1 The author proposes to devote another study to the latter topic. Still another study by the author, Die Krise des Steuerstaats (Graz, 1918), seeks to approach the problem of the Zeitgeist from another angle. The discussion of economic problems in the present study is necessarily held to relatively brief length and is to be supplemented by a study of neo-mercantilism, yet to be published. Another study, Die Ideenseele des Sozialismus, likewise as yet unpublished, is to deal with a related complex of ideas.
1 To be sure, there were accomplishments in various fields. Above all, the currency was restored. It is also true that coming events were casting their shadows before them—in Huskisson’s tariff policy. But overall orientation with respect to the great questions of the day was purely negative.
2 We shall revert to this point repeatedly in the following.
3 It is true that certain other acts of Disraeli’s could be adduced. But the Zulu War was really the act of the local commander, Sir Bartle Frere, who earned a reprimand from the cabinet. The annexation of the Transvaal (1877), revoked only by the Treaty of London (1884) under Gladstone, was the result of a very difficult situation vis-à-vis the natives. The Afghanistan adventure, likewise reversed by Gladstone, was a countermove to a Russian advance. And the title of “Empress of India” was a gesture that serves to demonstrate to the hilt the verbal character of this imperialism.
4 Egypt was Gladstone’s conquest, but a conquest against his will. From the very outset it was intended to leave Egypt to Turkey, and negotiations on this point reached a stage where it was solely Turkey’s fault that this intention was not realized. Even so, there was no annexation, though such action would have been diplomatically quite feasible and would even have met the approval of Germany. Later on the situation changed, first because of the gathering agitation among the Mohammedan population and later because of the general worsening of world conditions.
5 It scarcely seems worth while still to discuss the stock phrase about “commercial jealousy,” which has now been pretty generally abandoned. It has been shown rather conclusively, first, that there were no grounds for such sentiments, and second, that they played a part—and a relatively unsuccessful one at that—only in one segment of the press. This is shown by the very fact that the free-trade policy continued. We shall, however, come upon this question in another context.
6 Of course this is not meant to imply that political developments on the domestic scene in any country are somehow dependent on the “fortunes of war.” The result of these battles was a natural reflection of social circumstances, especially the relative security from external enemies which placed the crown at a disadvantage in developing its instruments of power. The sentences that follow must likewise be read with this in mind.
7 Was, then, the policy of Lord North in accordance with public opinion? No, but he took a beating too. Even in this instance, by the way, the crown had to have a majority in Parliament behind its policies. It obtained this majority by means of corruption. In the end even this method failed whenever crown policy departed too far from the will of the masses. Even the great aristocratic coteries could not in the long run survive without popular favor. As early as the middle of the eighteenth century, that favor was powerful enough to prevail over the crown and the aristocracy, as the career of the elder Pitt shows. It was also powerful enough to make the position of a minister untenable, even though he was the king’s favorite, as is shown by Bute’s misfortunes.
8 A policy that would have been in accord with the past as well as the future was represented by Fox, whose position was weak in Parliament, but relatively strong outside. The mere fact that such an opposition policy could exist supports the argument of the text.
9 The Holy Alliance resembled a cartel. It was, to be sure, a cartel of imperialist interests, but by nature it was directed toward conservation rather than aggression.
10 The outstanding monument of this policy is Russell’s note of October 27, 1860, in which he backed Piedmont against Naples and the Pope, in a tone that was then quite unusual in diplomacy. From the “objective” point of view, the Crimean war was a betrayal of this policy, but “subjectively” it appears in the light of a defensive war against imperialism.
11 Characteristically, it was Cobden, the leader in the struggle for free trade, who first successfully represented this policy in public. In his treatise on Russia (1840) he opposed the literary exponent of interventionism at the time, David Urquhart (founder of the magazine Portfolio in 1835 and author of, among other works, Turkey and Its Resources; England, France, Russia and Turkey; and Sultan Mahmud and Mehemet Ali). What happened paralleled the fate of every point argued by utilitarianism and the Manchester school. Both trends were so unpopular in England, accorded so little with popular inclination, that every politician who desired to get ahead and play a role of importance, carefully eschewed them. Yet in different verbal guise one of their points after another was usurped and realized. The most conspicuous milestone in this process was Gladstone’s speech in the Don Pacifico debate of 1850.
12 On the pacifist character of English foreign policy in the time prior to the first world war, see Reventlow, Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, 1st ed., passim.
1 The psychological aspect here resembles the case of the modern captain of industry, whose actions likewise cannot be viewed as a balancing of hedonist purpose against effort which is experienced as disagreeable. See my Theory of Economic Development.
2 This is no mere analogy of the kind rightly held in contempt. We are dealing with the fact that every purposive organization by its mere existence adapts its members to its purpose.
3 This applies also to the Turkish wars, waged mainly by Catholic nations. These wars were not crusades and though the religious element often emerges in them, it never appears as the motivation.
4 In later times Mohammedanism also knew expansion by means of conversion, notably in India and among the Mongols. But this does not change our diagnosis of Arab imperialism.
1 To the need for action there was added the fighting instinct. Royal policy gave direction to both. A mass of subsidiary motives were also present, among which lust for booty, murder, and destruction was by no means absent.
2 Thus he never carried further Leibniz’s plan for the conquest of Egypt. Conquests in the western part of the North African coast would have been even more plausible, but were never considered. Warfare in the colonies was conducted with considerable lassitude and financed only meagerly.
1 This is not meant to prejudice the question of whether such efforts, in the final reckoning, achieved objective cultural gains or not, a subject falling outside our present province. Personally, I take a predominantly negative view of their significance. But my arguments along these lines are again beyond the present study.
2 Imperialism is one of many examples of the important fact, already illuded to in the beginning, that the application of the economic interpretation of history holds out no hope of reducing the cultural data of a given period to the relations of production of that same period. This always serves to support objections to the basic economic approach, particularly since one of the consequences of the cited fact is that relations of production in a given period may often be reduced to existing economic sentiments that are independent of those relations. For example, the constitutional and political order of the Normans in southern Italy cannot be explained by the relations of production prevailing in that country. The very economy of the Normans in southern Italy becomes comprehensible only by reference to their capacity and wishes. But this does not actually refute the economic interpretation, for the mentality of the Normans was not something that existed outside the economic sphere. Its sources are found in the economic background from which the Normans came to southern Italy.
3 There is here a conflict (not elaborated in the present study) with Marxism, primarily with the theories of increasing misery and the reserve army, but indirectly also with the basic conception of the whole process of capitalist production and accumulation.
4 See in this connection especially Lederer, “Zum sozialpsychischen Habitus der Gegenwart,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Vol. 44.
5 This parallelism, of course, cannot be traced in every individual case. Countries and ideas differ far too greatly for that. Kant, for example, certainly did not have a pronounced capitalist background, though English influences did play an important part with him. His case, by the way, offers the occasion to point out that we mean our assertions to apply to all types formed by capitalism, not merely, or primarily, to capitalistic classes in the sense of propertied classes—in other words the capitalist class. A misunderstanding in this respect would be regrettable. It should be further emphasized that utilitarianism was not a philosophy of capitalists, either by origin or social tendency, although it was a capitalistic philosophy in the sense that it was possible only in a world of capitalism. Indeed, the “capitalist class” in England preponderantly and sharply rejected utilitarianism, from its early beginnings to its culmination in the younger Mill, and so did the big landowners. This fact is commonly ignored, because utilitarianism fits in so well with bourgeois practice. It does so, however, only so long as its distorted journalistic projection is confounded with its true character, only when it is taken at face value. Actually it shows an unmistakable kinship to socialism, in its philosophic approach, its social orientation, and many of its practical demands. It is the product of capitalist development, but by no means of capitalist interests. Pacifism, for example, can be shown to flow from it—though not from it alone. Present-day pacifist tendencies have their roots largely elsewhere, notably in Christian thought, which, of course, preceded the capitalist era, though it could become effective in this direction only in the capitalist world. Unfortunately it is not possible here to set forth these things at length and thus to guard our views against the danger of being misunderstood.
6 It is an interesting fact, by the way, that while the peace policy is certainly not rooted in the capitalist upper class, some of the most eminent exponents of the political interests of the trusts are among the most zealous promoters of the peace movement.
7 Rather, imperialist and nationalist literature is always complaining vociferously about the debility, the undignified will to peace, the petty commercial spirit, and so on, of the capitalist world. This in itself means very little, but it is worth mentioning as confirming a state of affairs that can be established from other indications.
8 The stubborn power of old prejudices is shown by the fact that even today the demand for the acquisition of colonies is justified by the argument that they are necessary to supply the demand for food and raw materials and to absorb the energies of a vigorous, rising nation, seeking world outlets. Since the flow of food and raw materials from abroad is only impeded by tariffs at home, the justification has no rhyme or reason even in our world of high protective tariffs, especially since in the event of war traffic with colonies is subject to the same perils as traffic with independent countries. For the rest, the element of war danger circumscribes what has been said in the text to the extent that it creates an interest in the control of such food and raw material producing countries as are situated so as to offer secure access even in wartime. In the case of universal free trade, however, the danger of war would be substantially less. It is in this sense that the sentence about dominion of the seas, which follows in the text, must be understood.
9 Even with free trade there would be capital exports to the countries offering the highest interest rate at any given time. But that flow would be lacking in any aggressive character, just as would be true of export of commodities, which would be regulated by the law of costs, or, if capital and labor were but incompletely mobile, by the law of comparative costs. Any forcing of exports, whether of commodities or of capital, would be senseless.
10 Workers too may be temporarily placed in dire straits by a shift to other industries or methods that becomes necessary in such a case. For some individuals a shift to occupations for which they are not qualified may be altogether impossible. As a class, however, and in the long run, workers only gain through such a process—unless the industries forced out of business by competition employ relatively more workers than those which proceed to occupy the places made vacant. For in general, under free trade, production opportunities are better exploited, greater quantities are produced, and, all other things being equal, more workers are employed too. To be sure, these “other things” are by no means always equal, but that does not change the core of the argument. The fear that domestic industry will be undersold by the foreign products of cheaper labor and that wages will be consequently depressed stems from popular superstition. Actually such a danger exists to but a trifling degree. But we cannot deal with all of these questions here.
11 Capitalism is its own undoing but in a sense different from that implied by Marx. Society is bound to grow beyond capitalism, but this will be because the achievements of capitalism are likely to make it superfluous, not because its internal contradictions are likely to make its continuance impossible. This is not properly part of our subject. I do wish, however, to preclude any interpretation that I regard capitalism as the final phase of social evolution, as something that exists of natural necessity, that cannot be adequately explained. Still less do I regard it as an ideal in any sense. I do not go along with Hilferding, incidentally, in anticipating that trustification will bring about a stabilization of capitalism.
12 The reasons may, in part, lie in the fact that orthodox socialism has always been inclined to regard the question of protective tariff vs. free trade as something of essential concern only to the bourgeoisie, something almost unworthy of socialist attention, to be left to literary polemicists who are in the habit of compromising with the existing order. Tactically this attitude can scarcely be maintained any longer today, nor is it maintained with respect to export monopolism. Yet it was tactically comprehensible in Marx’s own time, for any other stand would have compelled him to admit a community of interests between the proletariat and the contemporary bourgeoisie—in England an interest in free trade, in Germany an interest in an “educational tariff,” which he and Engels acknowledged. The stand, however, did impair theoretical understanding. It was one of the elements in the incorrect total evaluation of the effects of the system of free competition: especially of what Marx called the “anarchy of production,” but also of the suicidal stimulus of profit, and finally, of the movement toward concentration. What was indirectly at stake was the entire concept underlying the theory of underconsumption, impoverishment, and collapse. Adherence to these views, regarded as essential to “scientific socialism,” has led to far too favorable an evaluation of export monopolism, which is supposed to have brought “order” into “anarchy.” See Lederer’s excellent study: “Von der Wissenschaft zur Utopie,” Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, Vol. VII.
13 An imperialism in which the entrepreneurs and other elements woo the workers by means of social welfare concessions which appear to depend on the success of export monopolism may be called “social imperialism,” a term appropriate to the factual situation, but certainly not implying imperialism on the part of the working class. Social imperialism in the sense of an imperialism rooted in the working class does not exist, though agitation may, of course, succeed in kindling such a mood locally and temporarily in the working class. Social imperialism in the sense of imperialist interests on the part of the workers, interests to which an imperialist attitude ought to correspond, if the workers only understood it correctly—such an imperialist policy oriented toward working-class interests is nonsensical. A people’s imperialism is today an impossibility.
14 Methodologically, it is interesting to note here that, though nationalism and militarism are not “reflexes” of the capitalist alignment of interests, neither did they emerge as what they are today during the periods in which they had their roots. Yet they do not necessarily escape the focus of the economic interpretation of history. They are the forms assumed in the environment of the modern world by habits of emotion and action that originally arose under primitive conditions.
1 We also mean to imply that a class is no mere “resultant phenomenon,” [Resultatenerscheinung] such as a market, for example (for the same viewpoint, from another theoretical orientation, see Spann, loc. cit.). We are not concerned with this here, however. What does matter is the distinction between the real social phenomenon and the scientific construct.
2 In support of this criterion we may now also invoke the authority of Max Weber, who mentions it in his sociology, though only in passing.
3 We do not use the term “estate” since we have no need of it. Technically it has fixed meaning only in the sense of status and in connection with the constitution of the feudal state. For the rest, it is equated, sometimes with “profession,” and sometimes with “class.” Caste is merely a special elaboration of the class phenomenon, its peculiarity of no essential importance to us.
4 The theory of the “original” classless society is probably headed for a fate similar to that which has already overtaken the theory of primitive communism and primitive promiscuity. It will prove to be purely speculative, along the line of “natural law.” Yet all such conceptions do receive apparent confirmation in the conditions of the “primitive horde.” Where a group is very small and its existence precarious, the situation necessarily has the aspects of classlessness, communism, and promiscuity. But this no more constitutes an organizational principle than the fact that an otherwise carnivorous species will become vegetarian when no meat is available constitutes a vegetarian principle.
5 The explanatory value of historically observable genesis must not be overrated. It does not always lead to an explanation and never offers an explanation ipso facto, not even when a phenomenon appears immediately in its “pure” form, which is neither inevitable nor even frequent.
1 With blood relationship the critical factor, we do not limit ourselves to the parental family here. Hence we use the terms family, clan, tribe as synonymous, though a presentation that went into greater detail would have to make distinctions.
2 More precisely: independent of positional elements that are recognizable before the event occurs. For the event may be—and generally is—tied to some one of these elements.
3 Such aggressiveness was a mode of life, important to the knightly estate as a method of natural selection. In the case cited this is seen—if evidence be needed—from the events following the capture, twice in succession, of Aggstein, robber citadel of the Kuenringens, each time by captains of the regional prince. Each time the captor, duly invested with his prize, was aping his predecessors in a matter of months.
4 I refer to my exposition of this mechanism in my Theory of Economic Development, which devotes a special chapter to it, though the topic is also discussed elsewhere in that treatise.
5 These cases, however, include those that are “historically” most significant and thus widely known to the public. The rule is control by a syndicate or an even weaker organizational form.
6 This is an important factor of success and social ascent in every walk of life. It is what the English gambler calls “playing to the score.”
1 The monarchial position is not something sui generis, but simply the topmost position of the high aristocracy as a class—even though, in the individual case, the monarch may hold quite aloof from that class.
2 See Sir J. Stamp’s communication in The Economic Journal, December 1926.
3 Cf. Chapman and Marquis in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, February 1912.
4 Both the fact of class struggle and the expression itself would then appear in a different light; but it is important to emphasize that they would not lose all significance.
1 Of course it is by no means a matter of indifference whether failure acts in this fashion or objectively and automatically, as in the case of a businessman, for example. But these finer distinctions, essential to an interpretation of class history, cannot be considered here.
2 Specialization along occupational lines need not, of itself, tend to form classes. Men and women have always had distinct spheres of work, yet they never formed “classes” on the basis of mere inter-individual relationships.
3 Legal and social history usually treats this rise from the opposite aspect—the decline in the position of other elements in the population.
4 True, this process was not completed until the twelfth century. Earlier techniques of war did not impose even approximately such demands, as has already been indicated. Yet while acknowledging the importance of this element, it must not be overestimated, even for later times. The equestrian art in our sense, or anything like it, did not even exist before the time of the classical school. There were then no assemblages of armored horse, no training in cavalry techniques.
5 The Saxon nobility colonized East Elbia in the same way and at about the same time as the Byzantine nobility colonized the southern and eastern border reaches of Asia Minor.
6 I employ this term, suggestive of the economic interpretation of history, in order to give expression to my belief that our line of reasoning is entirely reconcilable with that approach.
7 Incorrectly because there is implied a distinction between the spheres of private and public law, which is peculiar only to the age of capitalism. But we are here concerned only with characterizing a familiar phenomenon.
8 They do not do so at the same rate, however, as is shown by the examples of the English and French aristocracies. Sharp breaks in constitutional continuity and excesses are only symptoms of revolution, just as panics and depressions are symptoms of economic crisis; but the essential thing is a process of transformation that may but need not lead to revolution or crisis. The position of classes is not won or lost, in a causal sense, through revolutions. As Gottfried Kunwald puts it: when one already has the power, one can make a revolution, among other things; but power that does not exist cannot be created by revolution.
9 To the extent that other persons were involved, they were “elevated” and assimilated to the nobility—not always voluntarily.
10 It is more accurate, by the way, to say that class determines “occupation” than the other way round.
1 It is only this process of entrenchment that creates a special cultural background, a greater or lesser degree of promptness in concerted action, one aspect of which is expressed in the concept of the class struggle. We refrain here from passing any judgment on the actual significance of this factor.
2 The impression is not entirely a general one, for we do have concrete instances to go by, notably studies of relatively homogeneous bodies of civil servants.
3 This becomes clear in its full significance when we compare Goddard’s study of the Kallikak family, for example, with Galton’s Hereditary Genius. But both material and methods are steadily improving. Even today, we can agree that K. Pearson’s pithy statement, “ability runs in stocks,” is far truer than its opposite, especially since everyday experience confirms it. But should not then class position, once established, endure ad infinitum in every case? Before we embarked on our study, this might have been a reasonable question. But I have no answer for those who put it at this point.
4 A noteworthy feature of this system is the elaborate “ordeal” which the rising family as a rule had to endure.