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THE DENIER OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

More crocodile tears have been shed over the issue of academic freedom than perhaps any other. Academics are possibly more eloquent on this freedom than any other topic receiving their attention. In the eyes of some, it seems to be equated with the very basis of Western civilization! Hardly a day passes without indignant statements from the American Civil Liberties Union over some real or imagined violation of academic freedom. And all this seems pale in comparison with the anger of the labor unions of professional academics and teachers.

From the name itself, academic freedom would seem to be innocuous enough. Certainly “academics,” like everyone else, should have freedom—freedom of speech, freedom to travel, freedom to take or leave a job—the usual freedoms that everyone enjoys. But that is not what is meant by the phrase “academic freedom.” Instead, it has a very special meaning—the freedom to teach the subject matter in whatever form the academic wishes to teach it, despite any wishes to the contrary his employer may harbor. Therefore, “academic freedom” prohibits the employer from firing the teacher as long as he teaches the subject matter, no matter how objectionable the teaching is.

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Please understand, Professor Rand, we are not questioning your academic freedom. We’re just curious. As a favor could you fill us in a trifle about your course, ‘John Wayne, Father of Nato’.”

Now this is a very special and spectacular doctrine. Consider what would happen if it were applied to almost any other occupation—sanitation work or plumbing. “Plumber’s freedom” would consist of the right to install pipes and plumbing equipment in a way the plumber thought best. What if a customer wanted his plumbing done in a way which differed with the plumber’s professional judgment. Without the doctrine of “plumber’s freedom” the plumber would, of course, be free to refuse the job. But under the doctrine of “plumber’s freedom," he would not have to turn it down. He would have the right to take the job and do it his way. He would have the right to say that his views should prevail, and the customer would not have the right to dismiss him.

“Taxi driver’s freedom,” would guarantee to drivers the right to go where they wanted to go, regardless of where the paying customer wanted to be taken. “Waiter’s freedom,” would give the waiter the right to decide what you will eat. Why should not plumbers, waiters, and taxi drivers have a “vocational freedom”? Why should it be reserved for academics?

Basically, the difference which is said to exist between these vocations and the academics is that the academics require free inquiry, untrammeled rights of expression, and the right to pursue thoughts wherever they may lead. This claim and this distinction is, of course, made by the academics. In addition to being objectionably elitist, this argument also misses an important point, one which is not concerned with the question, of what is involved in intellectual activity. It is the impropriety of “vocational freedom” in upholding the employee’s “right” to a job on the basis of purely formalistic requirements, regardless of the wishes and desires of customers and employers.

If there is an acceptance of the elitist argument which claims that the “intellectual” professions must be granted a freedom inappropriate to other professions, what of others which qualify as “intellectual”? What about “medical freedom” for doctors, “legal freedom” for lawyers, “artistic freedom” for artists, etc. “Medical freedom” might give doctors the right to perform operations, regardless of whether the patient approved. Would it prevent patients from firing doctors whose procedures they disapproved of? Would “artist freedom” give artists the right to charge for art which is neither wanted nor appreciated? Considering the way “academic freedom” operates, these questions must all be answered affirmatively. One shudders at the possibility that these freedoms be granted to chemists, lawyers, or politicians.

What is really at issue in the question of “academic freedom” is the right of individuals to freely contract with one another. The doctrine of academic freedom is a denial of the sanctity of contract. The odds are against the employer, and freezes the situation in favor of the academic. It resembles nothing so much as a medieval guild system, with its restrictions, protectionism, and the fostering of a caste system.

Thus far, it has been implicitly assumed that the schools and universities are privately owned. The contention has been that academic freedom amounts to a violation of the rights of these property owners.

But virtually all of the institutions of learning in the United States are controlled by the government, i.e., they are stolen property. Academic freedom, therefore may be defended on the ground that it is perhaps the only device by which control over the educational system may be wrested away, at least in part, from the ruling class or power elite, which controls it.1 Assuming that this claim is true, for the sake of argument, there is a powerful defense of academic freedom.

In this view, it would not be the innocent student-consumer who is being defrauded by claims to academic freedom; for it is not the innocent student-consumer who is presently being forced to maintain in employment an academic whose services he does not wish. It would be the non-innocent ruling class which is being so forced. If the ruling class theory is correct, academicians with views favorable to the ruling class have nothing to gain from academic freedom. They will be retained in their jobs in any case. It is the academic with views that are not amenable to the ruling class, and he alone, who benefits. He gains from academic freedom because it prevents ruling class employers from dismissing him on ideological or other nonformalistic grounds.

Academic freedom, as such, can be looked upon as a fraud and theft, because it denies individuals the right of free and voluntary contracts. But that a “bad” means can also be used for good ends should occasion no surprise.

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1See G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York: Random House, 1970).