CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE: POSSIBLE WORLDS

 

1. Joseph Nye, Jr., “Peering into the Future,” Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 82.

2. Ibid.

3. See Scenario Planning: Forging a Link with Strategic Decision Making (Corporate Executive Board, 1999), 51; and Arie de Geus, The Living Company (Harvard Business School Press, 1997); David Mason, “Scenario-Based Planning Decision Model for the Learning Organization,” in Planning Review, vol. 22, March/April 1994; Ian Wilson, “The Effective Implementation of Scenario Planning: Changing the Corporate Culture,” in Learning from the Future: Competitive Foresight Scenarios, ed. Liam Fahey (Wiley, 1998).

4. Scenario Planning, supra n. 3.

5. Ibid., 19 – 21.

6. For an excellent treatment of the scenario process see Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View (New York: Doubleday, 1991).

7. Public Global Scenarios 1992 – 2020, 2 (Shell International Petroleum Company, 1992). “[T]he purpose of scenario planning is not to pinpoint future events but to highlight large-scale forces that push the future in different directions. It's about making these forces visible, so that if they do happen, the planner will at least recognize them. It's about helping make better decisions today. Scenario planning begins by identifying the focal issue or decision. There are an infinite number of stories that we could tell about the future; our purpose is to tell those that matter, that lead to better decisions.”

8. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts (National Intelligence Council 2000 – 02, Dec. 2000), 12. The following “assumed facts” for the scenario period are taken from this document.

9. See National Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threat, declassified (U.S. GPO, 1999).

10. Walt W. Rostow, “2050: An Essay on the 21st Century,” 29 (ms.).

11. Ibid.

12. Paul Domjan, “Future Scenarios” (2001) (unpublished manuscript).

13. Ibid., 9.

14. William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (Simon & Schuster, 1997), 167 – 168; this is basically a description of Germany's policy in the late 1990s.

15. Roger Rainbow, in Scenarios for the Future.

16. Fukuyama, xiv.

17. Ibid., 77.

18. Ibid., 48.

19. This is a paraphrase of Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, 48.

20. See Benjamin Barber, Jihad v. McWorld (Ballantine Books, 1995); and Patrick Glynn, “The Age of Balkanization,” Commentary 96 (July 1993): 21 – 24.

21. Seven Tomorrows: Seven Scenarios for the Eighties and Nineties (MCB University Press, 1982), 150 et seq.

22. Joseph Jaworski, Synchronicity (Berrett-Koehler, 1996): 164; see also Tragic Choices.

23. Quoting a speech by R. Kako, who was chairman of Canon, Inc., at the time.