On the question that the Committee consist of a Member from each State
it passed in the negative [Ayes — 1; noes — 9.]
On the question that the Committee consist of Seven
it passed in the negative [Ayes — 5; noes — 5.]
On the question that the Committee consist of five
it passed unanimously in the affirmative. [Ayes — 10; noes — 0.]
To-morrow assigned for appointing the Committee.
and then the house adjourned till to-morrow at 11 o’clock.
〈Mr. John Langdon Mr. Nicholas Gilman from N. Hampshire took their seats.〉 3
Resoln: 17. that provision ought to be made for future amendments of the articles of Union. Agreed to nem con.
Resoln. 18. “requiring the Legis: Execut: Judy. of the States to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union”. taken into consideration.
Mr. Williamson suggests that a reciprocal oath should be required from the National officers, to support the Governments of the States.
Mr. Gerry moved to insert as an amendmt. that the oath of the Officers of the National Government also should extend to the support of the Natl. Govt. which was agreed to nem. con.
Mr. Wilson said he was never fond of oaths, considering them as a left handed security only. A good Govt. did not need them. and a bad one could not or ought not to be supported. He was afraid they might too much trammel the the Members of the Existing Govt in case future alterations should be necessary; and prove an obstacle to Resol: 17. just agd. to. 4
Mr. Ghorum did not know that oaths would be of much use; but could see no inconsistency between them and the 17. Resol: or any regular amendt. of the Constitution. The oath could only require fidelity to the existing Constitution. A constitutional alteration of the Constitution, could never be regarded as a breach of the Constitution, or of any oath to support it.
Mr Gerry thought with Mr. Ghorum there could be no shadow of inconsistency in the case. Nor could he see any other harm that could result from the Resolution. On the other side he thought one good effect would be produced by it. Hitherto the officers of 〈the two〉 Governments had considered them as distinct from, not as parts of the-General System, had in all cases of interference given a preference to the State Govts. The proposed oaths will cure that error. —
The Resoln. (18). was agreed to nem. con. —
Resol: 19. referring the new Constitution to Assemblies to be chosen by the people for the express purpose of ratifying it” was next taken into consideration.
Mr. Elseworth moved that it be referred to the Legislatures of the States for ratification. Mr. Patterson 2ded. the motion.
Col. Mason considered a reference of the plan to the authority of the people as one of the most important and essential of the Resolutions. The Legislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators. And he knew of no power in any of the Constitutions, he knew there was no power in some of them, that could be competent to this object. Whither then must we resort? To the people with whom all power remains that has not been given up in the Constitutions derived from them. It was of great moment he observed that this doctrine should be cherished as the basis of free Government. Another strong reason was that admitting the Legislatures to have a competent authority, it would be wrong to refer the plan to them, because succeeding Legislatures having equal authority could undo the acts of their predecessors; and the National Govt. would stand in each State on the weak and tottering foundation of an Act of Assembly. There was a remaining consideration of some weight. In some of the States the Govts. were 〈not〉 derived from the clear undisputed authority of the people. This was the case in Virginia. Some of the best wisest citizens considered the Constitution as established by an assumed authority. A National Constitution derived from such a source would be exposed to the severest criticisms.
Mr Randolph. One idea has pervaded all 〈our〉 proceedings, to wit, that opposition as well from the States as from individuals, will be made to the System to be proposed. Will it not then be highly imprudent, to furnish any unnecessary pretext by the mode of ratifying it. Added to other objections agst. a ratification by Legislative authority only, it may be remarked that there have been instances in which the authority of the Common law has been set up in particular States agst. that of the Confederation which has had no higher sanction than Legislative ratification. — Whose opposition will be most likely to be excited agst. the System? That of the local demogagues who will be degraded by it from the importance they now hold. These will spare no efforts to impede that progress in the popular mind which will be necessary to the adoption of the plan, and which every member will find to have taken place in his own, if he will compare his present opinions with those brought with him into the Convention. It is of great importance therefore that the consideration of this subject should be transferred from the Legislatures where this class of men, have their full influence to a field in which their efforts can be less mischievous. It is moreover worthy of consideration that some of the States are averse to any change in their Constitution, and will not take the requisite steps, unless expressly called upon to refer the question to the people.
Mr. Gerry. The arguments of Col. Mason Mr. Randolph prove too much, they prove an unconstitutionality in the present federal 〈system〉 even in some of the State Govts. Inferences drawn from such a source must be inadmissable. Both the State Govts. the federal Govt. have been too long acquiesced in, to be now shaken. He considered the Confederation to be paramount to any State Constitution. The last article of it authorizing alterations must consequently be so as well as the others, and everything done in pursuance of the article must have the same high authority with the article. — Great confusion he was confident would result from a recurrence to the people. They would never agree on any thing. He could not see any ground to suppose that the people will do what their rulers will not. The rulers will either conform to, or influence the sense of the people.
Mr. Ghorum was agst. referring the plan to the Legislatures. 1. Men chosen by the people for the particular purpose, will discuss the subject more candidly than members of the Legislature who are to lose the power which is to be given up to the Genl. Govt. 2. Some of the Legislatures are composed of several branches. It will consequently be more difficult in these cases to get the plan through the Legislatures, than thro’ a Convention. 3. in the States many of the ablest men are excluded from the Legislatures, but may be elected into a Convention. Among these may be ranked many of the Clergy who are generally friends to good Government. Their services were found to be valuable in the formation establishment of the Constitution of Massachts. 4. the Legislatures will be interrupted with a variety of little business. by artfully pressing which, designing men will find means to delay from year to year, if not to frustrate altogether the national system. 5 — If the last art: of the Confederation is to be pursued the unanimous concurrence of the States will be necessary. But will any one say. that all the States are to suffer themselves to be ruined, if Rho. Island should persist in her opposition to general measures. Some other States might also tread in her steps. The present advantage which N. York seems to be so much attached to, of taxing her neighbours 〈by the regulation of her trade〉, makes it very probable, that she will be of the number. It would therefore deserve serious consideration whether provision ought not to be made for giving effect to the System without waiting for the unanimous concurrence of the States.
Mr. Elseworth. If there be any Legislatures who should find themselves incompetent to the ratification, he should be content to let them advise with their constituents and pursue such a mode as wd be competent. He thought more was to be expected from the Legislatures than from the people. The prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern States is to get rid of the public debt; and the idea of strengthening the Natl. Govt. carries with it that of strengthening the public debt. It was said by Col. Mason 1. that the Legislatures have no authority in this case. 2. that their successors having equal authority could rescind their acts. As to the 2d. point he could not admit it to be well founded. An Act to which the States by their Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from which no one of the parties can recede of itself. As to the 1st. point, he observed that a new sett of ideas seemed to have crept in since the articles of Confederation were established. Conventions of the people, or with power derived expressly from the people, were not then thought of. The Legislatures were considered as competent. Their ratification has been acquiesced in without complaint. To whom have Congs. applied on subsequent occasions for further powers? To the Legislatures; not to the people. The fact is that we exist at present, and we need not enquire how, as a federal Society, united by a charter one article of which is that alterations therein may be made by the Legislative authority of the States. It has been said that if the confederation is to be observed, the States must unanimously concur in the proposed innovations. He would answer that if such were the urgency necessity of our situation as to warrant a new compact among a part of the States, founded on the consent of the people; the same pleas would be equally valid in favor of a partial compact, founded on the consent of the Legislatures.
Mr. Williamson thought the Resoln. (19) so expressed as that it might be submitted either to the Legislatures or to Conventions recommended by the Legislatures. He observed that some Legislatures were evidently unauthorized to ratify the system. He thought too that Conventions were to be preferred as more likely to be composed of the ablest men in the States.
Mr. Govr. Morris considered the inference of Mr. Elseworth from the plea of necessity as applied to the establishment of a new System on ye. consent of the people of a part of the States, in favor of a like establishnt. on the consent of a part of the Legislatures as a non sequitur. If the Confederation is to be pursued no alteration can be made without the unanimous consent of the Legislatures: Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal compact, would clearly not be valid. The Judges would consider them as null void. Whereas in case of an appeal to the people of the U. S., the supreme authority, the federal compact may be altered by a majority of them; in like manner as the Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of the people of the State. The amendmt. moved by Mr. Elseworth erroneously supposes that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.
Mr. King thought with Mr. Elseworth that the Legislatures had a competent authority, the acquiescence of the people of America in the Confederation, being equivalent to a formal ratification by the people. He thought with Mr. E— also that the plea of necessity was as valid in the one case as in the other. At the same time he preferred a reference to the authority of the people expressly delegated to Conventions, as the most certain means of obviating all disputes doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution; as well as the most likely means of drawing forth the best men in the States to decide on it. He remarked that among other objections made in the State of N. York to granting powers to Congs. one had been that such powers as would operate within the State, could not be reconciled to the Constitution; and therefore were not grantible by the Legislative authority. He considered it as of some consequence also to get rid of the scruples which some members of the States Legislatures might derive from their oaths to support maintain the existing Constitutions.
Mr. 〈Madison〉 thought it clear that the Legislatures were incompetent to the proposed changes. These changes would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions, and it would be a novel dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence. There might indeed be some Constitutions within the Union, which had given, a power to the Legislature to concur in alterations of the federal Compact. But there were certainly some which had not; and in the case of these, a ratification must of necessity be obtained from the people. He considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation, there were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null void. 2. The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations in the case of treaties is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties, frees the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a union of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been understood to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing the two modes in point of expediency he thought all the considerations which recommended this Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the reform were in favor of State Conventions in preference to the Legislatures for examining and adopting it.
On question on Mr Elseworth’s motion to refer the plan to the Legislatures of the States
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. Pa. no- Del. ay- Md. ay. Va. no. N- C- no. S. C- no. Geo. no. [Ayes — 3; noes — 7.]
Mr. Govr. Morris moved that the reference of the plan be made to one general Convention, chosen authorized by the people to consider, amend, establish the same. — Not seconded.
On question for agreeing to Resolution 19, touching the mode of Ratification 〈as reported from the Committee of the Whole; vi, to refer the Constn. after the approbation of Congs. to assemblies chosen by the people. 5
N. H. ay. Mas- ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 9; noes — 1.]
Mr. Govr. Morris Mr. King moved that the representation in the second branch consist of members from each State, who shall vote per capita. 6
Mr Elseworth said he had alway approved of voting in that mode.
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to fill the blank with three. He wished the Senate to be a pretty numerous body. If two members only should be allowed to each State, and a majority be made a quorum the power would be lodged in 14 members, which was too small a number for such a trust.
Mr Ghorum preferred two to three members for the blank. A small number was most convenient for deciding on peace war c. which he expected would be vested in the 2d. branch. The number of States will also increase. Kentucky, Vermont, the province of Mayne Franklin will probably soon be added to the present number. He presumed also that some of the largest States would be divided. The strength of the general Govt. will lie not in the largeness, but in the smallness of the States.
Col. Mason thought 3 from each State including new States would make the 2d. branch too numerous. Besides other objections, the additional expence ought always to form one, where it was not absolutely necessary.
Mr. Williamson. If the number be too great, the distant States will not be on an equal footing with the nearer States. The later can more easily send support their ablest Citizens. He approved of the voting per capita.
On the question for filling the blank with “ three ”
N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes — 1; noes — 8.] 7
On question for filling it with “two.” Agreed to nem- con,
Mr. L Martin was opposed to voting per Capita, as departing from the idea of the States being represented in the 2d. branch.
Mr. Carroll, was not struck with any particular objection agst. the mode; but he did not wish so hastily to make so material an innovation.
On the question on the whole motion viz. the 2d. b. to consist of 2 members from each State and to vote per capita.”
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 9; noes — 1.]
Mr. Houston Mr. Spaight moved “that the appointment of the Executive by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States, be reconsidered.” Mr. Houston urged the extreme inconveniency the considerable expense, of drawing together men from all the States for the single purpose of electing the Chief Magistrate.
On the question which was put without any debate
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del — ay. Md. no. Virga. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 7; noes — 3.]
Ordered that to morrow be assigned for the reconsideration. 〈Cont Pena. no — all the rest ay —〉 8
Mr. Gerry moved that the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of a Natl. Govt. (except the part relating to the Executive), be referred to a Committee to prepare report a Constitution conformable thereto.
Genl. Pinkney reminded the Convention that if the Committee should fail to insert some security to the Southern States agst. an emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, 9 he shd. be bound by duty to his State to vote agst. their Report. — The appt. of a Come. as moved by Mr. Gerry. Agd. to nem. con. 10
Shall the Come. consist of 10 members” 〈one from each State prest.〉. 11 — All the States were no. except Delaware. ay.
Shall it consist of 7. members.
N. H. ay Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [Ayes — 5; noes — 5.] The question being lost 〈by an equal division of Votes.〉
It was agreed nem — con — that the Commttee consist of 5 members, 〈to be appointed tomorrow.〉 12
Adjourned
1. The Constitutionality of
the Measure.
Reasons.
1. The people the Source of Power. Union —
2. The Legr. of To-Morrow may repeal the Act of the Legr. of To-Day. So as to Convention —
3. Some of the Constns. not well or authoritatively founded — Acquiesence.
Expediency.
2 Branches in some of the States —
Judges, etc excluded —
The very Men that will oppose — Rh. Island —
The Debt will go with the Govt. — this a prevailing Idea —
The Legr. has no Right to alter the Constn. or the Confedn. —
Not acting under the Confedn. Nothing but a Compact resting upon the 13 States.
Congress over again.
A Violation of the Compact by one of the Parties, leaves the rest at Large, and exonerated from the Agreemt.
It was moved and seconded to strike the following words out of the resolution respecting the supreme Executive namely “by electors appointed for that purpose by the Legislatures of the States” and to insert the words
“by the national Legislature”
which passed in the affirmative. [Ayes — 7; noes — 4.]
It was moved and seconded to strike out the word “six” and to insert the word “fifteen.”
It was moved and seconded to postpone the consideration of the resolution respecting the Executive
which passed in the negative [Ayes — 4; noes — 6; divided — 1.]
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following resolution namely.
Resolved that the supreme Executive shall be chosen every years
by Electors to be taken by lot from the national Legislature; the Electors to proceed immediately to the choice of the Executive, and not to separate until it be made The question of Order being taken on the last Motion — it was determined that the motion is in order. [Ayes — 7; noes — 4.] 1
On the question to postpone the consideration of the resolution, it passed unanimously in the affirmative
The House then produced to ballot for the Committee of detail when the honorable Mr Rutledge, Mr Randolph, Mr Gorham, Mr Elsworth, and Mr Wilson were chosen —
It was moved and seconded to discharge the Committee of the whole House from acting on the propositions submitted to the Convention by the honorable Mr C. Pinckney — and that the said propositions be referred to the Committee to whom the Proceedings of the Convention are referred
which passed unanim: in the affirmative
It was moved and seconded to take the like order on the propositions submitted to the Convention by the honorable Mr Paterson
which passed unan: in the affirmative
and the the House adjourned till to-morrow at 11 o’Clock A. M.
New Hampshire | Massachusetts | Rhode Island | Connecticut | New York | New Jersey | Pennsylvania | Delaware | Maryland | Virginia | North Carolina | South Carolina | Georgia | Questions | Ayes | Noes | Divided | |
[215] | aye | aye | no | aye | no | aye | no | no | aye | aye | aye | To strike out the words “by Electors ca and to insert the words “by the national Legislature” | 7 | 4 | |||
[216] | no | no | aye | no | aye | dd | aye | aye | no | no | no | To postpone the resolution respecting the Executive | 4 | 6 | 1 | ||
[217] | aye | aye | no | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | no | no | no | whether Mr Wilson’s motion respecting the election of the Executive be in order. | 7 | 4 |
That ye Legislatures of ye several States shall ballot in ye in ye following proportions for ye supreme Executive, a Majority of votes shall determine the Election, but in case there shall not be a Majority, the four persons having ye highest votes shall be candidates for ye office, out of these the first Branch shall elect two, the second Branch shall determine which of ye two so elected shall be chief Magistrate
N H | 1 |
Mass | 3 |
R I | 1 |
Con | 2 |
N Y | 2 |
N J | 2 |
P — | 3 |
D | 1 |
M | 2 |
V | 3 |
N C | 2 |
S C | 2 |
G — | 1 |
25 |
The Executive shall be chosen every years by Electors to be taken by lot from the national legislature — the electors to proceed immediately to the choice of the Executive and not to separate until it be made —
Suppose the whole to consist of 90 —
65 |
25 |
90 |
then put in 90 balls — of which as many as the proposed number of electors shall be gilded — those who draw these balls to be Electors
The appointment of the Executive by Electors reconsidered.
Mr. Houston moved that he be appointed by the “Natl. Legislature. 〈instead of “Electors appointed by the State Legislatures” according to the last decision of the mode〉 4 He dwelt chiefly on the improbability, that capable men would undertake the service of Electors from the more distant States.
Mr. Spaight seconded the motion.
Mr. Gerry opposed it. He thought there was no ground to apprehend the danger urged by Mr. Houston. The election of the Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance and will create great earnestness. The best men, the Governours of the States will not hold it derogatory from their character to be the electors. If the motion should be agreed to, it will be necessary to make the Executive ineligible a 2d. time, in order to render him independent of the Legislature; which was an idea extremely repugnant to his way of thinking.
Mr. Strong supposed that there would be no necessity, if the Executive should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him ineligible a 2d. time; as new elections of the Legislature will have intervened; and he will not depend for his 2d. appointment on the same sett of men as his first was recd. from. It had been suggested that gratitude for his past appointment wd. produce the same effect as dependence for his future appointment. He thought very differently. Besides this objection would lie agst. the Electors who would be objects of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of great importance not to make the Govt. too complex which would be the case if a new sett of men like the Electors should be introduced into it. He thought also that the first characters in the States would not feel sufficient motives to undertake the office of Electors.
Mr. Williamson was for going back to the original ground; to elect the Executive for 7 years and render him ineligible a 2d. time. The proposed Electors would certainly not be men of the 1st. nor even of the 2d. grade in the States. These would all prefer a seat either in the Senate or the other branch of the Legislature. He did not like the Unity in the Executive. He had wished the Executive power to be lodged in three men taken from three districts into which the States should be divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of interests between the N. S. States, particularly in the carrying trade, the power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to be taken from part of the Union, to the part from which he is not taken. The case is different here from what it is in England; where there is a sameness of interest throughout the Kingdom. Another objection agst. a single Magistrate is that he will be an elective King, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for the succession of his children. It was pretty certain he thought that we should at some time or other have a King; but he wished no precaution to be omitted that might postpone the event as long as possible. — Ineligibility a 2d. time appeared to him to be the best precaution. With this precaution he had no objection to a longer term than 7 years. He would go as far as 10 or 12 years.
Mr. Gerry moved that the Legislatures of the States should vote by ballot for the Executive in the same proportions as it had been proposed they should chuse electors; and that in case a majority of the votes should 〈not〉 center on the same person, the 1st. branch of the Natl. Legislature should chuse two out of the 4 candidates having most votes, and out of these two, the 2d. branch should chuse the Executive. 5
Mr. King seconded the motion — and on the Question to postpone in order to take it into consideration, The noes were so predominant that the States were not counted.
Question on Mr. Houston’s motion that the Executive be appd. by Nal. Legislature
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 7; noes — 4.]
Mr. L. Martin Mr. Gerry moved to reinstate the ineligibility of the Executive a 2d. time. 6
Mr. Elseworth. With many this appears a natural consequence of his being elected by the Legislature. It was not the case with him. The Executive he thought should be reelected if his conduct proved him worthy of it. And he will be more likely to render him〈self〉 worthy of it if he be rewardable with it. The most eminent characters also will be more willing to accept the trust under this condition, than if they foresee a necessary degradation at a fixt period.
Mr. Gerry. That the Executive shd. be independent of the Legislature is a clear point. The longer the duration of his appointment the more will his dependence be diminished — It will be better then for him to continue 10, 15, or even 20 — years and be ineligible afterwards.
Mr. King was for making him re-eligible. This is too great an advantage to be given up for the small effect it will have on his dependence, if impeachments are to lie. He considered these as rendering the tenure during pleasure.
Mr. L. Martin, suspending his motion as to the ineligibility, moved “that the appointmt. of the Executive shall continue for Eleven years.
Mr Gerry suggested fifteen years.
Mr. King twenty years. This is the medium life of princes. *
Mr. Davie Eight years
Mr. Wilson. The difficulties perplexities into which the House is thrown proceed from the election by the Legislature which he was sorry had been reinstated. The inconveniency of this mode was such that he would agree to almost any length of time in order to get rid of the dependence which must result from it. He was persuaded that the longest term would not be equivalent to a proper mode of election, unless indeed it should be during good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that at a certain advance of life, a continuance in office would cease to be agreeable to to the officer, as well as desireable to the public. Experience had shewn in a variety of instances that both a capacity inclination for public service existed — in very advanced stages. He mentioned the instance of a Doge of Venice who was elected after he was 80 years of age. The popes have generally been elected at very advanced periods, and yet in no case had a more steady or a better concerted policy been pursued than in the Court of Rome. If the Executive should come into office at 35. years of age, which he presumes may happen his continuance should be fixt at 15 years. at the age of 50. in the very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he must be cast aside like a useless hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British Jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of 50. been fixt there as the ultimate limit of capacity or readiness to serve the public. The great luminary (Ld. Mansfield) held his seat for thirty years after his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had been done he could not but hope that a better mode of election would yet be adopted; and one that would be more agreeable to the general sense of the House. That time might be given for further deliberation he wd. move that the present question be postponed till to-morrow.
Mr Broom seconded the motion to postpone.
Mr. Gerry. We seem to be entirely at a loss on this head. He would suggest whether it would not be advisable to refer the clause relating to the Executive to the Committee of detail to be appointed. Perhaps they will be able to hit on something that may unite the various opinions which have been thrown out.
Mr. Wilson. As the great difficulty seems to spring from the mode of election, he wd. suggest a mode which had not been mentioned. It was that the Executive be elected for 6 years by a small number, not more than 15 of the Natl Legislature, to be drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and who should retire immediately and make the election 〈without separating〉. 7 By this mode intrigue would be avoided in the first instance, and the dependence would be diminished. This was not he said a digested idea and might be liable to strong objections.
Mr. Govr. Morris. Of all possible modes of appointment that by the Legislature is the worst. If the Legislature is to appoint, and to impeach or to influence the impeachment, the Executive will be the mere creature of it. He had been opposed to the impeachment, but was now convinced that impeachments must be provided for, if the appt. was to be of any duration. No man wd. say, that an Executive known to be in the pay of an Enemy, should not be removable in some way or other. He had been charged heretofore (by Col. Mason) with inconsistency in pleading for confidence in the Legislature on some occasions, urging a distrust on others. The charge was not well founded. The Legislature is worthy of unbounded confidence in some respects, and liable to equal distrust in others. When their interest coincides precisely with that of their Constituents, as happens in many of their Acts, no abuse of trust is to be apprehended. When a strong personal interest happens to be opposed to the general interest, the Legislature can not be too much distrusted. In all public bodies there are two parties. The Executive will necessarily be more connected with one than with the other. There will be a personal interest therefore in one of the parties to oppose as well as in the other to support him. Much had been said of the intrigues that will be practiced by the Executive to get into office. Nothing had been said on the other side of the intrigues to get him out of office. Some leader of party will always covet his seat, will perplex his administration, will cabal with the Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting him. This was the way in which the King of England was got out, he meant the real King, the Minister. This was the way in which Pitt (Ld. Chatham) forced himself into place. Fox was for pushing the matter still farther. If he had carried his India bill, which he was very near doing, he would have made the Minister, the King in form almost as well as in substance. Our President will be the British Minister, yet we are about to make him appointable by the Legislature. Something had been said of the danger of Monarchy — If a good government should not now be formed, if a good organization of the Execuve should not be provided, he doubted whether we should not have something worse than a limited Monarchy. In order to get rid of the dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, the expedient of making him ineligible a 2d. time had been devised. This was as much as to say we shd. give him the benefit of experience, and then deprive ourselves of the use of it. But make him ineligible a 2d. time-and prolong his duration even to 15-years, will he by any wonderful interposition of providence at that period cease to be a man? No he will be unwilling to quit his exaltation, the road to his object thro’ the Constitution will be shut; he will be in possession of the sword, a civil war will ensue, and the Commander of the victorious army on which ever side, will be the despot of America. This consideration renders him particularly anxious that the Executive should be properly constituted. The vice here would not, as in some other parts of the system be curable- It is 〈the〉 most difficult of all rightly to balance the Executive. Make him too weak: The Legislature will usurp his powers: Make him too strong. He will usurp on the Legislature. He preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a different mode of election. A long period would prevent an adoption of the plan: it ought to do so. He shd. himself be afraid to trust it. He was not prepared to decide on Mr. Wilson’s mode of election just hinted by him. He thought it deserved consideration. It would be better that chance sd. decide than intrigue.
〈On A question to postpone the consideration of the Resolution on the subject of the Executive〉 8
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. divd. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes — 4; noes — 6; divided — 1.]
Mr. Wilson 〈then〉 moved 9 that the Executive be chosen every years by Electors to be taken by lot from the Natl Legislature who shall proceed immediately to the choice of the Executive 〈and not separate until it be made〉” 10
Mr. Carrol 2ds. the motion
Mr Gerry. this is committing too much to chance. If the lot should fall on a sett of unworthy men, an unworthy Executive must be saddled on the Country. He thought it had been demonstrated that no possible mode of electing by the Legislature could be a good one.
Mr. King — The lot might fall on a majority from the same State which wd. ensure the election of a man from that State. We ought to be governed by reason, not by chance. As no body seemed to be satisfied, he wished the matter to be postponed
Mr. Wilson did not move this as the best mode. His opinion remained unshaken that we ought to resort to the people for the election. He seconded the postponement.
Mr. Govr. Morris observed that the chances were almost infinite agst. a majority of electors from the same State.
〈On a question whether the last motion was in order, it was determined in the affirmative; 7. ays. 4 noes.〉 11
On the question of postponemt. it was agreed to nem. con.
Mr Carrol took occasion to observe that he considered the clause declaring that direct taxation on the States should be in proportion to representation, previous to the obtaining an actual census, as very objectionable, and that he reserved to himself the right of opposing it, if the Report of the Committee of detail should leave it in the plan.
Mr. Govr. Morris hoped the Committee would strike out the whole of the clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He had only meant it as a * bridge to assist us over a certain gulph; having passed the gulph the bridge may be removed. He thought the principle laid down with so much strictness, liable to strong objections
On a ballot for a Committee to report a Constitution conformable to the Resolutions passed by the Convention, the members chosen were
Mr. Rutlidge, Mr Randolph, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. Elseworth, Mr. Wilson — 12
〈On motion to discharge the Come. of the whole from the propositions submitted to the Convention by Mr. C. Pinkney as the basis of a constitution, and to refer them to the Committee of detail just appointed. it was agd. to nem. con.
A like motion then made agreed to nem: con: with respect to the propositions of Mr Patterson
Adjourned.〉 11
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following amendment to the resolution respecting the election of the supreme Executive namely
“except when the Magistrate last chosen shall have continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen, and be reeligible in which case the choice shall be by Electors appointed for that purpose by the several Legislatures”
it passed in the negative [Ayes — 4; noes — 7.] 1
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following amendment to the resolution respecting the supreme Executive, namely
“Provided that no person shall be capable of holding the said office for more than six years in any term of twelve”
It was moved and seconded to postpone the consideration of the last amendment
which passed in the negative. [Ayes — 5; noes — 6.] 2
On the question to agree to the amendment
it passed in the negative [Ayes — 5; noes — 6.]
[That the members of the Committee be furnished with copies of the proceedings Ayes — 10; noes — 1. 3
That the members of the House take copies of the resolutions which have been agreed to Ayes — 5; noes — 6. 4 ]
It was moved and seconded to refer the resolution respecting the Executive (except that clause which provides that it consist of a single Person) to the Committee of detail.
Before a determination was taken on the last motion [To adjourn Ayes — 9; noes — 2.] 5 The House adjourned till to-morrow at 11 o’Clock A. M.
New Hampshire | Massachusetts | Rhode Island | Connecticut | New York | New Jersey | Pennsylvania | Delaware | Maryland | Virginia | North Carolina | South Carolina | Georgia | Questions | Ayes | Noes | Divided | |
[218] | aye | no | aye | no | aye | no | aye | no | no | no | no | To agree to Mr Elsworth’s amendment in the election of the Executive. | 4 | 7 | |||
[219] | no | no | aye | aye | aye | no | aye | aye | no | no | no | To postpone Mr Pinckney’s amendment | 5 | 6 | |||
[220] | aye | aye | no | no | no | no | no | no | aye | aye | aye | To agree to Mr Pinckney’s amendment | 5 | 6 | |||
[221] | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | no | aye | That the Members of the Committee be furnished with copies of the proceedings | 10 | 1 | |||
[222] | no | no | aye | aye | no | aye | no | aye | aye | no | no | That the Members of the House take copies of the resolutions which have been agreed to | 5 | 6 | |||
[223] | no | aye | no | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | To adjourn |
Clause relating to the Executive again under consideration
Mr. Elseworth moved “that the Executive be appointed by the Legislature,” except when 〈the magistrate last chosen shall〉 have 〈continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen, be reeligible, in which case the choice shall be〉 by -Electors appointed by the Legislatures of the States 〈for that purpose.”〉 6 By this means a deserving Magistrate may be reelected without making him dependent on the Legislature.
Mr. Gerry repeated his remark that an election at all by the Natl. Legislature was radically and incurably wrong; and moved 7 that the Executive be appointed by the Governours Presidents of the States, with advice of their Councils, and when there are no Councils by Electors chosen by the Legislatures. The executives to vote in the following proportions: 〈viz —〉
Mr. 〈Madison.〉 There are objections agst. every mode that has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made either by some existing authority under the Natil. or State Constitutions — or by some special authority derived from the people — or by the people themselves. — The two Existing authorities under the Natl. Constitution wd be the Legislative Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the question. The former was in his Judgment liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of that mode on the independence of the Executive, 1. the election of the Chief Magistrate would agitate divide the legislature so much that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones by such occasions than by any others. 2. the candidate would intrigue with the Legislature, would derive his appointment from the predominant faction, and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views. 3. The Ministers of foreign powers would have and make use of, the opportunity to to mix their intrigues influence with the Election. Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the head of our Governmt. a man attached to their respective politics interests. No pains, nor perhaps expence, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature an appointmt. favorable to their wishes. Germany Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the former, the election of the Head of the Empire, till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much influenced 8 by foreign interference — In the latter, altho’ the elective Magistrate has very little real power, his election has at all times produced the most eager interference of forign princes, and has in fact at length slid entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in the States are the Legislative, Executive Judiciary. The appointment of the Natl Executive by the first was objectionable in many points 〈of view〉, some of which had been already mentioned. He would mention one which of itself would decide his opinion. The Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of pernicious measures. 9 One object of the Natl. Legislre. was to controul this propensity. One object of the Natl. Executive, so far as it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul the Natl. Legislature, so far as it might be infected with a similar propensity. Refer the appointmt of the Natl. Executive to the State Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be defeated. The Legislatures can will act with some kind of regular plan, and will promote the appointmt. of a man who will not oppose himself to a favorite object. Should a majority of the Legislatures at the time of election have the same object, or different objects of the same kind, the Natl Executive, would be rendered subservient to them. — An appointment by the State Executives, was liable among other objections to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they could would be courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Ministers of foreign powers. The State Judiciarys had not he presumed wd. not be proposed as a proper source of appointment. The Option before us then lay between an appointment by Electors chosen by the people — and an immediate appointment by the people. He thought the former mode free from many of the objections which had been urged agst. it, and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Natl. Legislature. As the electors would be chosen for the occasion, would meet at once, proceed immediately to an appointment, there would be very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption,. As a further precaution, it might be required that they should meet at some place, distinct from the seat of Govt. and even that no person within a certain distance of the place at the time shd. be eligible. This mode however had been rejected so recently by so great a majority that it probably would not be proposed anew. The remaining mode was an election by the people or rather by the 〈qualified part of them.〉 10 at large. With all its imperfections he liked this best. He would not repeat either the general argumts. for or the objections agst this mode. He would only take notice of two difficulties which he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and the disadvantage this wd. throw on the smaller States. Great as this objection might be he did not think it equal to such as lay agst. every other mode which had been proposed. He thought too that some expedient might be hit upon that would obviate it. The second difficulty arose from the disproportion of 〈qualified voters〉 10 in the N. S. States, and the disadvantages which this mode would throw on the latter. The answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion would be continually decreasing under the influence of the Republican laws introduced in the S. States, and the more rapid increase of their population. 2. That local local considerations must give way to the general interest. As an individual from the S. States he was willing to make the sacrifice.
Mr. Elseworth. The objection drawn from the different sizes of the States, is unanswerable. The Citizens of the largest States would invariably prefer the Candidate within the State; and the largest States wd. invariably have the man.
Question on Mr. Elseworth’s motion as above.
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no-Md. ay. Va no. N- C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes — 4; noes — 7.]
Mr. Pinkney moved that the election by the Legislature be qualified with a proviso that no person be eligible for more than 6 years in any twelve years. He thought this would have all the advantage at the same time avoid in some degree the inconveniency, of an absolute ineligibility a 2d. time.
Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanction of experience in the instance of Congs. and some of the Executives of the States. It rendered the Executive as effectually independent, as an ineligibility after his first election, and opened the way at the same time for the advantage of his future services. He preferred on the whole the election by the Natl. Legislature: Tho’ Candor obliged him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as had been suggested. This was the most serious objection with him that had been urged.
Mr Butler. The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home, influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either if the Election be made by the Natl Legislature. On the other hand, the Govt. should not be made so complex unwieldy as to disgust the States. This would be the case, if the election shd. be referred to the people. He liked best an election by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States. He was agst. a re-eligibility at all events. He was also agst. a ratio of votes in the States. An equality should prevail in this case. The reasons for departing from it do not hold in the case of the Executive as in that of the Legislature.
Mr. Gerry approved of Mr Pinkney’s motion as lessening the evil.
Mr Govr. Morris was agst. a rotation in every case. It formed a political School, in wch. we were always governed by the scholars, and not by the Masters — The evils to be guarded agst in this case are. 1. the undue influence of the Legislature. 2. instability of Councils. 3. misconduct in office. To guard agst. the first, we run into the second evil. we adopt a rotation which produces instability of Councils. To avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of men is ever followed by a change of measures We see this fully exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the State of Pena. The selfsufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate Solomon. 2. the Rotation in office will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the Legislature. The man in office will look forward to the period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of the period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life will be no obstacle. Such is the nature of man, formed by his benevolent author no doubt for wise ends, that altho’ he knows his existence to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live forever. But taking another supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look forward to his re-election to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep in view the opportunity of his going into the Legislature itself. He will have little objection then to an extension of power on a theatre where he expects to act a distinguished part; and will be very unwilling to take any step that may endanger his popularity with the Legislature, on his influence over which the figure he is to make will depend. 3. To avoid the third evil, impeachments will be essential, and hence an additional reason agst an election by the Legislature. He considered an election by the people as the best, by the Legislature as the worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could not but favor the idea of Mr. Wilson, of introducing a mixture of lot. It will diminish, if not destroy both cabal dependence.
Mr. Williamson was sensible that strong objections lay agst an election of the Executive by the Legislature, and that it opened a door for foreign influence. The principal objection agst. an election by the people seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that each man should vote for 3 candidates. One of these he observed would be probably of his own State, the other 2. of some other States; and as probably of a small as a large one.
Mr. Govr. Morris liked the idea, suggesting as an amendment that each man should vote for two persons one of whom at least should not be of his own State.
Mr 〈Madison〉 also thought something valuable might be made of the suggestion with the proposed amendment of it. The second best man 11 in this case would probably be the first, in fact. The only objection which occurred was that each Citizen after havg. given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen wd. throw away his second on some obscure Citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that the Citizens of many States would be so sanguine of having their favorite elected, as not to give their second vote with sincerity to the next object of their choice. It 12 might moreover be provided in favor of the smaller States that the Executive should not be eligible more than times in years from the same State.
Mr. Gerry — A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men dispersed through the Union acting in Concert to delude them into any appointment. He observed that such a Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They were respectable, United, and influencial. They will in fact elect the chief Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to the people. — His respect for the characters composing this Society could not blind him to the danger impropriety of throwing such a power into their hands.
Mr. Dickenson. As far as he could judge from the discussion which had taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections lay agst an election of the Executive by the Natl. Legislature; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of the States — He had long leaned towards an election by the people which he regarded as the best and purest source. Objections he was aware lay agst this mode, but not so great he thought as agst the other modes. The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the House seemed to arise from the partiality of the States to their respective Citizens. But, might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose. Let the people of each State chuse its best Citizen. The people will know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the people of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those of which they will have the greatest reason to be proud — Out of the thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen either by the Natl Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.
On a Question which was moved for postponing Mr. Pinkney’s motion, in order to make way for some such proposition as had been hinted by Mr. Williamson others. 〈it passed in the negative.〉
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes — 5; noes — 6.]
On Mr. Pinkney’s motion that no person shall serve in the Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, 〈it passed in the negative.〉
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay [Ayes — 5; noes — 6.]
〈On a motion that the members of the Committee be furnished with copies of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Carolina alone being in the negative —
It was then moved 13 that the members of the House might take copies of the Resolions which had been agreed to; which passed in the negative.
N. H. no — Mas. no. Con — ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no — Del. ay. Maryd. no. V — ay. N—C. ay. S. C. no — Geo. no —〉 14 [Ayes — 5; noes — 6.]
Mr. Gerry Mr Butler moved to refer the 〈resolution〉 relating to the Executive 〈(except the clause making it consist of a single person)〉 to the Committee of detail 15
Mr. Wilson hoped that so important a branch of the System wd. not be committed untill a general principle shd. be fixed by a vote of the House.
Mr Langdon was for the Committment. — Adjd. 16
It was moved and seconded to amend the third clause of the resolution respecting the national executive so as to read as follows, namely
“for the term of seven years to be ineligible a second time”
which passed in the affirmative [Ayes — 7; noes — 3.]
On the question to agree to the whole resolution respecting the supreme Executive namely.
Resolved That a national Executive be instituted
with power to carry into execution the national Laws
it passed in the affirmative. [Ayes — 6; noes — 3; divided — 1.]
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following Resolution namely.
Resolved That it be an instruction to the Committee to whom were referred the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of landed property and citizenship in the United States for the Executive, the Judiciary, and the Members of both branches of the Legislature of the United States; and for disqualifying all such persons as are indebted to, or have unsettled accounts with the United States from being Members of either Branch of the national Legislature.
It was moved and seconded to strike out the word “landed”
it passed in the affirmative [Ayes — 10; noes — 1.]
On the question to agree to the clause respecting the qualification as amended
it passed in the affirmative [Ayes — 8; noes — 3.]
It was moved and seconded to add the words “and Pensioners of the Government of the United States” to the clause of disqualification
which passed in the negative. [Ayes —3; noes — 7; divided — 1.]
It was moved and seconded to strike out the following words, namely
“or have unsettled accounts with”
which passed in the affirmative. [Ayes — 9; noes — 2.]
On the question to agree to the clause of disqualification as amended
it passed in the negative [Ayes — 2; noes — 9.]
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following resolution namely
Resolved that it be an instruction to the Committee to whom were referred the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of a national Government, to receive a clause or clauses for preventing the seat of the national Government being in the same City or Town with the seat of the Government of any State, longer than until the necessary public Buildings can be erected.
It was moved and seconded to postpone the consideration of the last resolution.
It was moved and seconded to refer such proceedings of the Convention, as have been agreed on since Monday last, to the Committee of detail
which passed unanimously in ye affirmative
[To adjourn till monday August Ayes — 11; noes — 0.] 1 and then the House adjourned till monday Augt 6th
New Hampshire | Massachusetts | Rhode Island | Connecticut | New York | New Jersey | Pennsylvania | Delaware | Maryland | Virginia | North Carolina | South Carolina | Georgia | Questions | Ayes | Noes | Divided | |
[224] | aye | no | aye | no | no | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | for the term of “seven years” “to be ineligible a second time.” (supreme Executive) | 7 | 3 | ||||
[225] | aye | aye | aye | no | no | no | dd | aye | aye | aye | To agree to the whole resolution respecting the supreme Executive | 6 | 3 | 1 | |||
[226] | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | no | aye | aye | aye | aye | To strike out the word “landed” in the qualification | 10 | 1 | |||
[227] | aye | aye | no | aye | no | no | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | To agree to the clause of qualification | 8 | 3 | |||
[228] | no | aye | no | no | no | no | aye | no | dd | no | aye | To agree to the amendment for disqualification officers under the government and Pensioners. | 3 | 7 | 1 | ||
[229] | aye | aye | aye | no | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | no | To strike out the words or have unsettled accounts with | 9 | 2 | |||
[230] | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | aye | no | aye | To agree to the clause of disqualification | 2 | 9 | |||
[231] | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | aye | To adjourn till monday August | |||||
End of seventh loose sheet] |
Col. Mason. In every Stage of the Question relative to the Executive, the difficulty of the subject and the diversity of the opinions concerning it have appeared. Nor have any of the modes of constituting that department been satisfactory. 1. It has been proposed that the election should be made by the people at large; that is that an act which ought to be performed by those who know most of Eminent characters, qualifications, should be performed by those who know least. 2 that the election should be made by the Legislatures of the States. 3. by the Executives of the States. Agst these modes also strong objections have been urged. 4. It has been proposed that the election should be made by Electors chosen by the people for that purpose. This was at first agreed to: But on further consideration has been rejected. 5. Since which, the mode of Mr Williamson, requiring each freeholder to vote for several candidates has been proposed. This seemed like many other propositions, to carry a plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to fatal objections. A popular election 〈in any form〉, as Mr. Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment into the hands of the Cincinnati, a Society for the members of which he had a great respect; but which he never wished to have a preponderating influence in the Govt. 6. Another expedient was proposed by Mr. Dickenson, which is liable to so palpable material an inconvenience that he had little 〈doubt〉 of its being by this time rejected by himself. It would exclude every man who happened not to be popular within his own State; tho’ the causes of his local unpopularity might be of such a nature as to recommend him to the States at large. 7. Among other expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the tickets do not appear to be in much demand, it will probably, not be carried on, and nothing therefore need be said on that subject. After reviewing all these various modes, he was led to conclude- that an election by the Natl Legislature as originally proposed, was the best. If it was liable to objections, it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived at the same time that a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his primary object, for the pole star of his political conduct, the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of Civil liberty, that the great officers of State, and particularly the Executive should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken, in order that they may feel respect those rights interests, Which are again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded with moving that the constitution of the Executive as reported by the Come. of the whole be re-instated, viz. “that the Executive be appointed for seven years, be ineligible a 2d. time,”
Mr. Davie seconded the motion
Docr. Franklin. It seems to have been imagined by some that the returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate. This he thought was contrary to republican principles. In free Governments the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter was not to degrade but to promote them- and it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them, to keep them always in a State of servitude, and not allow them to become again one of the Masters.
Question on Col. Masons motion as above; 〈which passed in the affirmative〉
N. H. ay. Masts. not on floor. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 7; noes — 3; absent — 1.]
Mr. Govr. Morris was now agst. the whole paragraph. In answer to Col. Mason’s position that a periodical return of the great officers of the State into the mass of the people, was the palladium of Civil liberty he wd. observe that on the same principle the Judiciary ought to be periodically degraded; certain it was that the Legislature ought on every principle-yet no one had proposed. or conceived that the members of it should not be re-eligible. In answer to Docr. Franklin, that a return into the mass of the people would be a promotion. instead of a degradation, he had no doubt that our Executive like most others would have too much patriotism to shrink from the burden of his office, and too much modesty not to be willing to decline the promotion.
〈On the question on the whole resolution as amended in the words following 2 — “that a National Executive be instituted — to consist of a single person — to be chosen by the Natl. legislature — for the term of seven years — to be ineligible a 2d. time — with power to carry into execution the natl. laws — to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for — to be removeable on impeachment conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty — to receive a fixt compensation for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the Natl. Treasury” — it passed in the affirmative 3 〉
N. H. ay. Mas. not on floor. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. divd. Mr. B. 〈Blair〉 Col. M. 〈Mason〉 ay. Genl. W. 〈Washington〉 Mr M — 〈Madison〉 no. Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House. N- C- ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 6; noes — 3; divided — 1; absent — 1.]
Mr Mason moved “that the Committee of detail be instructed to receive a clause requiring certain qualifications of landed property citizenship 〈of the U. States〉 in members of the Legislature, 4 and disqualifying persons having unsettled Accts. with or being indebted to the U. S. 〈from being members of the Natl. Legislature”〉 5 — He observed that persons of the latter descriptions had frequently got into the State Legislatures, in order to promote laws that might shelter their delinquencies; and that this evil had crept into Congs. if Report was to be regarded.
Mr Pinckney seconded the motion
Mr Govr. Morris. If qualifications are proper, he wd. prefer them in the electors rather than the elected. As to debtors of the U. S. they are but few. As to persons having unsettled accounts he believed them to be pretty many. He thought however that such a discrimination would be both odious useless. and in many instances unjust cruel. The delay of settlemt. had been more the fault of the public than of the individuals. What will be done with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or services or property to their Country, without having been yet able to obtain a liquidation of their claims? Are they to be excluded?
Mr. Ghorum was for leaving to the Legislature, the providing agst such abuses as had been mentioned.
Col. Mason mentioned the parliamentary qualifications adopted in the Reign of Queen Anne, which he said had met with universal approbation
Mr. 〈Madison〉 had witnessed 6 the zeal of men having accts. with the public, to get into the Legislatures for sinister purposes. He thought however that if any precaution were to be taken for excluding them, the one proposed by Col. M〈ason〉 ought to be new modelled. It might be well to limit 7 the exclusion to persons who had recd money from the public, and had not accounted for it.
Mr Govr. Morris — It was a precept of great antiquity as well as of high authority that we should not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought to be equally on our guard agst. being wise over much. The proposed regulation would enable the Govent. to exclude particular persons from office as long as they pleased He mentioned the case of the Commander in chief’s presenting his account for secret services, which he said was so moderate that every one was astonished at it; and so simple that no doubt could arise on it. Yet had the Auditor been disposed to delay the settlement, how easily might he have affected it, and how cruel wd. it be in such a case to keep a distinguished meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability disfranchisement. He mentioned this case merely to illustrate the objectionable nature of the proposition. He was opposed to such minutious regulations in a Constitution. The parliamentary qualifications quoted by Col. Mason, had been disregarded in practice; and was but a scheme of the landed agst the monied interest.
Mr Pinckney Genl. Pinckney moved to insert by way of amendmt. the words Judiciary Executive so as to extend the qualifications to those departments which was agreed to nem con
Mr. Gerry thought the inconveniency of excluding a few worthy individuals who might be public debtors or have unsettled accts ought not to be put in the Scale agst the public advantages of the regulation, and that the motion did not go far enough.
Mr. King observed that there might be great danger in requiring landed property as a qualification since it would exclude the monied interest, whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies to the public safety. 8
Mr. Dickenson. was agst. any recital of qualifications in the Constitution. It was impossible to make a compleat one, and a partial one would by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions, The best defence lay in the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature. Whilst this Source should remain pure, the public interest would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt, no little expedients would repel the danger. He doubted the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for wealth. He had always understood that a veneration for poverty virtue, were the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed improper that any man of merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic where merit was understood to form the great title to public trust, honors rewards.
Mr Gerry if property be one object of Government, provisions for securing it can not be improper.
Mr. 〈Madison〉 moved to strike out the word landed, before the word, “qualifications”. If the proposition sd. be agreed to he wished the Committee to be at liberty to report the best criterion they could devise. Landed possessions were no certain evidence of real wealth. Many enjoyed them to a great extent who were more in debt than they were worth. The unjust laws of the States had proceeded more from this class of men, than any others. It had often happened that men who had acquired landed property on credit, got into the Legislatures with a view of promoting an unjust protection agst. their Creditors. In the next place, if a small quantity of land should be made the standard. it would be no security, — if a large one, it would exclude the proper representatives of those classes of Citizens who were not landholders. It was politic as well as just that the interests rights of every class should be duly represented understood in the public Councils. It was a provision every where established that the Country should be divided into districts representatives taken from each, in order that the Legislative Assembly might equally understand sympathise, with the rights of the people in every part of the Community. It was not less proper that every class of Citizens should have an opportunity of making their rights be felt understood in the public Councils. The three principle classes into which our citizens were divisible, were the landed the commercial, the manufacturing. The 2d. 3rd. class, bear as yet a small proportion to the first. The proportion however will daily increase. We see in the populous Countries in Europe now, what we shall be hereafter. These classes understand much less of each others interests affairs, than men of the same class inhabiting different districts. It is particularly requisite therefore that the interests of one or two of them should not be left entirely to the care, or the impartiality of the third. This must be the case if landed qualifications should be required; few of the mercantile, and scarcely any of the manufacturing class, chusing whilst they continue in business to turn any part of their Stock into landed property. For these reasons he wished if it were possible that some other criterion than the mere possession of land should be devised. He concurred with Mr. Govr. Morris in thinking that qualifications in the Electors would be much more effectual than in the elected. The former would discriminate between real ostensible property in the latter; But he was aware of 〈the difficulty of〉 forming any uniform standard that would suit the different circumstances opinions prevailing in the different States.
Mr. Govr Morris 2ded. the motion.
On the Question for striking out “landed”
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 10; noes — 1.]
On Question on 1st. part of Col. Masons proposition as to qualification of property citizenship” 〈as so amended〉 9
N. H. ay. Masts. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 8; noes — 3.]
“The 2d. part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons having unsettled accounts”, being under consideration
Mr. Carrol moved to strike out “having unsettled accounts”
Mr. Ghorum seconded the motion; observing that it would put the commercial manufacturing part of the people on a worse footing than others as they would be most likely to have dealings with the public.
Mr. L- Martin. if these words should be struck out, and the remaining words concerning debtors retained, it will be the interest of the latter class to keep their accounts unsettled as long as possible.
Mr. Wilson was for striking them out. They put too much power in the hands of the Auditors, who might combine with rivals in delaying settlements in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular men. We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The time has been, and will again be when the public safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individuals which will necessarily open accts. with the public, and when such accts. will be a characteristic of patriotism. Besides a partial enumeration of cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying odious dangerous characters.
Mr. Langdon was for striking out the whole clause for the reasons given by Mr Wilson. So many Exclusions he thought too would render the system unacceptable to the people.
Mr. Gerry. If the argumts. used to day were to prevail, we might have a Legislature composed of public debtors, pensioners, placemen contractors. He thought the proposed qualifications would be pleasing to the people. They will be considered as a security agst unnecessary or undue burdens being imposed on them 〈He moved to add “pensioners” to the disqualified characters which was negatived.
N. H. no Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del no Maryd. ay. Va. no. N. C. divided. S. C. no. Geo. ay.〉 10 [Ayes — 3; noes — 7; divided — 1.]
Mr. Govr. Morris The last clause, relating to public debtors will exclude every importing merchant. Revenue will be drawn it is foreseen as much as possible, from trade. Duties of course will be bonded. and the Merchts. will remain debtors to the public. He repeated that it had not been so much the fault of individuals as of the public that transactions between them had not been more generally liquidated adjusted. At all events to draw from our short scanty experience rules that are to operate through succeeding ages, does not savour much of real wisdom.
On question for striking out “persons having unsettled accounts with the U. States.”
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [Ayes — 9; noes — 2.]
Mr. Elseworth was for disagreeing to the remainder of the clause disqualifying public debtors; and for leaving to the wisdom of the Legislature and the virtue of the Citizens, the task of providing agst. such evils. Is the smallest as well largest debtor to be excluded? Then every arrear of taxes will disqualify. Besides how is it to be known to the people when they elect who are or are not public debtors. The exclusion of pensioners placemen in Engd is founded on a consideration not existing here. As persons of that sort are dependent on the Crown, they tend to increase its influence.
Mr. Pinkney sd. he was at first a friend to the proposition, for the sake of the clause relating to qualifications of property; but he disliked the exclusion of public debtors; it went too far. It wd. exclude persons who had purchased confiscated property or should purchase Western territory of the public, and might be some obstacle to the sale of the latter.
On the question for agreeing to the clause disqualifying public debtors
N. H. no. Mas- no. Ct. no. N- J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 2; noes — 9.]
Col. Mason. observed that it would be proper, as he thought, that some provision should be made in the Constitution agst. choosing for the seat of the Genl. Govt. the City or place at which the seat of any State Govt. might be fixt. There were 2 objections agst. having them at the same place, which without mentioning others, required some precaution on the subject. The 1st. was that it tended to produce disputes concerning jurisdiction — The 2d. principal one was that the intermixture of the two Legislatures tended to give a provincial tincture to ye Natl. deliberations. He moved that the Come. be instructed to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the Natl. Govt. being 〈in the same City or town with〉 the seat of 〈the Govt. of〉 any State 〈longer〉 than untill the necessary public buildings could be erected. 11
Mr. Alex. Martin 2ded. the motion.
Mr. Govr. Morris did not dislike the idea, but was apprehensive that such a clause might make enemies of Philda. N. York which had expectations of becoming the Seat of the Genl. Govt.
Mr. Langdon approved the idea also: but suggisted the case of a State moving its seat of Govt. to the natl. seat after the erection of the public buildings
Mr. Ghorum. the precaution may be evaded by the Natl. Legislre. by delaying to erect the public buildings
Mr. Gerry conceived it to be the genel. sense of America, that neither the Seat of a State Govt. nor any large commercial City should be the seat of the Genl. Govt.
Mr. Williamson liked the idea, but knowing how much the passions of men were agitated by this matter, was apprehensive of turning them agst. the system. He apprehended also that an evasion might be practiced in the way hinted by Mr. Ghorum.
Mr. Pinkney thought the seat of a State Govt. ought to be avoided; but that a large town or its vicinity would be proper for the seat of the Genl. Govt.
Col. Mason did not mean to press the motion at this time, nor to excite any hostile passions agst. the system. He was content to withdraw the motion for the present.
Mr. Butler was for fixing 〈by the Constitution〉 the place, a central one, 〈for the seat of the Natl Govt〉
The 〈proceedings since monday last were referred unanimously to the〉 12 Come. of detail, 〈and the Convention then unamously〉 13 Adjourned till Monday. Augst. 6. that 〈the〉 Come. of detail 〈might〉 have time to prepare report the Constitution: 14
〈The whole proceedings as referred are as follow: (here copy them from the Journal p. 207.
With the above resolutions were referred the propositions offered by Mr. C. Pinckney on the 29th of May. by Mr. Patterson on the 15th. of June.〉 13
[Among the Wilson Papers in the Library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania are found a number of documents evidently relating to the work of the Committee of Detail. With a few additions from other sources, it is possible to present a nearly complete series of documents representing the various stages of the work of the Committee. All documents obtainable are here given.]
1. | Resolved | That the Government of the United States ought to consist of a Supreme Legislative, Judiciary and Executive |
2. | Resolved | That the Legislature of the United States ought to consist of two Branches |
3. | Resolved | That the Members of the first Branch of the Legislature of the United States ought to be elected by the People of the several States — for the Term of two Years — to be of the Age of twenty five Years at least — to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any Office under the Authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the Functions of the first Branch) during the Time of Service of the first Branch |
4. | Resolved | That the Members of the second Branch of the Legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the Individual Legislatures — to be of the Age of thirty Years at least — to hold their Offices for the Term of six Years; one third to go out biennially — to receive a Compensation for the Devotion of their Time to the public Service — to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any Office under the Authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the Functions of the second Branch) during the Term for which they are elected, and for one Year thereafter. |
5. | Resolved. | That each Branch ought to possess the Right of originating Acts. |
6. | Resolved | That the Right of Suffrage in the first Branch of the Legislature of the United States ought not to be according to the Rules established in the Articles of Confederation but according to some equitable Ratio of Representation |
7. | Resolved | That in the original Formation of the Legislature of the United States the first Branch thereof shall consist of sixty five Members of which Number New Hampshire shall send three — Massachusetts eight — Rhode Island one — Connecticut five — New. York six — New-Jersey four — Pennsylvania eight — Delaware one — Maryland six — Virginia ten — North. Carolina five — South Carolina five — Georgia three. |
But as the present Situation of the States may probably alter in the Number of their Inhabitants, the Legislature of the United States shall be authorised from Time to Time to apportion the Number of Representatives; and in Case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by Addition of Territory, or any two or more States united, or any new States created within the Limits of the United States, the Legislature of the United States shall possess Authority to regulate the Number of Representatives in any of the foregoing Cases, upon the Principle of the Number of their Inhabitants, according to the Provisions herein after mentioned namely — Provided always that Representation ought to be proportioned according to direct Taxation: And in order to ascertain the Alteration in the direct Taxation, which may be required from Time to Time, by the Changes in the relative Circumstances of the States — | ||
Resolved that a Census be taken, within six years from the first Meeting of the Legislature of the United States, and once within the Term of every ten Years afterwards, of all the Inhabitants of the United States in the Manner and according to the Ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of April 18th. 1783 — And that the Legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct Taxation accordingly. | ||
Resolved that all Bills for raising or Appropriating Money, and for fixing the Salaries of the Officers of the Government of the United States shall originate in the first Branch of the Legislature of the United States, and shall not be altered or amended by the second Branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury but in Pursuance of Appropriations to be originated by the first Branch | ||
Resolved | that from the first Meeting of the Legislature of the United States until a Census shall be taken, all Monies for supplying the public Treasury by direct Taxation shall be raised from the several States according to the Number of their Representatives respectively in the first Branch | |
8. | Resolved | That in the second Branch of the Legislature of the United States each State shall have an equal Vote. |
Resolved | That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation. | |
Resolved | That the legislative Acts of the United States made by Virtue and in Pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all Treaties made and ratified under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the respective States so far as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and Inhabitants; and that the Judicatures of the several States shall be bound thereby in their Decisions, any thing in the respective Laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding. | |
Resolved | That a national Executive be instituted to consist of a single Person — to be chosen for the Term of six Years — with Power to carry into Execution the national Laws — to appoint to Offices in Cases not otherwise provided for — to be removeable on Impeachment and Conviction of mal Practice or Neglect of Duty — to receive a fixed Compensation for the Devotion of his Time to public Service — to be paid out of the public Treasury. | |
Resolved | That the national Executive shall have a Right to negative any legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards passed, unless by two third Parts of each Branch of the national Legislative. | |
Resolved | That a national Judiciary be established to consist of one Supreme Tribunal — the Judges of which shall be appointed by the second Branch of the national Legislature — to hold their Offices during good Behaviour — to receive punctually at stated Times a fixed Compensation for their Services, in which no Diminution shall be made so as to affect the Persons actually in Office at the Time of such Diminution | |
Resolved | That the Jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to Cases arising under the Laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such other Questions as involve the national Peace and Harmony. | |
Resolved | That the national Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals. | |
Resolved | That Provision ought to be made for the Admission of States lawfully arising within the Limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary Junction of Government and Territory, or otherwise, with the Consent of a number of Voices in the national Legislature less than the whole. | |
Resolved | That a Republican Form of Government shall be guarantied to each State; and that each State shall be protected against foreign and domestic Violence. | |
Resolved | That Provision ought to be made for the Amendment of the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary. | |
Resolved | That the legislative, executive and judiciary Powers, within the several States, and of the national Government, ought to be bound by Oath to support the Articles of Union. | |
Resolved | That the Amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation by the Convention ought at a proper Time or Times, after the Approbation of Congress, to be submited to an Assembly or Assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the People to consider and decide thereon. | |
Resolved | That the Representation in the second Branch of the Legislature of the United States consist of two Members from each State, who shall vote per capita. |
Resolved That a National Executive be instituted
with power to carry into execution the national Laws
Resolved That it be an instruction to the Committee to whom were referred the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of property and citizenship in the United States for the Executive, the Judiciary, and the Members of both branches of the Legislature of the United States.
1. A Confederation between the free and independent States of N. H. c. is hereby solemnly made uniting them together under one general superintending Government for their common Benefit and for their Defense and Security against all Designs and Leagues that may be injurious to their Interests and against all Forc[e] 4 and Attacks offered to or made upon them or any of them
2 The Stile
3 Mutual Intercourse — Community of Privileges — Surrender of Criminals — Faith to Proceedings c.
4 Two Branches of the Legislature — Senate — House of Delegates — together the U. S. in Congress assembled
H. D. to consist of one Member for every thousand Inhabitants 8/6 of Blacks included
Senate to be elected from four Districts — to serve by Rotation of four Years — to be elected by the H. D. either from among themselves or the People at large
5 The Senate and H. D. shall by joint Ballot annually chuse the Presidt. U. S. from among themselves or the People at large. — In the Presidt. the executive Authority of the U. S. shall be vested. — His Powers and Duties — He shall have a Right to advise with the Heads of the different Departments as his Council
6 Council of Revision, consisting of the Presidt. S. for for. Affairs, S. of War, Heads of the Departments of Treasury and Admiralty or any two of them togr wt the Presidt.
7 The Members of S. H. D. shall each have one Vote, and shall be paid out of the common Treasury.
8 The Time of the Election of the Members of the H. D. and of the Meeting of U. S. in C. assembled.
9 No State to make Treaties — lay interfering Duties — keep a naval or land Force (Militia excepted to be disciplined c according to the Regulations of the U. S.
10. Each State retains its Rights not expressly delegated — But no Bill of the Legislature of any State shall become a law till it shall have been laid before S. . H. D. in C. assembled and received their Approbation.
11. The exclusive Power of S H. D. in C. Assembled
12. The S. H. D. in C. ass. shall have the exclusive Power of regulating Trade and levying Imposts — Each State may lay Embargoes in Time of Scarcity
13 ——— of establishing Post-Offices
14. S. H. D. in C. ass. shall be the last Resort on Appeal in Disputes between two or more States; which Authority shall be exercised in the following Manner c
15. S. H. D. in C. ass. shall institute Offices and appoint Officers for the Departments of for. Affairs, War, Treasury and Admiralty —
They shall have the exclusive Power of declaring what shall be Treason Misp. of Treason agt. U. S. — and of instituting a federal judicial Court, to which an Appeal shall be allowed from the judicial Courts of the several States in all Causes wherein Questions shall arise on the Construction of Treaties made by U. S. — or on the Law of Nations — or on the Regulations of U. S. concerning Trade Revenue — or wherein U. S. shall be a Party — The Court shall consist of Judges to be appointed during good Behaviour — S. H. D. in C. ass shall have the exclusive Right of instituting in each State a Court of Admiralty, and appointing the Judges c of the same for all maritime Causes which may arise therein respectively.
16. S H. D. in C. ass. shall have the exclusive Right of coining Money — regulating its Alloy Value — fixing the Standard of Weights and Measures throughout U. S.
17. Points in which the Assent of more than a bare Majority shall be necessary.
18 Impeachments shall be by the H. D. before the Senate and the judges of the federal judicial Court.
19. S. H. D. in C. ass. shall regulate the Militia thro’ the U. S.
20. Means of enforcing and compelling the Payment of the Quota of each State.
21. Manner and Conditions of admiting new States.
22. Power of dividing annexing and consolidating States, on the Consent and Petition of such States.
23. The assent of the Legislature of States shall be sufficient to invest future additional Powers in U. S. in C. ass. and shall bind the whole Confederacy.
24. The Articles of Confederation shall be inviolably observed, × and the Union shall be perpetual; × unless altered as before directed 5
25 The said States of N. H. c guarantee mutually each other and their Rights against all other Powers and against all Rebellions c.
In the draught of a fundamental constitution, two things deserve attention:
1. A preamble seems proper not for the purpose of designating the ends of government and human polities — This (business, if not fitter for the schools, is at least sufficiently exausted) display of theory, howsoever proper in the first formation of state governments, (seems) is unfit here; since we are not working on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those rights, modified by society, and (supporting) interwoven with what we call (states) the rights of states — Nor yet is it proper for the purpose of mutually pledging the faith of the parties for the observance of the articles — This may be done more solemnly at the close of the draught, as in the confederation — But the object of our preamble ought to be briefly to (represent) declare, that the present foederal government is insufficient to the general happiness, that the conviction of this fact gave birth to this convention; and that the only effectual (means) 〈mode〉 which they (could) 〈can〉 devise, for curing this insufficiency, is the establishment of a supreme legislative executive and judiciary — (In this manner we may discharge the first resolution. We may then proceed to establish) 6 a Let it be next declared, that the following are the constitution and fundamentals of government for the United States 6 b — After this introduction, let us proceed to the
2. First resolution — This resolution involves three particulars
In the next place, treat of the legislative, judiciary and executive in their order, and afterwards, of the miscellaneous subjects, as they occur, bringing together all the resolutions, belonging to the same point, howsoever they may be scattared about and leaving to the last the steps necessary to introduce the government — (Tak) The following plan is therefore submitted
I The Legislative
(shall never be greater in number than
To effect this, pursue a rule, similar to that prescribed in the 16th. article of the New-York constitution.)
11. The qualification of electors shall be the same (throughout the states; viz.) with that in the particular states unless the legislature shall hereafter direct some uniform qualification to prevail through the states.
(citizenship:
manhood
sanity of mind
previous residence for one year, or possession of real property within the state for the whole of one year, or inrolment in the militia for the whole of a years.) 8
(12. All persons who are may be elected)
The delegates shall be privileged from arrest 9 (or restraint) personal restraint during their attendance, for so long a time before and after,
as may be necessary, for travelling to and from the legislature (and they shall have no other privilege whatsoever.)
4 b) The Senate —
the qualification of (a) senator s shall be
the age of 25 years at least:
citizenship in the united states:
and property to the amount of
(Their duration in office shall)
They shall be elected for six years and immediately after the first election they shall be divided by lot as near as may be into (four) three classes, (six in each class,) and numbered 1, 2, 3: and the seats of the members of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the (first) second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth and of the third class at the end of the sixth year, and so on continually, that a third part of the senate may be biennially chosen.
The senators shall be privileged from arrest 10 personal restraint during their attendance,
and for so long a time before
and so long after,
as may be necessary for travelling to and from the legislature
(and they shall have no other privileges whatsoever.)
The senators shall be ineligible to and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the united states,
during the term for which they are elected, and for one year thereafter,
(except in the instance of those offices, which may be instituted for the better conducting of the business of the senate, while in session)
The wages of the senators shall be paid out of the (nat) treasury of the united states.:
those wages for the first six years shall be dollars per diem —
at the beginning of (the) every sixth year after the first, the supreme judiciary shall cause a special jury of the most respectable merchants and farmers to be summoned to declare what shall have been the averaged value of wheat during the last six years, in the state, where the legislature may be sitting: And for the six subsequent years, the senators shall receive per diem the averaged value of bushels of wheat.)
The following are
agrd. 1. To raise money by taxation, unlimited as to sum, for the ( future ) past ( or ) 〈〉 future debts and necessities of the union and to establish rules for collection
Exception(s)
agrd. No Taxes on exports. — Restrictions 1. direct taxation proportioned to representation 2. No (headpost) capitation-tax which does not apply to all inhabitants under the above limitation ( to be levied uniform) 3. no (other) indirect tax which is not common to all 4. (Delinquencies shall be be distress — [illegible words]) 5. To regulate commerce 〈both foreign domestic〉
Restrictions
(To make treaties of peace or alliance
(qu: as to senate) under the foregoing restrictions, and
without the surrender of territory for an equivalent,
and in no case, unless a superior title.)
To provide tribunals and punishment for mere offences against the law of nations.
〈Indian Affairs〉 11
To declare the law of piracy, felonies and captures on the high seas, and captures on land.
〈to regulate Weights Measures〉 11
(To draw forth the) 〈make Laws for calling forth the Aid of the〉 militia, (or any part, or to authorize the Executive
to embody them) 〈to execute the Laws of the Union
to repel Invasion to inforce Treaties suppress internal Comns.〉
To subdue a rebellion in any particular state, on the application of the legislature thereof.
〈of declaring the Crime Punishmt of Counterfeitg it〉 11 a
To send embassadors)
〈Power to borrow Money-
To appoint a Treasurer by (joint) ballot.〉 11 a
〈Insert the 11 Article〉
(All laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void, and in the decision thereon, which shall be vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents without which the general principles cannot be satisfied shall be considered, as involved in the general principle.)
〈That Trials for Criml. Offences be in the State where the Offe was comd — by Jury — and a right to make all Laws necessary to carry the foregoing Powers into Execu —〉
to appoint to offices not otherwise provided for.
〈by the constitution〉
〈shall propose to the Legisle. from Time to Time by Speech or Messg such Meas as concern this Union〉 11 a
to be removeable on impeachment,
made by the house of representatives and (on) conviction
(of malpractice
or neglect of duty;)
before the supreme judiciary 12
〈of Treason Bribery or Corruption.〉
to receive a fixed compensation for
the devotion of his time to public service
the quantum of which shall be settled
by the national legislature
to be paid out of the national
treasury 〈no Increase or decrease during
the Term of Service of the Executive〉 12 a
and shall receive punctually,
at stated times
a (fixed) compensation for their services, to be settled by the legislature
in which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such diminution.
and shall swear fidelity to the union.
to such other cases, as the national legislature
may assign, as involving the national
peace and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes between citizens
of different states
〈in disputes between a State a Citizen or Citizens of another State〉 12 a
in disputes between different states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are concerned
〈 in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn〉
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except in 〈Cases of Impeachmt. (in)〉 those instances, in which the legislature shall make it original. and the legislature shall organize it
Miscellaneous provisions
within the limits of a particular state, by the consent of a major part of the people of that state.)
〈States lawfully arising if within the Limits of any of the prest. States by Consent of the Legisle. of those States.〉 12 a
The ratification of the reform is — After the approbation of congress — to be made
by a special convention 〈in each State〉
recommended by the assembly
to be chosen for the express purpose
of considering and approving and rejecting it in toto:
and this recommendation may be used from time to time
The object of an address is to satisfy the people of the propriety of the proposed reform.
To this end the following plan seems worthy of adoption
This is the shortest scheme, which can be adopted. For it would be strange to ask (for) new powers, without assigning some reason — it matters not how general soever — which may apply to all of them Besides we ought to furnish the advocates of the plan in the country with some general topics. Now I conceive, that these heads do not more, than comprehend the necessary points.
already confederated united and known (known) by the Stile of the United States of America” | We The People of the States of New-Hampshire C do (agree upon), ordain declare and establish the following (Frame of Government as the) Frame of Govt as the Constitution (of the “United States of America” according to which we and our Posterity shall be governed under the Name and Stile of the “United States of America”) of the said United States |
1 | |
in a general Assembly to consist of two separate and distinct Bodies of Men, the one to be called the House of Representatives, of the People of the United States the other the Senate of the United States. | The legislative Power of the United States shall be vested in two (Branches a Senate and a House of Representatives;) each of which Bodies shall have a Negative on the other |
2. | |
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen biennially by the People of the United States in the following Manner. | |
Every Freeman of the Age of twenty one Years (having a freehold Estate within the United States) who has (having) resided in the United States for the Space of one whole Year immediately preceding the Day of Election, and has a Freehold Estate in at least fifty Acres of Land |
The Continuation of the Scheme
Miscellaneous Resolutions
to be added
We the People of ( and ) the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New. York, New. Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North. Carolina, South. Carolina and Georgia do ordain declare and establish the following Constitution for the Government of ourselves and of our Posterity.
The Stile of this Government shall be the “United People and States of America.”
The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive and judicial Powers.
The (Supreme) legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of two separate and distinct Bodies of Men, (one to be called the) a House of Representatives, (the other to be called the) and a Senate (of) each of which shall in all Cases have a Negative on the other (in all cases not otherwise provided for in this Constitution)
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second Year (in the Manner following) by the People of the several States comprehended within this Union (the Time and Place and the Manner and the of holding the Elections and the Rules) The Qualifications of the Electors shall be (appointed) prescribed by the Legislatures of the several States; but the ir provisions (which they shall make concerning them shall be subject to the Control of) concerning them may at any Time be altered and superseded by the Legislature of the United States.
(No person shall be capable of being chosen) Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be (twenty-five Years of Age) of the Age of twenty five Years at least; shall have been a Citizen in the United States for at least three Years before his Election, and shall be, at the Time of his Election, a Resident of the State, (from) in which he shall be chosen.
The House of Representatives shall, at its first Formation and until the Number of Citizens and Inhabitants shall be taken in the Manner hereinafter described consist of 65 Members, of whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, c.
As the (present) Proportions of Numbers in the different States will alter from Time to Time; as some of the States may be hereafter divided; as others may be enlarged by Addition of Territory, or two or more States may be united; and as new States will be erected within the Limits of the United States; the Legislature shall, in each of these cases, possess Authority to regulate the Number of Representatives by the Number of Inhabitants according to the provisions herein after made.
(Representation) Direct Taxation shall always be in Proportion to (direct Taxation.) Representation in the House of Representatives.
(In order to ascertain and regulate the Proportions of direct Taxation from Time to Time, the Legislature of the United States shall, within six Years after its first Meeting and within the Term of every ten Years afterwards, cause)
The Proportions of direct Taxation shall be regulated by the whole Number of white and other Free Citizens and Inhabitants of every c. which Number (shall) shall, (be taken) within six Years after the first Meeting of the Legislature (of the United States,) and within the Term of every ten Years afterwards, be taken in such Manner as the said Legislature shall direct (and appoint).
From the first Meeting of the Legislature until the Number of Citizens and Inhabitants shall be taken (in the Manner beforementioned) as aforesaid, direct Taxation shall be in Proportion to the Number of (Inhabitants) Representatives chosen in each State.
All Bills for raising or appropriating Money and for fixing the Salaries of the Officers of Government shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in Pursuance of Appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.
The House of Representatives shall be the grand Inquest of this Nation; and all Impeachments shall be made by them. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be supplied by Writs of Election from the (Supr) Executive (Pow) Authority of the State in the Representation ( of ) from which they shall happen.
The House of Representatives shall chuse its own Speaker and other Officers
The (Members of the) Senate of the United States shall be chosen ( every sixth year ) by the Legislatures of the several States; Each (of which) Legislature shall chuse two Members. (The votes shall not be given by States, but by the Members separately from each State. ) Each Member shall have one Vote.
The Members of the Senate shall be chosen for six Years; provided that immediately after the first Election they (Members of the Senate) shall (by) be divided by Lot into three Classes as nearly as may be, and numbered one, two and three. The Seats of the Members of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, (th) of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, of the third Class at the (End) Expiration of the sixth Year, (that a) and so on continually, that a third Part of the Members of the Senate may be (biennially) chosen every second Year.
Every Member of the Senate shall be of the Age of thirty Years at least (thirty Years of Age), shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least four Years before his Election, and shall be, at the Time of his Election a Resident of the State for which he shall be chosen
The Senate (shall be empowered) of the United States shall have Power to make Treaties of (Peace, of Alliance, and of Commerce,) to send Ambassadors, and to appoint the Judges of the Supreme national Court
Each House of the Legislature shall possess the right of originating (Acts) Bills, except in Cases beforementioned
The Senate shall chuse its own President and other Officers. | In each House ( of the Legislature ) a Majority of the Members shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from Day to Day |
The Members of each House shall be ineligible to and incapable of holding any Office under the Authority of the United States during the Time for which they shall be respectively elected: And the Members of the Senate shall be ineligible to and incapable of holding any such Office for one Year afterwards. | Each House of the Legislature shall be the Judge of the Elections Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members |
The Times and Places and the Manner of holding the Elections (for) of the Members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislatures of each State; but their Provisions concerning them may, at any Time, be altered and superseded by the Legislature of the United States. | |
The enacting Stile of the Laws of the United States shall be “be it enacted and it is hereby enacted by the House of Representatives, and by the Senate of the United States in Congress assembled | The Legislature of the United States shall have Authority to establish such Qualifications of the Members of each House (of the Legislature) with Regard to Property as to the said Legislature shall seem proper and expedient. |
The Members of each House shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be (paid) ascertained and paid by the State in which they shall be chosen | (A Majority of the Members of each House shall constitute a Quorum to do Business but a smaller Number than a Majority of them may, in each House, adjourn from Day to Day.) |
The House of Representatives and the Senate when it shall be acting in a legislative Capacity (Each House) shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and shall from Time to Time publish them, (except such Parts as in their Judgment require Secrecy;) and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of each House on any Question shall at the Desire of any Member be entered on the Journal at the desire of any Member | Each House shall have Authority to (settle) determine the Rules and Order of its Proceedings, and (have Power) to punish its own Members for disorderly ( and indecent ) Behaviour |
Each House may expel a Member, but not a second Time for the same Offence. | |
Freedom of Speech | Neither House shall adjourn for more than three Days without the Consent of the other; nor with such Consent, to any other Place than that at which the two Houses are sitting. But this Regulation shall be applied to the Senate only in its Legislative Capacity. |
The Members of each House shall, in all cases, except Treason, Felony Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning from it. |
An Appeal for the Correction of all Errors both in Law and Fact
That the United States in Congress be authorised — to pass Acts for raising a Revenue, — by levying Duties on all Goods and Merchandise of foreign Growth or Manufacture imported into any Part of the United States — by Stamps on Paper Vellum or Parchment — and by a Postage on all Letters and Packages passing through the general Post-Office, to be applied to such foederal Purposes as they shall deem proper and expedient — to make Rules and Regulations for the Collection thereof — to pass Acts for the Regulation of Trade and Commerce as well with foreign Nations as with each other to lay and collect Taxes
That the Executive direct all military Operations
That the Judiciary have authority to hear and determine all Impeachments of foederal Officers; and, by Way of Appeal, in all Cases touching the Rights of Ambassadors — in all Cases of Capture from an Enemy — in all Cases of Piracies and Felonies on the high Seas — in all Cases of Revenue — in all Cases in which Foreigners may be interested in the Construction of any Treaty, or which may arise on any Act for regulating Trade or collecting Revenue or on the Law of Nations, or general commercial or marine Laws
If any State, or any Body of Men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into Execution the Acts or Treaties of the United States; the Executive shall be authorised to enforce and compel Obedience by calling forth the Powers of the United States.
That the Rule for Naturalization ought to be the same in every State
The Legislature shall consist of two distinct Branches — a Senate and a House of Delegates, each of which shall have a Negative on the other, and shall be stiled the U. S. in Congress assembled.
Each House shall appoint its own Speaker and other Officers, and settle its own Rules of Proceeding; but neither the Senate nor H. D. shall have the power to adjourn for more than Days, without the (other) Consent of both.
There shall be a President, in which the Ex. Authority of the U. S. shall be vested. It shall be his Duty to inform the Legislature of the Condition of U. S. so far as may respect his Department — to recommend Matters to their Consideration — to correspond with the Executives of the several States — to attend to the Execution of the Laws of the U. S. — to transact Affairs with the Officers of Government, civil and military — to expedite all such Measures as may be resolved on by the Legislature — to inspect the Departments of foreign Affairs — War — Treasury — Admiralty — to reside where the Legislature shall sit — to commission all Officers, and keep the Great Seal of U. S. — He shall, by Virtue of his Office, be Commander in chief of the Land Forces of U. S. and Admiral of their Navy — He shall have Power to convene the Legislature on extraordinary Occasions — to prorogue them, provided such Prorogation shall not exceed Days in the space of any — He may suspend Officers, civil and military
The Legislature of U. S. shall have the exclusive Power — of raising a military Land Force — of equiping a Navy — of rating and causing public Taxes to be levied — of regulating the Trade of the several States as well with foreign Nations as with each other — of levying Duties upon Imports and Exports — of establishing Post-Offices, and raising a Revenue from them — of regulating Indian Affairs — of coining Money — fixing the Standard of Weights and Measures — of determining in what Species of Money the public Treasury shall be supplied.
The foederal judicial Court shall try Officers of the U. S. for all Crimes C in their Offices — (and to this Court an Appeal shall be allowed from the Courts of)
The Legislature of U. S. shall have the exclusive Right of instituting in each State a Court of Admiralty for hearing and determining maritime Causes.
The power of impeaching shall be vested in the H. D. — The Senators and Judges of the foederal Court, be a Court for trying Impeachments.
The Legislature of U. S. shall possess the exclusive Right of establishing the Government and Discipline of the Militia of — and of ordering the Militia of any State to any Place within U. S.
mitted on the same Terms with the original States: But the Legislature may make Conditions with the new States (with Respect to) concerning the (then subsisting) public Debt (of the United States) which shall be then subsisting
The United States shall guaranty to each State a (A) Republican Form of Government (shall be guarantied to each State by the United States); and (the) shall protect each State (from) against (domestic Violence) foreign Invasion and, on the Application of its Legislature (from foreign Invasions) against domestic Violence.
This Constitution ought to be amended whenever such Amendment shall become necessary; and on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, the Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that Purpose.
The Members of the Legislature, and the executive and judicial Officers of the United States and of the several States shall be bound by Oath to support this Constitution.
Resolved, That the Constitution proposed by this Convention, to the People (and States) of the Uni(on) ted States for their approbation (should, as soon as may be laid) be (to) laid before the United States in Congress assembled for their Agreement and Recommendation and (should) be afterwards (be) submitted to a Convention chosen in each State under the Recommendation of its Legislature, in order to receive the Ratification of such Convention.
Resolved, That the Ratification of the Conventions of States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution: That each assenting (State) Convention shall notify its Assent and Ratification to the United States in Congress assembled: That the United States in Congress assembled, after receiving the Assent and Ratification of the Conventions of States shall appoint and publish a Day, as early as may be, and appoint a Place for (organizing and) commencing (Oper) Proceedings under this Constitution: That after such Publication or, — in case it shall not be made, — (after on ) after the Expiration of Days (after) from the Time when the Ratification of the Convention of the State shall have been notified to Congress the Legislatures of the several States shall (chuse) elect Members of the Senate, and direct the Election of Members of the House of Representatives, and shall provide for their support: That the Members of the Legislature shall meet at the Time and Place assigned by Congress or, — if Congress shall have assigned not Time and Place, — at such Time and Place as shall have been agreed on by the Majority of the Members elected for each House, and shall as soon as may be after their Meeting chuse the (Governour) President of the United States and proceed to (carry) execute this Constitution.
(The Legislature (Senate) of the United States shall have Authority) In all Disputes and Controversies now subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between two or more States, the Senate shall possess the following Powers. Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive Authority, or the lawful Agent of any State in Controversy with another shall (present a petition) by Memorial to the Senate, state the Matter in Question, and apply for a Hearing, Notice of such Memorial and application shall be given by Order of the Senate to the Legislature or the Executive Authority of the other State in Controversy. (A Day) The Senate shall also assign a Day for the Appearance of the Parties by their Agents before that House. The Agents shall be directed to appoint by joint Consent Commissioners or Judges to constitute a Court for hearing and determining the Matter in Question. But if the Agents cannot agree, the Senate shall name three Persons out of each of the several States, and from the List of such Persons each Party shall alternately strike out one (the Party who shall have applied for a Hearing beginning) until the Number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that Number not less than seven, nor more than nine Names, as the Senate shall direct, shall, in their Presence, be drawn out by Lot; and the Persons, whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be Commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine the Controversy; provided a major Part of the Judges, who shall hear the cause agree in the Determination. If either Party shall neglect to attend at the Day assigned, without showing (to the Sen) sufficient Reasons for not attending, or, being present, shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate three Persons out of each State, and the (President) Secretary or Clerk of the Senate shall strike in Behalf of the Party absent or refusing. If any of the Parties shall refuse to submit to the Authority of such Court, or shall not appear to prosecute or defend their Claim or Cause; the Court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce (Sentence or) Judgment. The (Sentence or) Judgment (of the court appointed in the Manner before presented) shall be final and conclusive. The Proceedings shall be transmitted to the (Governour) President of the (United States) Senate and shall be lodged among the public Records for the security of the Parties concerned. Every (Judge) Commissioner shall before he sit in Judgment, take an Oath, to be administered by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of the State, where the Cause shall be tried, “well and truly to hear and determine the Matter in Question, according to the best of his Judgment, without Favour, Affection or Hope of Reward.” All Controversies concerning Lands claimed under different Grants of two or more States, whose Jurisdictions, as they respect such Lands, shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent to such Grants, shall, on Application to the Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be in the same Manner as is before (des) prescribed for deciding Controversies between different States. |
(All) Every Bill(s), which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before (they) it become a Law(s) be presented to the Governour of the United States for his (Revisal) Revision; (and) If, upon such Revision, he approve (thereof) of it, he shall signify his Approbation by signing it; But, if, upon such Revision, it shall appear to him improper for (becoming) being passed into a Law, he shall return it, together with his Objection against it in Writing, to that House (of Representatives or Senate) in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objection at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider the Bill. But if after such Reconsideration, two thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the Objections of the Governour, agree to pass it; it shall, together with his objections, be sent to the other House, (where) by which it shall (also) likewise be reconsidered; and, if approved by two thirds of the other House also, it shall be a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays; and the Names of the Persons voting for or against the Bill shall be entered in the Journal(s) of each House respectively — If any Bill shall not be returned by the Governour within Days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a Law, unless the Legislature, by their Adjournment, prevent its Return; in which Case it shall be returned on the first Day of the next Meeting of the Legislature. |
We the People of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the following Constitution for the Government of ourselves and our Posterity.
The Stile of this Government shall be. “the United States of America”.
The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive, and judicial Powers.
The legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two separate and distinct Bodies of Men, a House of Representatives, and a Senate; each of which shall in all Cases, have a Negative on the other 〈To meet on the 1st Monday every December —〉
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second Year, by the People of the several States comprehended within this Union. The Qualifications of the Electors shall be (prescribed by the Legislatures of the several States; but these Provisions concerning them may, at any Time be altered and superseded by the Legislature of the United States) the same from Time to Time as those of the Electors, in the several States, of the most numerous Branch of their own Legislatures.
Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be of the Age of twenty five Years at least; shall have been a Citizen in the United States for at least three Years before his Election; and shall be, at the Time of his Election, a Resident of the State in which he shall be chosen.
The House of Representatives shall, at its first Formation, and until the Number of Citizens and Inhabitants shall be taken in the Manner herein after described, consist of sixty five Members, of whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North-Carolina, five in South-Carolina, and three in Georgia.
As the Proportions of Numbers in different States will alter from Time to Time; as some of the States may be hereafter divided; as others may be enlarged by Addition of Territory; as two or more States may be united; and as new States will be erected within the Limits of the United States, the Legislature shall, in each of these Cases (possess authority to) regulate the Number of Representatives by the Number of Inhabitants, according to the Provisions herein after made.
All Bills for raising or appropriating Money, and for fixing the Salaries of the Officers of Government, shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in Pursuance of Appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.
The House of Representatives shall (be the grand Inquest of the Nation; and all) 〈have the sole Power of〉 Impeachment(s shall be made by them).
Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be supplied by Writs of Election from the Executive Authority of the State, in the representation from which they shall happen.
The House of Representatives shall chuse its (own) Speaker and other Officers.
The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the Legislatures of the several States. Each Legislature shall chuse two Members. Each Member shall have one Vote.
The Senators shall be chosen for six Years; but immediately after the first Election they shall be divided, by Lot, into three Classes, as nearly as may be, numbered one, two and three. The Seats of the Members of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, (and so continually) 〈so〉 that a third Part of the Members (of the Senate) may be chosen every second Year.
Every Member of the Senate shall be of the Age of thirty Years at least; shall have been a Citizen in the United States for at least four Years before his Election; and shall be, at the time of his Election, a Resident of the State for which he shall be chosen.
The Senate shall (be comp) chuse its own President and other Officers
(Each House of the Legislature shall possess the Right of originating Bills, except in the Cases beforementioned.)
The Times and Places and the Manner of holding the Elections of the Members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State; but their Provisions concerning them may, at any Time, be altered (or superseded) by the Legislature of the United States.
The Legislature of the United States shall have Authority to establish such 〈uniform〉 Qualifications of the Members of each House, with Regard to Property, as to the said Legislature shall seem (proper and 〈fit〉) expedient.
In each House a Majority of the Members shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from Day to Day.
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.
Freedom of Speech and Debate in the Legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of the Legislature; and the Members of each House shall, in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning from it.
Each House (shall have Authority to) may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, (and to) may punish its (own) Members for disorderly Behaviour. (Each House) and may expel a Member, (but not a second Time for the same Offence).
The House of Representatives, and the Senate, when it shall be acting in a legislative Capacity, (Each House) shall keep a Journal of their Proceedings, and shall, from Time to Time, publish them: and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of each House, on any Question, shall at the Desire of (any) 〈⅕th. of the〉 Member〈s〉 be entered on the Journal.
Neither House (shall adjourn for more than three Days;) without the Consent of the other 〈shall adjourn for more than three Days〉; nor (without such Consent,) to any other Place than that, at which the two Houses are sitting. But this Regulation shall (be applied) 〈not extend〉 to the Senate (only in its legislative Capacity.) 〈when it shall exercise the Powers mentd. in the Article.〉
The Members of each House shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any Office under the Authority of the United States during the Time, for which they shall be respectively elected: And the Members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any such Office for one Year afterwards.
The Members of each House shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained and paid by the State, in which they shall be chosen.
The enacting Stile of the Laws of the United States shall be “be it enacted and it is hereby enacted by the House of Representatives and by the Senate of the United States in Congress assembled”.
Each House shall possess the Right of Originating Bills, except in the Cases beforementioned.
Every Bill, which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the (Governour) 〈President〉 of the United States for his Revision: If, upon such Revision, he approve of it; he shall signify his Approbation by signing it: But if, upon such Revision, it shall appear to him improper for being passed into a Law; he shall return it, together with his Objections against it, to that House, in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider the Bill. But if after such Reconsideration, two thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the Objections of the (Governour) 〈President〉, agree to pass it, it shall, together with his Objections, be sent to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and, if approved by two thirds of the other House also; it shall be a Law. But in all such Cases, the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays; and the Names of the Persons voting for or against the Bill shall be entered in the Journal of each House respectively.
If any bill shall not be returned by the (Governour) 〈President〉 within 〈seven〉 days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a Law, unless the Legislature by their Adjournment prevent its Return; in which Case it shall (be returned on the first Day of the next Meeting of the Legislature) 〈not〉.
The Legislature of the United States shall have the (Right and) Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises; to regulate (Naturalization and) Commerce 〈with foreign Nations amongst the several States〉; to establish an uniform Rule for Naturalization throughout the United States; to coin Money; to regulate the (Alloy and) Value of 〈foreign〉 Coin; to fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; to establish Post-offices; to borrow Money, and emit Bills on the Credit of the United States; to appoint a Treasurer by Ballott; to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme (national) Court; to make Rules concerning Captures on Land or Water; to declare the Law and Punishment of Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and the Punishment of counterfeiting the 〈Coin〉 (and) 〈of the U. S. 〉 of Offences against the Law of Nations; (to declare what shall be Treason against the United States;) 〈 of Treason agst the U: S: or any of them; not to work Corruption of Blood or Forfeit except during the Life of the Party;〉 to regulate the Discipline of the Militia of the several States; to subdue a Rebellion in any State, on the Application of its Legislature; to make War; to raise Armies; to build and equip Fleets, to (make laws for) call(ing) forth the Aid of the Militia, in order to execute the Laws of the Union, (to) enforce Treaties, (to) suppress Insurrections, and repel invasions; and to make all Laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into (full and complete) Execution (the foregoing Powers, and) all other powers vested, by this Constitution, in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof;
(Representation shall)
(Direct Taxation shall always be in Proportion to Representation in the House of Representatives.)
The proportions of direct Taxation shall be regulated by the whole Number of white and other free Citizens and Inhabitants, of every Age, Sex and Condition, including those bound to Servitude for a Term of Years, and three fifths of all other Persons not comprehended in the foregoing Description; which Number shall, within six Years after the first Meeting of the Legislature, and within the Term of every ten Years afterwards, be taken in such Manner as the said Legislature shall direct.
From the first Meeting of the Legislature until the Number of Citizens and Inhabitants shall be taken as aforesaid, direct Taxation shall be in Proportion to the Number of Representatives chosen in each State.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid by the Legislature, on Articles exported from any State; nor on the emigration or Importation of such Persons as the several States shall think proper to admit; nor shall such emigration or Importation be prohibited.
No Capitation Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census herein before directed to be taken.
No Navigation Act shall be passed without the Assent of two thirds of the Members present in each House.
The United States shall not grant any Title of Nobility.
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in Pursuance of this Constitution, and all Treaties made under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the several States, and of their Citizens and Inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their Decisions, any Thing in the Constitutions or Laws of the several States to the Contrary notwithstanding.
No State shall enter into any (Al) Treaty, Alliance (or) Confederation 〈with any foreign Power nor witht. Const. of U. S. into any agreemt. or compact wh (any other) another State or Power〉; nor lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports; 18 nor keep Troops or Ships of War in Time of Peace; 18 nor grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; nor coin Money; nor (emit Bills of Credit), without the Consent of the Legislature of the United States, 〈emit Bills of Credit.〉 No State shall, without such Consent engage in any War, unless it shall be actually invaded by Enemies, or the Danger of Invasion be so imminent as not to admit of a Delay, until the Legislature of the United States can be consulted. No State shall grant any Title of Nobility.
The Senate of the United States shall have Power to make Treaties; to send Ambassadors; and to appoint the Judges of the Supreme (national) Court.
In all Disputes and Controversies now subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between two or more States 〈respecting (Territory) Jurisdn or Territory〉, the Senate shall possess the following Powers. Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive Authority, or the lawful Agent of any State, in controversy with another, shall, by Memorial to the Senate, state the Matter in Question, and apply for a Hearing, Notice of such Memorial and Application shall be given, by Order of the Senate, to the Legislature, or the Executive Authority of the other State in Controversy. The Senate shall also assign a Day for the Appearance of the Parties, by their Agents before that House. The Agents shall be directed to appoint, by joint Consent, Commissioners or Judges to constitute a Court for hearing and determining the Matter in Question. But if the Agents cannot agree, the Senate shall name three Persons out of each of the several States; and from the List of such Persons each Party shall alternately strike out one, until the Number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that Number not less than seven, nor more than nine names, as the Senate shall direct, shall in their Presence, be drawn out by Lot; and the Persons whose Names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall be Commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine the Controversy, provided a major ity (Part) of the Judges, who shall hear the Cause, agree in the Determination. If either Party shall neglect to attend at the Day assigned, without shewing sufficient Reasons for not attending; or being present, shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate three Persons out of each State, and the (Secretary or) Clerk of the Senate shall strike in Behalf of the Party absent or refusing. If any of the Parties shall refuse to submit to the Authority of such Court, or shall not appear to prosecute or defend their Claim or Cause; the Court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce Judgment. The Judgment shall be final and conclusive. The Proceedings shall be transmitted to the President of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the public Records for the Security of the Parties concerned. Every Commissioner shall, before he sit in Judgment, take an Oath, to be administered by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of the State where the Cause shall be tried, “well and truly to hear and determine the Matter in Question according to the best of his Judgment, without Favor, Affection or Hope of Reward.”
All controversies concerning Lands claimed under different Grants of two or more States, whose Jurisdictions as they respect such Lands, shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent to such Grants 〈or any of them〉 shall, on Application to the Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding Controversies between different States.
The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single Person. His Stile shall be, “The President of the United States of America;” and his Title shall be, “His Excellency”. He shall be elected by Ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his Office during the term of seven Years; but shall not be elected a second Time.
He shall from Time to Time give information 〈to the Legislature〉 of the State of the (Nation to the Legislature) 〈Union〉; he may recommend (Matters) 〈such measures as he shall judge nesy. expedt.〉 to their Consideration, and (he) may convene them on extraordinary Occasions 〈 in Case of a disagreement between the 2 Houses with regard to the Time of Adj. he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.〉 19 (He shall take Care to the best of his Ability, that the Laws) 〈It shall be his duty to provide for the due faithful exec — of the Laws〉 of the United States (be faithfully executed) 〈to the best of his ability〉. He shall commission all the Officers of the United States and (shall) appoint (Officers in all Cases) (〈such of them whose appts.) them in all cases〉 not otherwise provided for by this Constitution. He shall receive Ambassadors, and shall correspond with the (Governours and other) 〈Supreme〉 Executive s (Officers) of the several States.
He shall have power to grant Reprieves and Pardons; but his Pardon shall not be pleadable in Bar of an Impeachment. He shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States. He shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a fixed Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during his Continuance in Office. Before he shall enter on the Duties of his Department, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation, “I—solemnly swear, — or affirm, — that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States of America.” He shall be (dismissed) removed from his Office on Impeachment by the House of Representatives, and Conviction in the Supreme (National) Court, of Treason (or) Bribery or Corruption. In Case of his Impeachment, (Dismission) Removal, Death, Resignation or Disability to discharge the Powers and Duties of his (Department) Office; the President of the Senate shall exercise those Powers and Duties, until another President of the United States be chosen, or until the President impeached or disabled be acquitted, or his Disability be removed.
All Commissions, Patents and Writs shall be in the Name of “the United (People and) States of America.”
The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme (National) Court, and in such (other) 〈inferior〉 Courts as shall, from Time to Time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.
The Judges of the Supreme (National) Court shall (be chosen by the Senate by Ballott). (They shall) hold their Offices during good Behaviour. They shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.