32

THE EMPLOYER OF CHILD LABOR

High on the list of the enemies of society, one can always find the employer of child labor—cruel, cold hearted, exploitative, cunning, and evil. In the public mind, child labor is almost equivalent to slave labor, and the children’s employer is no better than the slave owner.

It is important to correct this view. Simple justice demands it, for the majority opinion on this question is completely fallacious. The archetypical child labor employer is as kindly, benevolent, and filled with the milk of human kindness as anyone else. Moreover, the institution of child labor is an honorable one, with a long and glorious history of good works. And the villains of the piece are not the employers, but rather those who prohibit the free market in child labor. These do-gooders are responsible for the untold immiseration of those who are thus forced out of employment. Although the harm done was greater in the past, when great poverty made widespread child labor necessary, there are still people in dire straits today. Present prohibitions of child labor are thus an unconscionable interference with their lives.

The first plank in the defense is that the employer of child labor has not forced anyone to join his employ. Any and all labor agreements are completely voluntary. As such, unless they were thought to be mutually beneficial, they would not be agreed to.

But in what sense can a labor contract with a child be completely voluntary? Does not complete voluntarism imply an awareness that a child is not capable of? To answer this question, consideration should be given to a proper definition of what a child is.

This is an ancient question which has never been fully resolved. Nevertheless, we shall consider several ages which have been suggested as dividing the child from the adult, analyze them, and then offer an alternative.

Among the earliest ages for the cut-off point between childhood and adulthood are those proposed by the various religions. The age of confirmation into the religion, which usually occurs in the very early teens, or even before, is the age at which many religions define adulthood. But the person (child) at, for example, age 13 also is, except in rare instances, still immature, relatively helpless, and ignorant of the skills necessary to care for himself. So it must be rejected.

The next candidate for adulthood is age 18. Usually picked because this is the age at which a young man becomes eligible for the draft, this age also has several problems as a definition of adulthood. We may start off by questioning whether or not fighting in wars is an “adult” action. All too often, going to war is virtually the opposite of behavior usually indicative of adulthood. Also, merely following orders (the be-all and end-all of the enlisted soldier) cannot be considered an adult paradigm. In addition, there is the problem that the draft, an involuntary institution if ever there was one, serves as the very basis for the order-taking that follows. At least if the original decision to obey orders was made on a voluntary basis, such as the decision to join an orchestra, and then to follow all (musical) orders of the conductor, there might be some adult-like behavior involved in the draft. However, based as it is on original involuntarism, even so much cannot be said for the 18 year old draftable age. Another problem with the 18 year cut-off point is that the original reason for our search was the fear that a mere child would be unable to make voluntary contracts on his own. How then can we base such an age on a patently involuntary institution such as the draft?

Perhaps the latest candidate for adulthood is the voting age—21 years old. But even this is open to harsh criticism. There is first the problem that several, if not many 10 year olds, have a greater grasp of political, social, historical, psychological, and economic factors, presumably the factors that enable one to vote “wisely,” than do many people over the age of 21. One would then think that if this were true, there would be some recognition of the fact in the form of a movement to enfranchise all bright 10 year olds, or rather, all bright children of any age. But this would defeat the original goal of allowing only adults to vote. Through this circularity of reasoning, we can see that the age of 21 is only an arbitrary cutoff point.

We can likewise see all other arbitrary definitions of adulthood to be without merit. What is needed is not an arbitrary age limit which will apply to all people regardless of ability, temperment, and behavior, but rather a criteria which can take all these qualities into account. Moreover, the criteria should be consistent with the libertarian principle of self-ownership of property: namely homesteading. What is wanted is an application of the principle of homesteading, which establishes self-ownership and ownership of property, but applied now to the perplexing problem of when a child becomes an adult.

Such a theory has been put forth by Professor Murray N. Rothbard. According to Rothbard, a child becomes an adult not when he reaches some arbitrary age limit, but rather when he does something to establish his ownership and control over his own person: namely, when he leaves home, and becomes able to support himself. This criteria, and only this criteria, is free of all the objections to arbitrary age limits. Moreover, not only is it consistent with the libertarian homesteading theory, it is but an application of it. For by leaving home and becoming his own means of support, the ex-child becomes an initiator, as the homesteader, and owes his improved state to his own actions.

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“When I was their age my old man got me a job in a boatyard. Man did I have calluses. The kids today got it made.”

The theory has several implications. If the only way a child may become an adult is by picking himself up and establishing such adulthood of and by his own volition, then the parent has no right to interfere with this choice. The parent cannot, then, forbid the child from leaving the parental household. The parent has other rights and obligations over the child as long as the child remains in the house of the parents. (This accounts for the validity of the oft-heard parental order: “As long as you’re in this house, you’ll do things my way.”) But the one thing the parent cannot do is forbid the child’s departure. To do this would be to violate the volitional aspects of growing up from a child to an adult.

It should be noted that this theory of the passage from childhood to adulthood is the only one consistent with the problem of mental deficiency. According to the specific arbitrary theories of adulthood, a mental incompetent, aged 50, ought to be considered an adult, even though he manifestly is not. These theories then come up with further arbitrary ad hoc “exceptions” to fit the case. But the mental incompetent is no embarrassment to the homesteading theory. Since he has not (been able to) seized ownership and adulthood of and for himself, the mental incompetent of whatever age is simply not an adult.

The most important implication of the homesteading theory of adulthood is, of course, the one regarding the prohibition of so-called “child” labor, where a child is defined as someone with less than a certain arbitrary number of years. For this prohibition of so-called “child” labor, as in the case of parental interference with the child’s decision to leave home, will effectively remove the possibility of “voluntarily” becoming an adult. If a person of tender years is effectively prohibited from working, the option to leave home and to support himself is removed from him. He is then excluded from “homesteading his own adulthood” and must perforce wait until the arbitrary number of years “defining” adulthood has been reached.

However, the adult homesteading theory does not require employers to hire young persons who are trying to establish their adulthood. It is, of course, true that unless some employer hires such a person, he will find it as difficult to become an adult as in the case where his parents forbade his departure, or the government prohibited it. But the key difference is that the voluntaristic nature of the passage from childhood to adulthood will not be infringed upon by employers refusing to hire young people. This is so because true voluntarism requires voluntary action on the part of both parties to an agreement. The employer, as well as the employee, must agree. In any case, since there can be no positive obligations, unless the individual himself contracts for them, and the employer has made no advance commitment to employ the youngster, there is no moral obligation on the part of the employer. (Employers will of course, employ young people when they feel it is to their advantage to do so, as they have always done when not prohibited by law.)

Not only is it important to end prohibitions of employment of children for the sake of their peaceful and voluntaristic transition into adulthood; it is also of overriding importance to the small but growing “kid liberation” movement. The prohibition against job opportunities will have to be ended if children are to be truly liberated from their parents while in residence in the parental abode. Of what value is the right to leave the family household and seek a living outside, if a youngster is prohibited from supporting himself? The right of every kid to “fire his parents” if they become too onerous, is completely compromised by the laws against child labor.

Can a labor contract with a mere “child” be truly voluntary, given his tender years, lack of experience, etc.? The answer is yes. A person, any person, who has had the ability to leave home and to attempt to earn his own living is mature enough to enter into a contract on a voluntary basis, since such a person is a child no longer. The opposite answer, as we have seen, would effectively bar young people from striking out on their own and becoming adults through homesteading. Their only alternative would be to wait until they have reached whatever arbitrary number of years “society,” in its infinite wisdom, has determined to be necessary for adulthood.

There are other objections, however, to the legalization of “child” labor. It will be said that a destitute youngster, even though an adult through homesteading, will be taken advantage of by employers; that the employer will “make profit” from the plight the youngster happens to find himself in.

But it would be far more harmful if his one source of support, however bleak, were legislated out of existence. Despite the fact that the employer might be cruel, the job menial, and the salary low, it would be far more injurious to forbid him the opportunity. If there are other, more favorable, alternatives, the young person will avail himself of them even if the law allows the choice of accepting or rejecting the unfavorable job. If there are no other opportunities, the law prohibiting child labor will take from him this one opportunity, however unfavorable.

In a free market society, the employer will not be able to take advantage of the misery of the young worker, if by this it is meant that he will not be able to pay him less than his marginal product. As we have seen in the chapter on the capitalist-pig-employer, there exist powerful forces on an open market which will tend to force all wages up toward the level of productivity of the worker in question.

However destitute and helpless the youngster who is looking for work may be, it is not the fault of the potential employer. Even if the destitution and “lack of bargaining power” of the worker were very extreme, and even if the employer were able to “take advantage of this” (as we have seen is not the case), it would still not be the fault of the employer. If anything, the unfortunate situation would have to be blamed on the background of the (ex-) child.

The question arises as to what degree the parent is obligated to support the child. As a general principle, the parent has no positive obligations whatsoever in regard to the child. The argument to the contrary, that a parent does have some positive obligations toward the child, based upon the supposed contractual nature, or voluntary decision on the part of the parents to bear the child, may be easily shaken. Consider the following:

1. All children are equal in rights due them from their parents, regardless of the way in which they were conceived.

2. Specifically, the child who is a product of rape has as many obligations due him from his female parent as any other child. (We assume that the male parent, the rapist, has gone.) No matter what views we have on rape, the child who is a product of such rape is entirely guiltless of this crime, or any other crime.

3. The voluntary nature of child rearing and conception does not apply in the case of rape.

4. Therefore, the argument that the parent owes some obligations to the child which arise out of the voluntary nature of the conception, or out of an “implicit contract,” cannot apply in the case of rape, i.e., in the case of rape, at least, the female parent owes no positive obligation to the child, because she did not consent to its inception.

5. All children, being equally guiltless of any crime, in spite of any theory to the contrary, such as “original sin,” have equal rights due them from their parents. Since all such rights (supposedly) flow from the voluntary nature of conception, and the children born of rape manifestly lack this voluntary aspect, they, at least have no rights due them from their (female) parent. But their rights are equal to those of all other children. Therefore, no child, whosoever, has any positive obligations due him from his parents.

Nor is it immediately or intuitively obvious that there are any other grounds for establishing any parental duties to children. Given, then, that nothing but a voluntary agreement on the part of the parent could establish obligations to children, and that this argument fails, it is obvious that there are no positive obligations incumbent upon parents toward their children.

“No positive obligations” implies that the parent has no more of an obligation to feed, clothe, and shelter his own child than he has to serve the children of other people, or, for that matter, than to serve other adults who are completely unrelated to him, by birth, agreement, etc. This is not to suggest, however, that the parent may kill the child. Just as the parent has no right to kill the children of other parents, he has no right to kill his “own” children, or rather, children he has given birth to.

The parent, when he assumes the role of parenthood, is a sort of caretaker for the child. If ever the parent wishes to relinquish this role that he or she has voluntarily adopted, or not assume this obligation in the first place, she is completely free to do so. She can offer the baby for adoption, or, in the old tradition of the natural law, leave the baby on the steps of a church or charitable institution specializing in the care of children.

But the parent may not secret the baby in a hidden corner of the house without food, or refuse to offer it for adoption, and wait for it to die. To do this would be equivalent to murder—a crime which must always be severely condemned. The parent who keeps the child hidden while starving it (so as not to actually commit violent murder upon it) has renounced his caretakership or the parental relationship others might be willing to assume.

Perhaps the parental-caretaker role may be made clearer by entering it into a hierarchy of homesteading: the child falls into a realm between that of another adult and that of an animal. If one adult helps another, he cannot by that help alone, come to be the owner of the other person. If an adult domesticates an animal, and through his own efforts brings the animal into productive use (productive for mankind), he can thereby come to own it. The child, an intermediate case, can be “owned” through homesteading, but only on a caretaker basis, until he is ready to assert ownership over his own person; namely, to assume adulthood by becoming independent of his parents. The parent can exercise control over the child and rear it only as long as he continues his homesteading efforts. (With an animal, or with land, once it is homesteaded, the owner need no longer continue to homestead it in order to own it. He can, for example, be an absentee landlord or animal owner.) If he discontinues his homesteading operations with the child, he must then either offer it for adoption, if it is too young and helpless to fend for itself, or he must allow it to run away to set up its own life, if it is able and willing.

If the parent brought up the child with just enough help and aid to qualify as a continuance of homesteading, but no more, and if the child is in a relatively deprived background, this cannot be laid at the door of the prospective employer. Prohibiting an employer from hiring such a youngster will in no way improve his lot—it can only worsen it.

True, there are parents who make unwise decisions concerning children, unwise from the vantage point of outside observers. It does not follow, however, that the welfare of children will be raised by placing them in the hands of the state apparatus. The state, too, makes unwise, and even unhealthy decisions concerning children, and a child can much more easily leave his parent than leave his government, which rules us all.

We must conclude, then, that all labor contracts concerning young people are valid as long as they are voluntary—and they can be voluntary. Either the young person is an adult (whatever his age), who has earned his adulthood and hence is able to consent to contracts, or else he is still a child, and is able to work on a voluntary basis through the intermediation of parental consent.