom one would have to restrain, giving them intoxicating drinks or locking them up every day with copies of Playboy or The New Masses. The simplest way would probably be to hit them over the head. Force would have to be used, as Procrustes used it. But the use of force limits and in most cases destroys freedom.

A “free” landscape has hills and valleys. To make an “egalitarian” landscape one would have to blow off the tops of the mountains and fill the valleys with rubble. To get an even hedge, one has to clip it regularly. To equalize wealth (which so many “progressive” countries on either side of the Iron Curtain are now doing) one would have to pay “equal wages and salaries,” or tax the surplus away—to the extent that those earning above the average would refuse additional work. Since these are usually gifted people with stamina and ideas, their refusal has a paralyzing effect on the commonweal.

In other words, there is a real antagonism, an incompatibility, a mutual exclusiveness between liberty and enforced equality. This is a curious situation if we remember that in the popular mind these two concepts are closely linked. Is this only due to the fact that the French Revolution chose as its slogan “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”—or is there another reason?

Apart from this formulation there is in fact no basis for this state of affairs except for the psychological nexus we mentioned earlier. If A is superior to B—more powerful, more handsome, more intelligent, more influential, wealthier—then B will feel inferior, ill at ease, and probably even afraid of A. If we subscribe to the famous “Four Freedoms” and accept the formulation of “Freedom from Fear,” then we can see how inequalities actually engender fear—and envy, though envy is rarely mentioned in this connection. Fear and envy, needless to say, are twin brothers, yet we really should speak of triplets, because hate keeps them good company.

This psychological tie notwithstanding, equality on one side and freedom on the other are mutually hostile. Since equality is the dynamic element in democracy, while liberty lies at the base of true liberalism, these two political concepts do not really mix.