BY
M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.
Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited the Academica. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of Davies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very deficient when judged by the criticism of the present time.
This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities, and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes have been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of junior students. During the last three or four years I have read the Academica with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such information concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary history of the Academica as could not be readily got from existing books; next, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to learn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals.
My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that the very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical training of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was better cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The acceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they are obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made to rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the reader the arguments for and against different readings in the most important places where the text is doubtful.
My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero must build. His edition of the De Finibus contains more valuable material for illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of the Academica, than all the professed editions of the latter work in existence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be done in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have therefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other sources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its appearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom it was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to look out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by means of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if it were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that occurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere reference for an actual quotation.
As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not touched upon somewhere in the Academica, it is evidently impossible for an editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is studying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable readers to find easily for themselves the information they require, and have only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as were in some special way bound up with the Academica. The two books chiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (whenever Zeller is quoted without any further description this book is meant), and the Historia Philosophiae of Ritter and Preller. The pages, not the sections, of the fourth edition of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's De Finibus, all teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.
Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing together much scattered information illustrative of the Academica, which was before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the way for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of recent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with quite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above. Should this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan some others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's writings.
In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University, and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English scholarship as compared with that of Germany,
I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and omissions from any who are interested in the subject.
JAMES S. REID.
CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, December, 1873.
Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. = Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus; Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. = Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. = In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. = In Catilinam.
Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis; Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.
Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. = Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.
Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. = De Stoicis Repugnantiis.
Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. = Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhoneôn Hypotyposeôn Syntagmata.
Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.
Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.
Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis.
Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.
Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.
Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.
Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium.
Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.
Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. = Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. = Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.
Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. = Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.
Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.
Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie.
Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.
Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. = conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. = emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. = especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. = Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. = subjunctive.
R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis contexta.
I. Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of Letters: 90—45 B.C.
It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]
Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens, whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the tenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4] Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus. It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the Epicurean school.[5]
At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively, the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the monopoly of the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in the severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]
In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo, like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher, he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory. Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever, and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]
We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each. His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the ethical part of Greek philosophy.
During the years 88—81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged, and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of oratory[13].
The whole two years 79—77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time resident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18]. Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated. Cicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with the Epicurean doctrines.
There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic, was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is probable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero knew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time unknown to him.
The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later, when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially in dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a pointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the philosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many friends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in the Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.
The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however, formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a minute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of any other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius, may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known either personally.
From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins, Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68—62 B.C., afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the midst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed his intellect, but never his heart.
The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]." At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38] will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and Dicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of Theopompus[40].
The years from 59—57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring literature" with a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had, beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the end of the year, he was busily engaged on the De Oratore, a work which clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature, that of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At this time was written the De Republica, a work to which I may appeal for evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to drop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at this time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the De Legibus, written amid many distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older philosophers of the Socratic schools.
In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate mention in the Brutus[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].
The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a προπυλον at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[53]. It seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in the books De Republica[54]. His wishes with regard to Athens still kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke of conferring on the city some signal favour[55]. Cicero was anxious to show Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus, who accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[56]. From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other philosophers, among them Xeno the friend of Atticus[58].
On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the De Republica[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant is present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is himself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about tyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of books; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however, nothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn became unpleasant[64].
As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books." These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to Sulpicius[67]. The Partitiones Oratoriae, the Paradoxa, the Orator, and the Laudatio Catonis, to which Caesar replied by his Anticato, were all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the Hortensius and the De Finibus had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in the following year the Academica, the history of which I shall trace elsewhere, was written.
I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his life which preceded the writing of the Academica. Even the evidence I have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made by some people on the publication of his first book of the later period—the Hortensius—that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate as it was extensive. So far as the Academica is concerned, I have had in my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the success of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the progress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many feelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low estimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too closely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance the illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the De Legibus as "an oasis in the desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political partizanship, and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all students to free themselves in reading the Academica.
II. The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero.
In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical examination of the later Greek schools—the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean and new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they came from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age; Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils of Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum by Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and Carneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put forward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning any particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering opinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at the head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the Academica[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.
The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical standard[71]. We have in the Academica Cicero's view of the first problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the Lucullus as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.
It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration, and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar to some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to Mill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the progress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to maturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice, says Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can be said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of every question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80]. Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81]. The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom, that in the fifth book of the Tusculan Disputations, he maintains a view entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the De Finibus, and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former statements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84]." The Academic sips the best of every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his sole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth, has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.
Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators, politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic tenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most sympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most respectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was most estimable, ceteris paribus, and that man was Carneades[94].
In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first. Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (ars vivendi). All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage in the beginning of the Academica Posteriora[95], which has given much trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and Philo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers, maintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand, in the works which Cicero had written and published before the Academica, wherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The works themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase "Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," so long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front, and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had found no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero wrote the Academica he was charged with constituting himself the champion of an exploded and discredited school[96].
Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the De Legibus when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be silent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected, is in the De Legibus spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they should be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions, therefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism than even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the philosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The Stoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero agrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a life enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be happy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic and Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire) and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104]. These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno, ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however, regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon Socrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows, refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero was inconsistent. In the De Finibus he argued that the difference between the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the Tusculan Disputations he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his works are the Tusculan Disputations and the De Officiis.
With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was, as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form, he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It went to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by the plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the truth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics, Cicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose from the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines, which they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious and the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111]. Still, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic physics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of his notions about physics, the Timaeus of Plato, which he knew well and translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well aware of the fact.
Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully represented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the author of the Organon were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112], and in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic family. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood absolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they discarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing but loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.
III. The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works.
It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher, and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal value, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it. Any one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps feel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas. Such outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have already noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine which the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before the Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works (if we except the third book of the De Officiis), which he does not freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised no unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself.
When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C. Amafinius, mentioned in the Academica[113], was the first to write, and his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large number of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115]. Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of Horace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal and social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of any speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of superstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a purely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject, interesting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has been, I can treat no farther.
These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans. The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to keep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an obscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public.
In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was best left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect to deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only, he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other channels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory, which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].
There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125]. Philosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and politics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies as he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such studies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly, unpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that Cicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging the pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.
Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly understood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then, which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess, the Academica and the De Finibus, required the composition of a sort of philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to present new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its history. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at in this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who contrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work by a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek philosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed worthlessness of the philosophy of his age.
In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical and political writings, all or nearly all published before the Hortensius, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only two works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded the Academica, were the De Consolatione, founded on Crantor's book, περι πενθους, and the Hortensius, which was introductory to philosophy, or, as it was then called, protreptic.
For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their composition, the student must be referred to the Dict. of Biography, Art. Cicero.
IV. History of the Academica.
On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C., Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134]. Here he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book De Consolatione was written. He found the mechanic exercise of composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days together[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till nightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A grief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would crush him, he felt, in the busy city[137].
It was amid such surroundings that the Academica was written. The first trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for historical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the Academica. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he had determined on some new work to which our Academica would correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean school; who were then the most noted πολιτικοι at Athens. The meaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in the De Oratore[140], where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the Academica that in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of the remainder of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention in his letters to Atticus of the Academica[142]. He declares that however much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not read the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the same space of time that he has taken to write them[143].
In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near Antium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote to Atticus that he had finished while at Astura duo magna συνταγματα, words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many scholars, including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the Academica, along with the De Finibus, is intended. Against this view the reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the letters to Atticus that the De Finibus was being worked out book by book long after the first edition of the Academica had been placed in the hands of Atticus. The De Finibus was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it was still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the Academica[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the De Finibus is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero complains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the fifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia having copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in the De Divinatione[154] affords almost direct evidence that the Academica was published before the De Finibus. On all these grounds I hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having been finished simultaneously at Astura.
Another view of the συνταγματα in question is that they are simply the two books, entitled Catulus and Lucullus, of the Priora Academica. In my opinion the word συνταγμα, the use of which to denote a portion of a work Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural meaning. Cicero uses the word συνταξις of the whole work[156], while συνταγμα[157], and συγγραμμα[158], designate definite portions or divisions of a work. I should be quite content, then, to refer the words of Cicero to the Catulus and Lucullus. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides that this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the Hortensius (or de Philosophia) and the Priora Academica are the compositions in question. If this conjecture is correct, we have in the disputed passage the only reference to the Hortensius which is to be found in the letters of Cicero. We are quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and published before the Academica. This would be clear from the mention in the Academica Posteriora alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the De Finibus[160] place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the Hortensius had been published a sufficiently long time before the De Finibus, to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers. Further, in the Tusculan Disputations and the De Divinatione[161] the Hortensius and the Academica are mentioned together in such a way as to show that the former was finished and given to the world before the latter. Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word συνταγμα, which equally affects the old view maintained by Madvig.
Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the Hortensius and the Academica must have been more closely connected, in style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the Academica and the De Finibus. The interlocutors in the Hortensius were exactly the same as in the Academica Priora, for the introduction of Balbus into some editions of the fragments of the Hortensius is an error[162]. The discussion in the Academica Priora is carried on at Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the Hortensius at the villa of Lucullus near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there should be but one direct reference to the Hortensius in the Lucullus[163].
While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero sent Atticus the Torquatus, as he calls the first book of the De Finibus[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the Academica to Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the Catulus and Lucullus, in which the public characters from whom the books took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant prooemium of the Lucullus is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who visited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity between the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they were made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not uncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity should be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of statements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans which he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I may note, as of some interest in connection with the Academica, the fact that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one from Varro[166].
On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his choice of interlocutors for the Academica, for the first thing he did on his arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to Varro, or if not the Academica, the De Finibus[170]. Cicero had never been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw them more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the Academica was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work De Lingua Latino. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise. From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude of that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years without making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little of anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for grumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since the De Finibus was already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer to Varro the Academica, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of noble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they possess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had been made in the first edition of the Academica to maintain[176]. For them another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the Academica would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his Academica, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by Atticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be introduced was found impracticable[180].
Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus, but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans. Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to assure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters. In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he wishes it, but you know he is
δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο.
So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a charge which you will perceive to be untrue[183]." Cicero, then, feared Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness. Before these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of the effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured him to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how Varro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance, and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it proceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the De Finibus, but employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187].
Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the Academica is often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole, to greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds, "Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to approach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and altogether better than the last[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may possess[189]." Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190]." The binding and adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and the letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome, Cicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro. He wrote thus to Atticus: "I tell you again and again that the presentation will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to Brutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou wert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part "shuddered" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work had passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to prevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another in Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had just managed to get access to the De Finibus[194]. In a letter, dated apparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet Atticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable to do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to approve any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as soon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time, then," says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal step; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my letter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to hear how the matter stands[197]." Again, a little later: "You have been bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them, but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the Tusculan Disputations[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the Academica, at a time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing the first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies of the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of course assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people, wishes to have the "Splendidiora, breviora, meliora." Still, on every occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately after the Academica Posteriora was completed[200], and often subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as four[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title Academica is clear[202]. The expressions Academica quaestio, Ακαδημικη συνταξις, and Academia, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the frequent appellation Academici libri[204]. The title Academicae Quaestiones, found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the Tusculanae Quaestiones, which was supported by the false notion, found as early as Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the book was written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he called his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that the work was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.
Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the second edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books are expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the title Academica. Augustine speaks of them only as Academici libri, and his references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the Academica. Plutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207].
I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed to examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions.
a. The lost dialogue "Catulus."
The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the Lucullus are among those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of their connection with Cicero.
Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the Lucullus[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had received from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in the De Oratore, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself from the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to have heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be found in their ατριψια with respect to philosophy[211]. This ατριψια did not amount to απαιδευσια, or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of philosophy in the Hortensius[212]. Though Cicero sometimes classes the father and son together as men of literary culture and perfect masters of Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of all the passages where the two are mentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning of the son[213]. But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be considered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties. During all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence are often depicted in even extravagant language by the orator[214]. He is one of the pillars of the state[215], Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed with the ancient worthies of Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law, and asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic power concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with one voice "On you[217]." He alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the one hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of danger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or hope, or cause to swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he be dead, will ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious in his life, but fortunate in his death[221].
Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the viri consulares who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title "Father of his country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden times[223]." The statement of Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224]. Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of the two Catuli[225].
We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first edition of the Academica from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of the contents of the lost prooemium to the Catulus. The achievements of the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was made to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had written in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60 B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which is alluded to in the Lucullus[227]. It is well known that in the arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against anachronisms.
The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made to the Hortensius, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between the dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy. Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from indications offered by the Lucullus, it is necessary to speak of the character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.
In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention his sapientia, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was, says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the De Oratore, in which he appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments. Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man, par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234]. The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his mind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].
Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the Academica that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the De Oratore, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and the whole tone of the De Oratore shows that Catulus could have had no leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the Lucullus seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to Catulus[248].
I now proceed to draw out from the references in the Lucullus the chief features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the older Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must have consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic schools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of the later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the πιθανον which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts of Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of Academicism[253] seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance of the genuine Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and ακαταληπτα would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by Lucullus on the way in which the probabile had been handled appertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would naturally be reserved for the most brilliant and incisive orator of the party—Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of establishing an intimate connection between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and the succeeding one of Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo were mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them, a satisfactory basis for επιστημη, was already attained by the Carneadean theory of the πιθανον; whereupon Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus, that such a basis was provided by the older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the discussion. With this arrangement none of the indications in the Lucullus clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare statement on the part of the latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for the Carneadean πιθανον. One important opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man would opine[255] (τον σοφον δοξασειν), seems another indication of the generally constructive character of his exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.
Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it extremely probable that he gave a résumé of the history of philosophy, corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the Academica Posteriora. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech could have been assigned in the first edition. In the Academica Posteriora it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a historical résumé as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word commoveris[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled Hortensius, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any allusion.
The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of Antiochus.
The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is preserved in the Academica Posteriora[262]. He justified the New Academy by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore, reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical summary. He must have dealt with the theory of καταληπτικη φαντασια and εννοιαι (which though really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he found it necessary to "manufacture" (fabricari) Latin terms to represent the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the headlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact that he had not had occasion to Latinize the terms καταληψις (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual καταληπτικη φαντασια), εναργεια, ‛ορμη, αποδειξις, δογμα, οικειον, αδηλα, εποχη, nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some extent in the Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to translate for himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more clearly does it appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy, and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely introduced in order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although foreign to its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent to the truth of each class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the elaborate speech of Cicero in the Lucullus proves that no general or minute demonstration of the impossibility of επιστημη in the dogmatic sense had been attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in the Catulus was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the cause of Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the discussion[272], but only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a more minute examination in the Lucullus.
One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of Catulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (partes mihi sumpsi Philonis[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's speech in the Catulus were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus.
In that intermediate form of the Academica, where Cato and Brutus appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The rôle given to Hortensius, however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the Academica Priora. He would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276]. If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the Academica to render it necessary to treat of him farther.
b. The "Lucullus."
The day after the discussion narrated in the Catulus, during which Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends lingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia distant[281].
Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although when the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the book, while in the last but one the De Finibus, the De Natura Deorum and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of the Tusculan Disputations, which was carried out immediately after the publication of the Academica and De Finibus, is clearly to be seen[285].
Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue, and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several times mentioned by Pliny in the Natural History as the patron of Greek artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a reply to that of Cicero in the Catulus. Any closer examination of its contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The same may be said of Cicero's answer.
In the intermediate form of the Academica, the speech of Lucullus was no doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289]. Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero, during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].
c. The Second Edition.
When Cicero dedicated the Academica to Varro, very slight alterations were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the Hortensius[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of the Academica, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro, and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296].
For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his philosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to read, adding "Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti, ελικτα και ουδεν[297]." All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in the year before the Academica was published, testify to this approximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero. The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication of the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].
The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro De Philosophia[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288 philosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on the Academica Posteriora will show that there is no reason for accusing Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition owes its currency to Müller, who, from Stoic phrases in the De Lingua Latina, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].
The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in ed. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1. Atticus must have been almost a κωφον προσωπον.
I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old editions the Lucullus is marked throughout as Academicorum liber IV. This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius' quotations, which are always from the second edition, and can tell us nothing about the constitution of the first. One other thing is worth remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the Academica Priora before the Posteriora. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the subject-matter of the Varro is certainly prior, logically, to that of the Lucullus.
I. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset, continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et vetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus, paulumque cum ab eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus: atque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad suam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis, ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse novi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille: intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum—me autem dicebat—quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me politius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti studium—nihil enim eius modi celare possumus—non te ea intermittere, sed accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare, quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et studiis et artibus antecedat.
II. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris. Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu, quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem—eadem enim ipse didicisti—non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur labor. 6. Iam vero physica, si Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris, de corpusculorum—ita enim appellat atomos—concursione fortuita loqui? Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere? Quid, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum esse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas. 7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi: quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum moventibus ne suspicari quidem. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur, quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui—nihil enim magno opere meorum miror—feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa dicta dialectice †quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate quadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum prooemiis †philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.
III. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti, plurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi nunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem, Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem sint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem—dicam enim, ut res est—dum me ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat, haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo. Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi litterarum.
IV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te veterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit, ut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra ea Philonis Antiochus scripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus, inquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus. Sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi vero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes].
15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum audierunt perscripti varie et copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.
V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus: Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in partibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur. Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem—id enim erat tertium—adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum, ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis inducitur ratio bonorum.
VI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum: illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam, nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad virtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui, forma atque descriptio.
24. De natura autem—id enim sequebatur—ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.
VII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas ποιοτητας Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica: suis utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. Quod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto id magis nobis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26. Tu vero, inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. Itaque aër—utimur enim pro Latino—et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa dicuntur: e quibus aër et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi, dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate—faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius—materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed in suas partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur, omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28. Et cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29. quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.
VIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi ιδεαν appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam ετυμολογιαν appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. 33. Haec erat illis disciplina a Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.
IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae: spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. 35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero, inquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.
X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda, ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum, officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in bonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.
XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40. Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille φαντασιαν, nos visum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et voluntariam. 41. Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis hoc? Nos vero, inquit. Quonam enim modo καταληπτον diceres?—Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis—nova enim dicebat—usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi, collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat. Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.
XII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est, inquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse [autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc Varro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis paene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio sustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposuisti, vetus, haec nova nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....
EX LIBRO I.
1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere, dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I.: quid autem stomachatur Menesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?
2. Nonius s.v. concinnare p. 43. Idem in Academicis lib. I.: qui cum similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.
EX LIBRO II.
3. Nonius p. 65. Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II. vocabulum accepisse confirmat: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo etiam aequor illud poetae vocant.
4. Nonius p. 69. Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: qui enim serius honores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini possunt esse.
5. Nonius p. 104. Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis lib. II.: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad imitandum iuventuti.
6. Nonius p. 121. Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere? cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur cornua.
7. Nonius p. 162. Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: quid? mare nonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....
8. Nonius p. 162. Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non regulis.
9. Nonius p. 394. Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur et sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: alius (color) adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, alius sanis, alius siccis, alius vinulentis ...
10. Nonius p. 474. Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.: si quando enim nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum cernimus.
11. Nonius p. 545. Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: quibus etiam alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.
EX LIBRO III.
Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo prooemium id est, quod in Academico tertio.
12. Nonius p. 65. Digladiari ... idem tertio: digladiari autem semper, depugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam stultissimum dixerit?
13. Nonius p. 65. Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus ...
14. Nonius p. 123. Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae.
15. Nonius p. 419. Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum lib. III.: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.
16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico tertio verba sunt: quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent, sic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset emendatio temeritatis.
17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. Varro ad Ciceronem tertio fixum et Cicero Academicorum tertio (= Lucullus §27): †malcho in opera adfixa.
18. Nonius p. 139. Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. = Lucullus §51.
19. Nonius p. 117. Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: qui gallinas alere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae gallina peperisset dicere solebant. = Lucullus §57.
EX LIBRO IIII.
20. Nonius p. 69, Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis lib. IIII.: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = Lucullus §67.
21. Nonius p. 65. Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et columna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: item ille cum aestuaret, veterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = Lucullus §70.
22. Nonius p. 99. Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII.: non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = Lucullus §100.
23. Nonius p. 164. Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: quia nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole conlucet.... = Lucullus §105.
24. Nonius p. 107. Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum. = Lucullus §108.
25. Nonius p. 163. Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = Lucullus §109.
26. Nonius p. 122. Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: at hoc Anaximandro infinitatem. = Lucullus §118.
27. Nonius p. 65. Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = Lucullus §120.
28. Nonius p. 189. Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: nec ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse dicat. = Lucullus §121.
29. Martianus Capella V. §517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. Cicero ... in Academicis: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa tenebris. = Lucullus §122.
30. Nonius p. 102. E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia. = Lucullus §123.
31. Nonius p. 80. Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et confusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: plane, ut supra dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = Lucullus §135.
Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.
32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. Haec tua verba sunt (sc. Cicero!): mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.
33. August. contra Academicos II. §26.: id probabile vel veri simile Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare. ... Talia, inquit Academicus, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno. Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem. [Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba.]
34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §15. Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo, qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.
35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §43. Ait enim Cicero illis (i.e. Academicis) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.
36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T. Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone, homine, inquit, omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.
I. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut enim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit; deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor—licebat enim celerius legis praemio—, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit mirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum, verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere, credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in urbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem.
II. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset. Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.
5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari. Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur, scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere.
III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur. Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla contentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius, quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad saxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare potuissent—statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis—, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa, quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus, quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in spatio consedimus.
IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea, quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem, inquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in promptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille: Non sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est iis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde ea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, non vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum animos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem, fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant: et homo natura lenissimus—nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius—stomachari tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent descripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat, praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur, tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.
V. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini—me autem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt, quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur. Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit, commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam, alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem, Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret, qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci ειρωνειαν vocant: quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.
VI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est igitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut putatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit: nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit—declarat multitudo librorum—ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus Metrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam καταληψιν illi vocant, eosque, qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius εναργειαι, ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi—me appellabat iocans—hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent, definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere putabant, ne qui fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum enim ita negaret, quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset—id enim volumus esse ακαταληπτον—, si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum—iam enim hoc pro φαντασιαι verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus—visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem, quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.
VII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum, qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt. Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur, et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen. Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia sentiatur:—potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non apertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae notitiae—εννοιας enim notitias appellare tu videbare—, si igitur essent hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus, sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item. Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat, aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is, qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem tractabit, multa perceperit?
VIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non possint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter appetitio—eam enim volumus esse ‛ορμην—, qua ad agendum impellimur, et id appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud autem, quod movet, prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id, quod visum erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri animus ad appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur, numquam movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum, quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem, cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea, quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenetur. Itaque argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece αποδειξις, ita definitur: 'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.'
IX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant δογματα, quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis interesse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse. 29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id haberent Academici decretum,—sentitis enim iam hoc me δογμα dicere—, nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus, fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae visa accipi oporteret et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse, qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere dubia neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.
X. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior—habet enim aliquantum a physicis—, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum εννοιας, tum προληψεις vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem, et istam καταληψιν, quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat—nihil est enim ei veritatis luce dulcius—tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.
32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea, quae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim—et hoc quidem vel maxime vos animadvertebam moveri—probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.
XI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo agimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod ita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur: 'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur. Non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque adseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique occurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo levius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod visum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis visis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides: deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt. Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.
XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκαταθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod animal agit aliquid—nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit—, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat—Graeci id οικειον appellant—, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit. 39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit, omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e vita.
XIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt igitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et genera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit, totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est, id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint, ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:' reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum: 'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum, quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis, item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt, volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa, quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.
XIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed ab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa vera definitio sit? sin negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur, id percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus partibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide perspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt, ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et ea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.
45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse videamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus est vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese, quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.
XV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere, de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere constitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis, auspiciis, extis declarentur—haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra disputant—, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae nihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset, qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in visis distinctio appareat.