INTRODUCTION

The people presented in this book are generally considered villainous, and the functions they perform, harmful. Sometimes society itself is damned because it spawns such reprehensible characters. However, the thrust of this book will concentrate on the following propositions:

1. they are guilty of no wrongdoing of a violent nature;

2. in virtually every case, they actually benefit society;

3. if we prohibit their activities, we do so at our own loss.

The impetus for this book is Libertarianism. The basic premise of this philosophy is that it is illegitimate to engage in aggression against nonaggressors. What is meant by aggression is not assertiveness, argumentativeness, competitiveness, adventurousness, quarrelsomeness, or antagonism. What is meant by aggression is the use of violence, such as that which takes place in murder, rape, robbery, or kidnapping. Libertarianism does not imply pacifism; it does not forbid the use of violence in defense or even in retaliation against violence. Libertarian philosophy condemns only the initiation of violence—the use of violence against a nonviolent person or his property.

There is nothing untoward or controversial about such a view. Most people would give it their wholehearted support. Indeed, this sentiment is part and parcel of our Western civilization, enshrined in the law, in our Constitution, and in the natural law.

The uniqueness of Libertarianism is found not in the statement of its basic principle but in the rigorously consistent, even maniacal manner with which the principle is applied. For example, most people do not see any contradiction between this principle and our system of taxation. Libertarians do.

Taxation is contrary to the basic principle because it involves aggression against nonaggressive citizens who refuse to pay. It makes not the slightest difference that the government offers goods and services in return for the tax money. What is important is that the so-called “trade” (tax money for government services) is coerced. The individual is not free to reject the offer. Nor does the fact that a majority of the citizens support this coercive taxation make any difference. The initiation of aggression, even when endorsed by the majority, is not legitimate. Libertarianism condemns it in this area as it condemns it wherever it occurs.

Another difference between the beliefs of Libertarians and the beliefs of other members of society is the obverse of the view that initiatory violence is evil. Libertarians maintain that as far as political theory is concerned, anything which does not involve the initiation of violence is not evil and that as far as political theory is concerned, anything which does not involve the initiation of violence is not a punishable evil and should not be outlawed. And this is the basis for the first part of my argument. The so-called “villains” are not villains at all, in this sense, because they do not initiate violence against nonaggressors.

Once it is realized that no one in this seeming rogue’s gallery is guilty of any coercive wrongdoing, it is not difficult to appreciate the second point: virtually all of the people with whom we are concerned are responsible for benefiting the rest of society. The people we are considering are not aggressors. They do not force themselves on anyone. If the other members of the community have any dealings with them, these dealings are voluntary. People engage in voluntary transactions because they feel that some benefit can be derived. Since people voluntarily trade with our “villains,” they must get from them something they desire. The “villains” must be providing a benefit.

The third premise follows ineluctably from the second. Given that voluntary trade (the only avenue of interaction open to those who, like the scapegoats, have eschewed violence) must always benefit all parties, it follows that the prohibition of voluntary trade must harm all parties. In fact, my point is even stronger. I will argue that prohibiting the activities of the people we are considering harms not only the potential parties to the trade, but it can seriously harm third parties. One blatant example is the prohibition of the activities of the heroin seller. In addition to harming the seller and the customer, the prohibition of the sale of heroin is responsible for a high proportion of the crime committed in our society, for police graft, and in many areas, for the general breakdown of law and order.

The chief point I wish to make in this introduction—the core of my position—is that there is a crucial difference between the initiation of aggression and all other acts which, while they may displease us, do not involve such aggression. It is only the act of aggressive violence that violates man’s rights. Refraining from aggressive violence must be considered a fundamental law of society. The people dealt with in this book, though reviled by the media and condemned out of hand by almost everyone, do not violate anyone’s rights, so they should not be subjected to judicial sanctions. It is my belief that they are scapegoats—they are visible, they are available to attack, but they must be defended, if justice is to prevail.

This book is a defense of the marketplace. It singles out for special praise those participants in the free enterprise system who are the most reviled by its critics. It does so because if the price system can be shown to be mutually beneficial and productive in these extreme examples, then the case for markets in general is strengthened even the more.

However, it is important to counteract one possible misinterpretation. This book does not claim that the marketplace is a moral economic institution. True, the profit and loss business system has brought mankind a plethora of consumer goods and services unknown in the entire history of the world. These benefits are the envy of all peoples not fortunate enough to live under its banner. Given the tastes, desires, preferences of the ultimate consumer, the market is the best means known to man for providing for his satisfaction.

But the marketplace also produces goods and services—such as gambling, prostitution, pornography, drugs (heroin, cocaine, etc.), alcohol, cigarettes, swinger’s clubs, suicide abettment—whose moral status is, to say the least, highly questionable and in many cases highly immoral. The free enterprise system, thus, cannot be considered a moral one. Rather, as a means of consumer satisfaction, it can only be as moral as are the goals of the market participants themselves. Since these vary widely, all the way from the completely depraved and immoral to the entirely legitimate, the market must be seen as amoral—neither moral nor immoral.

The market in other words is like fire, or a gun, or a knife, or a typewriter: a splendidly efficient means toward both good and bad ends. Through free enterprise we are capable of achieving virtuous actions, but also their very opposite as well.

How, then, can we defend the immoral activities of some market actors? This stems from the philosophy of libertarianism, which is limited to analyzing one single problem. It asks, under what conditions is violence justified? And it answers, violence is justified only for purposes of defense, or in response to prior aggression, or in retaliation against it. This means, among other things, that government is not justified in fining, punishing, incarcerating, imposing death penalties on people who act in an immoral manner—as long as they refrain from threatening or initiating physical violence on the persons or property of others. Libertarianism, then, is not a philosophy of life. It does not presume to indicate how mankind may best live. It does not set out the boundaries between the good and the bad, between the moral and the immoral, between propriety and impropriety.

The defense of such as the prostitute, pornographer, etc., is thus a very limited one. It consists solely of the claim that they do not initiate physical violence against nonaggressors. Hence, according to libertarian principles, none should be visited upon them. This means only that these activities should not be punished by jail sentences or other forms of violence. It decidedly does not mean that these activities are moral, proper, or good.

Walter Block